Greg Spouts Off About P-38 Drop Tanks (1 Viewer)

[Jabberwocky]

That misrepresented the views of the bomber advocates. They believed that strategic bombing would be decisive and argued again and again that tactical bombing was an ineffective diversion of resources. Their public writings and archival material have made this crystal clear.

I'd argue that that "The bomber advocates believed strategic bombing would be decisive and argued again and again that using strategic bombers in tactical bombing roles was an ineffective diversion of resources."

The USAAF, for instance, procured large numbers of light/attack bombers (A-20, A-26) and medium bombers (B-26, B-25). The 'bomber barons' were fine with deploying these aircraft in tactical and what I'd label 'semi strategic' roles (against targets like transportation hubs, lines of communication, airfields and naval concentrations).

Even then, I'd say that the USAAF's approach was highly theater and mission dependent. Look at what the 5th Air Force did in the Southwest Pacific. There the (admittedly much smaller) force of heavy four engine bombers were used with great flexibility, and integrated with the attack and medium bomber forces into a real mix of missions.

The 5th's B-17s and B-24s undertook the USAAF's preferred mission of daylight "precision" formation bombing, usually in groups of 20 to 40 aircraft formations and often at high altitudes (25,000 ft), in both escorted and unescorted missions. But, they were also commonly deployed in medium-altitude small formation (2-8 aircraft) attacks and in night bombing attacks, again in small formations and also in 'bomber stream' type attacks similar to the RAF doctrine in the ETO.

The 5th's heavy bombers were also used in attack missions. Japanese airfields were regularly bombed at 3000 to 8000ft altitudes, and occassionally the heavy bombers were deployed at near treetop/mast height for attacks against airfields and (generally unescorted) naval targets.

'A War of Their Own - Bombers Over the Southwest Pacific' is a good read on the subject:

https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Books/B_0096_RODMAN_WAR_OF_THEIR_OWN.pdf

 

[Reluctant Poster]

This is an interesting point.

Anyone got a month by month (or even week by week) comparison of USAAF claims in North Africa and Western Europe?

I wonder at what point the rate of ETO claims takes over that of MTO claims.

From a previous post of mine
"Even if it is assumed that the RAF, VSS and the Armie de Aire contributed nothing to the demise of the Luftwaffe and that the USAAC was solely responsible, the P47 was still a relatively small factor. In 1943 the center of gravity for the western allies was the Mediterranean, not the UK. According to the USAAC Statistical Digest, up to the end of 1943 USAAC MTO Fighters claimed 1351 German aircraft vs 458 claimed in the ETO. Note that the P47 was not serving in the MTO until late December 1943."

The Statistical Digest gives month by month claim numbers. I have attached the ETO and MTO numbers. Note that these are claims and not actual kills. Also note that the claims posted by bombers are pure fantasy.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

This may be true, but it is also irrelevant.

To be accurate, it's cause-and-effect error. Are you shooting down more Axis aircraft in the MTO because there are more of them there, or simply because almost all of your fighter forces are there? You can construct some simple distributions of squadrons between the theaters that make it obvious that you can allocate forces to put the majority of the shoot-downs that you achieve into one theater or the other.

Allocation of fighters is a strategic decision. They were put in the Mediterranean to support the strategic aim of invading Sicily and then Italy. In 1943 the USAAF strategic bombing offense was an experiment that had yet to prove anything. You put your resources where they will do the most good. Losing 60 B-17s in a single mission is a catastrophe for the air force but in the overall scheme of things is not of much consequence. Losing two loaded troopships off the coast of Sicily because of lack of air cover would have much greater consequences.

Fighter vs fighter combat is romantic, but the reality is that fighters exist because bombers exist. Fighters are the means to an end but they are not the end game. They win control of the air so that your bombers can do their work while preventing the enemies bombers from doing theirs.

 

[elbmc1969]

I'd argue that that "The bomber advocates believed strategic bombing would be decisive and argued again and again that using strategic bombers in tactical bombing roles was an ineffective diversion of resources."

The USAAF, for instance, procured large numbers of light/attack bombers (A-20, A-26) and medium bombers (B-26, B-25). The 'bomber barons' were fine with deploying these aircraft in tactical and what I'd label 'semi strategic' roles (against targets like transportation hubs, lines of communication, airfields and naval concentrations).

8th AF HQ and other strategic bombing advocates objected to the diversion of medium bombers from strategic bombing, even though they couldn't reach deep targets, because they could help "swamp" German defenses in the coastal belt. One of the main arguments in late-42 through mid-43 for why the strategic bombing offensive would succeed was they German "barrier" defense. They argued the building up the bomber force would allowing penetrations at multiple points simultaneously, overwhelming the German command and control systems.

Some time in 1944, 8th AF HQ and some other bombing advocates requested the termination of the production of medium bombers and a shift of all production capacity to heavy bombers. The reason given was, "There is nothing the medium bomber can do that the heavy bomber cannot do more efficiently." This argument obviously pulls the rug from under any tactical or operational uses of bombers in support of the ground forces.

 

[J.D.]

If I may, there are things that never seem to appear in threads about the so-called bomber theory but which shed something of a different light on a lot of what has been said about it.

First of all, we probably need to acknowledge - albeit reluctantly - the fact that the terms seems to have been popularised by Malcolm Gladwell, via his 2021 book of the same name. Seems to me that someone just co-opted it and used it for their own purposes.

Secondly, everyone seems to have at least a reasonable understanding of the mechanics of how this theorem manifested itself in any country that fielded a strategic bombing force. What is missing from all of the online discussions I've seen is the motivation. That information vacuum has allowed an awful lot of people to colour it in any way they like, up to and including conspiracy. In his book "Masters of the Air", Donald Miller talks about Douhet and Mitchell and their motivations:

"Whatever the nature of the connection, Mitchell shared with Douhet a number of core assumptions about airpower. The experience of World War I was paramount; both sought to end long wars of attrition and close quarter slaughter. They proposed to shorten war by returning the advantage to the offensive. Advances in the technology of killing--the machine gun, poison gas and rifled artillery--had made infantry attacks on dug-in positions suicidal.The solution they arrived at independently was airpower--Winged Victory."

Now, Miller might not be from the top echelon - I can't say I've got feelings on that either way - but he at least goes where few others have gone. The obvious suggestion is that, as bad as strategic bombing might be, they believed fewer people would die, which is hardly an unreasonable motivation, much less a malicious one, the sort of thing "bomber mafia" tends to suggest.

So let's try something different here. Let's look at it as a sequence of events that were not unpredictable but not pre-ordained either.

When the Eighth Air Force commenced its European campaign in August, 1942 they did so while Eaker was trying to get hold of P-38s for escort. Okay, we know this so let's move to the next part. Arnold needed them in the Pacific and the Med. Both men knew the wisdom of that decision would be measured in human lives. But who and where, they didn't know.

The first raids on European territory - France and the Low Countries - were an unpleasant experience for new American bomber crews but in relative terms, casualties were not excessive. When they moved to bombing German soil - Wilhelmshafen - they again, did not suffer unduly. But we know that as time wore on, attrition went up. But when does a few raids with relatively high losses become a trend? When does that trend become a repudiation of strategy? What's the alternative?

It seems to me that time - not drop tanks - was the problem. The Casablanca conference put the Western Allies on a path to D-Day. It was a matter of planning it and Eaker and Spaatz came up with Operation POINTBLANK. The directive most people are already aware of was the destruction of Germany's industrial base for aviation. The plan was to attack at all levels from the factory to the fighter pilot. Anything to rid the skies of the Luftwaffe before D-Day. Invasion couldn't take place in 1943 and 1945 was unreasonable.

So the COA came up with a list of priority targets and ball bearing production was one of the, Given that Schweinfurt produced about 40% of Germany's need (not just for aircraft), it presented a reasonable bottleneck for causing disruption.Unfortunately, a lot of pejorative - not all of it justified, IMHO - has been leveled at COA by people like Brian Vlaun. Let's hope everyone's favourite YouTuber doesn't get to hear about that. Since he doesn't seem to read books, I'm not too worried.

The point is that Schweinfurt and Regensburg had to be attacked. B-17s were the only means the USAAF had at its disposal to do it. The cost would be high and everyone knew it. But for some bad English weather, the Schweinfurt mission might have been as successful as the Regensburg one (that not many people talk about). But while about 120 airmen died on the first Schweinfurt mission and 60 aircraft were lost from both, has anyone considered the cost of not doing it? The critics, with their ritual hand-wringing, never seem to provide a realistic alternative either.

Above all, the matter of P-47s with drop tanks is little more than noise, in terms of the overall planning. There was no immediately available alternative either.

Anyone pointing the finger at Arnold also misses the point. Arnold was no fool and in August, following the Schweinfurt-Regensburg missions, wrote his famous letter to Gen. Barney Giles, seeking a long range escort fighter within six months and it didn't matter if one had to be developed from scratch.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

As a thought, imagine limiting maritime patrol aircraft range to that of the current fighters because the enemy has aircraft carriers, similarly land bomber range to fighter. Throughout the 1930's there was a continual shift as the latest bomber/fighter exceeded the performance of the old fighter/bomber. As each latest bomber appeared so did the promise of low casualties revive.

The 1930's assumed a France versus Germany, much better weather than reality, much better accuracy, much better bombs including chemical and possibly biological. It held out the idea an air campaign would be accurate though still killing civilians but would cause a rapid collapse of the enemy economy though damage and morale, thereby reverting to the short war and lower casualties. The Battle of Berlin was the last attempt at this sort of idea and it seems Bomber Command's killed for the war is comparable to 21st Army Group in 11 months of fighting.

