Greg Spouts Off About P-38 Drop Tanks (2 Viewers)

[drgondog]

Thank you for the very informative post.
The 'small delay' part is what I disagree with. Having a high-performance rangy fighter, that has no worrying flaws, in the ETO from at least mid-1943 is a far cry vs. having a great fighter from December of 1943 on. Going with the full-blown Merlin Mustang from NAA will remove that fighter from basically whole 1943, unlike if the Mk.X. Six months was eternity under the conditions of the ww2.

There would have been small chance of any unit being provided a V-1650-1 version of the P-51B until very late Summer 1943 - and not in the ETO. The first of the P-51A and last A-36 didn't arrive in CBI until fall 1943. I'm not at all sure of Mk X deliveries as the first one wasn't evaluated by 8th AF until April, with lukewarm praise. Production of converted Mustang I to Mk X would hardly kept apace of the P-51B from Inglewood.

Start with a smaller fuselage tank, add the drop tanks, and use these fighters in the escort role the Spitfire IXs were used.

I think Apples to Oranges? 8th AF would not have accepted P-51B absent high altitude escort capability. They would have soldiered on with the P-38H &J until the P-47D-25 - circa D-Day.

RAF could operate but they really had no high altitude escort mission.

 

[tomo pauk]

There would have been small chance of any unit being provided a V-1650-1 version of the P-51B until very late Summer 1943 - and not in the ETO. The first of the P-51A and last A-36 didn't arrive in CBI until fall 1943.

My suggestion is not that the P-51B gets the V-1650-1, but that a V-1650-1-powered Mustang is made instead of the A-36 and P-51A.

I think Apples to Oranges? 8th AF would not have accepted P-51B absent high altitude escort capability.

Mustang X is a RAF's fighter, not USAAF's.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

AWPD-1 was drawn up in 1941 as the theoretical USAAF war plan, AWPD-42 about a year later more an actual plan but the latter ran into the reality it had to defer to a joint Army/Navy plan. Both assumed it would take at least 2 years from start of hostilities to being able to invade France, raising the profile of air power.

https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Books/B_0008_WATTS_FOUNDATIONS_DOCTRINE.pdf

Has a nice map of the proposed AWPD-1 deployments.

https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA424862.pdf

For a summary of AWPD-42

Plan 1 assumed deployments to existing British controlled areas with a mixture of 10 medium (B-25/26), 20 heavy (B-17/24) and 24 very heavy (B-29/32) strategic bomber groups, with army support provided by a separate force based in England, no fighter units were allocated to the strategic forces as no fighter had the range to reach the chosen targets and the bombers could defend themselves well enough, with the usual provisos about things could change. It meant accepting heavy losses of 20% of the force per month until the German defences cracked mostly due to a lack of replacements. It was the culmination of pre war USAAF thought. You can see the echoes in 1943, the early losses for a big later gain, the fighters going elsewhere, the ideas of 300 bombers (say 15 groups) forming the main raid, the defences being "only coastal" and unable to replace losses as fast as the US could.

By mid 1942 it was clear the 1,000 mile fighters were not needed, one with a 400 mile combat radius would cover much of western Germany, 600 miles all of Germany, but effective ranges depended on tactics, bomber speed? Fighter speed? As much of the B-17 did not have Tokyo Tanks in early/mid 1943 they were limited to around 320 miles to target.

Williamson Murray puts the 8th AF monthly heavy bomber losses during 1943 as low/mid teens to April, mostly above 20% to October, then back to the teens, however as the units had more bombers than crews the crew loss percentage May to October 1943 was heading to twice the bomber losses. For 1944 around 20% or above bomber losses per month until July.

I have yet to see anything that presents Arnold's side of the story and very little that presents anyone else's.

Yet seem to have found plenty of other commentary? Arnold's autobiography is called Global Mission. In summary the USAAF went into 1942 thinking its bigger, faster, higher flying, heavier defended, unescorted heavy bombers could strike deep with acceptable losses, the 8th Air Force was the last to abandon the idea.

I don't believe Vlaun at face value because he has given me no reason to believe him. He's very confident about his incredibly partisan claim and that's all.

What qualifies as an acceptable reason? Meantime others can note the number and strength of the raids and see how the USAAF was overestimating the effects of bombing, when you strip out the adjectives that leaves what Vlaun is saying. Machine tools proved remarkably resilient to explosives, fire on the other hand did bad things to precision machinery. The USAAF was not as bad as the RAF in 1940/41 but it was still over estimating. Similarly the ability to work around problems or shortages was underestimated.

Where did this come from? The reason I ask is that I'm looking for a reasonably brief volume on the Eighth's campaign, from say 17 August, 1942 to the end of the war. I'm not looking for a blow-by-blow, mission-by-mission account.

Yet to obtain what went right and wrong to say end 1943 requires the detailed data, to show the difference between escorted and non escorted raids, to see the trends in loss figures. You queried monthly figures but now want less detail?

In the meantime though, what you have said sounds like what I suspected: that the right arm didn't know what the left arm was doing. But that's true of any organisation and doesn't prove any malfeasance, incompetence, or agenda.

No, it is more you have a set of pre existing beliefs and are invoking the blue pencil against contradictory evidence. Humans are bad at predicting the future, war is one of the costliest ways to find that out. The evidence to decide how good or bad the commanders were and why is what they actually did, then look at their training, how much the system was saying they made the right decisions even if the results were bad, then their explanations.

I'm trying to be polite here and I'd appreciate the same in return, thanks.

"p-47 thunderbolt drop tanks"

P-47 drop tanks

Question; paper drop tanks, were they used in the southwest pacific ie New Guinea, Dobodura, Nazdab etc…. The ranges were long and when the P-38's were pulled from the 475th they got the 47D's.

ww2aircraft.net

"p-47 thunderbolt july 1943 ferry tank"

https://fighteraircraft.quora.com/https-www-quora-com-When-were-specific-drop-tanks-available-to-the-P-47-Thunderbolt-answer-Paul-Adam-13

P-47 questions, they may become more....

Hallo My basic question is concerned to the surface of the P-47. We know, that two basic options are there. Olive Drap or metal. To the metal option: Are there parts of the wings like on the P-51 which are covered with lacquer? Is the wing surface realy pure metal or are some parts grinded and fi...

www.britmodeller.com

Both search strings require less typing than the claim of rudeness. It is also often considered rude to ignore people, in this case the information on P-47 drop tanks, internal fuel and force mix, all of which contradict your claims. For 28 July 1943 the war dairy notes 123 P-47 sent with the 120 B-17 claiming 9 kills, while the 36 B-26 on diversion raids had 119 P-47 escort sorties, no claims made

If you have a reference, I'd appreciate you simply pointing me to a reliable one,

Sorry, I cannot do that as it is clear the ones I have are not considered reliable, I will put a list of the ones I have used to you can avoid them.

Nothing I have seen suggests that the ferry tank could get anywhere near operational height.

Well, that is wrong, perhaps define operational height? The P-47D clean is reported as using 101 gallons during Warm-up, Take-off, and Climb to 25,000 feet, covering 57 miles. The clean P-38J 90 gallons/42 miles, P-51B 46 gallons/50 miles.

When I see a quote or two from a senior USAAF commander - like Arnold - that says something like, "We have to keep going with this to prove that our bomber theory works and we will do that by bombing targets and never mind the casualties as long as we are proven right", then I'll believe it's doctrine.

