Groundhog Thread v. 2.0 - The most important battle of WW2

[Thumpalumpacus]

But, there is still the point that there is no proof that redirecting convoys was saving shipping and that not redirecting convoys was causing losses

British convoys were now rerouted away from areas where U-boats were operating. The odds in the Battle of the Atlantic began to even.

Through the summer of 1941, U-boat attacks greatly diminished. The fact that U-boats were having less success against convoys at the same time that the U-boat fleet was finally growing puzzled Dönitz.

The Codebreakers’ War in the Atlantic

Britain appeared doomed until the German naval codes were cracked.

warfarehistorynetwork.com

[Emphasis added -- Thump]

The dramatic decline in sinkings (compared with those that had occurred during the first five months of 1941) cannot be explained other than that Ultra gave the British a crucial edge over their undersea opponents. No new technology, no increase in escorts, and no extension of air coverage can be credited. Ultra alone made the difference.

Ultra Code Breakers: The Misunderstood Allied Secret Weapon

Ultra code-breaker intelligence was key to the Allied victory — but also sometimes squandered.

www.historynet.com

The Allies were trying just as hard to route the convoys away from where the wolf packs were forming, and the failure to do so in late March 1943 was a factor in the high convoy losses.

H-019-4 "Black May": Battle of the Atlantic 1943

H-Gram 019, Attachment 4 Samuel J. Cox, Director NHHC June 2018

www.history.navy.mil

Our primary defensive operations were concerned with routing convoys and the "Queens" 2 which, because of their high speed, operated independently. We in combat intelligence were in constant touch with the convoy and routing watch officers. A change in U-boat dispositions, such as the German wolfpacks, would immediately be noted and routing changes made.

https://www.nsa.gov/Portals/70/documents/news-features/declassified-documents/cryptologic-spectrum/Ultra.pdf

''German U-Boats were at the close of 1941, nowhere close to isolating and strangling Britain .''
''Wolf pack tactics were on the whole a failure ''.

This drop-off was a direct result of rerouting.

 

[Glider]

Notwithstanding these difficulties,oil tankers were attacked and were lost .The question is : why were not more oil tankers sunk .

Maybe because

1) They were in the centre of the convoys so the U Boats had to get through the other merchant ships first
2) Because you couldn't see much through a periscope at night
3) Initially the tactic of approaching and penetrating semi submersed which initially worked became almost suicidal once radar improved so it was effective against this type of target

Does any of this ring a bell with you?

 

[pbehn]

Ultra was the name for signals intelligence, most but not all was from enigma. A submarine commander transmitting "hello mum" every day says nothing but he does give away his position, however when the codes changed and enigma had to be broken again, Bletchley Park knew that whatever was received from him encrypted by enigma said "hello mum" when decoded. There is no such thing as a useless message in code breaking and signals intelligence, it was all used to provide "depth". Wiki says this "
At Bletchley Park, extensive indices were kept of the information in the messages decrypted.[42]​ For each message the traffic analysis recorded the radio frequency, the date and time of intercept, and the preamble—which contained the network-identifying discriminant, the time of origin of the message, the callsign of the originating and receiving stations, and the indicator setting. This allowed cross referencing of a new message with a previous one.[43]​ The indices included message preambles, every person, every ship, every unit, every weapon, every technical term and of repeated phrases such as forms of address and other German military jargon that might be usable as cribs.[44]​

 

[Glider]

To know roughly where the U Boats were, or to know roughly where the the convoy was, was totally worthless . You had to know where they were precisely .The U Boat search lines could mostly not find the convoys they knew were in the area, not because of Ultra, but because the only thing the U Boats knew was that a convoy was in the area .And the area was too big .
About Doenitz :
he knew where the convoys started : NY,etc, but could not attack them there , he also knew where they were going (Liverpool ) ,but did not attack them there. He attacked them where he could not find them : in the Atlantic .
Not an intelligent strategy .
He knew that if he did not find them,he could not attack them,but still refused to change his strategy .
And , then, he had the ''brilliant ''( haha ) idea to attack the stronger one (US ) by sending his U Boats to the eastern/southern coasts of the US (Drumbeat ),knowing very well that going and returning would consume most of their fuel, meaning that they could operate only a short time .And he knew very well that the oil tankers that were lost had as destination,not Britain, but the eastern states of the US and Canada : Britain did not import ONE ton less of oil because of Drumbeat, thus, Drumbeat was nothing more than a wast .
Oil was Britain's Achilles Heel, most of the other products could be made in Britain .Attacking Britain's coastal shipping could have obtained better results,but he failed to do it .
Why ?
Because he was obsessed by the idea that the only thing that could force Britain to capitulate,was to sink more,while the truth is that it was not a question of quantity, but of quality .Not : how much, but what .

