Groundhog Thread v. 2.0 - The most important battle of WW2

[pbehn]

The element of surprise is one of the greatest weapons an adversary can possess and can mean the difference between victory and defeat.

If the U.S. knew when and where the Japanese were going to strike Pearl, the attack would have turned out considerably different.
If the Germans knew the date and time of Overlord, the Allied landings would have been a copy of the Dieppe raid on a massive scale.

There is a reason spies are a valuable asset (as well as being executed if caught by the enemy), their eyes and ears provide information that allows the ability to counter the enemy's intent.
Breaking the enemy's code(s) is much like having a spy, except the enemy himself is telling you exactly what they're up to.

Hitler called the Lorenz code his geheimnis schreiber or secrets writer/diary. But he didnt know it was being broken. As you obviously know (but others dont seem to) the effort taken to mislead Adolf as to where allied forces were and what they intended to do was a war in itself. On D-Day Ike and Monty had all the German forces order of battle in front of them from Lorenz and this went on up to the end of the war.

 

[ThomasP]

Hey ljadw,

The Wiki link "Second Happy Time - Wikipedia" has a detailed timeline of what happened during 'The Second Happy Time' aka 'Operation Drumbeat', along with a fair explanation of the reasons. It would (I think) answer some of your questions.

 

[pbehn]

Type VII submarine - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Performance of the most produced U Boat below, a Liberty ship did 11.5kts. There were many things Doenitz couldnt do with his U Boats when forced to be submerged.

Speed	17.7 knots (32.8 km/h; 20.4 mph) surfaced[3]​ 7.6 knots (14.1 km/h; 8.7 mph) submerged[3]​
Range	8,500 nmi (15,700 km; 9,800 mi) at 10 knots (19 km/h; 12 mph) surfaced[3]​ 80 nmi (150 km; 92 mi) at 4 knots (7.4 km/h; 4.6 mph) submerged[3]​

 

[ljadw]

The element of surprise is one of the greatest weapons an adversary can possess and can mean the difference between victory and defeat.

If the U.S. knew when and where the Japanese were going to strike Pearl, the attack would have turned out considerably different.
If the Germans knew the date and time of Overlord, the Allied landings would have been a copy of the Dieppe raid on a massive scale.

There is a reason spies are a valuable asset (as well as being executed if caught by the enemy), their eyes and ears provide information that allows the ability to counter the enemy's intent.
Breaking the enemy's code(s) is much like having a spy, except the enemy himself is telling you exactly what they're up to.

If the Germans knew the date and time of Overlord, Overlord would still be a big success .
And, mostly the enemy is not telling you exactly what they are up to ,because he doesn't know it himself .

 

[ljadw]

Dont bother me with reports of ship and submarine movements, we will just fire shells, depth charges and torpedoes randomly into stretches of water, we will hit something eventually.

From the start of history, battles were won by one side not knowing what the other side were doing, to claim it is not important is a new and worrying strand of revisionism. If knowing where the opposition is, is not important, what is? Try it out in a game of football (any rules).

Knowing where the opposition is ,is only important if the opposition can do something :and on the average, Doenitz could not do much ,because he did not know where the opposition was .The opposition was hided by the ocean .

 

[ljadw]

If someone honestly believes that knowing approximately where U-Boats were was no use at all in the U Boat conflict, I dont know where you go from there. The people attacking a U Boat knew there was a U Boat there, so it must have some use.

Approximately is useless :a submarine had to know where exactly the convoy was and would be . And let's not forget the escorts, speed ,ammunition ,fuel ,...

 

[pbehn]

If the Germans knew the date and time of Overlord, Overlord would still be a big success .
And, mostly the enemy is not telling you exactly what they are up to ,because he doesn't know it himself .

The deception plan around D-Day had Hitler holding tanks and other assets in reserve waiting for the main strike in the Pas de Calais, the daft corporal was told exactly what wouldnt happen and he believed it. He gave one spy (Garbo) who was feeding him complete nonsense the Iron Cross in July 1944 while the British gave him an MBE for the same work in November 1944.