So no conviction without a confession. It was doctrine to send unescorted heavy bombers into contested airspace, otherwise expect Eaker to be rapidly relieved of command for obvious reasons. It was assumed numbers would break the enemy, which actually happened but needed a lot more than was available in 1943 and could not be done by the bombers alone.

But the silence is deafening. All the people involved have been presented as "faceless men". Un-personed. What's also deafening is the noise made by people like Vlaun and Greg, who can speak so confidently about this without presenting any sort of balance. The idea that "doctrine" was prioritised over operational or mission objectives is so incredible to me that they might as well be accused of spreading communism. That's how it comes across.

Actually the USAAF was influenced by the Dutch Royal Family, the house of Orange, the softer Reds. Operational and mission objectives for the bombers were destruction of key ground targets, shooting down enemy fighters was an expected bonus. That many such targets were beyond fighter range was accommodated via the doctrine of the self defending bomber. Eaker was following doctrine.

I'm afraid that the list that went with this quote really didn't tell me anything, other than um... a list of targets and tonnages dropped.

You gave a sub list of USAAF targets, I gave the full list since you asked for what to bomb within escort range, I ignored reply was find targets the Luftwaffe was willing to fight over. You have also ignored how few bombs were actually dropped and what that means for the idea the raids were worth it.

It seems to me that the mainstream boilerplate picture of this is incredibly one-sided.

No.

I outlined my reasons and my concerns in the first part of this post.

Yes, and they are now considered immovable

My reasons for believing that the P-47 drop tanks issue is just noise remain in tact.

By employing a blue pencil.

I think too many people have made too many assumptions of what might have been - or worse, what "would have happened", all without much understanding of what did happen. I'm trying to find out the latter,

I started with the day to day data, built that up and noted how there were trends, I then saw what the 8th Air Force thought was possible to start with and how that changed. I found in the many thousands of words written by people like Arnold and Eaker support for and against the self defending bomber idea, for and against long range fighters, some good but mostly over estimates of bomb effectiveness and accuracy and so on. All quite expected. The conclusions often contradict your ideas.

rather than accepting a technical argument as a substitute for a historical one. Many people have done this.

Ah, the famed "other" or "many" and interesting sounding phrases. Technically speaking Eaker had choices, prioritise the air to air war and look for what the Luftwaffe would defend within US fighter range, while learning and growing, or accept heavier air losses in exchange for damage to designated key targets deep inside enemy airspace. Strangely enough over the year or so involved he switched between the two but kept pushing towards self defending heavy bombers were.

Theoretical aircraft ranges, especially at 16,000ft, don't do much for figuring out actual escort ranges.

Yes, I am sort of surprised no one commented on the P-47 range being superior to the P-51 or that the final 25% of power was worth around 100 mph but the point was about how fuel consumption went up with speed.

The references used so far

AIR 22/321 8th Air Force Statistics
AIR 8/750 USAAF strength in England, weekly reports.
USAAF Statistical Digest
America's Hundred Thousand Francis Dean
P-51B Mustang — North American Bastard Stepchild that Saved the Eighth Air Force James William "Bill" Marshall and Lowell F. Ford
Plate from a historical document entitled Extension of Combat Radius
Eighth Air Force Tactical Development — August 1942–May 1945
Tactics and Techniques Developed by the United States Tactical Air Commands in the ETO.
Mighty Eighth War Manual Roger Freeman page 221
"Case History of Fighter Plane Range Extension Program, Parts I and II," USAF Historical Research Document 202.2-11, 22 February 1945, Enclosure 1.
P-38F fuel US Archives Record Group 342 Entry P26 Box 2237.
Mighty Eighth War Diary

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN LONG-RANGE ESCORT FIGHTER BOYLAN, BERNARD LAWRENCE
https://www.dafhistory.af.mil/Information/Studies/Numbered-USAF-Historical-Studies-101-150/ number 136
Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907-1964, by Robert F. Futrell (1971; revised 1974). 511 pages. Study 139

https://www.dafhistory.af.mil/Portals/16/documents/Studies/101-150/AFD-090529-045.pdf

To Command The Sky by McFarland and Newton
Americas Pursuit of Precision Bombing, McFarland.
The USAAF official history, Craven and Cate,
Bomber Offensive, Noble Frankland.
Air War Europa, Hammel

RAF Fighter Command Intelligence Summary
18-Jul-43 German fighters confirmed carrying air to air rockets
13-Aug-43 German fighter strength, Single engine 620 in west out of 1,350, twin engine 470 in west out of 610.

E R Hooton, Eagle in Flames (Based on the figures in K Gunderlach Die Deutsche Luftwaffe in Mittelmeer 1940-45. Band I 1940-1942. Band 2 1943-1945, page 716).
Alfred Price Luftwaffe Data Book
Fighter units
Flugzeugbestand und Bewegungsmeldungen, Zerstörerverbände
Day Fighters in Defence of the Reich - Caldwell

Air Force History Index

Arnold paper, Arnold papers, General Arnold, WAR PLANS DIVISION, as search strings. You need to order the files to read them.

 

[GrauGeist]

Check out a possible scenario: USAAF sends 100 B-25s to bomb something in Italy in 1943. Enemy has fighters that can do 370-410 mph.
USAAF escorts are, option a) P-40Fs, and or option b) P-51s with the same engine. Thirty aircraft each. One type can do 360+ mph, another does 400-410 mph. I'd pick the option b (it even has a better fuel tankage, so we don't need to keep one eye glued to the fuel gauge).

Problem with this scenario is that the option b) didn't existed.

But Tomo, they did use P-40s to escort B-25s in the MTO.

That's all they had available at the time and even as late as mid-43, the Tuskagees were tasked with escorting B-25s into areas like Sicily with their P-40s.

 

[drgondog]

JD - without cut and paste I will try to give you my opinion on several of your questions:

Arnold - impatient, driver, politician, leader who oversaw the messaging, the pleading with FDR to control the distribution of aircraft to not only the RAF and VVS, but also the AAF, and led the growth of the AAC/AAF to the strongest AF in the world by 1944. He picked leaders whom he believed to be good ones and fired the ones that didn't meet expectations.

His vision was to develop Airpower to be the war winner by destroying enemy industry and that the four engine heavy bomber was the key. In 1939 the B-17 was still capable of out running global pursuit aircraft at altitudes that few could attain - but he realized from Spanish Civil War that Interception was growing more lethal to the point that the mantra 'the bomber will always get through' was in jeopardy. His appointed Emmons Board focused on making the bomber more lethal and had escort fighter in 4th priority - he personally changed that R&D objective to #1 in 1940. The result of that priority change, unfortunately was the XP-75 frankenstein - but IMO that was based on abused trust of Gen Oliver Echols' poor judgement.

He (and Spaatz and Eaker) viewed the P-51 as an excellent, but underpowered airframe in January 1942, but he intervened by over-riding Echols attempt to kill the A-36, and the follow on P-51A, as well as acted on what he believed may have been a political plea by Ambassador Winant who was very enthusiastic about the Mustang I/Merlin project, by assigning A1 priority to NAA for the Packard 1650-3 modification. When I say 'He', I mean via Military Requirements agreeing (Barney Giles and Muir Fairchild) that the project had great potential - all this May through July 1942. Asst Sec War Lovett was KEY to the nudging Arnold's decisions.