I would love to know when you are going to start researching a topic from more than one source, before letting everyone know just how little you do know

To know roughly where the U Boats were, or to know roughly where the the convoy was, was totally worthless .
You clearly haven't taken up the suggestion I gave you to research Rodger Winn and the tracking team.
A quote from War Beneath the Sea 'Donitz would listen to the third staff officer on enemy shipping, almost exclusively from decrypts supplied by B-Dienst.'
Contrary to your firm statement above, B-Dienst had broken the RN codes and they remained broken until mid 1943. So Donitz had an excellent understanding as to where to position his U Boats to intercept the convoys.
Interestingly in these early years of the war it was the British who hadn't broken the navy codes and were relying on 'intelligent guesswork' which is their own description of their work. The kind of information that you describe as 'totally worthless'. This totally worthless information enabled quite a lot of success.
Another quote from 'War Beneath the Sea' Despite B-Dienst's frequent successes, the last minute evasive routing practised by the trade division of the Admiralty to Winns plots increasingly cancelled out their efforts.
So the worthless information had a lot of worth saving many ships their crews an cargo's

And , then, he had the ''brilliant ''( haha ) idea to attack the stronger one (US ) by sending his U Boats to the eastern/southern coasts of the US (Drumbeat ),knowing very well that going and returning would consume most of their fuel, meaning that they could operate only a short time .And he knew very well that the oil tankers that were lost had as destination,not Britain, but the eastern states of the US and Canada : Britain did not import ONE ton less of oil because of Drumbeat, thus, Drumbeat was nothing more than a wast
I admit that I was taken aback by this section. The tankers that were going to the UK came from the eastern seaboard of the United States. By intercepting them at their most vulnerable the Germans achieved the maximum damage for the minimum cost and it did have an impact on the Battle of the Atlantic. Are you aware the the RN had to reverse lend lease quite a number of AS vessels to the USN at a time when the Battle of the Atlantic was far from over. The morale of the US leaders was significantly shaken and yes fewer tankers were sent to the UK because the US priority was the US and Britain didn't have a problem with oil supplies.

Oil was Britain's Achilles Heel, most of the other products could be made in Britain .
Clearly you missed / ignored my previous posting in that oil was never a problem to the British. Indeed there were times when we had to reduce imports of certain types as we had run out of storage capacity. I invite you to support your statement with evidence. If you want to check my statement I suggest you look up the minutes of the Oil Committee which are available from the National Archives

Attacking Britain's coastal shipping could have obtained better results,but he failed to do it .
Why ?
If you don't know the answer to this then its clear that your knowledge of the subject is negligible. A submarines biggest threat is aircraft and the RAF had a number of short/medium aircraft in Coastal Command but a massive shortage of long ranged AS aircraft. Go close to shore and you are playing into the hands of the RN and Coastal Command. Submarinne losses will skyrocket and the chances of success fall dramatically as the convoys will be have far better protection

So to sum up your statement you couldn't really have been more wrong if you tried.
a) Donitz had an excellent idea as to where the convoys were
b) He set his wolf packs into positions to intercept which sounds like a good strategic approach to me
c) The totally useless information (your quote) was good enough to enable the British to avoid the worst of the German attack
d) The other parts of your posting are self explanatory and totally wrong

 

[ThomasP]

Hey ljadw,

While I cannot comment on the Silent Hunters book you mention (I have not read it) I think you might like to read the U-boat related pages on the following website, beginning with:

"U-boat Warfare 1939-1940"

I think you will find the parts on the early campaign in the 'GERMAN U-BOATS AT WAR' through 1943 are particularly applicable to this thread, pro or con.

