Greg Spouts Off About P-38 Drop Tanks

[GrauGeist]

I have to say that I don't trust anyone using either "greetings" or "salutations" as an opening. Greg, of course, uses the former.

Back when I was recovering from my wreck, the boss had me do a Monday video conference from home on the week's shop workload (which I did not want to do).

I'd start the meeting with "Hola Pendejos" and the bossman was not amused.

Perhaps this phrase would be a good starter for a YT series?

 

[Just Schmidt]

Hey everyone, how's it going? Ok, it's actually a while since last I clicked on a Greg. In the beginning I liked his explaining technical stuff where I did not have a clue. For someone with my background, the level was pretty bang on. For some here it was of course kindergarten.
YouTube is a big place, and the quality varies immensely. Greg got less interesting as he began to tackle the larger picture, where frankly he is out of his deaths . It's like that with many channels, you start out doing something you're pretty good at, and suddenly you has to continue a succesful channel and know everything.
A lot falls through when they reach that point. And sme get their ego greatly inflated
Bonuspoint to anyone who recognizes the rather meandering channel the greeting is from. It's not meant as a recommendation...

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Hey everyone, how's it going?

[...]

Bonuspoint to anyone who recognizes the rather meandering channel the greeting is from. It's not meant as a recommendation...

IHYLS

 

[Dimlee]

There are channels in which I wish the creator used an AI voice -- it would be better than his leaden diction.

There were mornings when I wished to have an AI voice. And face.

 

[Just Schmidt]

There were mornings when I wished to have an AI voice. And face.

I think you have a very lovable face. Wait, is that not your real face?!

 

[special ed]

As other have said, they were not dropped on peacetime missions except in emergencies.

I recall a friend saying in our home town said he observed a USAF T-33A dropping its tip tanks over a populated area.
I recall reading in a USAF safety magazine about a T-33A taking off from Mountain Home AFB, ID, just before a storm front hit. They were rolling down the runway when the gust front overtook them from behind, instantly causing a huge drop in airspeed. The only way to get off the ground before the runway ran out was to punch off the tip tanks.
And I recall a former military pilot admitting that he left two drop tanks in a golf course.

And that is all the cases I have ever heard about, despite 25 years on active duty in the USAF and a lifelong study of aviation.

Now, a friend of mine who was in a German POW camp in WW2 said that Allied pilots would on occasion drop their tanks into the POW compound. They probably were Polish pilots and were just trying to say hello, buck, up, we're here, etc. but of course everyone's reaction was to run like hell and duck for cover. He said there occasionally was enough fuel left in the tanks to fill a cigarette lighter and that the tank he saw was made out of paper.

I may have mentioned in another thread, way back, about an incident with Geography exams and a T-33. It seems that our Geography exams were in a luggage pod attached to the belly of the T-33 our instructor flew home for the weekend. Monday morning, we were told that all of us had passed our exams as they were lost somewhere west of the Rockies.

 

[elbmc1969]

Hear me out.

I'd suggest that we don't do some mad scramble the moment Greg posts a video, even if the title contains the word like 'Bomber mafia' and similar. I know that finding mistakes in his videos is cool here, but still.

Just to be clear--I watched the entire video and posted numerous comments before posting the video here. I had also discussed this topic with Greg and he apparently decided to ignore an extensive historical study that I pointed him to. He appears to obliquely dismiss it in the video.

Greg is absolutely right that there was a bomber mafia, and that it held unrealistic views. However, he ignores the views of the fighter advocates in the years leading up to the Second World War, leading him deep into nonsensical error. When the fighter guys don't think that it's possible to build an effective long-range escort, it's hard to argue against unescorted bombers.

 

[elbmc1969]

Anyone got a month by month (or even week by week) comparison of USAAF claims in North Africa and Western Europe?

I wonder at what point the rate of ETO claims takes over that of MTO claims.

This may be true, but it is also irrelevant.

To be accurate, it's cause-and-effect error. Are you shooting down more Axis aircraft in the MTO because there are more of them there, or simply because almost all of your fighter forces are there? You can construct some simple distributions of squadrons between the theaters that make it obvious that you can allocate forces to put the majority of the shoot-downs that you achieve into one theater or the other.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Just to be clear--I watched the entire video and posted numerous comments before posting the video here. I had also discussed this topic with Greg and he apparently decided to ignore an extensive historical study that I pointed him to. He appears to obliquely dismiss it in the video.