As early as 1942, Arnold and Spaatz agreed that drop tanks were important to fighter combat ops. The interim solution, however was the heavily armed 'escort bombers', the YB-40 and XB-41. The gating factor was that nobody believed that a single engine fighter could attain a fuel fraction necessary to accompany bombers all the way, while still maintaining necessary performance against much lighter interceptors. FWIIW RAF and LW leaders agreed.


8th AF - At first, following the first missions in ETO, Spaatz was very optimistic that the B-17 could fight its way deep into Germany with acceptable losses. (Memo to Arnold Oct 42) When 8th AF began bombing western Germany the losses at first remained tolerable - with two statistically important observations. First, larger formations flying disciplined formations were experiencing fewer losses. Second, claims by B-17 gunners indicated that the LW was being severely attritted. The RAF continuously reported on the overstated claims but 8th AF continued to report them and they formed the basis for Eaker to believe he could win by attrition until the long range escort arrived. Specifically Eaker saw that the trend from April and May were alarming - ~ 6%, which meant that no crew would survive a 25 mission tour - and requested Lovett's help in appealing to Arnold in late June to expedite the P-38 and note that the P-51B was 'promising'. Arnold asked Military Requirements and Doolittle for a recommendation - at first the P-38J, then P-51B were deemed 'best option'. These actions occurred 6 weeks before August 17th.

The problem was not dogmatic belief that the bomber would always get through, it was that 8th AF had a committed job to execute with the assets in hand, until the long-range escort arrived in the form of P-38J and P-51B while Republic struggled to add standard drop tanks and more internal fuel for the P-47D.

In July Arnold re-directed planned movement of 20th and 55th P-38 FGs from MTO to ETO. Both departed US in August, 55th Operational in October and 20th in December, 1943. In August Arnold ordered that the first P-51B go to 9th AF, then in October ordered that ALL P-38s and P-51FG go to ETO. Arnold also pressured Portal for the return (trade) of Mustang III to USAAF in ETO.

Contrast the reality versus the mantra 'deceit and treachery' coined by Telenko, Speyer and Greg (Gordon).

Strategic Plans in ETO correctly were looking for industrial bottlenecks and were correct in assigning ball bearings as a critical chokepoint. The first attempt at Schweinfurt shocked Speer, who later commented that the error wasn't the target but the inability to mount repeated short interval attacks until Schweinfurt was destroyed. By the time the October 14 mission, he had time to disperse.

In addition to Geoffrey's list I would add:
Both Global Power and American Airpower Comes of Age (Arnold Diaries) are worthwhile reads. Ditto Air Force Spoken Here (Eaker), Carl Spaatz by Davis, Forged in Fire by Parton, are also valuable reads. I would also note that there are contradictions.

 

[tomo pauk]

But Tomo, they did use P-40s to escort B-25s in the MTO.
That's all they had available at the time and even as late as mid-43, the Tuskagees were tasked with escorting B-25s into areas like Sicily with their P-40s.

We are not in disagreement there.

 

[drgondog]

My suggestion is not that the P-51B gets the V-1650-1, but that a V-1650-1-powered Mustang is made instead of the A-36 and P-51A.

NAA in fact contacted R-R in May 1941 but were shut down on 1650-1 conversion by GMC and Allison. Had that been available, the A-36 would still have been acquired as dive bombing doctrine was alive in winter 1942, but it might have been powered by the 1650-1. Obstructing that promise however was that Curtiss had A-1 priority for P-40F and all US % of the joint RAF/AAF agreement for Packard production.

Mustang X is a RAF's fighter, not USAAF's.

I know that. What I inferred from your suggestion is that a.) RAF would order further conversions, and b.) lend them to daylight operations.

 

[tomo pauk]

NAA in fact contacted R-R in May 1941 but were shut down on 1650-1 conversion by GMC and Allison. Had that been available, the A-36 would still have been acquired as dive bombing doctrine was alive in winter 1942, but it might have been powered by the 1650-1. Obstructing that promise however was that Curtiss had A-1 priority for P-40F and all US % of the joint RAF/AAF agreement for Packard production.

Thank you.

I know that. What I inferred from your suggestion is that a.) RAF would order further conversions, and b.) lend them to daylight operations.

We know that there were no further conversions. My suggestion is that was a mistake, and that all and any Mustang I in the UK should've gotten to the Mk.X standard (provided that standard existed, of course).
RAF fighters were flying daylight operations anyway.

 

[ColFord]

We know that there were no further conversions. My suggestion is that was a mistake, and that all and any Mustang I in the UK should've gotten to the Mk.X standard (provided that standard existed, of course).
RAF fighters were flying daylight operations anyway.

But in the RAF doing the Merlin X conversion to all their Mustang Is, two other problems arrive.

Where do the Merlins for the conversions come from? UK suitable manufactured Merlins were all basically committed to existing and planned UK build aircraft programs for both fighters and bombers. The UK Air Staff was already conflicted over the number of Merlins going to fighter production when they needed more for bomber production - and in the reverse they were also conflicted over the number going to bomber production as it impacted fighter production. Make a decision to convert all the Mustang Is over to Mustang X specification, and additionally, the resources to do that in the UK also then has to come from some other existing program, and then what other aircraft type falls by the wayside for what would largely be viewed as an interim stop-gap solution.

Then if all the Mustang Is get converted and go to Fighter roles, what aircraft is realistically left to pick up the Tactical Fighter Reconnaissance role for the RAF with the same capabilities as the Allison engined Mustang in the period from mid-1943 onwards? The interim types they proposed and utilised (Spitfire V, Spitfire FR.IX, Typhoon FR.1b) all fell short in multiple assessments and in actual use. Make a decision to convert all the Mustang Is over to Mustang X specification in late 1942 into early 1943 with the impacts that has on Army Co-operation and the UK War Office which is already having severe doubts about the RAF's ability to provide proper support to the Army (especially at that stage there were still visions floating around about a potential invasion of France in 1943 if the right conditions existed or presented themselves) without a viable alternative and the stage is set for a major revival of the War Office's open political campaign to create their own air arm with all that entails. The Air Staff didn't want that 'can of worms' opening up again.

 

[tomo pauk]

Where do the Merlins for the conversions come from? UK suitable manufactured Merlins were all basically committed to existing and planned UK build aircraft programs for both fighters and bombers. The UK Air Staff was already conflicted over the number of Merlins going to fighter production when they needed more for bomber production - and in the reverse they were also conflicted over the number going to bomber production as it impacted fighter production. Make a decision to convert all the Mustang Is over to Mustang X specification, and additionally, the resources to do that in the UK also then has to come from some other existing program, and then what other aircraft type falls by the wayside for what would largely be viewed as an interim stop-gap solution.

Start toning down the Hurricane production by late 1942. Frees RR to make more Merlin 60 series and/or Griffon IIs.
Give some care to the Spitfire V in the winter of 1942/43. Some details from the Spit IX - internal BP glass, streamlined exhausts instead of the draggy ones, a good carb that does not require the ice guard and add to the speed and ceiling. Make sure that fit & finish standards are actually met. Spitfire with such changes plus some nip & tuck will do above 380 mph even with the horrible carb - cue the RAE Tech Note No. Aero 1273 (Flight).
If someone sees a 440+ mph fighter available in hundreds in 1943 as anything but a major boon to the Allied war effort, that is just too bad.