Please note that almost all of the same sources that the author of Silent Hunters would have had available to him, were also used in the construction of this website, as well as many more (both in number and newer).

The answers to the questions you have raised are given quite clearly in some(many?) of the cases.

 

[ljadw]

The Codebreakers’ War in the Atlantic

Britain appeared doomed until the German naval codes were cracked.

warfarehistorynetwork.com

[Emphasis added -- Thump]

Ultra Code Breakers: The Misunderstood Allied Secret Weapon

Ultra code-breaker intelligence was key to the Allied victory — but also sometimes squandered.

www.historynet.com

H-019-4 "Black May": Battle of the Atlantic 1943

H-Gram 019, Attachment 4 Samuel J. Cox, Director NHHC June 2018

www.history.navy.mil

https://www.nsa.gov/Portals/70/documents/news-features/declassified-documents/cryptologic-spectrum/Ultra.pdf

This drop-off was a direct result of rerouting.

You have still not given a proof that the reason why there were less shipping losses,was the rerouting .
Such proof does not exist ,because the successes of rerouting are depending on the unproved assumption that convoys that were not rerouted were in a bigger danger than convoys that were rerouted .
What was the chance that a non rerouted convoy would be detected by the U Boats ? And what was the chance that such a detection would result in an attack ? And, what was the chance that such an attack would result in sinkings of MV ?
And, what was the chance that a rerouted convoy would not be detected ?
The answer is : in most cases the same chance as for a non rerouted convoy .
In the first eight months of August 1942 3253 MV went from the Americas to Britain : 30 of them were lost .
This proves that the results of rerouting were meaningless,unless there are proofs that the 30 MV that were lost ,were not rerouted and that they were lost because they were not rerouted,and that the 3223 that were not lost were rerouted and that they were not lost because they were rerouted .
There is even NO proof at all that a non rerouted MV would be lost because it was not rerouted .
There is no proven relation between losses and rerouting .
The decrease of shipping losses in 19411 was caused by the inability of U Boats to find a non rerouted convoy and the ability of the convoy and its escort to block attacks from submarines .

 

[ljadw]

I would love to know when you are going to start researching a topic from more than one source, before letting everyone know just how little you do know

To know roughly where the U Boats were, or to know roughly where the the convoy was, was totally worthless .
You clearly haven't taken up the suggestion I gave you to research Rodger Winn and the tracking team.
A quote from War Beneath the Sea 'Donitz would listen to the third staff officer on enemy shipping, almost exclusively from decrypts supplied by B-Dienst.'
Contrary to your firm statement above, B-Dienst had broken the RN codes and they remained broken until mid 1943. So Donitz had an excellent understanding as to where to position his U Boats to intercept the convoys.
Interestingly in these early years of the war it was the British who hadn't broken the navy codes and were relying on 'intelligent guesswork' which is their own description of their work. The kind of information that you describe as 'totally worthless'. This totally worthless information enabled quite a lot of success.
Another quote from 'War Beneath the Sea' Despite B-Dienst's frequent successes, the last minute evasive routing practised by the trade division of the Admiralty to Winns plots increasingly cancelled out their efforts.
So the worthless information had a lot of worth saving many ships their crews an cargo's

And , then, he had the ''brilliant ''( haha ) idea to attack the stronger one (US ) by sending his U Boats to the eastern/southern coasts of the US (Drumbeat ),knowing very well that going and returning would consume most of their fuel, meaning that they could operate only a short time .And he knew very well that the oil tankers that were lost had as destination,not Britain, but the eastern states of the US and Canada : Britain did not import ONE ton less of oil because of Drumbeat, thus, Drumbeat was nothing more than a wast
I admit that I was taken aback by this section. The tankers that were going to the UK came from the eastern seaboard of the United States. By intercepting them at their most vulnerable the Germans achieved the maximum damage for the minimum cost and it did have an impact on the Battle of the Atlantic. Are you aware the the RN had to reverse lend lease quite a number of AS vessels to the USN at a time when the Battle of the Atlantic was far from over. The morale of the US leaders was significantly shaken and yes fewer tankers were sent to the UK because the US priority was the US and Britain didn't have a problem with oil supplies.