In 1938 the Battle at fast cruise was rated at 795 miles with 1,000 pounds, 733 miles with 1,500 pounds, the Blenheim I 678 miles with 1,000 pounds, the Blenheim IV 1,160 miles. Meantime at economic cruise, that is slower than the bomber fast cruise, the Spitfire did 575 miles, the Hurricane I 580 miles, add some external fuel and you had all the way escort to target for the majority of the RAF modern bomber force in early 1939. Similar for USAAF fighters and the B-10 and B-18. Alternatively fighters in France picking up bombers flying from Britain when it came to the heavier twins and 4 engine types. The true believers thought the latest bombers did not need escort but there were working options if that proved incorrect.

The bomber as a decisive factor in war reached its peak in mid 1940, almost everyone well over rated the Luftwaffe and that belief was a major reason the Battle of Britain was fought. Then came the various reality checks, Ground Controlled Interception worked, radar worked, navigation was harder than it looked, even by day, weather was worse than assumed, ground defences more effective, bombs were not as accurate or as effective as assumed. It took time for the evidence to make it up the chain of command to be met with orders to do what you could with what you had. The distances to target and amount of hostile airspace to cross in Europe were much higher than the pre war plans, while the fall of France meant short range airpower was not very useful unless there were ground forces engaged. At a minimum no large western allied ground operations until mid 1943 at least, the overall war situation pushed that to 1944.

As of August 1942 the USAAF had very little combat experience with heavy bomber raids and mostly in low intensity situations.

The first raids on European territory - France and the Low Countries - were an unpleasant experience for new American bomber crews but in relative terms, casualties were not excessive. When they moved to bombing German soil - Wilhelmshafen - they again, did not suffer unduly.

That is not correct. The following figures use bombers credited with attacking, use effective sorties the percentages drop, use despatched and they drop again, add write offs and they climb. The first 7 columns are the monthly figures, the final 3 the cumulative figures since the start of the campaign. The bombing raids were in trouble in early 1943.

Be	Fr	Ge	NL	No	Po	Total	Fr	Ge	All Targets
0.00​	0.00​		0.00​			0.00​	0.00​		0.00​
	2.70​		0.00​			2.41​	1.41​		1.18​
0.00​	5.15​					5.07​	3.24​		2.92​
	3.27​					3.27​	3.25​		3.09​
	7.60​					7.60​	4.28​		4.11​
	8.06​	1.82​				6.64​	5.05​	1.82​	4.72​
	6.85​	11.65​				8.84​	5.30​	8.23​	5.55​
	2.27​	5.08​	1.64​			3.11​	4.54​	6.48​	4.74​
4.88​	4.91​	15.09​				7.98​	4.58​	8.46​	5.26​
2.19​	5.76​	5.90​				5.42​	4.88​	7.08​	5.32​
10.26​	3.90​	9.07​				7.58​	4.75​	7.93​	5.87​
	3.70​	10.10​	0.00​	0.48​		6.70​	4.57​	8.65​	6.09​
	1.90​	15.23​	2.72​			6.54​	3.95​	9.81​	6.18​
0.00​	3.32​	7.62​	0.00​			3.98​	3.77​	9.55​	5.72​
	11.32​	9.48​	0.00​		4.72​	8.99​	3.84​	9.53​	6.26​
0.00​	10.00​	3.85​	0.00​	2.84​		3.73​	3.89​	7.93​	5.81​
0.00​	2.99​	3.58​				3.43​	3.73​	6.51​	5.22​

But we know that as time wore on, attrition went up. But when does a few raids with relatively high losses become a trend? When does that trend become a repudiation of strategy? What's the alternative?

The trend is quite clear and the overall losses were kept down by raiding targets with weaker defences, targets that the Germans were not as worried about. The alternative was to stay within escort range and build expertise that way, something going on in the Mediterranean. Part of squaring the circle was the idea of overwhelming German air defences, a figure of 300 bombers was set in 1942 and stayed at that number through 1943 as the defences increased strength.

It seems to me that time - not drop tanks - was the problem. The Casablanca conference put the Western Allies on a path to D-Day. It was a matter of planning it and Eaker and Spaatz came up with Operation POINTBLANK. The directive most people are already aware of was the destruction of Germany's industrial base for aviation. The plan was to attack at all levels from the factory to the fighter pilot. Anything to rid the skies of the Luftwaffe before D-Day. Invasion couldn't take place in 1943 and 1945 was unreasonable.

What was the Spaatz contribution? Casablanca resulted in Bomber Command being told bomb U-boats, Aircraft Industry, Transportation, Oil Plants in that order, in February came help the USSR, bomb Berlin, in April came bombing U-boat bases was not working, revert to harassment only. POINTBLANK had a number of contributors including the COSSAC Staff, in June 1943 came the idea because the bombers were being so successful more German fighters were going west, so German fighter strength became the main priority because they could stop the bombers, followed by U-boats, Aircraft Industry, Ball Bearings, Oil (Assuming Ploesti raids worked)

By end 1942 the USAAF in the Mediterranean had decided scoring heavy bombers was a good idea to necessity for most missions.

The point is that Schweinfurt and Regensburg had to be attacked. B-17s were the only means the USAAF had at its disposal to do it. The cost would be high and everyone knew it.

Necessity is a weak argument, Germany had a synthetic rubber bottleneck, the Huls raid was one of the most successful raids. P-47 crossed the German border on 26 July 1943, the early 1943 ideas of the fighters going one way and the bombers another was changing. The Germans were showing a strong willingness to defend Ruhr targets.

But for some bad English weather, the Schweinfurt mission might have been as successful as the Regensburg one (that not many people talk about). But while about 120 airmen died on the first Schweinfurt mission and 60 aircraft were lost from both, has anyone considered the cost of not doing it? The critics, with their ritual hand-wringing, never seem to provide a realistic alternative either.

By attacking when they did the USAAF alerted the Germans to the problems while being unable to do the necessary follow up raids, stocks plus the ability to order bearings in short supply from Sweden covered the production losses. Sweden as a neutral limited the Germans to pre war values of bearings but allowed adjustments on type.

The alternative was up the pressure on targets within fighter range.

Above all, the matter of P-47s with drop tanks is little more than noise, in terms of the overall planning. There was no immediately available alternative either.

Drop tanks were available and more than noise, 17 August 1943 there were 432 serviceable B-17 and 195 P-47, 8 October it was 410 B-17, 112 B-24, 390 P-47.

Anyone pointing the finger at Arnold also misses the point. Arnold was no fool and in August, following the Schweinfurt-Regensburg missions, wrote his famous letter to Gen. Barney Giles, seeking a long range escort fighter within six months and it didn't matter if one had to be developed from scratch.

That was far too late and the P-51 was already on the way, the USAAF effort for longer fighter range had restarted in early 1942. The B-17 being an earlier design and having its production pushed arrived in numbers before the P-38 and well before the P-47. Decisions made about force mix made in 1941/42 had effects into 1944.

The 8th Air Force loss rates rapidly hit dangerous levels, the experience from the Mediterranean said escorts were needed, the 8th Air Force persisted into mid 1943 with separate bomber and fighter air wars and decided it should strike targets according to how vital they appeared to be, not what was within fighter range.

Realistically the 8th Air Force was going to do little to the Germans for most of 1943. The following is bombs by target by country, to end October 1943, a minority non the declared vital targets. In fact Bomber Command with things like the Kassel raid fire storm were more concentrated on the aircraft target list and maybe doing more damage.

Target Type/Country	Be	Fr	Ge	NL	No	Po	Total
A/F	108.7​	4897.8​	157​	418.3​			5581.8​
A/F (Dummy)				39​			39​
A/I		637.1​		51.5​			688.6​
A/Iasy FW 190			496.8​				496.8​
A/Iasy He 111		145​					145​
A/Iasy Me 109			298.8​				298.8​
A/Icomp		232​	482.3​				714.3​
A/Icomp Fighter			81​				81​
A/Icomp FW 190			536.5​				536.5​
A/Ieng		441​					441​
A/Ieng & Bear		229​					229​
A/Irepair	555.8​						555.8​
AFV	161.5​						161.5​
Bearings			908​				908​
Diversion		0​					0​
Hydro					414.3​		414.3​
I/A		185.8​	2866.6​	86.3​			3138.7​
Leaflets		0​					0​
Loco/Wks		286.1​					286.1​
M/T	184.5​	118.8​					303.3​
M/T & Arm		251​					251​
M/Y		837.9​	631.3​				1469.2​
Naval Storage		132.5​					132.5​
NB/Large Site Cons		482​					482​
P/A		677.3​	584.6​				1261.9​
P/A Shipping						308​	308​
Port Militaire		534.5​					534.5​
Q-Boat		62​					62​
RR		3​					3​
RR/Sidings		62​					62​
Shipping		3​	91.6​	36.9​			131.5​
Shipyard		24​		199.5​			223.5​
Steel			267​				267​
Steel & Eng		192.7​					192.7​
SynRub			418​				418​
T/O		62.8​	1421.5​	8​			1492.3​
Tires			213.8​				213.8​
UB/entrance		301​					301​
UB/Facilities					81​		81​
UB/Pens		2111.3​					2111.3​
UB/Yards			3453.2​				3453.2​
YB-40		0​	0​		0​		0​
Total	1010.5​	12909.6​	12908​	839.5​	495.3​	308​	28470.9​

Airfields received nearly 100 tons of bombs per bomber lost, bearings 9.5 tons, overall 740 bombers missing, 38.5 tons of bombs dropped per bomber lost.