Operation Fortitude - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Juan Pujol García - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[ljadw]

Ever heard of the phrase, When your in a hole stop digging?

All my statements are easily (make that very easily) supported and proved by some very simple and easy research

A - totally wrong : the information of the B Dienst did not tell Doenitz where he could find a non rerouted convoy and even if the B Dienst was telling it, the information was worthless and the information of Ultra did not tell the Admiralty where the U Boats were ,and, if Ultra was telling it, the information was still worthless .
The only valuable protection for U Boats and for MV ,was THE SEA .The sea was hiding and protecting them .
Are you really saying that knowing where you target convoys are and where they are going is useless information, Really!!
Also you must be the only person in the world who cannot believe that Ultra (which wasn't a factor in the early stages of the war) wasn't a huge advantage
Strongly recommend you do some research on that. A simple search on B Dienst on google should help you, it will also tell you that the UK convoy codes had been broken until 1943.
B : wolf packs did not have better results than non wolf packs . Besides : the word wolf packs is totally wrong : a wolf pack was a simultaneous attack by a group of wolves , There were no simultaneous attacks by groups of U Boats
Again your statements continue to emphasise how little you know. Ask yourself why if the Wolf Pack was such a failure did the USA use a modified version against the Japanese. When you have asked yourself this question do that thing called Research. I suggest you research
i) Wolfpack Naval tactic
ii) Happy time in N Atlantic submarine Warfare
C No proof for your claim Attacks on Coastal Shipping : the number of U Boat losses was irrelevant . There was a war going on .And attacks on Coastal shipping did not result in better protection for Coastal convoys
Guess what I am going to suggest, yes you've got it. Do some research on the Mid Atlantic Gap and let us know what you find

If Britain did not have a problem with oil supplies, what was then the reason for Drumbeat ?
Because like you Germany didn't know that the UK didn't have a problem with fuel supplies and wanted to do the most damage with the minimum of losses

You are really good at big statements which only show how little you know and how adverse you are to doing research

PS After demonising Donitz for being such a rubbish leader and a fool. We are still waiting for you to tell us how the U Boats could concentrate on the tankers.

Less supply losses and less losses of MV do NOT mean more imports : it was not Doenitz who decided how much and what would be imported .
1940 : supply and food imports : 41,4 million ton .
1941 : 29,7 million ton
1942 : 22,1 million ton
1943 : 24,3 million ton
1944 :22,8 million ton .
In 1944 the U Boat danger was lower than in 1941,and the result was that the imports decreased .
In 1941 the losses were lower than in 1940 ,but yet the imports also were lower .
This means that there is no causal relation between the losses and the imports and this means that the importance of the Battle of The Atlantic has been much exaggerated .

 

[pbehn]

Approximately is useless :a submarine had to know where exactly the convoy was and would be . And let's not forget the escorts, speed ,ammunition ,fuel ,...

So if the position is wrong by 10 meters the convoy isnt there? Dont remind me of what others and myself have reminded you as if it is knowledge.

 

[pbehn]

Less supply losses and less losses of MV do NOT mean more imports : it was not Doenitz who decided how much and what would be imported .
1940 : supply and food imports : 41,4 million ton .
1941 : 29,7 million ton
1942 : 22,1 million ton
1943 : 24,3 million ton
1944 :22,8 million ton .
In 1944 the U Boat danger was lower than in 1941,and the result was that the imports decreased .
In 1941 the losses were lower than in 1940 ,but yet the imports also were lower .
This means that there is no causal relation between the losses and the imports and this means that the importance of the Battle of The Atlantic has been much exaggerated .

Did Germany invading Russia and Pearl Harbour affect things? Asking for a friend.

 

[ljadw]

The deception plan around D-Day had Hitler holding tanks and other assets in reserve waiting for the main strike in the Pas de Calais, the daft corporal was told exactly what wouldnt happen and he believed it. He gave one spy (Garbo) who was feeding him complete nonsense the Iron Cross in July 1944 while the British gave him an MBE for the same work in November 1944.