Oil was Britain's Achilles Heel, most of the other products could be made in Britain .
Clearly you missed / ignored my previous posting in that oil was never a problem to the British. Indeed there were times when we had to reduce imports of certain types as we had run out of storage capacity. I invite you to support your statement with evidence. If you want to check my statement I suggest you look up the minutes of the Oil Committee which are available from the National Archives

Attacking Britain's coastal shipping could have obtained better results,but he failed to do it .
Why ?
If you don't know the answer to this then its clear that your knowledge of the subject is negligible. A submarines biggest threat is aircraft and the RAF had a number of short/medium aircraft in Coastal Command but a massive shortage of long ranged AS aircraft. Go close to shore and you are playing into the hands of the RN and Coastal Command. Submarinne losses will skyrocket and the chances of success fall dramatically as the convoys will be have far better protection

So to sum up your statement you couldn't really have been more wrong if you tried.
a) Donitz had an excellent idea as to where the convoys were
b) He set his wolf packs into positions to intercept which sounds like a good strategic approach to me
c) The totally useless information (your quote) was good enough to enable the British to avoid the worst of the German attack
d) The other parts of your posting are self explanatory and totally wrong

A : totally wrong : the information of the B Dienst did not tell Doenitz where he could find a non rerouted convoy and even if the B Dienst was telling it, the information was worthless and the information of Ultra did not tell the Admiralty where the U Boats were ,and, if Ultra was telling it, the information was still worthless .
The only valuable protection for U Boats and for MV ,was THE SEA .The sea was hiding and protecting them .
B : wolf packs did not have better results than non wolf packs . Besides : the word wolf packs is totally wrong : a wolf pack was a simultaneous attack by a group of wolves , There were no simultaneous attacks by groups of U Boats .
C No proof for your claim .
Attacks on Coastal Shipping : the number of U Boat losses was irrelevant . There was a war going on .And attacks on Coastal shipping did not result in better protection for Coastal convoys .
About Drumbeat : Drumbeat did not attack tankers that were sailing to Britain, but tankers that were supplying the north-east coast of the US and of Canada with oil .
If Britain did not have a problem with oil supplies, what was then the reason for Drumbeat ?

 

[pbehn]

You have still not given a proof that the reason why there were less shipping losses,was the rerouting .
Such prove does not exist ,because the successes of rerouting are depending on the unproved assumption that convoys that were not rerouted were in a bigger danger than convoys that were rerouted .
What was the chance that a non rerouted convoy would be detected by the U Boats ? And what was the chance that such a detection would result in an attack ? And, what was the chance that such an attack would result in sinkings of MV ?
And, what was the chance that a rerouted convoy would not be detected ?
The answer is : in most cases the same chance as for a non rerouted convoy .
In the first eight months of August 1942 3253 MV went from the Americas to Britain : 30 of them were lost .
This proves that the results of rerouting were meaningless,unless there are proofs that the 30 MV that were lost ,were not rerouted and that they were lost because they were not rerouted,and that the 3223 that were not lost were rerouted and that they were not lost because they were rerouted .
There is even NO proof at all that a non rerouted MV would be lost because it was not rerouted .
There is no proven relation between losses and rerouting .
The decrease of shipping losses in 19411 was caused by the inability of U Boats to find a non rerouted convoy and the ability of the convoy and its escort to block attacks from submarines .

Nothing "proves" anything. Compared to any other battle except possibly the Pacific it is a different battle to others. The Atlantic is huge and the number of combatants vanishingly small. If Doenitz has 40 U Boats at sea how far apart are they in a picket line? A convoy could still pass through the line undetected or be detected by accident by a submarine that wasnt where the captain thought it was. Both sides were just seeking to push the small chance of success in their favour. In daylight a submarine cant see very far when submerged, and the area that submarines had to stay submerged constantly increased as the range of allied recon increased. A submerged submarine cant travel very far or very fast, control of the air from land based aircraft and escort carries restricted the places U Boats could be successful even if they found a convoy.