German report,
REGENSBURG, E. 1679 - Chief, Orpo., 8a 1151 – Min. of Pub. Inf. & Prop., E. 2606 - Min of Armaments & War Production. 17 AUGUST. From about 1125 hours about 120 American aircraft attacked the town and the Messerschmitt Aircraft Works. Damage was mainly inflicted on the Messerschmitt Works and that on the town was "scarcely worth mentioning".

Bombs dropped: 1200 H.E. (21 duds or D.A.), 100 incendiary bombs, 500 phosphorous bombs and/or drums, 4 oil bombs.

Houses: 4 plus 4 hutments destroyed, 4 plus 6 hutments severely damaged, 7 medium damage, 19 slightly damaged

Casualties: 247 dead and 461 injured.

Several flak sites (works defences) were destroyed. A direct hit vas scored on the chief water main and telephone lines were destroyed. In the factory area of Messerschmitt factory 1080 H.E. bombs were dropped destroying 80% of the factory and causing 100% loss of production for some time. Several assembly halls and the administrative building were destroyed, equalling a floor space of 91532 sq, metres out of a total of 138920 sq. metres.

USSBS Regensburg Bf109 production July to December 1943, 270, 240, 77, 163, 205, 270

 

[J.D.]

That is not correct. The following figures use bombers credited with attacking, use effective sorties the percentages drop, use despatched and they drop again, add write offs and they climb. The first 7 columns are the monthly figures, the final 3 the cumulative figures since the start of the campaign. The bombing raids were in trouble in early 1943.

Thank you for those very enlightening figures. I see where there may have been cause for concern but if anything, it also emphasises what I said earlier: when does a spike, like February, April, June or July, become a trend or even a repudiation? I'm not saying you're wrong: I'm simply pointing out that it took a while for those spikes to become a consistent trend. Now, a theatre commander would be right to be concerned any time there are higher than expected losses but I'm sure there are some who would conclude that things were going south in February but commanders had to remain calm. What do you do? Trapped between a rock and a hard place.

The trend is quite clear and the overall losses were kept down by raiding targets with weaker defences, targets that the Germans were not as worried about. The alternative was to stay within escort range and build expertise that way, something going on in the Mediterranean. Part of squaring the circle was the idea of overwhelming German air defences, a figure of 300 bombers was set in 1942 and stayed at that number through 1943 as the defences increased strength.

I would suggest that, on the strength of your figures, the trend was not clear until the middle of the year. That's my point: at what point does it become a trend and then a repudiation? I know this is vague. I'm sorry. I just think that hindsight is a wonderful thing and I'm trying to think outside the box. Unless you're in the thick of it in mid-1943... And yes, perhaps with hindsight, continuing as things were was the wrong decision but what was the alternative? That's my other point.

POINTBLANK had a number of contributors including the COSSAC Staff, in June 1943 came the idea because the bombers were being so successful more German fighters were going west, so German fighter strength became the main priority because they could stop the bombers, followed by U-boats, Aircraft Industry, Ball Bearings, Oil (Assuming Ploesti raids worked)

By end 1942 the USAAF in the Mediterranean had decided scoring heavy bombers was a good idea to necessity for most missions.

Yep, that's pretty much as I understood it. I'm sorry, I don't know what that last sentence means.

Necessity is a weak argument, Germany had a synthetic rubber bottleneck, the Huls raid was one of the most successful raids. P-47 crossed the German border on 26 July 1943, the early 1943 ideas of the fighters going one way and the bombers another was changing. The Germans were showing a strong willingness to defend Ruhr targets.

If necessity is a weak argument then what was the point of even being there? I'm sorry, I'm not seeing it. I'm not trying to sound callous either but this is the reality of command. I'd have said necessity was the only argument. Alternatives seemed to be in relatively short supply. I doubt any of the senior commanders relished the idea of sending so many people on a one way trip. Yet that has become a central narrative in this.

By attacking when they did the USAAF alerted the Germans to the problems while being unable to do the necessary follow up raids, stocks plus the ability to order bearings in short supply from Sweden covered the production losses. Sweden as a neutral limited the Germans to pre war values of bearings but allowed adjustments on type.

The follow up raid was only necessary because the first raid did not achieve the hoped-for results. There are many factors in this, weather being one of them. And yes, indecision by senior command (Fred Anderson?) was another. So we know that coordination went to pot and the second wave suffered badly; worse than expected. So the idea of follow up missions alerting the Germans is a bit of a post hoc, ergo propter hoc argument.

Sweden covered some of the losses. Speer spoke after the war of sourcing split bearings over ball bearings which, he acknowledged, was not as good but still worked.

Drop tanks were available and more than noise, 17 August 1943 there were 432 serviceable B-17 and 195 P-47, 8 October it was 410 B-17, 112 B-24, 390 P-47.

This is the bit I don't buy. First of all, it assumes that drop tanks would have solved the problem and I'm not seeing it. At the end of 1943, P-47 fighter squadrons started their own field modifications to plumb the wing pylons to carry drop tanks, prior to which there was only the centreline pylon. That resulted in the D-9 model and later, the D-11, when it became a line mod. But that wasn't the whole problem. The P-47 simply didn't carry enough internal fuel (256 gallons) and that had been a problem since before the war.

When it came to missions in early 1944, the D-9 and D-11 models could not quite reach Magdeburg. Now, I'm prepared to accept that two 108 US gallon tanks are a whole different drag penalty from one 205 gallon drop tank but the problem remains the same: you consume half the fuel in the tank getting the other half there. I haven't seen anything conclusive that the 205 gallon "Brisbane" tank was a viable solution. Did they even know about something that was happening on the other side of the world?

I have even seen suggestions that the 200 gallon ferry tank was an option but as far as I know, it couldn't have been jettisoned in an emergency.

This is why I say drop tanks are mostly noise. They are not a complete answer because there are other parts of the problem they simply don't address.

That was far too late and the P-51 was already on the way, the USAAF effort for longer fighter range had restarted in early 1942. The B-17 being an earlier design and having its production pushed arrived in numbers before the P-38 and well before the P-47. Decisions made about force mix made in 1941/42 had effects into 1944.

And I would agree. The first USAAF P-51s were ordered, from memory, in October, 1942. But even with the best will in the world, they were still going to be some way off, even in mid-1943. Like I said: time was more of an issue than drop tanks.

The 8th Air Force loss rates rapidly hit dangerous levels, the experience from the Mediterranean said escorts were needed, the 8th Air Force persisted into mid 1943 with separate bomber and fighter air wars and decided it should strike targets according to how vital they appeared to be, not what was within fighter range.

Exactly. But that's not the same as being stuck in the bomber mindset. It's simply the reality that these places needed to be hit if the operational objectives were going to be met. Accusations have been levelled at COA too, by writers like Brian Vlaun, whose criticisms come off as less than objective. I think it's just not as simple as most people think it was.

In fact Bomber Command with things like the Kassel raid fire storm were more concentrated on the aircraft target list and maybe doing more damage.

You mean 22 October? Operation Corona?

Per: the Regensburg report, I think that was repeated in Martin Middlebrook's book on the mission.

Thanks for your figures. Sorry to go on for so long. I'd be interested in anything drgondog can add to it, should he wish.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

I see where there may have been cause for concern but if anything, it also emphasises what I said earlier: when does a spike, like February, April, June or July, become a trend or even a repudiation?

In general terms when the number of sorties hits statistical significance, 1 out of 10 versus 100 out of 1,000. In the 8th Air Force case it is understanding not all targets were equal and noticing the reports of the big gap in losses between early escorted and unescorted raids to France resulting in adjustments to targets that helped keep the overall monthly loss figure down, while giving inexperienced units a chance to learn. In early 1943 the 8th was aware the Mediterranean was escorting its heavy bombers or taking unacceptable losses.

To end October 1943,

Paris, 881 attacking sorties, 5.34% loss, le Bourget 221 sorties, 4.5% loss, La Pallice 196 sorties, 3.06%, Lorient, 353 sorties, 5.95%, St Nazaire 633 sorties 7.27%.

Going east coastal Germany, Emden 3.02%, Wilhelmshaven 6.22%, Bremen 8.3%, Kiel 9.62%

It is knowing the growth of the average number of Luftwaffe fighters in the west, slowly in early 1943, more made up of using night fighters to the major jumps in Q3 but keeping to the figure of 300 heavy bombers would saturate the defences. It is knowing bombing rarely destroyed a target and repeated raids were needed, which meant sustainable losses for those raids. It is noticing more than 1 in 6 bombs were dropped on airfields in raids that had very low loss rates, which averaged out the heavy losses elsewhere.

I'm simply pointing out that it took a while for those spikes to become a consistent trend.

If you isolate raids to Germany you have a point, given the small number, not when you add the French raids, in particular when you look at the chosen targets, then combine them with the German raids and cross check against the number of escorts. In 1943 the RAF was quite happy the USAAF was providing a viable day bomber force, that was where the Luftwaffe fighters could be found.

Now, a theatre commander would be right to be concerned any time there are higher than expected losses but I'm sure there are some who would conclude that things were going south in February but commanders had to remain calm. What do you do? Trapped between a rock and a hard place.

The 8th Air Force did not really change strategy from that formulated in 1942, when it came to fighters it certainly asked about drop tanks, the British advised in February 1943 no rush orders could be done, then the 8th asked for many in June 1943, but in mid July rated the tanks fourth priority, the British received approval for the fittings designs in October.

The 8th chose to ignore what everyone was telling them, deciding economic importance rated higher than keeping losses to a level that allowed repeated raids to the economically important targets.