Then if all the Mustang Is get converted and go to Fighter roles, what aircraft is realistically left to pick up the Tactical Fighter Reconnaissance role for the RAF with the same capabilities as the Allison engined Mustang in the period from mid-1943 onwards? The interim types they proposed and utilised (Spitfire V, Spitfire FR.IX, Typhoon FR.1b) all fell short in multiple assessments and in actual use. Make a decision to convert all the Mustang Is over to Mustang X specification in late 1942 into early 1943 with the impacts that has on Army Co-operation and the UK War Office which is already having severe doubts about the RAF's ability to provide proper support to the Army (especially at that stage there were still visions floating around about a potential invasion of France in 1943 if the right conditions existed or presented themselves) without a viable alternative and the stage is set for a major revival of the War Office's open political campaign to create their own air arm with all that entails. The Air Staff didn't want that 'can of worms' opening up again.

The recce people will need to adopt and prevail. War will be won by defeating Germany, and defeating Germany requires trashing Luftwaffe, 1st and ASAP.Even more so if the invasion is planned for 1943.
The tacR aircraft can't do it.

 

[ColFord]

Start toning down the Hurricane production by late 1942.

But then what do they use to replace all the Hurricane IIs that they are sending to the MTO and CBI and promised to Russia? If you remove them from the equation, that leaves a gap to be filled that at the time there was nothing else in production, available, and in the numbers required to fit the bill.

The recce people will need to adopt and prevail. War will be won by defeating Germany, and defeating Germany requires trashing Luftwaffe, 1st and ASAP.Even more so if the invasion is planned for 1943.
The tacR aircraft can't do it.

On that basis the War Office then would have what I would politely call a 'dummy spit' of monumental proportions, Without the information that the Tac/R aircraft provide the Army has one of its key sources of intelligence for any landing and beach head breakout emoved. Without the Tac/R aircraft such as the Mustang I available, then ISTD beach coverage does not take place, the recce coverage of planned invasion areas is not as effective, the recce coverage of enemy support areas is not as effective, and/or the chosen replacement has lesser performance leading to high loss rates with subsequent loss of intelligence information received. Example: after the initial landings in Normandy, Montgomery issued a directive that Tac/R aircraft were not to engage in combat except in self defence, were not to engage targets of opportunity, that their prmary focus was to be the safe return with the required reconnaissance coverage completed and the resulting intelligence information obtained being available to Higher Command to help formulate the direction of the campaign. As the Germans ramped up their efforts to intercept and interdict the low level Tac/R aircraft which started to lead to losses at a higher rate, a response was to provide the low leve Tac/R aircraft with escort cover. Suggest you get hold of a copy of AIR37/54 Tactical Reconnaissance in Second Tactical Air Force to understand how important the low level Tac/R role actually was.

A small extract from that report.

 

[tomo pauk]

But then what do they use to replace all the Hurricane IIs that they are sending to the MTO and CBI and promised to Russia? If you remove them from the equation, that leaves a gap to be filled that at the time there was nothing else in production, available, and in the numbers required to fit the bill.

Note that I've not suggested that no Hurricanes are made post 1943.

On that basis the War Office then would have what I would politely call a 'dummy spit' of monumental proportions, Without the information that the Tac/R aircraft provide the Army has one of its key sources of intelligence for any landing and beach head breakout emoved. Without the Tac/R aircraft such as the Mustang I available, then ISTD beach coverage does not take place, the recce coverage of planned invasion areas is not as effective, the recce coverage of enemy support areas is not as effective, and/or the chosen replacement has lesser performance leading to high loss rates with subsequent loss of intelligence information received.

Note that I've not suggested that the tacR squadrons are disbanded. They will need to have their equipment slots filled with non-ideal aircraft, since they are to loose Mustangs.

Example: after the initial landings in Normandy, Montgomery issued a directive that Tac/R aircraft were not to engage in combat except in self defence, were not to engage targets of opportunity, that their prmary focus was to be the safe return with the required reconnaissance coverage completed and the resulting intelligence information obtained being available to Higher Command to help formulate the direction of the campaign. As the Germans ramped up their efforts to intercept and interdict the low level Tac/R aircraft which started to lead to losses at a higher rate, a response was to provide the low leve Tac/R aircraft with escort cover. Suggest you get hold of a copy of AIR37/54 Tactical Reconnaissance in Second Tactical Air Force to understand how important the low level Tac/R role actually was.

Thanl you for teh excerpt.
Between the winter of 1942/43 and the actual landings, Allies will still have heaps of photos taken, and German forces even in greater shambles due to the effects of the earlier kicks received in 1943.

 

[J.D.]

Yet seem to have found plenty of other commentary?

I quoted it for illustration purposes. Nowhere in that quote from Vlaun does he provide any first hand quotes from anyone that backs up what he said. So why should I accept his version of events? So let me ask you this: why should I believe that the "bomber mafia" just ignored the figures? Nobody has provided any quotes that say anything of the sort. I'll ask again: when does a few bad missions become a trend? When does a trend become a repudiation? When does a commander who is trying to balance losses with operational requirements suddenly say, "Enough"? How long does he agonise over the next mission? This is very, very different from ignoring things and I simply don't believe that version of events.

What qualifies as an acceptable reason?

When he provides evidence, preferably in the form of quotes from Arnold, etc..

No, it is more you have a set of pre existing beliefs and are invoking the blue pencil against contradictory evidence.

My pre-existing set of beliefs is simple: get both sides of the story. I think I made that pretty clear. Until I see quotes that show that people like Arnold and Eaker really did ignore advice from others, I'm sticking to first principles. Meanwhile, the silence is deafening.

Both search strings require less typing than the claim of rudeness.

Thank you Geoffrey, I shall seek out both of those threads.

"Even the most basic reading" implies that I have not done it. It would not be hard to interpret that as rude.

Well, that is wrong, perhaps define operational height? The P-47D clean is reported as using 101 gallons during Warm-up, Take-off, and Climb to 25,000 feet, covering 57 miles. The clean P-38J 90 gallons/42 miles, P-51B 46 gallons/50 miles.

And it is my understanding that they could not go much above 15K because they were not pressurised. Operational height would be 20-25K.

Furthermore, a half-full ferry tank was probably not going to yield any better results than a 108 US gallon tank, irrespective of when it happened. The P-47s simply could not go far enough into Germany. This is why I'm saying the drop tank issue is just noise.

Yes, and they are now considered immovable

Absolutely. I believe in seeing both sides before I cast any judgement.

I started with the day to day data, built that up and noted how there were trends, I then saw what the 8th Air Force thought was possible to start with and how that changed. I found in the many thousands of words written by people like Arnold and Eaker support for and against the self defending bomber idea, for and against long range fighters, some good but mostly over estimates of bomb effectiveness and accuracy and so on. All quite expected. The conclusions often contradict your ideas.

I never doubted your figures Geoffrey. What I doubted was that they provided an explanation for the claim that Arnold and Eaker ignored the figures. The link isn't strong enough.

Now you say you have quotes from Arnold and Eaker. In what context? When were they written? How do they support the claim that the commanders ignored the evidence?

Technically speaking Eaker had choices, prioritise the air to air war and look for what the Luftwaffe would defend within US fighter range, while learning and growing, or accept heavier air losses in exchange for damage to designated key targets deep inside enemy airspace. Strangely enough over the year or so involved he switched between the two but kept pushing towards self defending heavy bombers were.

Okay, now we're getting somewhere.