 

[ljadw]

The impact of Drumbeat on the arrival of oil in Britain is an invention .
''Owing to the shift in oil delivery systems in the US and to rationing, no crippling oil crises developed in the Americas or British Isles in 1942 (The Hunters P 697 ).
All we know is that during the first 8 months of 1941 8,250 million ton of oil was imported by Britain and in the same months of 1942 7,097 million ton . ( The Hunters P 699 ) . Note that this does not mean a loss of 1,153 million ton .
We know the reason of this decrease : it was not Drumbeat .
The reasons were
1 The number of MS from the Halifax convoys was reduced by 240
2 200 ships were sent to Russia in the PQ convoys
3 Many tankers en route from the Caribbean to the UK were rerouted to Sierra Leone,becoming slow convoys . The Hunters P 698 and 699 ).
This is one of the negative results of rerouting that its defenders are hiding .
The same would have happen without Drumbeat .

 

[pbehn]

The impact of Drumbeat on the arrival of oil in Britain is an invention .
''Owing to the shift in oil delivery systems in the US and to rationing, no crippling oil crises developed in the Americas or British Isles in 1942 (The Hunters P 697 ).
All we know is that during the first 8 months of 1941 8,250 million ton of oil was imported by Britain and in the same months of 1942 7,097 million ton . ( The Hunters P 699 ) . Note that this does not mean a loss of 1,153 million ton .
We know the reason of this decrease : it was not Drumbeat .
The reasons were
1 The number of MS from the Halifax convoys was reduced by 240
2 200 ships were sent to Russia in the PQ convoys
3 Many tankers en route from the Caribbean to the UK were rerouted to Sierra Leone,becoming slow convoys . The Hunters P 698 and 699 ).
This is one of the negative results of rerouting that its defenders are hiding .
The same would have happen without Drumbeat .

How would the UK have a crippling oil crisis? It would only affect the military. You have invented fuel as the most important part of the battle and use the lack of a shortage as proof of your theory. The internal combustion engine had only been in not very common use for 20-30 years, transport power generation and heating was done with coal.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

You have still not given a proof that the reason why there were less shipping losses,was the rerouting .

You should read those links with an eye to comprehension rather than argumentation. I'm not interested in trollery and will not make an exception for you. Take it up with the US Navy or the combat SIGINT report above. They clearly ascribe saving cargo bottoms to rerouting.

You think you know better than the agencies tasked with execution? I'll take their word over yours any day of the week and twice on Sundays. And what do you know ... it's Sunday.

 

[Glider]

A : totally wrong : the information of the B Dienst did not tell Doenitz where he could find a non rerouted convoy and even if the B Dienst was telling it, the information was worthless and the information of Ultra did not tell the Admiralty where the U Boats were ,and, if Ultra was telling it, the information was still worthless .
The only valuable protection for U Boats and for MV ,was THE SEA .The sea was hiding and protecting them .
B : wolf packs did not have better results than non wolf packs . Besides : the word wolf packs is totally wrong : a wolf pack was a simultaneous attack by a group of wolves , There were no simultaneous attacks by groups of U Boats .
C No proof for your claim .
Attacks on Coastal Shipping : the number of U Boat losses was irrelevant . There was a war going on .And attacks on Coastal shipping did not result in better protection for Coastal convoys .
About Drumbeat : Drumbeat did not attack tankers that were sailing to Britain, but tankers that were supplying the north-east coast of the US and of Canada with oil .
If Britain did not have a problem with oil supplies, what was then the reason for Drumbeat ?

Ever heard of the phrase, When your in a hole stop digging?

