Handley Page Hampden top speed? (1 Viewer)

[muskeg13]

I had this post into my Kindle library today. I need to finish the similar Short Sunderland book first.

 

[hobbes154]

It's a question as old as any means of travel. The first guy to ride a horse would have asked, I wonder how fast this thing can go? Have you never looked at a machine, be it a 50cc Vespa or a B-29 Superfort and asked the same? It's about curiosity, not practicality or utility.

No, that's just sad. You see a group having a laid back chat about how fast an aircraft can go, and you dismiss the convo as stupid. If it's stupid to you, why weigh in?

Also, top speed is a useful proxy for other things (cruise speed etc.) while being more commonly available and less ambiguous.

 

[nuuumannn]

I always find it good to make basic comparisons between contemporary aircraft to get a good idea of what they were capable of. It is of no value to quote figures without a demonstrable and importantly, contemporary frame of reference, otherwise you get statements like "it's too slow" - compared to what, exactly? A Sopwith Camel? An SR-71? Kinda irrelevant, isn't it. Now, one thing I have come across in my years of examining this stuff is a general rubbishing of early war British bombers, but if you compare them with their contemporaries, they come out pretty well. In fact, much better that what many of us here would actually believe. It's no use comparing Whitley Vs with B-17Gs, that's silly; the framework, timing, almost everything is far too different, especially since the Whitley was no longer a first rate, frontline bomber by the time the B-17G enters service. You also don't need to go too deep into this stuff to get the gist of how these aircraft compare. Here's an example.

Performance wise, the Hampden Mk.I and Do 17Z are very similar, with little between them. The Dornier has a slightly faster maximum speed at load than the Hampden, but the Hampden has a higher cruise speed at a higher altitude with a similar load. The Dornier has a higher maximum ceiling, but the Hampden has a greater range carrying a similar load. Both have similar manually aimed defensive armament of the same basic calibre, with no power turrets, although arguably, the Hampdens guns are better distributed. Look up the figures, they are easy to find.

Here is another example, in 1940, when the Do-17Z and Hampden Mk.I were in service in numbers and were carrying out combat operations, the most numerous in-service US bomber was the B-18 Bolo. Comparing it with the Hampden and Do 17 gives us these results. The Bolo is by far the slowest of the three with its maximum speed at a lower altitude also. Its cruise speed is lower than the Hampden and Dornier. Its range is lower than the Hampden but higher than the Dornier, while, bomb load-wise, it is the heaviest lifter, with the Hampden second and the Dornier last. The Hampden's long bomb bay enables it to carry a greater variety of load, including air dropped mines and depth charges, whereas the Dornier doesn't have that capability because of the configuration of its bomb bay. Defensive armament wise, the Bolo has the worst of the lot, no 50 cals either, three .303s/7.62 mil guns. It also, like US bombers of the period had no self-sealing tanks and no armor plating, things that were retrofitted to European bombers because of combat experience. (We all tend to forget that self-sealing tanks and armour came about from this wartime experience and this is where the US learned of it - the USAAC and US Navy didn't uniformly begin applying these things to their aircraft on production lines until 1941.)

This kind of thing gives us real comparisons, rather than just quoting figures, otherwise, what is our benchmark? It is best to compare contemporaries of similar characteristics.

Then we can get into details like the fact that the Hampden was criticised because of its narrow fuselage and inability of crews to exchange places in flight - fair call, certainly compared to the Do 17, but in the Do 17's case, an accurate burst by an interceptor at the glazed section could kill everyone aboard in seconds, rendering the situation in favour of the Hampden, because the likelihood of killing all crewmembers in the one pass is lower because of their distribution. Apparently, Hampden pilots enjoyed flying it because it was manoeuvrable, certainly compared to the Handley Page Heyfords or whatever the pilots had flown before, maybe Boulton Paul Overstands, which themselves were known for their good manoeuvrability, and they had a power operated gun turret.