Greg is absolutely right that there was a bomber mafia, and that it held unrealistic views. However, he ignores the views of the fighter advocates in the years leading up to the Second World War, leading him deep into nonsensical error. When the fighter guys don't think that it's possible to build an effective long-range escort, it's hard to argue against unescorted bombers.

There were bomber mavens who truly believed "the bomber will always get through", especially when that bomber carried a lot of machine guns. The question is whether those mavens were so devoted to their own doctrine that they chose to sacrifice lives rather than admit error.

What Greg brings to the table about P-38s being sent to Africa instead of escorting bombers ignores the fact that while 8th AF missions in Nov 42 over Europe were tiny, US Army troops in North Africa needed air-cover right.freakin.now. He also ignores the engine issues P-38s suffered over the ETO.

 

[GrauGeist]

I'm going to create a phrase:
"Battleship Mafia" because in the days leading up to WWII, the mindset was Battleships would decide naval engagements.

So anything other than Battleships were suppressed by the Battleship Mafia.

Do not come at me with actual facts or documents - anyone disagreeing will be deleted, mocked and blocked.

 

[pbehn]

Just to be clear--I watched the entire video and posted numerous comments before posting the video here. I had also discussed this topic with Greg and he apparently decided to ignore an extensive historical study that I pointed him to. He appears to obliquely dismiss it in the video.

Greg is absolutely right that there was a bomber mafia, and that it held unrealistic views. However, he ignores the views of the fighter advocates in the years leading up to the Second World War, leading him deep into nonsensical error. When the fighter guys don't think that it's possible to build an effective long-range escort, it's hard to argue against unescorted bombers.

Greg trips on the semantics of the word "bomber" smashes his head on the wall and falls out of the window into a pile of cow slurry. The "BOMBER MAFIA" were advocates of a strategic and tactical bomber force to project US power in times of war. It is impossible for anyone to argue that they werent correct, bearing in mind how the war in the far east ended and what happened after. To this day the USA has a massive bomb force, they just dont use aircraft anymore. It is a matter of historical fact that the USA was attacked at Pearl Harbor in December 1941, in April 1942 the Doolittle raid on Tokyo used BOMBERS taking off from a carrier at some risk simply to make a symbolic hit on Japans capital. If the USA had a fleet of B-29s in 1942, that is what would have been used. The BOMBER MAFIA were not in any way averse or opposed to using fighters, the issue was getting fighters with the rang to do it. Experiments with in flight refuelling and bombers actually carrying fighters were tried to that end. Gregs Bomber Mafia nonsense is just money making tripe, complete BS and he knows it, but he has years of experience keeping people clicking.

 

[GrauGeist]

In all honesty, the bombing strategy leading up to, and during the early days of WWII were shaped by technology of the day.

Single engined fighters simply did not have the range to accompany multi-engined (two, three, four, etc.) bombers.

We also saw the various types of interceptors designed to counter them, like Bell's YFM-1, turret fighters as well as the "heavy fighter" concept, which were to either intercept or escort bombers.

There was also the push within the USAAC to develop the extra long range bomber concept, which led to the B-29 and B-36 by way of the YB-15 and YB-19.

The 1930's were an interesting time for military aviation and the "Bomber Mafia" was nothing more than the USAAF making a transition from a 1930's mindset to the evolving battlefield situation of the 1940's.

 

[Shortround6]

I'm going to create a phrase:
"Battleship Mafia" because in the days leading up to WWII, the mindset was Battleships would decide naval engagements.

So anything other than Battleships were suppressed by the Battleship Mafia.

There was a "battleship Mafia", it just didn't go to the extremes that that Greg claims the Bomber Mafia did
The BB Mafia realized they needed escorts, cruisers and destroyers. The All powerful BBs could not deal with enemy night surface torpedo attacks and subs all on their own
The BB Mafia also realized that the DDs could never have the 'range' of a BB. So they built fleet oilers and arranged/experimented with underway replenishment and even figured out how to at least top up DDs from Cruisers, carriers and yes, even the battleships.

The destroyer designers had a similar problem to the escort fighter designer. If you want the range/endurance of a much larger ship/airplane you have to give up stuff (weapons/protection/performance) to get it assuming you have the same level of technology. Things look even worse for the Destroyer vs escort fighter analogy here. Destroyers used much lighter/comp[act engines per HP than battleships. Escort fighter designers do not have that crutch.

A quick look at the B-17B bomber specs shows the fighter designer's problem.