So it poses the most important question: what did Eaker say that brought you to this conclusion? When did he say it? Because if it was in 1942, then it probably doesn't apply very well. If it was 1943 then it's another matter. What is needed is the commanders' responses to the data and the interpretations that were given to them between say, March and August. There's a process that people go through to reach a conclusion, especially a critical one. Leaders like that wrote letters and kept notes. What do they say? Has anyone bothered to find out?

If you can answer that, you will have answered the question. Mission data is only one part of the story. To fill in the yawning gap between that and the conclusion that the data was ignored, we need evidence that it was ignored, not just accusations, like those from Vlaun. And to reiterate: it needs to be in their own words.

AIR 22/321 8th Air Force Statistics
AIR 8/750 USAAF strength in England, weekly reports.
USAAF Statistical Digest
America's Hundred Thousand Francis Dean
P-51B Mustang — North American Bastard Stepchild that Saved the Eighth Air Force James William "Bill" Marshall and Lowell F. Ford
Plate from a historical document entitled Extension of Combat Radius
Eighth Air Force Tactical Development — August 1942–May 1945
Tactics and Techniques Developed by the United States Tactical Air Commands in the ETO.
Mighty Eighth War Manual Roger Freeman page 221
"Case History of Fighter Plane Range Extension Program, Parts I and II," USAF Historical Research Document 202.2-11, 22 February 1945, Enclosure 1.
P-38F fuel US Archives Record Group 342 Entry P26 Box 2237.
Mighty Eighth War Diary

Thanks. As I said, my copy of Bill's book arrived only a couple of days ago and we are extremely busy selling the family home right now. That's the house with the link to the Kassel raid on 22 October, 1943.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN LONG-RANGE ESCORT FIGHTER BOYLAN, BERNARD LAWRENCE
https://www.dafhistory.af.mil/Information/Studies/Numbered-USAF-Historical-Studies-101-150/ number 136
Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907-1964, by Robert F. Futrell (1971; revised 1974). 511 pages. Study 139
https://www.dafhistory.af.mil/Portals/16/documents/Studies/101-150/AFD-090529-045.pdf
To Command The Sky by McFarland and Newton
Americas Pursuit of Precision Bombing, McFarland.
The USAAF official history, Craven and Cate,
Bomber Offensive, Noble Frankland.
Air War Europa, Hammel

RAF Fighter Command Intelligence Summary
18-Jul-43 German fighters confirmed carrying air to air rockets
13-Aug-43 German fighter strength, Single engine 620 in west out of 1,350, twin engine 470 in west out of 610.

E R Hooton, Eagle in Flames (Based on the figures in K Gunderlach Die Deutsche Luftwaffe in Mittelmeer 1940-45. Band I 1940-1942. Band 2 1943-1945, page 716).
Alfred Price Luftwaffe Data Book
Fighter units
Flugzeugbestand und Bewegungsmeldungen, Zerstörerverbände
Day Fighters in Defence of the Reich - Caldwell

Air Force History Index Arnold paper, Arnold papers, General Arnold, WAR PLANS DIVISION, as search strings. You need to order the files to read them.

Thanks, I will look into these, as time permits.

 

[J.D.]

JD - without cut and paste I will try to give you my opinion on several of your questions:

Arnold - impatient, driver, politician, leader who oversaw the messaging, the pleading with FDR to control the distribution of aircraft to not only the RAF and VVS, but also the AAF, and led the growth of the AAC/AAF to the strongest AF in the world by 1944. He picked leaders whom he believed to be good ones and fired the ones that didn't meet expectations.

His vision was to develop Airpower to be the war winner by destroying enemy industry and that the four engine heavy bomber was the key. In 1939 the B-17 was still capable of out running global pursuit aircraft at altitudes that few could attain - but he realized from Spanish Civil War that Interception was growing more lethal to the point that the mantra 'the bomber will always get through' was in jeopardy. His appointed Emmons Board focused on making the bomber more lethal and had escort fighter in 4th priority - he personally changed that R&D objective to #1 in 1940. The result of that priority change, unfortunately was the XP-75 frankenstein - but IMO that was based on abused trust of Gen Oliver Echols' poor judgement.

He (and Spaatz and Eaker) viewed the P-51 as an excellent, but underpowered airframe in January 1942, but he intervened by over-riding Echols attempt to kill the A-36, and the follow on P-51A, as well as acted on what he believed may have been a political plea by Ambassador Winant who was very enthusiastic about the Mustang I/Merlin project, by assigning A1 priority to NAA for the Packard 1650-3 modification. When I say 'He', I mean via Military Requirements agreeing (Barney Giles and Muir Fairchild) that the project had great potential - all this May through July 1942. Asst Sec War Lovett was KEY to the nudging Arnold's decisions.

As early as 1942, Arnold and Spaatz agreed that drop tanks were important to fighter combat ops. The interim solution, however was the heavily armed 'escort bombers', the YB-40 and XB-41. The gating factor was that nobody believed that a single engine fighter could attain a fuel fraction necessary to accompany bombers all the way, while still maintaining necessary performance against much lighter interceptors. FWIIW RAF and LW leaders agreed.


8th AF - At first, following the first missions in ETO, Spaatz was very optimistic that the B-17 could fight its way deep into Germany with acceptable losses. (Memo to Arnold Oct 42) When 8th AF began bombing western Germany the losses at first remained tolerable - with two statistically important observations. First, larger formations flying disciplined formations were experiencing fewer losses. Second, claims by B-17 gunners indicated that the LW was being severely attritted. The RAF continuously reported on the overstated claims but 8th AF continued to report them and they formed the basis for Eaker to believe he could win by attrition until the long range escort arrived. Specifically Eaker saw that the trend from April and May were alarming - ~ 6%, which meant that no crew would survive a 25 mission tour - and requested Lovett's help in appealing to Arnold in late June to expedite the P-38 and note that the P-51B was 'promising'. Arnold asked Military Requirements and Doolittle for a recommendation - at first the P-38J, then P-51B were deemed 'best option'. These actions occurred 6 weeks before August 17th.

The problem was not dogmatic belief that the bomber would always get through, it was that 8th AF had a committed job to execute with the assets in hand, until the long-range escort arrived in the form of P-38J and P-51B while Republic struggled to add standard drop tanks and more internal fuel for the P-47D.

In July Arnold re-directed planned movement of 20th and 55th P-38 FGs from MTO to ETO. Both departed US in August, 55th Operational in October and 20th in December, 1943. In August Arnold ordered that the first P-51B go to 9th AF, then in October ordered that ALL P-38s and P-51FG go to ETO. Arnold also pressured Portal for the return (trade) of Mustang III to USAAF in ETO.

Contrast the reality versus the mantra 'deceit and treachery' coined by Telenko, Speyer and Greg (Gordon).

Strategic Plans in ETO correctly were looking for industrial bottlenecks and were correct in assigning ball bearings as a critical chokepoint. The first attempt at Schweinfurt shocked Speer, who later commented that the error wasn't the target but the inability to mount repeated short interval attacks until Schweinfurt was destroyed. By the time the October 14 mission, he had time to disperse.

In addition to Geoffrey's list I would add:
Both Global Power and American Airpower Comes of Age (Arnold Diaries) are worthwhile reads. Ditto Air Force Spoken Here (Eaker), Carl Spaatz by Davis, Forged in Fire by Parton, are also valuable reads. I would also note that there are contradictions.

Thanks Bill. This is EPIC. You've actually come pretty close to answering the question.

