Jabberwocky
Staff Sergeant
I'd argue that that "The bomber advocates believed strategic bombing would be decisive and argued again and again that using strategic bombers in tactical bombing roles was an ineffective diversion of resources."
The USAAF, for instance, procured large numbers of light/attack bombers (A-20, A-26) and medium bombers (B-26, B-25). The 'bomber barons' were fine with deploying these aircraft in tactical and what I'd label 'semi strategic' roles (against targets like transportation hubs, lines of communication, airfields and naval concentrations).
Even then, I'd say that the USAAF's approach was highly theater and mission dependent. Look at what the 5th Air Force did in the Southwest Pacific. There the (admittedly much smaller) force of heavy four engine bombers were used with great flexibility, and integrated with the attack and medium bomber forces into a real mix of missions.
The 5th's B-17s and B-24s undertook the USAAF's preferred mission of daylight "precision" formation bombing, usually in groups of 20 to 40 aircraft formations and often at high altitudes (25,000 ft), in both escorted and unescorted missions. But, they were also commonly deployed in medium-altitude small formation (2-8 aircraft) attacks and in night bombing attacks, again in small formations and also in 'bomber stream' type attacks similar to the RAF doctrine in the ETO.
The 5th's heavy bombers were also used in attack missions. Japanese airfields were regularly bombed at 3000 to 8000ft altitudes, and occassionally the heavy bombers were deployed at near treetop/mast height for attacks against airfields and (generally unescorted) naval targets.
'A War of Their Own - Bombers Over the Southwest Pacific' is a good read on the subject:
