GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
You do realize that Magenheimer is a devout revisionist, right?
Many of his writings have been discredited by the academic community on verious levels.
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You do realize that Magenheimer is a devout revisionist, right?My source is Rahn ''Combat Readiness and Combat Power of German Submarines P 80 ,cited by Magenheimer in ''Hitler's War on P 132 .
But , you are still focusing on the number of supplies that was lost by submarines, while this number is subordinate on the number of supplies that arrived in Liverpool .Yeah, I didn't mean that broken ciphers gave away all info, all the time. That is exactly why I added the caveat "when the Allies were able to read German mail."
I had thought such wording would make clear that the Allies weren't always able to decipher and/or reroute.
I do mostly disagree with Magenheimer, but the figures about operational U Boats,are not his figures, but those of Rahn .You do realize that Magenheimer is a devout revisionist, right?
Many of his writings have been discredited by the academic community on verious levels.
What losses ?Oh yes they did. Losses during the Battle of the Atlantic - Wikipedia
That is what you say, I dont agree. What was decisive was the number of U Boats sunk compared to U Boats made and crews trained on one side and the tonnage of shipping lost on the other compared to how much was launched.. The fact that you talk about selecting tankers to sink shows you havnt thought about it much.What losses ?
Losses of U Boats ? These can not be used to argue that the situation changed .
Losses of MV: idem,because there were loaded MV and empty MV.
Losses of supplies ? idem : a loss of 100000 GRT supplies can be more dangerous than a loss of 200000 GRT .
What is important is not how many supplies were lost but WHAT supplies were lost .
And, what is decisive is WHAT arrived in Britain and the number of ships that returned in the Americas .
Werner Rahn never published anything with that title, by the way...I do mostly disagree with Magenheimer, but the figures about operational U Boats,are not his figures, but those of Rahn .
No, I'm not. I'm saying that the ability to get the supplies over to the UK was the Allied victory condition. I'm not sure where your confusion is arising, but I'm sure you're confused about my point, which is that decrypts played a role in helping those ships deliver their cargoes. That was the entire point of all the measures the Allies took in the BotA: to ensure the safe delivery of cargoes. I should think it obvious that this is why rerouting was done.But , you are still focusing on the number of supplies that was lost by submarines, while this number is subordinate on the number of supplies that arrived in Liverpool .
Of course.Question :
was it possible for U Boats to recognize oil tankers ?
If yes, why was not more oil sunk ?
It may or may not be possible to tell what is a tanker at night though a periscope, how many ships should a captain let go before he sinks one, maybe the tankers are in another part of the convoy maybe there arent any tankers in the convoy. Having sunk a tanker how long do you stooge about looking for another or do you sink as many as possible as quickly as possible before the escorts get you?No, I'm not. I'm saying that the ability to get the supplies over to the UK was the Allied victory condition. I'm not sure where your confusion is arising, but I'm sure you're confused about my point, which is that decrypts played a role in helping those ships deliver their cargoes. That was the entire point of all the measures the Allies took in the BotA: to ensure the safe delivery of cargoes. I should think it obvious that this is why rerouting was done.
Of course.
Perhaps the firing solutions weren't handy for the U-boat skipper? Related -- perhaps the U-boat skipper didn't see the tanker(s) because another ship was blocking clear identification of said tanker(s)? Perhaps it had a tanker lined up and before it could launch torpedoes an escort charged it?
There are plenty of reasons why things go wrong in a battle. Clausewitz coined the term "friction" to explain how the exigencies of war can hamper military operations. It's a vital concept in understanding almost all battles one cares to look at.
It may or may not be possible to tell what is a tanker at night though a periscope, how many ships should a captain let go before he sinks one, maybe the tankers are in another part of the convoy maybe there arent any tankers in the convoy. Having sunk a tanker how long do you stooge about looking for another or do you sink as many as possible as quickly as possible before the escorts get you?
Tactics changed on both sides, before convoys a submarine may surface and use the deck gun to save torpedoes, armed merchantmen put an end to that malarkey. Many captains preferred to get inside a convoy and attack as it passed, but then escorts got wise to that and were waiting at the back.Exactly. The fog of war contributes to friction. Especially with subs and their tender hulls, loitering about to pick the optimal target doesn't strike me as a good idea.
I do remember that most submarines of the era operated on the surface at night, but that doesn't negate your larger point at all. Periscope or binoculars, on a sub we're talking about observers on a relatively low platform (restricting sighting distance) which may be sailing through swells (further reducing observational capability) in the dark (that's right, there's more reduction in observation) against ships which are generally sailing unlighted.
Even in daylight, surface ships were regularly misidentified. Now consider the manifold difficulties produced by night, and it's no wonder subs didn't hang around to pick out the juiciest cow in the herd for its shots.
You're dead right on this point.
There were special tanker designs but to me they just look like ships, a class of Liberty ship were tankers, they definitely look like all other Liberty ships.
More submarines in the Atlantic does not mean more losses of MV, but more loses of submarinesMore submarines in the Atlantic does not mean more losses of MV, but more loses of submarines .
If Doenitz said that with more U Boats he could prevent the US from supplying Britain, he was a fool :
Britain was not supplied by the US only
To have 80/100 U Boats active in the Atlantic, he would need more than 500 U Boats and this was excluded .
On 1 January 1942 there were 249 U Boats of which 158 for training,from the remaining 91 only 55 were available for the Atlantic and of these 22 were on patrol at any given time .
And, most important, and this proves that he was not a good U Boat commander : to force Britain to give up did not depend on the amount of supplies that arrived in Liverpool,as Britain was less depending on imports during the war than before the war .Britain had ONE weak point : OIL . If the U Boats were concentrating on the oil tankers,the situation could become dangerous for Britain , but Doenitz preferred to sink ships with spam ,to have his name mentioned in the Sonderberichten from Radio Berlin .
More submarines in the Atlantic does not mean more losses of MV, but more loses of submarines
I think you will find that the increased loss of submarines had something to do with little things. Such as the breaking of the Enigma codes resulting in every supply U Boat being sunk. . Convoys being re routed because we had a good idea as to where the U Boat packs were.
Fair point and I stand corrected. The point I was trying to make was the ability to read and decipher the German codes was a massive advantage, but you are right, it removed a force multiplier.While I agree with the gist of your entire response, I'm not sure that milch cows being sunk increased combat U-boat losses by much; rather, it reduced their radius of action and forced shorter missions, effectively reducing the combat strength of the Ubootwaffen without many additional sinkings.
In short, it was removing a force-multiplier that Doenitz had. Is there a short-circuit in my thinking?
Interesting the topic of how the UK prepared for war and the feeding of its population is very (to me anyway) interesting. The level of preparation was quite extraordinary but was still never sufficient to make us self sufficient, and that is the key pointTo increase food production just import more tractors and fuel? Where is the problem?
Fair point and I stand corrected. The point I was trying to make was the ability to read and decipher the German codes was a massive advantage, but you are right, it removed a force multiplier.
Unless of course, your on one of the Milch Cows that got sunk
The UK hasnt been self sufficient since the mid 1800s when the population exploded, hard to increase production when you are finding all sorts of jobs for all the men and women in the country.Interesting the topic of how the UK prepared for war and the feeding of its population is very (to me anyway) interesting. The level of preparation was quite extraordinary but was still never sufficient to make us self sufficient, and that is the key point
Interesting the topic of how the UK prepared for war and the feeding of its population is very (to me anyway) interesting. The level of preparation was quite extraordinary but was still never sufficient to make us self sufficient, and that is the key point