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/B-17/B-17B-Characteristics_Performance_Summary.pdf

850 US gallons was the normal fuel load. 2492 US gal was max fuel load.
A back of of the envelope calculation shows that a single engine fighter needs to be able to carry 210-215 US gallons to match the normal 'endurance' of the 4 engine bomber.
Use drop tanks or don't. A P-36 needs about a 50-60 gal drop tank and fuel internal fuel and will be considered to very, very over loaded with such an external tank.
Chances of escorting a B-17 that was carrying even 1200 gals? 300 gallons in/under a 1200hp fighter? Even with drop tanks?
A P-43 with 100 gallons in drop tanks?
A P-38 without protected tanks and with a pair of 100 gallon drop tanks gives the twin engine fighter about 600 gallons. Of course even the P-38E only had 1150hp engines so performance with a heavy load of fuel might have been a bit lacking?

The state of the art in Aircraft/engine design did not allow for escort fighters in 1938-39-40. Germans were not stupid when they designed the Bf 110. And they were only trying to escort He 111s.
Now when did the crossover point come?????
When did the combination of aerodynamics, structure and powerplant allow for a decent escort fighter of even 400-500 radius occur?
Hanging 450 gallons under a P-40 is not going to work. You could do it, but you weren't going to escort anything.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

According to Roger Freeman, B-17B
3,600 miles at 176 mph at 10,000 feet with 2,496 gallons of fuel, no bombs, weight 45,650 pounds
2,400 miles at 230 mph at 25,000 feet with 1,700 gallons of fuel, 4,000 pounds of bombs, weight 44,500 pounds
1,300 miles at 230 mph at 25,000 feet with 850 gallons of fuel, 2,400 pounds of bombs, weight 37,000 pounds

Non Tokyo Tank B-17F 1,300 miles at 200 mph at 10,000 feet with 1,730 gallons of fuel, 6,000 pounds of bombs, weight 56,500 pounds
Tokyo Tank B-17F 2,200 miles at 200 mph at 10,000 feet with 2,810 gallons of fuel, 6,000 pounds of bombs, weight 65,500 pounds

Assuming the 1/3 rule, Non Tokyo B-17 radius above would be around 450 miles, with 8th Air Force tactics it was 320 miles, at 225/240 mph at 25,000 feet, 6,000 pounds of bombs. 1,760 gallons of fuel, 380 gallons used in climb, all up 1,075 gallons used to target, 115 gallons remaining on return.

Aerodynamics matters, Hurricane I economic cruise 7.73 mpg, Spitfire I 8.91 mpg, 15% more efficient

Gauntlet 15 minutes allowance = 12.4 gallons take off and climb to 15,000 feet
Gladiator II 15 minutes allowance = 18 gallons take off and climb to 15,000 feet
Hurricane I 15 minutes allowance = 19.4 gallons take off and climb to 15,000 feet
Spitfire I 15 minutes allowance = 20 gallons take off and climb to 15,000 feet
Spitfire VIII actual 23 gallons take off and climb to 20,000 feet, 54 gallons for combat and reserves.
The allowances seem to over estimate the Spitfire I requirements at least.

100 octane weight 7.2 pounds per gallon, allowance is fuel used in 15 minutes maximum power at sea level for warming up and climbing to operational height. Cruise height 15,000 feet, take off weight excludes external fuel, radius is for the aircraft released at 15,000 feet with running engine and full fuel tanks. Assumptions: external tanks are weightless and cost 10% of their fuel due to drag but do not drop speed and carry the fuel needed for the allowance and fly to radius distance. The final Spitfire column uses the mark VIII forward fuselage fuel capacity, 96 gallons to show what a seemingly small change in internal fuel does, radius at 305mph would be around 360 miles. The Spitfire Vb clean take off weight was 6,460 pounds, the Hurricane IIc 7,544 but with more power available. The US types have a protection problem.

Aircraft	Mohawk	Mohawk	Tomahawk	Tomahawk	Gauntlet	Gladiator	Hurricane I	Hurricane I	Spitfire I	Spitfire I	Spitfire I
Clean Take off Weight lb	7,000​	7,000​	7,602​	7,602​	4,028​	4,912​	6,661​	6,661​	6,255​	6,255​	6352.5​
Cruise Speed (m.p.h)	185​	248​	185​	278​	118​	142​	170 - 180	281​	180 - 190	305​	180 - 190
Fuel weight pounds/gallon	7.2​	7.2​	7.2​	7.2​	7.7​	7.5​	7.5​	7.5​	7.5​	7.5​	7.5​
Internal fuel gallons	132​	132​	132​	132​	79​	83​	97​	97​	84​	84​	96​
clean range with 15 mins allowance	800​	592​	800​	615​	511​	488​	580​	447​	575​	415​	681​
allowance gallons	29​	29​	25​	25​	12.60​	17.99​	19.40​	19.40​	19.47​	19.47​	19.53​
mpg	7.77​	5.75​	7.48​	5.75​	9.43​	8.04​	7.73​	5.76​	8.91​	6.43​	8.91​
fuel for combat+reserve gals	40​	40​	40​	40​	27​	34​	40​	40​	40​	40​	40​
radius miles	714.56​	529.00​	687.85​	528.79​	490.27​	394.17​	440.72​	328.32​	392.05​	282.92​	499.19​
external fuel gals	133.10​	133.10​	128.70​	128.70​	71.06​	73.68​	84.04​	84.04​	69.81​	69.81​	83.09​
external fuel wt lb	958.32​	958.32​	926.64​	926.64​	547.19​	552.63​	630.30​	630.30​	523.60​	523.60​	623.16​
total fuel gals	265.10​	265.10​	260.70​	260.70​	150.06​	156.68​	181.04​	181.04​	153.81​	153.81​	179.09​
Take off weight	7958.32​	7958.32​	8528.64​	8528.64​	4575.19​	5464.63​	7291.30​	7291.30​	6778.60​	6778.60​	6975.66​
%extra weight of external fuel	13.69​	13.69​	12.19​	12.19​	13.58​	11.25​	9.46​	9.46​	8.37​	8.37​	9.81​

Using these simplistic calculations the amount of fuel carried does not change with cruise speed, the radius drops. The extra weight carried could be compensated to an extent by constant speed propellers and proper runways (see the B-24 take off charts), going to 100 octane would give more energy in the fuel for a few pounds less weight, probably around what the external tank and fittings would weigh.

The USAAF calculated the combat radius figures on internal fuel as follows, P-38J 300 gallons 125 miles, 410 gallons 275 miles, P-47D 305 gallons 150 miles, 370 gallons 250 miles, P-51B 180 gallons 175 miles, 265 gallons 400 miles. Conditions, Escort fighter accompanying B-17 at 185 mph IAS, Full power (max continuous) climbing to 25,000 feet, Cruise at 210 mph IAS, 300 mph TAS, Tanks dropped when empty or at radius, 15 minutes combat at military power, 5 minutes combat at war emergency power, Return to base at required cruising speed, accompanying bombers, 30 minutes fuel reserve.

The P-38 with 300 gallons internal could only use 175 gallons of external fuel, unless it wanted to loiter within 350 miles from base or run out of fuel going home.

The state of the art in Aircraft/engine design did not allow for escort fighters in 1938-39-40. Germans were not stupid when they designed the Bf 110. And they were only trying to escort He 111s.

The A6M in 1940? The P-51 in 1941 once it had drop tanks? Both medium altitude types. The P-51B with 180 gallons internal could only use 135 gallons external, but had a radius of 500 miles. Plenty of He111 performance figures to choose from, early H 1,200 miles with full bomb load.

Now when did the crossover point come????? When did the combination of aerodynamics, structure and powerplant allow for a decent escort fighter of even 400-500 radius occur?

The unspoken condition, escort for USAAF B-17 and B-24 types at high altitude.

Decent fighter is at least partially defined by the opposition quality, the P-36 and P-40 as escorts would have had problems with Bf109E in 1939/40 then again like the Spitfire V in 1943, if there were enough bombers the interceptors would often try and avoid engaging escorts, making the escorts competitive. Part of the 8th Air Force success was numbers, not just quality.

US Archives Record Group 342 Entry P26 Box 2237. Decimal hours 0.333 = 20 minutes. P-38F 290 gallons internal, 300 gallons external fuel,
1. Warm up taxi, take off to 100 feet 12 gallons main tanks,
2. 100 to 15,000 feet 34 gallons, 0.16 hours, belly tank
3. cruise 2,280 RPM full throttle, 250 mph, 110 gallons per hour, 2.0 hours, 220 gallons, 500 air miles flown, belly tank,
4. Drop belly tank, with 46 gallons still in it (or use the fuel but stay within 500 miles of base)
5. combat full military power for 10 minutes, 42 gallons,
6. return cruise as per outgoing but at 280 mph, 196 gallons, 1.8 hours, 500 miles,
7. Reserve 40 gallons 0.333 hours.

AFHRA Reel A2069 page 1574, P-51B with 180 internal, 150 external gallons, combat radius as fighter 350-500 miles, as escort 250-350 miles, with 265 internal and 216 external radius as fighter 700-850 miles, as escort 500-600 miles. P-38J 290 internal 300 external radius as fighter 300-450 miles, as escort 200-330 miles, P-38J with 410 internal and 300 external radius as fighter 550-700 miles, as escort 375 to 475 miles.

The P-51B with 265 gallons internal and 150 external could go out to 750 miles radius, compared to the B-17G of 2,000 miles range at 182 mph at 10,000 feet with 6,000 pounds of bombs. It also helped fighters were no longer sticking with a given bomber formation thereby forgoing range by having to weave. The 1943 problem solved, now what about escorts for the new 1944 model, the B-29?

Over and above the engineering that favoured multi engine aircraft having longer ranges comes bombers had 2 range deductions, the fuel needed to take off and climb to height and the reserves, fighters had a third, combat allowance which was expensive, even at fast cruise speeds it was worth a couple of hundred miles of range.

The bigger the aircraft the general rule the longer it takes to develop and then build in numbers. As fighters are smaller it gives them a chance to pass. In order to have the bomber force it did the USAAF had to use 1,200 HP class engines in the B-17 and B-24, while the fighters could fit more powerful engines and then carry more fuel. Add the P-51 was a real advance in aerodynamics and construction, including providing more internal room for fuel tanks. The inevitable downside is changes tend to delay mass production, made worse because the B-17 and B-24 programs had head starts.

The USAAF had P-38 in early 1943 that could escort 8th Air Force B-17 all the way to target, at least until Tokyo tank versions became numerous and in mid 1943 the P-51B which could go almost everywhere the 8th Air Force then wanted to go, it took until early 1944 before the 8th Air Force had the two fighters in numbers. Meantime in the Mediterranean from late 1942 the standard US heavy bomber mission stayed within escort range, with some obvious exceptions, like Ploesti, or could get away without (many) escorts due to a lack of axis fighters in the target area or en route.

 

[Just Schmidt]

Ok, it's actually a while since last I clicked on a Greg.

So I went and watched it. He has gotten rather polemic, I have to admit. Still, no progress is made where everybody agrees on everything.

I have one question though. If they were 100% against escorted bombers, why then did they spend money like drunken sailors on YB 40's?

 

[RCAFson]

According to Roger Freeman, B-17B
3,600 miles at 176 mph at 10,000 feet with 2,496 gallons of fuel, no bombs, weight 45,650 pounds
2,400 miles at 230 mph at 25,000 feet with 1,700 gallons of fuel, 4,000 pounds of bombs, weight 44,500 pounds
1,300 miles at 230 mph at 25,000 feet with 850 gallons of fuel, 2,400 pounds of bombs, weight 37,000 pounds

Non Tokyo Tank B-17F 1,300 miles at 200 mph at 10,000 feet with 1,730 gallons of fuel, 6,000 pounds of bombs, weight 56,500 pounds
Tokyo Tank B-17F 2,200 miles at 200 mph at 10,000 feet with 2,810 gallons of fuel, 6,000 pounds of bombs, weight 65,500 pounds

Assuming the 1/3 rule, Non Tokyo B-17 radius above would be around 450 miles, with 8th Air Force tactics it was 320 miles, at 225/240 mph at 25,000 feet, 6,000 pounds of bombs. 1,760 gallons of fuel, 380 gallons used in climb, all up 1,075 gallons used to target, 115 gallons remaining on return.

Aerodynamics matters, Hurricane I economic cruise 7.73 mpg, Spitfire I 8.91 mpg, 15% more efficient

Gauntlet 15 minutes allowance = 12.4 gallons take off and climb to 15,000 feet
Gladiator II 15 minutes allowance = 18 gallons take off and climb to 15,000 feet
Hurricane I 15 minutes allowance = 19.4 gallons take off and climb to 15,000 feet
Spitfire I 15 minutes allowance = 20 gallons take off and climb to 15,000 feet
Spitfire VIII actual 23 gallons take off and climb to 20,000 feet, 54 gallons for combat and reserves.
The allowances seem to over estimate the Spitfire I requirements at least.

100 octane weight 7.2 pounds per gallon, allowance is fuel used in 15 minutes maximum power at sea level for warming up and climbing to operational height. Cruise height 15,000 feet, take off weight excludes external fuel, radius is for the aircraft released at 15,000 feet with running engine and full fuel tanks. Assumptions: external tanks are weightless and cost 10% of their fuel due to drag but do not drop speed and carry the fuel needed for the allowance and fly to radius distance. The final Spitfire column uses the mark VIII forward fuselage fuel capacity, 96 gallons to show what a seemingly small change in internal fuel does, radius at 305mph would be around 360 miles. The Spitfire Vb clean take off weight was 6,460 pounds, the Hurricane IIc 7,544 but with more power available. The US types have a protection problem.

Aircraft	Mohawk	Mohawk	Tomahawk	Tomahawk	Gauntlet	Gladiator	Hurricane I	Hurricane I	Spitfire I	Spitfire I	Spitfire I
Clean Take off Weight lb	7,000​	7,000​	7,602​	7,602​	4,028​	4,912​	6,661​	6,661​	6,255​	6,255​	6352.5​
Cruise Speed (m.p.h)	185​	248​	185​	278​	118​	142​	170 - 180	281​	180 - 190	305​	180 - 190
Fuel weight pounds/gallon	7.2​	7.2​	7.2​	7.2​	7.7​	7.5​	7.5​	7.5​	7.5​	7.5​	7.5​
Internal fuel gallons	132​	132​	132​	132​	79​	83​	97​	97​	84​	84​	96​
clean range with 15 mins allowance	800​	592​	800​	615​	511​	488​	580​	447​	575​	415​	681​
allowance gallons	29​	29​	25​	25​	12.60​	17.99​	19.40​	19.40​	19.47​	19.47​	19.53​
mpg	7.77​	5.75​	7.48​	5.75​	9.43​	8.04​	7.73​	5.76​	8.91​	6.43​	8.91​
fuel for combat+reserve gals	40​	40​	40​	40​	27​	34​	40​	40​	40​	40​	40​
radius miles	714.56​	529.00​	687.85​	528.79​	490.27​	394.17​	440.72​	328.32​	392.05​	282.92​	499.19​
external fuel gals	133.10​	133.10​	128.70​	128.70​	71.06​	73.68​	84.04​	84.04​	69.81​	69.81​	83.09​
external fuel wt lb	958.32​	958.32​	926.64​	926.64​	547.19​	552.63​	630.30​	630.30​	523.60​	523.60​	623.16​
total fuel gals	265.10​	265.10​	260.70​	260.70​	150.06​	156.68​	181.04​	181.04​	153.81​	153.81​	179.09​
Take off weight	7958.32​	7958.32​	8528.64​	8528.64​	4575.19​	5464.63​	7291.30​	7291.30​	6778.60​	6778.60​	6975.66​
%extra weight of external fuel	13.69​	13.69​	12.19​	12.19​	13.58​	11.25​	9.46​	9.46​	8.37​	8.37​	9.81​

Using these simplistic calculations the amount of fuel carried does not change with cruise speed, the radius drops. The extra weight carried could be compensated to an extent by constant speed propellers and proper runways (see the B-24 take off charts), going to 100 octane would give more energy in the fuel for a few pounds less weight, probably around what the external tank and fittings would weigh.

The USAAF calculated the combat radius figures on internal fuel as follows, P-38J 300 gallons 125 miles, 410 gallons 275 miles, P-47D 305 gallons 150 miles, 370 gallons 250 miles, P-51B 180 gallons 175 miles, 265 gallons 400 miles. Conditions, Escort fighter accompanying B-17 at 185 mph IAS, Full power (max continuous) climbing to 25,000 feet, Cruise at 210 mph IAS, 300 mph TAS, Tanks dropped when empty or at radius, 15 minutes combat at military power, 5 minutes combat at war emergency power, Return to base at required cruising speed, accompanying bombers, 30 minutes fuel reserve.

The P-38 with 300 gallons internal could only use 175 gallons of external fuel, unless it wanted to loiter within 350 miles from base or run out of fuel going home.


The A6M in 1940? The P-51 in 1941 once it had drop tanks? Both medium altitude types. The P-51B with 180 gallons internal could only use 135 gallons external, but had a radius of 500 miles. Plenty of He111 performance figures to choose from, early H 1,200 miles with full bomb load.

The unspoken condition, escort for USAAF B-17 and B-24 types at high altitude.