Yep, that's pretty much as I understood it. I'm sorry, I don't know what that last sentence means.

nor do I, try auto correct turning a typo for escorting into scoring and I missed it, giving By end 1942 the USAAF in the Mediterranean had decided escorting heavy bombers was a good idea to necessity for most missions.

If necessity is a weak argument then what was the point of even being there? I'm sorry, I'm not seeing it.

In 1943 building up the knowledge base and supply system to mount consistent sortie totals. Learning how to put together large raids, overcoming weather problems, hitting targets to see actual results and so on. All of that could be done within or close to within escort range. Instead the loss information and increasing defences were set to one side on the assumption air raids by around 300 heavy bombers would cripple the German war machine enough to justify the bomber losses. One raid day on Germany in January 1943, two in February, 3 in March, 1 in April with over 100 bombers attacking, 4 in May, 4 in June with over 200 bombers attacking on the 11th, 5 raid days 25 to 30 July 1943, 837 bombers attacking, 86 missing.

The follow up raid was only necessary because the first raid did not achieve the hoped-for results. There are many factors in this, weather being one of them. And yes, indecision by senior command (Fred Anderson?) was another. So we know that coordination went to pot and the second wave suffered badly; worse than expected. So the idea of follow up missions alerting the Germans is a bit of a post hoc, ergo propter hoc argument.

To make this claim requires many examples of economic targets being effectively destroyed by a single raid, that is just a few things going better for the USAAF and Schweinfurt is abandoned by the Germans for the war, with little salvaged, otherwise the USAAF has to keep going back to inflict more damage, including on the repairs. I know of 1 or 2 oil target raids that caused enough damage to cause the Germans to abandon repairs. Please list all the others.

This is the bit I don't buy. First of all, it assumes that drop tanks would have solved the problem and I'm not seeing it.

8th Air Force losses to enemy aircraft by target,
15 Emden
17 Anklam
17 Regensburg
17 Stuttgart
19 Munster
20 St Nazaire
20 Wilhelmshaven
24 Bremen
35 Kiel
89 Schweinfurt

Total 289, add the targets with 6 or more losses and it becomes 427 losses out of 511 total, few of these raids had escorts to target, assume escorts halved the losses to enemy fighters, saving around 200 to 250 heavy bombers, that decreases the loss rate by about 1%, or from over the 5% unsustainable to over 4%, high.

At the end of 1943, P-47 fighter squadrons started their own field modifications to plumb the wing pylons to carry drop tanks, prior to which there was only the centreline pylon. That resulted in the D-9 model and later, the D-11, when it became a line mod. But that wasn't the whole problem.

The big problem was in order to fit a 200 gallon ferry tank Republic came up with a non USAAF standard set of fittings. That took until Q3/43 to fix.

P-47D-6-RE with belly tank shackles produced from mid July 1943
P-47D-4-RA with belly tank shackles produced from mid August 1943
P-47D-15-RE with wing pylons produced from late October 1943
P-47D-16-RA (Or D-15) with wing pylons produced from end November 1943

The local effort to fix the under fuselage shackles was more extensive, doing the wing pylons too much work to achieve much.

The P-47 simply didn't carry enough internal fuel (256 gallons) and that had been a problem since before the war.

No pre war P-47. The internal fuel in 1943 was 305 gallons.

When it came to missions in early 1944, the D-9 and D-11 models could not quite reach Magdeburg.

Meantime as of 31 December 1943 the 8th could draw on 2 P-38 and 1 P-51 groups to provide deeper cover, and in any case were limiting raids to targets escorts could reach.

Now, I'm prepared to accept that two 108 US gallon tanks are a whole different drag penalty from one 205 gallon drop tank but the problem remains the same: you consume half the fuel in the tank getting the other half there. I haven't seen anything conclusive that the 205 gallon "Brisbane" tank was a viable solution. Did they even know about something that was happening on the other side of the world?

Your understanding of the drop tank situation is incorrect. By the way in December 1943 British 108 gallon tank production was slightly under 12,000.

I have even seen suggestions that the 200 gallon ferry tank was an option but as far as I know, it couldn't have been jettisoned in an emergency.

No, fuel could not be drawn from it at altitude, so it was half filled, used, then jettisoned, that got the P-47 almost to operational height.

This is why I say drop tanks are mostly noise. They are not a complete answer because there are other parts of the problem they simply don't address.

The big problem, deliberately going beyond escort range in the belief the results would be worth it or the losses remain sustainable, despite the evidence

And I would agree. The first USAAF P-51s were ordered, from memory, in October, 1942. But even with the best will in the world, they were still going to be some way off, even in mid-1943. Like I said: time was more of an issue than drop tanks.

The trouble I have with this statement is it originally refers to Arnold being smart by writing a letter about long range escorts in August 1943, which, if it was his first intervention, would prove the exact opposite.

It's simply the reality that these places needed to be hit if the operational objectives were going to be met.

What are the operational objectives being considered? How many were met?

I think it's just not as simple as most people think it was.

Few things are. The 8th Air Force stuck to pre war ideas that were firmed up in 1942, then ignored lots of information including from its own operations to continue trying the doctrine until October 1943. To switch to the USAAF statistical digest, which has different figures to the above, 8th Air Force lost 599 heavy bombers to enemy fighters to end October 1943, say escorts halve the loss rate, what was gained for the extra losses? What was lost by giving the Germans advanced warning of what bombing strategy was to come and what damage it could do?

Kassel:

You mean 22 October?

Yes.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Don't forget the XB-41

I've been trying to forget it since I first saw a photo of one

 

[J.D.]

The 8th chose to ignore what everyone was telling them, deciding economic importance rated higher than keeping losses to a level that allowed repeated raids to the economically important targets.

This is a very serious allegation. It may or may not be right. The problem is that in a lot of circles, it seems to have become boilerplate. The trouble is that I cannot find it in myself to believe in that level of malfeasance or incompetence. Even Eaker was asking for P-38s in 1942. Arnold had to make a choice and he chose to keep them in the Pacific. We agree that the Pacific was a smaller campaign, in the sense that it involved much smaller units. But it was spread out over a much larger area and the P-38 was the best only long-range fighter the USAAF had.

Both Eaker and Arnold knew that Arnold's choice would have ramifications somewhere. What would those ramifications have been if he had sent those P-38s to England instead? I doubt we will ever really know.

Total 289, add the targets with 6 or more losses and it becomes 427 losses out of 511 total, few of these raids had escorts to target, assume escorts halved the losses to enemy fighters, saving around 200 to 250 heavy bombers, that decreases the loss rate by about 1%, or from over the 5% unsustainable to over 4%, high.

I'm going to say from the start that I have no doubt your figures are correct. You seem to be the resident expert on this. You also make a good point about not treating the targets as equal. I'm trying not to but even then, there would have been some variation in response. But there's a reason I didn't address this earlier: I'm questioning how the figures were interpreted, where and by whom. Did the right arm know what the left arm was doing? This, along with what I said earlier about Eaker, is one reason why I'm reluctant to accept the "Damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead!" bomber mafia argument. Now, I'm not accusing you of anything: I'm posing a question and it may be unanswerable. Most of my sources are not really good enough to come to any definitive conclusion.

No pre war P-47. The internal fuel in 1943 was 305 gallons.

My understanding, FWIW, was that 305 gallons came with the D series. For 1943, the vast majority were C models.

Meantime as of 31 December 1943 the 8th could draw on 2 P-38 and 1 P-51 groups to provide deeper cover, and in any case were limiting raids to targets escorts could reach.

Yes. The second group of P-38s arrived on the last day of the year so the picture isn't quite as clear as it seems at first glance. By that time, the weather would have been unsuitable.

Your understanding of the drop tank situation is incorrect.

What's wrong with it? As i've said, it's largely noise, in my opinion, anyway.

No, fuel could not be drawn from it at altitude, so it was half filled, used, then jettisoned, that got the P-47 almost to operational height.

I assume this is theoretical, rather than operational.

The big problem, deliberately going beyond escort range in the belief the results would be worth it or the losses remain sustainable, despite the evidence

Then it was a matter of priorities.

The trouble I have with this statement is it originally refers to Arnold being smart by writing a letter about long range escorts in August 1943, which, if it was his first intervention, would prove the exact opposite.

That's more symbolic than anything else. It's simply an acknowledgement that something needed to be done. I've already pointed out that he was approached by Eaker in 1942. We also agree that the USAAF had already placed an order for 1,350 P-51s in October, 1942. So something was going on. There are plenty of people in recent times who have been really, really hard on Arnold and I'm not sure that it's entirely justified. Vlaun, for example, basically accuses him of living in some sort of ivory tower in Washington and making pronunciamentos from there. I think this is quite unfair and unless Vlaun can back it up with some serious evidence that Arnold was behaving as accused, it ignores what his reasons were. Arnold travelled extensively in 1943 and suffered two heart attacks, the first in February and the second in May. That's the price of high command.

I think it's worth remembering why people like Arnold wanted to make the bomber theorem work. Arnold was a friend of Mitchell and as far as I can tell, both were affected enough by the slaughter in the trenches of WWI to not want it repeated, least of all at the cost of American lives. That doesn't tally with the idea of pushing ahead and ignoring the advice to prove a doctrine, irrespective of casualties. Not in my mind, anyway. To formally acknowledge, as he did with his letter to Giles, that the theorem wasn't working must have come at considerable personal and political cost, especially given whom he was answerable to. I just think that, whatever his flaws - and they were considerable, Arnold might have been a better man that a lot of people give him credit for. I just think he was looking and thinking, "How far do we go before this becomes self-defeating?"

I also think it's become far too easy and far too readily accepted that people like Vlaun can just lambaste him the way he does without really considering why they thought the way they did. But if you depersonalise someone, it makes it far easier to accuse them of blind adherence. Also, the term "doctrine" has some rather nasty connotations. I haven't read Malcolm Gladwell's book but I sort of get the impression that he starts with an idea and just tries to join the dots. Greg is just a useful idiot, IMHO.

What are the operational objectives being considered? How many were met?

As I said: to attack the Luftwaffe at all levels, from the factory to the fighter pilot.

As to your second question, in the time we are talking about (i.e.: May to October 1943, or thereabouts), I don't know the answer to that.

Few things are. The 8th Air Force stuck to pre war ideas that were firmed up in 1942, then ignored lots of information including from its own operations to continue trying the doctrine until October 1943. To switch to the USAAF statistical digest, which has different figures to the above, 8th Air Force lost 599 heavy bombers to enemy fighters to end October 1943, say escorts halve the loss rate, what was gained for the extra losses? What was lost by giving the Germans advanced warning of what bombing strategy was to come and what damage it could do?

Perhaps the best answer to that is to look at what happened between February and June, 1944. But by then the USAAF could go literally anywhere in Germany and bomb whatever it wanted. That is air superiority. My question again is: what meaningful attacks could be made in 1943 if places like Bremen, Anklam, Schweinfurt and Regensburg had to be scratched from the list because they were too hard?

Yes.

Okay. This has become very topical in our family recently.

I'm Australian, from Melbourne. This week we are selling the family home that we have owned for almost 69 years. My mother, who passed away last year, lived in the same street literally all her life and knew the family who had lived there previously. Their name was Kitchen. Pretty much everyone in our street had served either in WWI or WWII. Most of my Dad's friends were WWII veterans. He was too young to go.

So I grew up literally surrounded by people who had been at war. I learnt early to listen.

To cut a long story short, the Kitchens had a son who was lost while serving with RAF Bomber Command. His mother spent the rest of her life trying to find out what happened to him.

A few years ago, my brother and I took up the challenge and started with his record, which can be found online through the AWM in Canberra. He went missing on a raid on Kassel on 22 October, 1943. He was just 20 years old and it was almost certainly his first mission.

After that, my brother started at the Commonwealth War Graves Commission and I started with German night fighter claims for that night and we sort of met in the middle.

On 12 October, 1943, he was posted to 57 Sqn, RAF, flying as a mid-upper gunner on Lancasters out of RAF East Kirkby, in Lincolnshire. The tail code of their aircraft was JB320.

German reports from that night say that the aircraft was coned by searchlights about 30 kms north east of Kassel and shot down by a night fighter. The aircraft crashed about 1 km south of the town of Dransfeld and was observed by a local policeman. All on board were killed instantly.

Records also show that the only engagement that night in that area was by Heinz-Wolfgang Schnaufer, whom I'm sure you know.

One rudder and some guns from Schnaufer's Bf-110 are held on display in the Australian War Memorial in Canberra and the marking for 22 October is there.

If anyone wishes to continue this element of this topic elsewhere, feel free.

 

[drgondog]

This is a very serious allegation. It may or may not be right. The problem is that in a lot of circles, it seems to have become boilerplate. The trouble is that I cannot find it in myself to believe in that level of malfeasance or incompetence. Even Eaker was asking for P-38s in 1942. Arnold had to make a choice and he chose to keep them in the Pacific. We agree that the Pacific was a smaller campaign, in the sense that it involved much smaller units. But it was spread out over a much larger area and the P-38 was the best only long-range fighter the USAAF had.

Eaker and Spaatz asked for P-38s and they got them for 8th AF Operation Bolero. The planned total included the 1st, 14th, 78th and 82nd FG composed of P-38F. The 1st and 14th were operational, the 82nd was near operational when Eisenhower requested all the P-38s for Operation Torch. Over Eaker, Marshall, Adm King objections to not dilute Bolero with Torch, FDR backed Eisenhower.

Kenney received one squadron initially in December 1942.

Lost in the discussion is that approximately 1000 (each) Lockheed 150/165-gal and the standard 75-gal drop tanks remained in Great Britain. Each were equipped with standard bomb lugs (14" O.C.) for the AN-B-7 and AN-B-10 shackles (P-38). The P-47Cs that arrived all had proprietary 28" O.C. attach on each skid plate for the Republic 205-gal Ferry tank. It wasn't until June, 1943 that Republic was Ordered by General Branshaw CG Mat.Div. Wright Field to design 'adaptors' for the standard tanks, test flew a modified D-2 in July with 3x75-gal drop tanks, unpressurized - The first delivery of the new Keel with B-7 rack arrived for the P-47C and D through the D-4 beginning one week after the August Schweinfurt-Regensburg mission.

Notably, Kelsey had ordered Republic in March 1942 for the same belly/wing mods to carry the 75 gal tank as partial solution for Ferry problem to ETO. Kartveli ignored him.

The P-47D-15 delivered with belly and wing racks in mid Oct 1943, Operational in squadron quantity mid March 1944. Kits delivered in December for wing pylons but far too lengthy modification to deliver many from Burtonwood for C-2 through D-11s.

Both Eaker and Arnold knew that Arnold's choice would have ramifications somewhere. What would those ramifications have been if he had sent those P-38s to England instead? I doubt we will ever really know.

See above.

My understanding, FWIW, was that 305 gallons came with the D series. For 1943, the vast majority were C models.

The P-47B through D-22 all had 205gal main and 100gal aux tank. The D-25 introduced the 270gal main with 100gal auxiliary. Was first delivered in mid Feb 1944, in squadron level deployment in June 1943.

Yes. The second group of P-38s arrived on the last day of the year so the picture isn't quite as clear as it seems at first glance. By that time, the weather would have been unsuitable.

Arnold ordered the 20th and 55th FG to deploy from CONUS in late June 1943, in spite of Eisenhower's demand for them as well as four B-17 BG, all three B-26 BG for the Invasion of Italy. He still had 3 of the 8th AF B-24 BGs for Tidal Wave and didn't return those shot up groups until late August. They were so badly shot up that they were only used for a 'feint' on October 14 Schweinfurt raid.

That's more symbolic than anything else. It's simply an acknowledgement that something needed to be done. I've already pointed out that he was approached by Eaker in 1942. We also agree that the USAAF had already placed an order for 1,350 P-51s in October, 1942. So something was going on. There are plenty of people in recent times who have been really, really hard on Arnold and I'm not sure that it's entirely justified. Vlaun, for example, basically accuses him of living in some sort of ivory tower in Washington and making pronunciamentos from there. I think this is quite unfair and unless Vlaun can back it up with some serious evidence that Arnold was behaving as accused, it ignores what his reasons were. Arnold travelled extensively in 1943 and suffered two heart attacks, the first in February and the second in May. That's the price of high command.

Arnold is unfairly trashed - ditto Eaker who pleaded with Arnold to send P-38s and P-51B, with support from Lovett, in June 1943. It was VERY clear that the losses beginning in April 1943 were unsupportable over time without severe attrition to the LW.

I think it's worth remembering why people like Arnold wanted to make the bomber theorem work. Arnold was a friend of Mitchell and as far as I can tell, both were affected enough by the slaughter in the trenches of WWI to not want it repeated, least of all at the cost of American lives. That doesn't tally with the idea of pushing ahead and ignoring the advice to prove a doctrine, irrespective of casualties. Not in my mind, anyway. To formally acknowledge, as he did with his letter to Giles, that the theorem wasn't working must have come at considerable personal and political cost, especially given whom he was answerable to. I just think that, whatever his flaws - and they were considerable, Arnold might have been a better man that a lot of people give him credit for. I just think he was looking and thinking, "How far do we go before this becomes self-defeating?"

See above. His June 30, 1943 letter to Giles sparked the recommendation in July 1943 that the P-51B was the fighter of choice. Giles single-handedly drove the Increase Internal Fuel priority to Republic, NAA and Lockheed. NAA and Lockheed delivered prototype flights in July, Republic in November.

EVERYONE on his Staff in July through October, knew that absent destroying the LW prior to OVERLORD, that the Invasion would be at extreme risk of failure. Kuter especially raised the alarm that the LW was strengthening its defenses at an alarming rate. Arnold was in fact the originator of the phrase "destroy the LW in the air and on the ground" while Doolittle was still in command of 12th AF in MTO.

I also think it's become far too easy and far too readily accepted that people like Vlaun can just lambaste him the way he does without really considering why they thought the way they did. But if you depersonalise someone, it makes it far easier to accuse them of blind adherence. Also, the term "doctrine" has some rather nasty connotations. I haven't read Malcolm Gladwell's book but I sort of get the impression that he starts with an idea and just tries to join the dots. Greg is just a useful idiot, IMHO.

IMO Greg is not an idiot, but he is fixated on the "Arnold done Republic Wrong" song. The source is his agreement with Trent Telenko and Pierre Speyer themes about the 'bomber mafia'

If anyone wishes to continue this element of this topic elsewhere, feel free.

Done - and remember that a.) Arnold could see the fate of the P-75, and b.) he also was the Exec that re-prioritized the "1500 mile range fighter' from number 4 to number 1 when the Emmons Board submitted priorities in 1940.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

This is a very serious allegation. It may or may not be right. The problem is that in a lot of circles, it seems to have become boilerplate. The trouble is that I cannot find it in myself to believe in that level of malfeasance or incompetence.

Boilerplate or orthodox tend to form around the available evidence, deciding this is wrong requires evidence to the contrary.