The inclusion of gunners' figures to make up the illusion that the Luftwaffe was being destroyed explains a lot. It reminds me of Beppo Schmid in the Battle of Britain. I can totally see the reasoning. It's also really easy to see why Eaker would have found the 6% average casualty figures both alarming and confusing, in the light of the gunners' claims.

I had a second look at your post from the other day and you pretty much confirmed with this post what I thought you were saying. Thanks for the Eaker reference. He seems to have written a few books but I haven't seen that one. I fully expect contradictions and in fact, the picture would be a bit suspect without a few. None of these things is ever simple.

Thanks again.

 

[Frog]

The report on the need of a fast tactical reconnaissance fighter was amptly justified in Normandy :

 

[drgondog]

Note that I've not suggested that no Hurricanes are made post 1943.


Note that I've not suggested that the tacR squadrons are disbanded. They will need to have their equipment slots filled with non-ideal aircraft, since they are to loose Mustangs.


Thanl you for teh excerpt.
Between the winter of 1942/43 and the actual landings, Allies will still have heaps of photos taken, and German forces even in greater shambles due to the effects of the earlier kicks received in 1943.

Tomo - respectfully, your perspective is one of a single ombudsman view of the state of the possible. I will focus on only one example where a 'great idea' was quashed with the burden of cold reality.

Early in the flight test cycle RAF/Air Ministry was excited about a proposition that NAA could construct Mustang I/IA airframes sans engine, but with design changes to adapt to the R-R changes necessary in the Powerplant section, as well as oil and prestone cooling changes. They asked NAA for a detailed proposal to a.) make the changes, b.) deliver the airframes to an assembly factory in Britain for RAF to secure control over the assembly and integration with R-R deliveries. Also included was NAA estimate to a.) Build the plants, b.) make the tooling, c.) train the employees. The proposal estimates for 300/mo final production was minimum two years.

Using the P-51C as an example of lead times. Dallas received drawings and tooling processes at the same time they were delivered at Inglewood. Namely late 1942. The Dallas plant was already producing AT-6 and B-24. Training program was in place. Logistics to send Dallas employes to Inglewood for learning curve on Mustang began in fall of 1942. B-24 contracts were cancelled and shop floor re-organized in February 1943. Work began on P-51C in April. Issues in QC arose immediately. Long story but the first P-51C wasn't accepted until August 1943. That cycle was only achievable with existing factory and skilled employees with added support from Inglewood experts.

Back to practicality. Can you imagine the reaction when NAA proposes scaling down P-51B requirements to the War Production Board to re-introduce tooling and floor space and labor to dilute P-51B for NA-83 airframe deliveries to British Specs? Another factor is that NAA Mustang production was already planned to deliver the P-51B/C to RAF in far higher quantities in 1943 than a UK based enterprise could start to deliver in late 1944?

In a parallel world, there was a similar exercise between AAF and Lockheed to develop a second P-38 assembly line - with the same results, namely late 1944 for earliest start.

Great concepts for immediate changes and results, but vaporware for tactical requirements in the interim.

To a second point, namely tactical recce. The Mustang I/IA was the only airframe with combination of speed and stability to perform the slate of tactical intelligence gathering from low and oblique photo gathering on an ad-hoc basis deep into Axis airspace. The D-Day planning specifically was supported by RAF Mustangs. 9th AF also contributed to AAF specific requirements but the recce strength of F-6s (all variants) was low in comparison.

Colin's comments were dead on in all respects, both conceptual and practical reality.

D-Day planning, requiring almost daily recce sorties to identify changes made Yesterday, was increasingly more vital as Rommel was fiddling with defense posture frequently. Converting all Mustang I to Mark X begs several questions: 1.) Why, which high altitude capable RAF mission trumped Army Co-Operation/Recon? Certainly not daylight bomber escort; 2.) Which aircraft type could be pulled (creating a vacuum per assigned role) to replace the Mustang? Not the Hurricane. At low level it was a flak gunners dream come true; C.) Not to mention that removal of any other type from any existing role and strength begged replacement.

Last point. The Mk I Mustang had zero sponsors in AAF powerful enough to secure production orders. The follow on A-36 and P-51A were purchased only after Arnold decided that NAA had delivered a very good airframe and that the prospects of future performance suggested by the R-R were strongly supported in particular by Ambassador Winant and Asst Sec Way Lovett - very close to FDR. Based on commitments the A-36, then the P-51A deliveries were cast in concrete and until the P-51A contact with provision to convert production to P-51B based on initial flight test. Funding for plant expansion came with the large P-51A order, and all capacity was expected to be consumed for P-51A and then P-51B as the A-36 tapered off. NAA could not even give away tooling devoted to NA-83 as much was still used in P-51B aft fuselage, and wing, going forward after last P-51A was completed in late spring 1943.

 

[tomo pauk]

Back to practicality. Can you imagine the reaction when NAA proposes scaling down P-51B requirements to the War Production Board to re-introduce tooling and floor space and labor to dilute P-51B for NA-83 airframe deliveries to British Specs? Another factor is that NAA Mustang production was already planned to deliver the P-51B/C to RAF in far higher quantities in 1943 than a UK based enterprise could start to deliver in late 1944?

Thank you again for the informative post.
I've never suggested that engine-less airframes are shipped from NAA to the UK, but that Mustang airframes already in the UK get towards the Mk.X. That is for 1943, not for 1944.

BTW - when you say 'in far higher quantities in 1943' - do you mean in, say, Spring to early Summer of 1943, or after October of 1943?

D-Day planning, requiring almost daily recce sorties to identify changes made Yesterday, was increasingly more vital as Rommel was fiddling with defense posture frequently. Converting all Mustang I to Mark X begs several questions: 1.) Why, which high altitude capable RAF mission trumped Army Co-Operation/Recon? Certainly not daylight bomber escort; 2.) Which aircraft type could be pulled (creating a vacuum per assigned role) to replace the Mustang? Not the Hurricane. At low level it was a flak gunners dream come true; C.) Not to mention that removal of any other type from any existing role and strength begged replacement.

Rommel was not in Normandy before late 1943.
As per your questions:
- 1) Wasn't the RAF doing the escort as much as the combat radius allowed them? RAF was also doing the high-altitude recon, up to the interwar German-Polish border. There are still the Tyhoons and Spitfires doing the short range low altitude work, that I have no wish to remove from there.
- 2) Spitfire.
- C) Of course.

Last point. The Mk I Mustang had zero sponsors in AAF powerful enough to secure production orders. The follow on A-36 and P-51A were purchased only after Arnold decided that NAA had delivered a very good airframe and that the prospects of future performance suggested by the R-R were strongly supported in particular by Ambassador Winant and Asst Sec Way Lovett - very close to FDR. Based on commitments the A-36, then the P-51A deliveries were cast in concrete and until the P-51A contact with provision to convert production to P-51B based on initial flight test. Funding for plant expansion came with the large P-51A order, and all capacity was expected to be consumed for P-51A and then P-51B as the A-36 tapered off. NAA could not even give away tooling devoted to NA-83 as much was still used in P-51B aft fuselage, and wing, going forward after last P-51A was completed in late spring 1943.

Thank you.
As you can see, I have no intention to sweep any Mustang (be it in parts or as whole aircraft) from NAA to be given to just anyone.

 

[Shortround6]

A short timeline of the Mustang I and P-51 no lette, cribbed from AHT.
Bill Marshal very likely has much more/better information.