Operation Fortitude - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Juan Pujol García - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

NO : Hitler did not think that the main strike would happen in the Pas de Calais, besides his reserves were located in Normandy . 15th Army was mostly ''bodenständige 'divisions who were useless in Normandy ,which was one of the reasons they were in thee Pas de Calais .

 

[pbehn]

NO : Hitler did not think that the main strike would happen in the Pas de Calais, besides his reserves were located in Normandy . 15th Army was mostly ''bodenständige 'divisions who were useless in Normandy ,which was one of the reasons they were in thee Pas de Calais .

Yes he did, read the article, that is exactly what he said to the Japanese ambassador and what happened. I am getting a little tired of you refusing to read anything that goes against your opinion.

From the previous links.

The Allies were able to judge how well Fortitude worked because of Ultra, the signals intelligence that was obtained by breaking German codes and ciphers. On June 1, a decrypted transmission by Hiroshi Ōshima, the Japanese ambassador, to his government that recounted a recent conversation with Hitler confirmed the effectiveness of Fortitude. When asked for Hitler's thoughts on the Allied battle plan, he had said, "I think that diversionary actions will take place in a number of places – against Norway, Denmark, the southern part of western France, and the French Mediterranean coast",[27]​ and he added that he expected the Allies would then attack in force across the Strait of Dover.[27]​

OKW accepted Garbo's reports so completely that they kept two armoured divisions and 19 infantry divisions in the Pas de Calais waiting for a second invasion through July and August 1944. The German Commander-in-Chief in the west, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, refused to allow General Erwin Rommel to move these divisions to Normandy.[4]​ There were more German troops in the Pas de Calais region two months after the Normandy invasion than there had been on D-Day.[42]​

 

[ljadw]

Did Germany invading Russia and Pearl Harbour affect things? Asking for a friend.

PH (8 December 1941 ) and Barbarossa did not affect the Atlantic convoys in 1941 : PQ convoys were very limited ,besides the US Atlantic Fleet was not going to the Pacific in 1942.
The decrease of British imports in 1944 was decided by Britain and the US ,independently of the number of operating U Boats . And the main reason was : Overlord .

 

[pbehn]

PH (8 December 1941 ) and Barbarossa did not affect the Atlantic convoys in 1941 : PQ convoys were very limited ,besides the US Atlantic Fleet was not going to the Pacific in 1942.
The decrease of British imports in 1944 was decided by Britain and the US ,independently of the number of operating U Boats . And the main reason was : Overlord .

Funny I thought USA Canada and UK started sending things to the Soviet Union not UK, like P-39s and tanks.

 

[ljadw]

Yes he did, read the article, that is exactly what he said to the Japanese ambassador and what happened. I am getting a little tired of you refusing to read anything that goes against your opinion.

From the previous links.

The Allies were able to judge how well Fortitude worked because of Ultra, the signals intelligence that was obtained by breaking German codes and ciphers. On June 1, a decrypted transmission by Hiroshi Ōshima, the Japanese ambassador, to his government that recounted a recent conversation with Hitler confirmed the effectiveness of Fortitude. When asked for Hitler's thoughts on the Allied battle plan, he had said, "I think that diversionary actions will take place in a number of places – against Norway, Denmark, the southern part of western France, and the French Mediterranean coast",[27]​ and he added that he expected the Allies would then attack in force across the Strait of Dover.[27]​

OKW accepted Garbo's reports so completely that they kept two armoured divisions and 19 infantry divisions in the Pas de Calais waiting for a second invasion through July and August 1944. The German Commander-in-Chief in the west, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, refused to allow General Erwin Rommel to move these divisions to Normandy.[4]​ There were more German troops in the Pas de Calais region two months after the Normandy invasion than there had been on D-Day.[42]​

If that was what Hitler was thinking ,explain me why he kept the majority of his mobile forces OUTSIDE the Pas de Calais .PzL, 12 SS and 21 Pz were located left of the Seine .
And, which were the 2 PzD in the Pas de Calais ?