Sayings, "Maintenance of Objective", "No situation is as good or bad as it seems", history is full of operations that stopped just before they would have been very successful, and others where continued operations turned a set back into a major defeat. In early 1944 there is a Spaatz quote along the lines Arthur Harris was winning or about to win either the air war or the entire war before the USAAF could prove itself.

Try once someone is trained in the big picture, in this case the self defending bomber in mass, the more they fit the evidence to the big picture, not the other way around. The 8th Air Force was growing and probably faster than the defences in the first half of 1943. The bombs were being dropped way more accurately than the average night raid and so causing more specific economic damage. At the same time there was a need to keep the command combat worthy, which meant keeping average losses down, in addition new units needed introductions to combat, but losses when going beyond escort range were consistently high to too high and the defences were improving.

Even Eaker was asking for P-38s in 1942.

Given the use of P-47 on fighter sweeps in the first half of 1943, or as escorts to B-26, saying I want P-38 is simply not enough, the RAF were doing escorts.

Arnold had to make a choice and he chose to keep them in the Pacific.

The USAAF managed to get 3 P-38 groups to Europe late 1942/early 1943, they were sent to the Mediterranean where they proved useful, but no more were sent there. Then it was August 1943 before another P-38 group arrived in Europe. One of the issues to confront is with hundreds of aircraft coming off the production line why so few combat units? In part for the USAAF in 1943 was training time, as well as training the training system. The aircrew rotation system required a bigger training system as another reason. Maintenance requirements. Add the continual improvements being done, making earlier examples look or feel obsolete, the amount of flying hours an airframe could take before its performance was considered degraded, then there were the casualties.

End June 1943, the USAAF had 1,267 front line P-38 from 2,295 P-38 accepted to end of month, there were 477 P-38 in the US, 514 in the MTO for 3 fighter groups or about 100% reserves, and 187 deployed against Japan and yes the totals do not add up. The P-38 went to the MTO, the ETO was ignored and the war against Japan was given enough to have a few top cover/long range units because that was all the system could provide in 1942/43 and keep the combat units viable.

What would those ramifications have been if he had sent those P-38s to England instead? I doubt we will ever really know.

What if is always a never really know. The P-38 in the MTO had lots of combat and non combat issues in 1943, the P-38 in the 8th Air Force had lots of non combat issues in 1943/44 and were probably losing one aircraft for each one they shot down. The 8th Air Force chose to convert some P-47 units to P-51 ahead of the P-38 units because of the range issues and the presence of P-38 did seem to reduce bomber losses.

I'm questioning how the figures were interpreted, where and by whom.

Reports were being sent up the chain of command, various people had their opinions on what it meant, Washington generally deferred to the local command and also tended in early/mid 1943 to conclude the self defending bomber was showing promise, echoing the ETO view

Did the right arm know what the left arm was doing? This, along with what I said earlier about Eaker, is one reason why I'm reluctant to accept the "Damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead!" bomber mafia argument.

There ware few full speed ahead by those involved or at least "the USAAF" in 1943. The USAAF kicked off the longer range for its fighters project in January 1942, end 1942 Eaker asked for drop tanks but not as a main priority, switched fighter sorties to escort instead of sweep and also decided that escorting the bombers half way to target was enough to keep losses sustainable long term, despite the gap in losses between escorted and unescorted raids. There were undoubtedly USAAF officers who kept the self defending bomber idea as truth in 1944, while others in 1942 were of the no escorts no way school. The USAAF ended in between the two in the ETO until October 1943, despite mounting evidence.

The 8th Air Force had the task of introducing the P-47 into combat and inevitably found lots of issues doing so, which delayed their effective deployment.

My understanding, FWIW, was that 305 gallons came with the D series. For 1943, the vast majority were C models......My understanding, FWIW, was that 305 gallons came with the D series. For 1943, the vast majority were C models.

All P-47B and C had 305 US gallons of internal fuel, or 254 imperial gallons. The 1943 P-47 had a greater range on internal fuel than the P-38, but could not carry as much external fuel. At the same time the 8th Air Force tactics tended to limit the early B-17 to targets within 320 miles of base, the Tokyo tanks were needed to go further. However escort tactics come into play, flying at bomber speed means a longer range but lower chances of intercepting the interceptors, flying at fighter speed cuts radius.

Calculated fighter ranges, no reserves, 16,000 feet
P-47B, 305 gallons, 75% power, 315 mph TAS, range 750 miles.
P-47B, 305 gallons, 50% power, 280 mph TAS, range 1180 miles.
P-51B, 180 gallons, 75% power, 350 mph TAS, range 740 miles.
P-51B, 180 gallons, 50% power, 280 mph TAS, range 970 miles.

As of 19 September 1943 the 6 P-47 groups reported 114 P-47C and 304 P-47D, plus a P-51B, an L-4B, a Tiger Moth and a Miles Master.

The second group of P-38s arrived on the last day of the year so the picture isn't quite as clear as it seems at first glance. By that time, the weather would have been unsuitable.

The time period was early 1944, which I usually interpret as Q1. The fact the 8th received a P-38 group late August 1943 and another late September, with 1 going operational mid October and the other on the last day of the year is irrelevant. By early March 1944, 3 P-38, 7 P-47 and 3 P-51 groups operational, plus the 9th Air Force P-51.

One of the factors usually omitted is the 8th Air Force operations late 1943 and early 1944, before Big Week, these operations denied the Jagdwaffe its usual winter R&R, helping to set up the spring fighting. The 8th dropped all its bombs visually to end August 1943, for the final 4 months of 1943 %visual, 88.9, 75.2, 39.2, 47.3, cumulative bombs dropped on Germany to end September 1943 8,723.1 tons, by end of 1943, 27,185.2, USAAF fighter claims for 1943 were 451 in the air, of which 205 were in November and December, add another 203 in January 1944, so 6 months in 1943 for the first 50 or so claims, 4 months for another 200, 2 months for the next 200, 1 month for the third.

It also helped the Luftwaffe put a lot of effort into reviving the twin engined day fighter force, to carry extra firepower, just in time for the raids to have escorts.

Overcoming weather problems was important, of 236 raids expecting visual bombing weather at target 155 actually did.

Drop tanks:

What's wrong with it? As i've said, it's largely noise, in my opinion, anyway.

Almost everything is wrong.

P-47 ferry tanks:

I assume this is theoretical, rather than operational.

The most basic reading would reveal the ferry tanks were used on operations, half filled as that was the fuel needed to get a P-47 from start up to near operational height.

The fighting in western Europe was not a priority for either side in the first half of 1943. The Luftwaffe minimised its commitments and the USAAF preferred to build up strength in the Mediterranean. In WWII the 8th Air Force was largely unable to take advantage of summer weather, it missed 1942, in 1943 substantial strength was sent to the Mediterranean including temporary deployment of the B-24 units, plus units were late arriving, in summer 1944 it was Overlord number 1, the war ended before summer 1945.

In July and August 1943 the Luftwaffe received a series of significant wake up calls, in date order,

1) On July 5 the Kursk offensive begins, for the first time in the east the Luftwaffe is unable to secure air superiority where it wants it, the Red Air Force is able to intervene effectively. The Luftwaffe needs to become bigger, given the Red Air Force largely ignores its opposite number the Luftwaffe can still usually operate.

2) 10 July the allied invasion of Sicily, in the air fighting before and during the invasion the Luftwaffe discovers the more aircraft it commits the higher the casualties without changing the overall situation. The Luftwaffe needs to become much bigger or leave.

3) 27 July the firestorm at Hamburg.

4) 17 August the strikes on Schweinfurt and Peenemunde.

The next day the Luftwaffe chief of staff committed suicide.

Starting in July, after the failures of the Kursk and Sicily operations and with pressure on the home defences the Luftwaffe focus shifted to defending Germany.

Richard Davis is a USAF historian who wrote a biography of General Spaatz, to do this he compiled spreadsheets of all USAAF 4 engine bomber and all RAF Bomber Command and 205 group raids, quite detailed, the 8th Air Force has 5,576 entries of which only 313 are to end October 1943. Cross reference to RAF records, or the usual books, to see which raids had what escorts and losses. Then see the patterns.

Then it was a matter of priorities.

No, it was a matter of doctrine and ignoring considerable numbers of warning flags.

To use an Arnold letter from August 1943 to advance the idea he had understanding is doing the exact opposite, he had been pushing for more range for existing fighters since January 1942. The P-38 had a very strong wing centre section well off the ground, able to carry large weights or volumes, the P-47 ended up non standard in order to carry a lot of extra fuel, then being the last to go into mass production and the hardest to find extra internal room, took the longest to modify. Meantime the P-51 appeared and thanks to the A-36 version had wing racks installed.

We also agree that the USAAF had already placed an order for 1,350 P-51s in October, 1942.

Actually the USAAF ordered 150 P-51 for the British in September 1941, then what became a mixture of P-51A and B in August 1942, then in late December 1942 what became P-51C from Dallas and in early January 1943 what became mostly P-51B, making the program as of end January 1943,

100 P-51A-1
210 P-51A-5
400 P-51B-1
400 P-51B-5
400 P-51C-1 (Dallas)
550 P-51D-1
640 P-51D-1 (150 not yet contracted)
600 P-51E-1 (Dallas)
350 P-51E-1 (Dallas) (not yet contracted)

There are plenty of people in recent times who have been really, really hard on Arnold

As I see it the difference is what evidence is being emphasised, pro or anti a given figure instead of examining the entire situation, the main characters have to be on 1 side or the other, using various quotes from their many writings.

As I said: to attack the Luftwaffe at all levels, from the factory to the fighter pilot.