All my statements are easily (make that very easily) supported and proved by some very simple and easy research

A - totally wrong : the information of the B Dienst did not tell Doenitz where he could find a non rerouted convoy and even if the B Dienst was telling it, the information was worthless and the information of Ultra did not tell the Admiralty where the U Boats were ,and, if Ultra was telling it, the information was still worthless .
The only valuable protection for U Boats and for MV ,was THE SEA .The sea was hiding and protecting them .
Are you really saying that knowing where you target convoys are and where they are going is useless information, Really!!
Also you must be the only person in the world who cannot believe that Ultra (which wasn't a factor in the early stages of the war) wasn't a huge advantage
Strongly recommend you do some research on that. A simple search on B Dienst on google should help you, it will also tell you that the UK convoy codes had been broken until 1943.
B : wolf packs did not have better results than non wolf packs . Besides : the word wolf packs is totally wrong : a wolf pack was a simultaneous attack by a group of wolves , There were no simultaneous attacks by groups of U Boats
Again your statements continue to emphasise how little you know. Ask yourself why if the Wolf Pack was such a failure did the USA use a modified version against the Japanese. When you have asked yourself this question do that thing called Research. I suggest you research
i) Wolfpack Naval tactic
ii) Happy time in N Atlantic submarine Warfare
C No proof for your claim Attacks on Coastal Shipping : the number of U Boat losses was irrelevant . There was a war going on .And attacks on Coastal shipping did not result in better protection for Coastal convoys
Guess what I am going to suggest, yes you've got it. Do some research on the Mid Atlantic Gap and let us know what you find

If Britain did not have a problem with oil supplies, what was then the reason for Drumbeat ?
Because like you Germany didn't know that the UK didn't have a problem with fuel supplies and wanted to do the most damage with the minimum of losses

You are really good at big statements which only show how little you know and how adverse you are to doing research

PS After demonising Donitz for being such a rubbish leader and a fool. We are still waiting for you to tell us how the U Boats could concentrate on the tankers.

 

[pbehn]

If someone honestly believes that knowing approximately where U-Boats were was no use at all in the U Boat conflict, I dont know where you go from there. The people attacking a U Boat knew there was a U Boat there, so it must have some use.

 

[GrauGeist]

If someone honestly believes that knowing approximately where U-Boats were was no use at all in the U Boat conflict, I dont know where you go from there. The people attacking a U Boat knew there was a U Boat there, so it must have some use.

That literally makes no sense - the entire concept of warfare is locating, engaging and destroying the enemy.

That would be like the RN stating:
"Oh, the Bismark has been spotted heading to sea, but that information is useless so we won't pay it any attention..."

 

[pbehn]

That literally makes no sense - the entire concept of warfare is locating, engaging and destroying the enemy.

That would be like the RN stating:
"Oh, the Bismark has been spotted heading to sea, but that information is useless so we won't pay it any attention..."

Dont bother me with reports of ship and submarine movements, we will just fire shells, depth charges and torpedoes randomly into stretches of water, we will hit something eventually.

From the start of history, battles were won by one side not knowing what the other side were doing, to claim it is not important is a new and worrying strand of revisionism. If knowing where the opposition is, is not important, what is? Try it out in a game of football (any rules).

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

It would appear L ljadw has never played a game of hide-and-seek. It's pretty hard to tag your opponent when you don't know where they are.

 

[GrauGeist]

Dont bother me with reports of ship and submarine movements, we will just fire shells, depth charges and torpedoes randomly into stretches of water, we will hit something eventually.

From the start of history, battles were won by one side not knowing what the other side were doing, to claim it is not important is a new and worrying strand of revisionism. If knowing where the opposition is, is not important, what is? Try it out in a game of football (any rules).

The element of surprise is one of the greatest weapons an adversary can possess and can mean the difference between victory and defeat.

If the U.S. knew when and where the Japanese were going to strike Pearl, the attack would have turned out considerably different.
If the Germans knew the date and time of Overlord, the Allied landings would have been a copy of the Dieppe raid on a massive scale.

There is a reason spies are a valuable asset (as well as being executed if caught by the enemy), their eyes and ears provide information that allows the ability to counter the enemy's intent.
Breaking the enemy's code(s) is much like having a spy, except the enemy himself is telling you exactly what they're up to.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Looking forward to him weighing in on the uselessness of Layton's intel to Nimitz at Midway. That should be golden.

 

[GrauGeist]

Looking forward to him weighing in on the uselessness of Layton's intel to Nimitz at Midway. That should be golden.

If you recall, they claim code-breaking is a myth...

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

If you recall, they claim code-breaking is a myth...

Crap, I forgot about that. Did Layton consult his Magic Eight-Ball or something?