 

[pbehn]

PH (8 December 1941 ) and Barbarossa did not affect the Atlantic convoys in 1941 : PQ convoys were very limited ,besides the US Atlantic Fleet was not going to the Pacific in 1942.
The decrease of British imports in 1944 was decided by Britain and the US ,independently of the number of operating U Boats . And the main reason was : Overlord .

Capturing ports in France and Italy didnt affect British imports of USA military supplies?

 

[pbehn]

If that was what Hitler was thinking ,explain me why he kept the majority of his mobile forces OUTSIDE the Pas de Calais .PzL, 12 SS and 21 Pz were located left of the Seine .
And, which were the 2 PzD in the Pas de Calais ?

He kept them away from where they could be bombed, the idea being to move mobile forces at the time of any attack. There is no doubt Hitler believed it, no point in discussing it further, or introducing other factoids.

 

[ljadw]

He kept them away from where they could be bombed, the idea being to move mobile forces at the time of any attack. There is no doubt Hitler believed it, no point in discussing it further, or introducing other factoids.

If he believed it, why did Das Reich ,located at Toulouse, receive the order on June 6 to go to ..Normandy ?
Why did he transfer 2 PzD (9 and 10 SS ) from the East to ...Normandy ?
Why did he order the second tank battalion of Panzer Lehr that was moving to the East on June 6 ,to return ...to Normandy ?
What he said to the Japanese ambassador ( if we may believe the Japanese ambassador ) was contradicted by what he did .
The German strategy was not dictated by Fortitude,not by the belief of a main attack ( a diversionary attack was as dangerous as a main attack ) but by the FACT that,as the French in 1940, Germany had to defend the whole coast of Western and Northern and Southern Europe .The allies could attack everywhere ,especially where there were no or few Germans .
The Pas de Calais did not receive any reinforcements after D Day,for the simple reason that there was no landing at the Pas de Calais .
The reinforcements were sent to where there was fighting .

 

[ljadw]

You simply cannot be serious, read it to yourself. You are ascribing the efforts of the allies to thwart U Boat activity to Doenitz being foolish. When Doenitz did make a massed attack in 1943 he faced massed losses, between air and sea assets a U Boat could be found and attacked on the surface or submerged anywhere near a convoy by day or night, and travelling on the surface could be found by day or night too, but they couldnt travel far under water.

There were several attacks which resulted in big losses,but the number of lost U Boats is irrelevant .
The principle of the attacks is questionable, as no attacks would not improve the Allied situation : a submarine fleet in being could be as efficient as a submarine fleet searching, mostly without results,for convoys .
For the rest, I repeat what C.Blair, a well known expert,said :
''Doenitz had not good intelligence ,thus the importance of rerouting is very questionable
Wolf packs were mostly failures
There was no possibility for the U Boats to strangle Britain.''
During almost 6 years the submarines were searching for convoys, mostly without any success .
When they found some convoys, mostly they could not attack them .
When they attacked them,they suffered heavy losses while inflicting few losses .
Conclusion : Doenitz failed totally .
He could have left his U Boats in the harbours and the result would not have been much different .

 

[pbehn]

There were several attacks which resulted in big losses,but the number of lost U Boats is irrelevant .
The principle of the attacks is questionable, as no attacks would not improve the Allied situation : a submarine fleet in being could be as efficient as a submarine fleet searching, mostly without results,for convoys .
For the rest, I repeat what C.Blair, a well known expert,said :
''Doenitz had not good intelligence ,thus the importance of rerouting is very questionable
Wolf packs were mostly failures
There was no possibility for the U Boats to strangle Britain.''
During almost 6 years the submarines were searching for convoys, mostly without any success .
When they found some convoys, mostly they could not attack them .
When they attacked them,they suffered heavy losses while inflicting few losses .
Conclusion : Doenitz failed totally .
He could have left his U Boats in the harbours and the result would not have been much different .

Only irrelevant to you because what you consider relevant is only that which supports your idea of the day.