Which it was not in early 1943 given the Battle of the Atlantic situation. Next came Casablanca, or rather the Desert Air Force experience, defeat the enemy air force before the land battle starts, things work much better than way.

To repeat myself, 8th Air Force lost 599 heavy bombers to enemy fighters to end October 1943, say escorts halve the loss rate, what was gained for the extra losses? What was lost by giving the Germans advanced warning of what bombing strategy was to come and what damage it could do?

Perhaps the best answer to that is to look at what happened between February and June, 1944. But by then the USAAF could go literally anywhere in Germany and bomb whatever it wanted. That is air superiority.

February to June 1944 the USAAF ETO fighters claimed 1,824 enemy aircraft in the air, add the 400 odd from November 1943 to January 1944, compare that to the 250 odd claims for the rest of 1943, yet somehow the superiority of 1944 was built on the unescorted raids in 1943? The near 100% Jagdwaffe pilot casualties January to May 1944?

My question again is: what meaningful attacks could be made in 1943 if places like Bremen, Anklam, Schweinfurt and Regensburg had to be scratched from the list because they were too hard?

If the objective is to fight the Luftwaffe whatever targets the Luftwaffe would react to, like oil in mid 1944. As for meaningful, in terms of bomb damage, the 8th Air force dropped 520,487.90 tons of bombs on Germany, cumulative totals to end of month in 1943.

137.5
396.8
928.8
1,191.8
2,478.3
4,282.0
6,332.9
7,631.6
8,723.1
12,908.0
18,291.5
27,185.2

or about 5% of total tonnage dropped, or around half that before all raids were escorted, almost irrelevant when it comes to bomb damage.

8th Air force to Germany
27-Jan-43 Emden, Wilhelmshaven
4-Feb-43 Emden, Hamm
26-Feb-43 Wilhelmshaven
4-Mar-43 Hamm
18-Mar-43 Vegesack
22-Mar-43 Wilhelmshaven
17-Apr-43 Bremen
14-May-43 Kiel
15-May-43 Emden, Heligoland
19-May-43 Flensberg, Kiel
21-May-43 Emden, Wilhelmshaven
11-Jun-43 Cuxhaven, Wilhelmshaven
13-Jun-43 Bremen, Kiel
22-Jun-43 Huls
25-Jun-43 Juist Island, Wangerooge Island
25-Jul-43 Hamburg, Kiel
26-Jul-43 Hamburg, Hannover, Langerooge
28-Jul-43 Kassel, Oschersleben
29-Jul-43 Kiel, Warnemunde
30-Jul-43 Kassel
12-Aug-43 Bochum, Bonn
17-Aug-43 Regensburg, Schweinfurt
6-Sep-43 Stuttgart
27-Sep-43 Emden
2-Oct-43 Emden
4-Oct-43 Frankfurt-am-Main, Saarbrucken, Saarlautern
8-Oct-43 Bremen, Vegesack
9-Oct-43 Anklam, Danzig, Marienburg
10-Oct-43 Munster
14-Oct-43 Schweinfurt
20-Oct-43 Duren
03-Nov-43 Wilhelmshaven
05-Nov-43 Gelsenkirchen, Munster
07-Nov-43 Duren, Wesel
11-Nov-43 Munster, Wesel
13-Nov-43 Bremen
19-Nov-43 Gelsenkirchen
26-Nov-43 Bremen
29-Nov-43 Bremen
30-Nov-43 Solingen
01-Dec-43 Solingen
11-Dec-43 Emden
13-Dec-43 Bremen, Hamburg, Kiel
16-Dec-43 Bremen
20-Dec-43 Bremen
22-Dec-43 Munster, Osnabruck
30-Dec-43 Ludwigshafen

The USAAF certainly had the idea mass heavy bomber daylight raids could work even unescorted, by early 1942 enough evidence was available plus removal of peacetime restrictions, to start a program of extending fighter ranges, mostly via external tanks. The various fighter designs had different degrees of adaptability in a situation where changes cost vital production. The more 1942 went into 1943 the more the USAAF saw for itself unescorted bombers were in trouble, otherwise why bother with any P-38 in the Pacific, Japanese defences were usually much weaker than German and there was plenty of neutral territory on the way to target. More USAAF thinking shifted to escorting and effective ways to do it. The 8th Air Force "won" the prize for being the last to switch over.

Meantime the commanders had to use the results of decisions taken years previously on force mixes, strengths, aircraft types and doctrine. The US military made plenty of mistakes in WWII but were generally the least likely to make the same mistake twice, the 8th Air Force was the air exception.

Pretty much everyone in our street had served either in WWI or WWII. Most of my Dad's friends were WWII veterans. He was too young to go.

Australia suffered heavily in WWI and was probably the most militarised of the western allies in WWII.

 

[EwenS]

P-38 units around the Pacific in WW2 were as follows:-

5th AF.
39th FS, 35th FG - began receiving P-38F in Aug 1942 becoming operational in Oct in New Guinea
9th FS, 49th FG - converted from P-40 to P-38 in mid-Jan 1943 while in New Guinea
80th FS, 8th FG - converted from P-39 to P-38 in Australia from late Jan 1943. Operational in New Guinea from late March.
475th FG - activated in Australia on 14th May 1943 as a P-38 equipped group. Operational in New Guinea from mid-Aug.

A shortage of P-38s in late 1943 saw the 39th lose its P-38s as the whole 35th FG re-equipped with the P-47D, while the 9th FS used P-47s temporarily.

In Feb 1944 enough P-38s had arrived in theatre to allow the 35th & 36th FS in 8th FG to become fully equipped on the type, joining the 80th FS and giving the 5th AF two whole P-38 groups.
The final 5th AF P-38 group, the 49th, didn't convert wholly to the type until Sept 1944, just before the return to the Philippines.

ComAirSols / 13th AF
339th FS - arrived on Guadalcanal with its P-38s in Nov 1942. It joined the 347th FG in early 1943.

During early 1943 some pilots from 12th & 70th FS also flew P-38s at times alongside the P-39.
From late 1943 the 12th & 44th FS in 18th FG converted to the P-38 being joined by the third squadron, 70th FS, in Spring 1944.
It was Spring 1944 before the 67th & 68th FS in the 347th FG converted from the P-39 to the P-38 to make that group fully P-38 equipped.

18th & 347th FG with P-38s then formed the fighter component of 13th AF to the end of WW2.

7th AF Central Pacific
It was late 1944 before any FG in 7th AF received any P-38s, and then it was temporary while they awaited P-51D or P-47N. Only the 318th saw combat with the P-38 while in the Marianas in late 1944, and then it was alongside their existing P-47D.

11th AF Aleutians
The 54th FS took its P-38E newly equipped to carry drop tanks, to the Aleutians at the beginning of June 1942, joining the 343rd FG in Sept. It was late 1943 before the other 3 squadrons began to convert to the P-38.

6th AF Panama Canal Zone.
51st FS began to receive P38s in late 1944 becoming fully equipped in March 1945. Other squadrons in that theatre also received some by Aug 1945, often hand me downs from 7th AF units.

CBI
In May 1943 X squadron (later redesignated 449th FS when it reached China) left Algeria to fly to Kunming, China, arriving in late July and became part of the 14th AF.

A second P-38 squadron was formed in Karachi on 1 Sept 1943, the 459th FS. It moved across India to become operational in Nov 1943 as part of 10th AF.

The 3 squadrons of the 33rd FG converted from the P-47D to the P-38 between Nov 1944 and Feb 1945 being joined in June by the 459th FS.

Summary
It is from late 1943 that the P-38 began to become available in increasing numbers as production built up and decisions were being made that it was no longer required in such large numbers in North West Europe.

 

[Shortround6]

Just looking at a few things

The USAAF managed to get 3 P-38 groups to Europe late 1942/early 1943, they were sent to the Mediterranean where they proved useful, but no more were sent there.

Lockheed only built 1479 P-38s in 1942 and 349 of them were built in Oct, Nov, Dec so many of them were still in the US.
One the other end of scale the planes being made in beginning of the year were P-38Es and P-332s and while the P-38E's were called combat capable that was a little marginal. They had 1150hp engines but somewhat under 200 were built in 1942, but with the around 120-130 (?, production started in Dec 1941) P-322s there are not a lot of P-38F and Gs to send over seas in mid to late 1942 and get them into combat in late 1942.

It is also instructive to look at how many other types of fighters the US built in 1941-1942 and how many they got into the hands of overseas units.
Plane...............1941...............1942
P-38..................207................1479
P-39..................926................1932
P-40...............2248.................3854
P-47...............----1..................532

On the last they started making P-47C in Sept 1942 after making 171 P-47Bs The first P-47C arrive in England as deck cargo on Dec 20th 1942. There is a two-three month delay in getting a plane from the US to combat theater (maybe 4 months to the South Pacific depending one where in the US the factory is located).

The US sent a lot of P-38s to North Africa in the Spring and summer of 1943. They sent no additional fighter groups but they sent large numbers of aircraft as replacements.
The USAAF is having a lot of trouble in North Africa in Sicily and Italy in the spring and summer of 1943. The P-38s are not doing great, but what are the alternatives?
The P-39s are filling out squadrons but the high command is keeping them away from combat as best as they can. Giving them to the free French or using them for anti sub patrol and a less suitable plane is hard to imagine.
And that leave the US with P-40s and the supply of Merlin engine P-40s is running out in the spring of 1943 and Allison powered P-40s need top cover from either Spitfires or P-38s as there aren't enough Merlin P-40s to do the job.
Decisions on which aircraft (and ground personnel) was often made several months in advance of actual combat debut.