Decent fighter is at least partially defined by the opposition quality, the P-36 and P-40 as escorts would have had problems with Bf109E in 1939/40 then again like the Spitfire V in 1943, if there were enough bombers the interceptors would often try and avoid engaging escorts, making the escorts competitive. Part of the 8th Air Force success was numbers, not just quality.

US Archives Record Group 342 Entry P26 Box 2237. Decimal hours 0.333 = 20 minutes. P-38F 290 gallons internal, 300 gallons external fuel,
1. Warm up taxi, take off to 100 feet 12 gallons main tanks,
2. 100 to 15,000 feet 34 gallons, 0.16 hours, belly tank
3. cruise 2,280 RPM full throttle, 250 mph, 110 gallons per hour, 2.0 hours, 220 gallons, 500 air miles flown, belly tank,
4. Drop belly tank, with 46 gallons still in it (or use the fuel but stay within 500 miles of base)
5. combat full military power for 10 minutes, 42 gallons,
6. return cruise as per outgoing but at 280 mph, 196 gallons, 1.8 hours, 500 miles,
7. Reserve 40 gallons 0.333 hours.

AFHRA Reel A2069 page 1574, P-51B with 180 internal, 150 external gallons, combat radius as fighter 350-500 miles, as escort 250-350 miles, with 265 internal and 216 external radius as fighter 700-850 miles, as escort 500-600 miles. P-38J 290 internal 300 external radius as fighter 300-450 miles, as escort 200-330 miles, P-38J with 410 internal and 300 external radius as fighter 550-700 miles, as escort 375 to 475 miles.

The P-51B with 265 gallons internal and 150 external could go out to 750 miles radius, compared to the B-17G of 2,000 miles range at 182 mph at 10,000 feet with 6,000 pounds of bombs. It also helped fighters were no longer sticking with a given bomber formation thereby forgoing range by having to weave. The 1943 problem solved, now what about escorts for the new 1944 model, the B-29?

Over and above the engineering that favoured multi engine aircraft having longer ranges comes bombers had 2 range deductions, the fuel needed to take off and climb to height and the reserves, fighters had a third, combat allowance which was expensive, even at fast cruise speeds it was worth a couple of hundred miles of range.

The bigger the aircraft the general rule the longer it takes to develop and then build in numbers. As fighters are smaller it gives them a chance to pass. In order to have the bomber force it did the USAAF had to use 1,200 HP class engines in the B-17 and B-24, while the fighters could fit more powerful engines and then carry more fuel. Add the P-51 was a real advance in aerodynamics and construction, including providing more internal room for fuel tanks. The inevitable downside is changes tend to delay mass production, made worse because the B-17 and B-24 programs had head starts.

The USAAF had P-38 in early 1943 that could escort 8th Air Force B-17 all the way to target, at least until Tokyo tank versions became numerous and in mid 1943 the P-51B which could go almost everywhere the 8th Air Force then wanted to go, it took until early 1944 before the 8th Air Force had the two fighters in numbers. Meantime in the Mediterranean from late 1942 the standard US heavy bomber mission stayed within escort range, with some obvious exceptions, like Ploesti, or could get away without (many) escorts due to a lack of axis fighters in the target area or en route.

This data card for a Hurricane I states the same data but with a climb to 20K ft:

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/hurricane/hurricane-I-ads.jpg

 

[GrauGeist]

So I went and watched it. He has gotten rather polemic, I have to admit. Still, no progress is made where everybody agrees on everything.

I have one question though. If they were 100% against escorted bombers, why then did they spend money like drunken sailors on YB 40's?

Don't forget the XB-41

 

[elbmc1969]

Greg trips on the semantics of the word "bomber" smashes his head on the wall and falls out of the window into a pile of cow slurry. The "BOMBER MAFIA" were advocates of a strategic and tactical bomber force to project US power in times of war.

That misrepresented the views of the bomber advocates. They believed that strategic bombing would be decisive and argued again and again that tactical bombing was an ineffective diversion of resources. Their public writings and archival material have made this crystal clear.

It is impossible for anyone to argue that they werent correct, bearing in mind how the war in the far east ended and what happened after.

Their theories failed utterly. The USAF bomber advocates were certain that high-altitude precision daylight bombing could destroy the vital centers of the enemy economy, crippling their war machine with minimum force and even vastly lower loss of life than the trench warfare of WWI.