Oct 24th 1941, First Mustang I arrives in England.
Nov 11th 1941, four more arrive in England.
Jan 1942, Mustang I production peaks at 92 per month.
April 1942. No 2 squadron is the first unit to get Mustang Is in the RAF.
May 10th 1942 is the first combat operation. No 2 squadron raids (strafes?) a German airfield near the French coast.
July 1942, last Mustang I comes off the production line. Here is were things get tricky, How many Mustang Is are in California or in transit?
Aug 18th 1942 The British had 4 squadrons equipped with Mustang Is. Where are the rest of the 617 Mustang Is? In British depots? on ship? being crated at Inglewood?
Aug 19th 1942. Perspective. The RAF also has 4 squadrons of Typhoons for Dieppe and just 4 squadrons of Spitfire IXs in service.
Jan 1943, RAF has 15 squadrons of Allison powered Mustangs in service.
This will rise to a max total of 21 squadrons. (when?)

Pulling Mustang Is off the ships in the summer/fall of 1942, Yanking the engines and fitting them with two stage Merlins is possible. But what else is not getting done? How many Spitfire IXs don't get engines or are delayed? What aircraft go to those 10-12 squadrons that got Mustang Is in the fall/early winter of 1942. Something is not a good answer and Spitfire IXs is not correct as there fewer Spitfire IXs after we steal their engines.
Are there extra Merlin 45s in crates or do the British stick Merlin XX (or newer) engines into the Spitfires to make do? And then stick single speed Merlins in the Hurricanes instead of two speed engines and make do with them?

Now how fast can these converted aircraft make it into service in a number of squadrons? like 8 to 12 squadrons, enough to make any sort of difference. 4 squadrons of Typhoons made zero difference to Dieppe as whole. Shooting down (or loosing ) 4-6 planes didn't allow the troops to stay for one hour longer or allow more that one boat more to get back with survivors.

Time check again, maybe the US is slow, but the first A-36 rolled off the line in Oct 1942. First combat operation was on June 6th 1943 at Pantelleria Island. Granted Mustang Is in England are a good 4-6 weeks closer than California but when could the Mustang X really be in squadron service?

We are also using hindsight while looking at the late arrivals of the P-51B&C in Europe in the fall of 1943. In the planning taking place in 1942 they did not anticipate the problems Packard had with production (several reasons) in the Spring summer of 1943. July 1943 saw 534 Airframes completed but only 173 engines received. Even another 250 planes completed by that same point in 1943 could have seen several more groups (not squadrons) available in Oct/Nov 1943. Wither they go to the Med or to the 9th Air force or the 8th is subject to question but getting more aircraft earlier may allow for better assessment. US also needs some planes to act as trainers. US policy (not always followed) was to train units in the US and then ship them overseas and issue new aircraft to the unit at the overseas bases leaving the used aircraft behind to act as trainers for the next batch of pilots and ground crew. British policy was??? Maybe a split between first aircraft going to combat units and operational training units?

The Mustang Is had no provision for drop tanks. Perhaps that could be changed (pair of 75 gallon tanks?) Perhaps a rear fuselage tank could have been added although smaller. The extra weight of the two stage Merlin, the larger propeller and keeping some of the cooling system under the engine certainly allows for some weight in the rear to balance things out.

BUT, the more time spent fooling around with the fuel system/s means more time spent in the shop while changing over the engine and a later deployment of service aircraft.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

So let me ask you this: why should I believe that the "bomber mafia" just ignored the figures?

To answer your question requires a list of bomber mafia members and where they were in 1943, with particular reference to having influence over 8th Air Force target decisions. To turn it around how did the 8th Air Force command continue to justify the tactic and account for the problems so far? Please provide the quotes.

Nobody has provided any quotes that say anything of the sort.

It is clear you only want quotes as evidence, not the actual operations done. In legal terms a confession or it is acquittal.

I'll ask again: when does a few bad missions become a trend?

You need to define few, an absolute number or a percentage of operations done? Under what conditions?

When does a trend become a repudiation?

For whom, at which level? Think combat units taking heavy losses might have a different perspective than a more senior command?

When does a commander who is trying to balance losses with operational requirements suddenly say, "Enough"? How long does he agonise over the next mission? This is very, very different from ignoring things and I simply don't believe that version of events.

Next mission to where? In any case in 1943 weather dictated a lot of 8th Air Force operations and therefore timings.

My pre-existing set of beliefs is simple: get both sides of the story. I think I made that pretty clear.

Yet it is coming across as the exact opposite, and quite clearly.

Until I see quotes that show that people like Arnold and Eaker really did ignore advice from others, I'm sticking to first principles.

Eaker and Arnold ignored lots of advice from others, good and bad. Perhaps as Bill has pointed out the advice on gunner shoot down claims? The advice a long range high performance fighter was impossible? As it turned out as far as the USAAF is concerned, there was only a small gap in bomber versus fighter range the late 1930's if the fighters could carry external fuel, it grew when the B-17 became a mass item, which shrank in 1944 only to blow out again with the B-29.

Meanwhile, the silence is deafening.

Being in a sealed room with fingers in ears does that.

"Even the most basic reading" implies that I have not done it. It would not be hard to interpret that as rude.

Your obvious misunderstanding of the situation indicates you did not do the reading.

And it is my understanding that they could not go much above 15K because they were not pressurised. Operational height would be 20-25K.

To misquote your first sentence, Nowhere in that quote from J.D. does he provide any first hand quotes from anyone that backs up what he said. So why should I accept his version of events? Please adhere to this level of proof from now on.

Furthermore, a half-full ferry tank was probably not going to yield any better results than a 108 US gallon tank, irrespective of when it happened.

So a fall back of any error was irrelevant.

The P-47s simply could not go far enough into Germany. This is why I'm saying the drop tank issue is just noise.

Far enough into Germany to do what? The 8th was taking losses bombing France and Belgium, 115 bombers from January to July 1943 compared with 227 attacking Germany, and 86 of the German target losses were in the final week of July. The Luftwaffe was obviously opposing the raids outside Germany, so what was wrong fighting over France and Belgium?

The 3 big raids in the last week in July saw 609 attacking with 52 missing or to put it another way it would require 1,040 sorties, an average of 347 per raid, to pull the loss rate down to 5%, and that assumes despite having over 400 more bombers in the air no more would be shot down by flak and all interceptors that missed the 200 strong raids would miss the 350 strong ones. Add the smaller raids and you have 837 sorties attacking, 86 missing, to make it 5% requires 1,720 sorties, over double, or 344 per raid.

Somehow Eaker missed that and went with 300 sortie bomber raids would work. Somehow going from 200 to 300 bombers was going to cut losses from 8.5% to 5% or less.

I never doubted your figures Geoffrey. What I doubted was that they provided an explanation for the claim that Arnold and Eaker ignored the figures. The link isn't strong enough.

Again somehow Arnold gets involved at a lower level that he was. Somehow with all that data pointing out the problems with unescorted raids the continued, but words speak louder than actions for proof.

Now you say you have quotes from Arnold and Eaker. In what context? When were they written?

Why exactly is Arnold dragged into this section? Have you noticed as factual material starts to contradict your statements the requirements for proof expands?

Bill has provided the overview, which you said "actually come pretty close to answering the question." The quotes come from the various histories some with footnotes, some not, and as already said they show a variety of views.

How do they support the claim that the commanders ignored the evidence?