2nd point.
Theoretical aircraft ranges, especially at 16,000ft, don't do much for figuring out actual escort ranges.
A P-47C could use up around 65-75 US gallons just starting the engine, warming up, taking off and just getting to 15,000ft. at 12,500lbs (clean). It needed 91-105 gallons to get 25,000ft. It was actually more fuel efficient to climb at combat settings (91 gal) rather than low power as it took around 85% longer to get to 25,000 using the low power setting/s.
A bit harder on the engine and a lot harder to form up the unit though.
Also explains how even a small drop tank (or a 1/2 full one) could make such a change in operational radius. A P-47 that made it to 25,000ft over the channel with about 200 US gallons was not going to get far. Having 275-300 gallons at that point was going to make a significant difference even if not what was wanted. Delay in fitting even a single drop tank to the P-47 is very hard to explain.

 

[ColFord]

J.D. suggest you get yourself a copy of drgondog's (Bill's) book about the origins and development of the Mustang as a starting point.

Then stand by for Volume 2 of his work when it is published, which does a deep dive into the Long Range Fighter from a largely US perspective and the development of the later model and 'light weight' P-51s.

In terms of Mustangs, first order made by USAAC, was for 150 NA-91 P-51 Mustang, which was Mustang IA in RAF service, ordered 25 September 1941. Originally this was intended as a Lend Lease order for the UK, with all 150 to go to the UK/RAF. But after Pearl Harbor US retained 58, UK received 92. Those retained by US and those allocated to USAAF primarily used as tactical fighter reconnaissance aircraft in the MTO and by training units in CONUS. Two allocated to NAA for the XP-51B program.

That was then followed in April 1942 with the order for 500 NA-97 A-36A Mustangs for the USAAF.

Last order for Allison engine Mustangs was in August 1942 for 1200 NA-99 P-51A Mustang, which UK received 50 as Mustang II. Was intended a a low to medium altitude fighter, Most of those produced were used either as tactical fighter reconnaissance aircraft in the ETO, or with USAAF groups in the CBI, with some retained for training units in CONUS.

At that time, the USAAF is well aware, as is NAA, of the Mustang X conversion of Mustang I airframes in the UK by Rolls-Royce, there is plenty of information flowing back and forth between the UK and USA on that front. NAA has already received the go ahead for the XP-51B program to fit the Packard built R-R Merlin into the two NA-91 Mustang airframes as a proof of concept and prototype/trials aircraft. Key timing for that depends on delivery of engines from Packard. R-R fly the first of their modified Mustang X in October 1942, with the trials proving the paper calculations on the performance improvements, particularly at altitude by fitting a Merlin to the Mustang airframe. NAA fly the first of their converted P-51s fitted with a Packard-Merlin in November 1942. End result, when the trials performance figures are seen by both RAF and USAAF, decision is to progress the Merlin engine Mustang program as a priority and to divert a large chunk of the NA-99 P-51A build contract over to P-51B airframes. As a result only 310 P-51A built before production switches to P-51B. Large orders then placed for further follow on production batches of Merlin engine Mustangs. Bill's book - see above - sets it all out.

Other good book on the subject is the one from the Rolls-Royce Heritage Trust by David Birch - Rolls-Royce and the Mustang.

Other point is that you cannot in relation to what is happening in the ETO and MTO, solely focus on the decisions being made by the USAAF senior officers in the US and in the ETO and MTO in isolation to political level decisions being made by those in the Joint Chiefs and the senior levels of Government. Added to that is the influence of the AIr Staff of the RAF and their leadership on the USAAF leadership - remembering that the RAF had a very strong bomber influence in its higher command structure and political leadership layers. Added to that were the representations made by the UK Government about priorities and strategic directions, balancing the different theatres of operations with political pressures home and abroad. They had their views which they were presenting forcefully about the primacy of the bomber offensive, how bombers should be used and were still coming to grips with exactly what the bombers could and could not do. Again there were quite a few reversals in opinions and policies as a result of various successes and set backs and over optimistic views about exactly what the bombers could achieve and were actually achieving.

 

[Engineman]

J.D. suggest you get yourself a copy of drgondog's (Bill's) book about the origins and development of the Mustang as a starting point.

View attachment 858841



At that time, the USAAF is well aware, as is NAA, of the Mustang X conversion of Mustang I airframes in the UK by Rolls-Royce, there is plenty of information flowing back and forth between the UK and USA on that front. NAA has already received the go ahead for the XP-51B program to fit the Packard built R-R Merlin into the two NA-91 Mustang airframes as a proof of concept and prototype/trials aircraft. Key timing for that depends on delivery of engines from Packard. R-R fly the first of their modified Mustang X in October 1942, with the trials proving the paper calculations on the performance improvements, particularly at altitude by fitting a Merlin to the Mustang airframe. NAA fly the first of their converted P-51s fitted with a Packard-Merlin in November 1942. End result, when the trials performance figures are seen by both RAF and USAAF, decision is to progress the Merlin engine Mustang program as a priority and to divert a large chunk of the NA-99 P-51A build contract over to P-51B airframes. As a result only 310 P-51A built before production switches to P-51B. Large orders then placed for further follow on production batches of Merlin engine Mustangs. Bill's book - see above - sets it all out.

Other good book on the subject is the one from the Rolls-Royce Heritage Trust by David Birch - Rolls-Royce and the Mustang.

View attachment 858842

It wasn't just the fitting of any Merlin that made the Merlin Mustang so effective in its time, it was the the redesign to fit the new 2-stage Merlin that made the difference.
If the Mustang had just been redesigned and fitted with the Merlin XX or Packard Merlin 28 it would never have been as effective. David Birch's book has a lot of detail.

Eng

 

[tomo pauk]

If the Mustang had just been redesigned and fitted with the Merlin XX or Packard Merlin 28 it would never have been as effective. David Birch's book has a lot of detail.

Merlin Mustang was indeed very effective. The only shortcoming was that it was effective in 1944.
If it was fitted with a Merlin 45, 50, XX or 28, it would've been a less effective, but it would've been a thing in 1943. Similar goes with the Mustang X, if all of the Mustang Is were converted to that by, say, mid-1943.

 

[J.D.]

J.D. suggest you get yourself a copy of drgondog's (Bill's) book about the origins and development of the Mustang as a starting point.

You'll never believe it but my copy arrived yesterday!

 

[drgondog]

Merlin Mustang was indeed very effective. The only shortcoming was that it was effective in 1944.
If it was fitted with a Merlin 45, 50, XX or 28, it would've been a less effective, but it would've been a thing in 1943. Similar goes with the Mustang X, if all of the Mustang Is were converted to that by, say, mid-1943.

Tomo - there were two critical paths to the operational P-51B. The Airframe Design and Packard deliveries.

The experimental design which required the lower cowl change, the drop of the wing and the change to the inlet scoop to eliminate 'rumble', was complete ~ October 1 but the first production 1650-3 blew up, delaying the flight tests that revealed the cooling issues, but the airframe design changes to drop the wing for the new cowl proceeded apace. No delay there. If the Merlin 28 had been installed, flight testing could have revealed the cooling system issues earlier, and solved earlier but the delivery of the production airframe late March 1943 would not have changed. What would have changed would be the timing of the first flight test of the P-51B-1 #1 by five weeks, but delivery of the P-51B-1 engineless airframes would have continued apace. That said, the Ames wind tunnel testing in April resulted in the lower scoop change to the production deliveries into May.

In the latter instance, deliveries of Merlin 28 would have been faster than the new 1650-3, but the Packard strike in June would have impacted deliveries to the P-51B-1 the same.

The medium altitude performance of the Merlin 28/1650-1 IMO would have a.) killed the July recommendation from Military Requirements that the P-51B was preferred over the P-38J as the long range escort solution. That in turn would have cemented the current planning that the P-51B was a 'battlefield air supremacy' fighter and relegated it to TacAir forever. The primary long range escort burden would have fallen to the less than satisfactory ETO deployed P-38J FG's.

IMO - In that role there would have been no pressure to install extra internal fuel, and no reason to expedite delivery to ETO as ordered by Arnold.

Ditto for the fate of the Mustang X. I can see no reason that RAF would have Ever agreed to install destabilizing 85-gal fuselage tank, or any reason to deliver them to 8th AF 'as is'. Nor did RAF require daylight long range escort. In any case, even the RAF Mustang III (without 85-gal fuse tank) was not dispatched to support 8th AF until Big Week, in small numbers, performing the same range withdrawal support at 8th AF P-47s.

Kindelberger and Atwood argued, and Arnold agreed, that the NA-101 XP-51B should install the Packard 1650-3 in June 1942. It was only then that NAA received A1 priority for the first two production V-1650-3s.





Result? A small delay

The new airfram

 

[tomo pauk]

Result? A small delay

Thank you for the very informative post.
The 'small delay' part is what I disagree with. Having a high-performance rangy fighter, that has no worrying flaws, in the ETO from at least mid-1943 is a far cry vs. having a great fighter from December of 1943 on. Going with the full-blown Merlin Mustang from NAA will remove that fighter from basically whole 1943, unlike if the Mk.X. Six months was eternity under the conditions of the ww2.

Ditto for the fate of the Mustang X. I can see no reason that RAF would have Ever agreed to install destabilizing 85-gal fuselage tank, or any reason to deliver them to 8th AF 'as is'. Nor did RAF require daylight long range escort. In any case, even the RAF Mustang III (without 85-gal fuse tank) was not dispatched to support 8th AF until Big Week, in small numbers, performing the same range withdrawal support at 8th AF P-47s.

Start with a smaller fuselage tank, add the drop tanks, and use these fighters in the escort role the Spitfire IXs were used.