They ended up engaging in indiscriminate city busting with incendiary, killing vast numbers of civilians. The atomic bombs were the apotheosis of counter-value attacks and should have been the nail in the coffin of the "vital centers" doctrine.

Delivering violence via aircraft is not the vision of the bomber advocates--they had far more precise and detailed theories.

 

[pbehn]

That misrepresented the views of the bomber advocates. They believed that strategic bombing would be decisive and argued again and again that tactical bombing was an ineffective diversion of resources. Their public writings and archival material have made this crystal clear.


Their theories failed utterly. The USAF bomber advocates were certain that high-altitude precision daylight bombing could destroy the vital centers of the enemy economy, crippling their war machine with minimum force and even vastly lower loss of life than the trench warfare of WWI.

They ended up engaging in indiscriminate city busting with incendiary, killing vast numbers of civilians. The atomic bombs were the apotheosis of counter-value attacks and should have been the nail in the coffin of the "vital centers" doctrine.

Delivering violence via aircraft is not the vision of the bomber advocates--they had far more precise and detailed theories.

Having been to the peace park at Hiroshima, you are delusional. The whole theory is seen in retrospect. The Bomber Mafia were followed by the target mafia. People who thought you could end the war with a single raid. But that neds you to know in advance who your enemy will be, what is industry will be and where and come up with a fantasy like removing all ball bearings from Germany with one raid. They were wrong, but in terms of being wrong they were far less wrong than any opponent. Without the combined bomber offensive in Europe the war would have run much differently, and the idea that some obsession with drop tanks had anything to do with anything is for the birds or the mentally ill, or just the plain greedy.

 

[Shortround6]

A lot of doctrines were changed/modified with war experience.
The "bomber" doctrine was mostly theoretical and was advanced by both Italian and French (?) advocates.
Nobody in the early 30s had either enough planes or large enough bombloads (or even large enough bombs) so there was a lot of wishful thinking going on.
Other Air Forces jumped on the band wagon but even so, nobody had enough bombers or big enough bombers for a good judgement to be made.
A few successes were touted as "proof" and failures were papered over with excuses (like not enough planes).

Sort of Strange but the successes of the Spanish civil war and the Japanese in China gave rather skewed views. In part because there was not much in the war of defense and in these wars they were operating in daylight. The bombers did take losses but not many.
Germans went to war in 1939 with 3 rifle caliber mgs defending most of their bombers. And we know how that worked out. French weren't much better, the 20mm gun in the dorsal turret was hard to aim and had very limited firing time. Only the British were fitting more than one power turret.
Way too much optimism was placed on the accuracy of the bombs/bombers. And that was in clear weather, in daylight.

Oddly enough it was the Germans (training?) that seemed to get the best results for amount of bombs dropped up until Sept 1940. But they ran into the best air defense system in the world at the time and losses were too high. Germans switched to night bombing and doctrine/schools of thought really begin to zig-zag.
Germans again are leading the pack with night bombing accuracy and night navigation, which tends to counter the claim of the Luftwaffe only being a tactical air force. But the Germans also screw up with not enough photo recon/target assessment and not making return visits/raids.
British take the lead with electronic counter measures but it takes quite a while for the British to figure out that their own bombers are often not even within 5 miles of the intended target/s, making much of the effort useless.

Long range daylight escorts for the Americans would have made little difference to accuracy of navigation, seeing the target from 20,000ft or higher in European conditions, Accuracy of bombing due to cross winds even if they could see the target and often using the wrong kind of bombs for the intended targets. They were not alone.
Many countries tried to fix these problems as each problem was thought to be the "key" that would unlock the potential of the bomber offensive to "win" the war.

It took quite a while for a number of air forces to figure out that a few 500lb bombs blowing the building roof off did not mean that the machinery inside was destroyed.

Fire bombing was not only effective for destroying the homes of the workers, it was the best way to destroy the machinery. Both burning out the electric motors and warping/bending the machinery itself.
For some reason it seems that in some air forces the people who were rebuilding their own factories were not talking to the people designing/building/buying the bombs/ordnance.

What is near criminal is that were assessments done during/after WW I on both British and German areas that had been bombed and by the British on bombs dropped in the "mid-east" Iraq-Iran and neighbors. Some of the so-called "mud huts" had 5 ft thick walls much like the walls of many building in those areas in 1991-2010. But the need for 500-1000lb bombs was over shadowed by the need for large numbers of small bombs in the minds of many (and the limited ability of planes of 1930s).

Focusing on the lack of escorts overlooks a lot of the other failings.