How about Eaker believing bomber gunner claims? Eaker continuing to launch operations well outside fighter cover? Despite the losses of previous raids. You want the people involved to confess, instead of evaluating their actions.

The 8th Air Force generated daily, weekly, monthly, yearly and all manner of special reports. The USAAF was big on scientific management which meant measuring everything. Eaker as commander had a duty to read most of them, the routine reports especially. Please provide a quote that says Eaker never saw the figures, in particular the loss numbers and the trends.

1) Figures are good but they show continued unsustainable losses trending up
2) Belief: Eaker did not ignore them.
3) Solution, Eaker did not see them. Other solution? How did the 8th Air Force continue using tactics its own reports were showing as unsustainable?

Okay, now we're getting somewhere.

No.

So it poses the most important question: what did Eaker say that brought you to this conclusion?

I started with the day to day data, built that up and noted how there were trends, I then saw what the 8th Air Force thought was possible to start with and how that changed. I use data, not dig for the one quote that rules them all. I noticed despite all the warnings Eaker kept doing unescorted raids.

When did he say it? Because if it was in 1942, then it probably doesn't apply very well. If it was 1943 then it's another matter.

All though 1943 Eaker was defending the unescorted bomber idea and launching operations to prove it.

What is needed is the commanders' responses to the data and the interpretations that were given to them between say, March and August. There's a process that people go through to reach a conclusion, especially a critical one.

You would be after the relevant 8th Air Force Staff meetings including what target for that day.

Leaders like that wrote letters and kept notes. What do they say? Has anyone bothered to find out?

Plenty of people have bothered to find out but so far you keep rejecting them as not providing enough evidence.

If you can answer that, you will have answered the question. Mission data is only one part of the story.

Once again it is not what they did, it is what they said. I go with what they did.

To fill in the yawning gap between that and the conclusion that the data was ignored, we need evidence that it was ignored, not just accusations, like those from Vlaun. And to reiterate: it needs to be in their own words.

You are perfectly secure in your beliefs. Eaker, in full possession of 8th Air Force reports, along with a full staff, with a duty to study them, continued to launch raids outside of fighter cover through 1943, often deep ones, despite the loss figures on earlier raids. He never said he ignored the loss reports, imagine the reaction if he did and how it would be a quote in many histories.

As for ignored there are many ways humans use to interpret reports, in this case bad data could be attributed to an outlier, random factors, inexperience, timing failure, weather, etc. or the expected price to be paid in the early fighting breaking the Luftwaffe.

In short ignored the data, in long came up with reasons to discount earlier losses, in both cases carried on. Sort of like P-47 with ferry versus 108 gallon drop tank.

For the winning the air combats ideas, 8th Air Force heavy bombers, number of enemy fighters claimed per bomber considered lost to fighters, noting a B-17 cost about 3.5 P-51

Jan-43​	2.50​
Feb-43​	3.43​
Mar-43​	7.89​
Apr-43​	5.21​
May-43​	7.75​
Jun-43​	3.76​
Jul-43​	6.67​
Aug-43​	4.61​
Sep-43​	5.54​
Oct-43​	5.69​
Nov-43​	2.00​
Dec-43​	2.72​

 

[drgondog]

I have opinions, mostly based on fact concerning the various alarms and decisions regarding operational directives that 8thAF was laboring against.

First, the strategic role of airpower in the form of heavy bombers destroying enemy industry was the 'mantra'. Not the 'bomber will always get through'.

Second, Eaker (proxy for Arnold) committed to the successful application of daylight strategic bombing to Churchill at Casablanca. There were no caveats expressed. In fairness to Eaker, his commitment was based on achieving a 600 bomber strike force (roughly 900 in inventory) - which in turn was committed by Arnold. Arnold however was immediately undermined by the RAF's insatiable desire for majority provision of US production, and USSR and China also intruded via FDR decrees. Churchill and FDR trumped Arnold via immediately drawing down on 8thAF to provision 12 AF for Torch.

Eaker and Spaatz were optimistic regarding B-17 ability to deal severe punishment to the LW based on early successes over France, leading Spaatz to report increased confidence in October 1942. That said, the introduction of the FW 190 and the Company Front techniques in November (by Egon Meyer) demonstrated a serious vulnerability to multiple cannon armed fighters and particular vulnerability to cockpit and engine destruction. After attacks on Germany Jan 1943, the intensity and quantity of attacks pressured unescorted 8th AF increasingly, even though the loss per sortie seemed sustainable, particularly as improved formation and (alleged) gunnery seemed to alleviate the pressure in February and March 1943.

Pause. Losses to RAF escorted legs were very low - but increased without escort, and compounded over Germany. The short range issues of the P-47C were understood and well known when they began ops in April. The P-38s were beginning to get success in MTO as pilots got better and tactics were developed. Additionally, they were providing escort in the 250-300 mi range. Doolittle's losses were significantly lower than Eaker's. Obviously neither the LW nor Italian fighters posed the same threat in the MTO but the contrast was apparent at Spaatz and Eaker and Arnold level.

By April/May it was clear that even with much better crews and tactics, addition of chin turret, etc., that losses per sortie were increasing with no real end in sight as long range escort fighters (P-38) were continuously diverted to other theatres and the P-51B still didn't have a champion in the US for the role of escort fighter. Republic was mysteriously unmoved by AAF request for much longer range - even to the point of producing a belly rack compatible with existing 75 gal tanks.

Eaker was getting huge pressure to increase number of missions as it was clear that Harris was far less hindered by weather. Eaker also sniffed out pressure from Eisenhower and Spaatz to relocate 8th AF to Italy following the invasion - and Eisenhower was requesting even more than the B-24 groups already dispatched to 9th AF for Tidal Wave.

Pause. Arnold was well aware that deep strikes into Germany and the campaign to destroy the LW in preparation for Overlord was of highest priority for AAF. He was skeptical that the P-38 was suitable as 'the choice' and more skeptical that the P-47 would not be the solution. While he was getting input from multiple sources that the P-51B might work, he KNEW that the P-75 was increasingly behind schedule. That said, he could only Personally do two things short term. One divert P-38s to Britain. Two, hold Eaker's feet to the fire - 'Fight with what you have while I orchestrate help from above'. For longer term, The FAREP directives issued to expedite the Long Range Escort were in motion, P-38J and P-51B added more fuel internally to contribute to already tested wing drop tanks - but Arnold made the delivery of THE long range escort by January to his new Chief of Staff LG Barney Giles.

The overarching dilemma that confronted Arnold, was that Eaker had to get results or Churchill was going to prevail and 8th AF would be absorbed by Bomber Command for joint night attacks. Everybody but Churchill knew that course would be a disastrous change of course, perhaps fatal, to the dream of an independent Air Force. At times Arnold felt like RAF was a more formidable foe than either Germany or Japan.

There is truth to observations of Anglophobia existed through US military ranks - and certainly with Adm King, probably Arnold and maybe Marshall. I personally think the disease was a major factor in the slow acceptance of the P-51 Mustang.

Result of Arnold's view after recovering from his cardiac arrest in the May-July 1943 period-
"we are where we are"
"stuff is coming at the end of the year. but I'm ordering immediate P-38 diversion from MTO"
"pressure is being applied to Republic for drop tank compatibility but not available until late summer"
"fight with what you have and I'll (Arnold) do my best to bring reinforcements"
"I expect results"
'That will be all!"