 

[Shortround6]

A good summation except for timing. Many aircraft were used well beyond their "best used by date" and both of these aircraft fall into that catagory.
But the Do-17Z was ending production in late Spring/early summer of 1940. It was used into 1942 or later by German Allies (Finns used at least one until 1952?)
English Electric got it's first contract for the Hampden on Aug 6th 1938 but the first delivery was Feb 22nd 1940, English Electric would wind up making 770 Hampdens (just over 50% of total production) with production ending March 15th 1942. Almost 1 3/4 years after the Germans stopped making Do-17Z.
HP stopped production in July 1940. The Canadians built 160 aircraft from Aug 1940 until late 1941.

The US stopped production of the B-18 in the summer of 1939 (?) and changed the last 38 planes of the order into B-23 bombers (twin 1600hp engines) with the first B-23 flying July 27th 1939 and the last (of 38) flying in Sept 1940. The US was not in a hurry, in large part because the NA had flown the NA-40 Attack bomber in Jan 1939 and had enlarged it into the B-25 during 1939 and flew the prototype In Aug 1940 (modifications were needed).
Things moved very quickly in the late 1930s and early 40s. The US started issuing B-18s to operational squadrons in late 1937, about 1 year before the Hampdens starting showing up in operational squadrons. B-18s were not quite as backwards as a simple listing of armaments might indicate.

Neither turret was powered but they were trying for more protected positions and the the nose gun of the Hampdens (at least the 3 gun versions) was based on optimism and the "famous maneuverability" of the Hampden for any hope of success.

Fixed gun aimed by pilot.
I will freely admit that the German Do 17Z wasn't much better in the early 3 gun versions.

Gun could be locked in place and fired by the pilot although most of the time the dedicated (?) gunner operated the gun in narrow arc. The 75 round magazines were also a limit.

 

[nuuumannn]

A good summation except for timing. Many aircraft were used well beyond their "best used by date" and both of these aircraft fall into that catagory.
But the Do-17Z was ending production in late Spring/early summer of 1940. It was used into 1942 or later by German Allies (Finns used at least one until 1952?)
English Electric got it's first contract for the Hampden on Aug 6th 1938 but the first delivery was Feb 22nd 1940, English Electric would wind up making 770 Hampdens (just over 50% of total production) with production ending March 15th 1942. Almost 1 3/4 years after the Germans stopped making Do-17Z.
HP stopped production in July 1940. The Canadians built 160 aircraft from Aug 1940 until late 1941.

The US stopped production of the B-18 in the summer of 1939 (?) and changed the last 38 planes of the order into B-23 bombers (twin 1600hp engines) with the first B-23 flying July 27th 1939 and the last (of 38) flying in Sept 1940. The US was not in a hurry, in large part because the NA had flown the NA-40 Attack bomber in Jan 1939 and had enlarged it into the B-25 during 1939 and flew the prototype In Aug 1940 (modifications were needed).
Things moved very quickly in the late 1930s and early 40s. The US started issuing B-18s to operational squadrons in late 1937, about 1 year before the Hampdens starting showing up in operational squadrons. B-18s were not quite as backwards as a simple listing of armaments might indicate.

Timing of service use and closeness of performance and capability makes these two instantly comparable, timing of production doesn't change that. Remember both aircraft were well and truly in service and were being used in bombing raids against each other's territory simultaneously in 1940. You can go into the specifics all you like, but it doesn't really change my assessment of the two aircraft given the rather broad criteria I chose.

You can't compare the B-23 with the Hampden and Do 17. Totally different weight class, not only that, but both the Hampden (first flight 1936) and Do 17 (first flight 1934) predate the B-23 (first flight 1939) by several years, which makes a big difference when comparing performance and service use. Again, though, you have to ask the question, how combat worthy were those B-23s in 1940? Like the Bolo, not very, and only 38 were built in total. Also, I never said the Bolo was backward, it was a thoroughly modern bomber before the war but its performance was just not a match with its European contemporaries by 1940, which, making general performance comparisons highlights the disparity, which was the point of what I did.

 

[pinehilljoe]

I have always thought those men that flew the first raid on Berlin in Hampdens, flying 600 miles, were very brave.

 

[yulzari]

I have always thought those men that flew the first raid on Berlin in Hampdens, flying 600 miles, were very brave.

And the French raid on Berlin on the 7th of June 1940.

 

[Shortround6]

My comment about "too slow" while a bit flippant is accurate.

The Hampden (and a lot of other aircraft) was thrust into a combat situation it not designed for or suited for.
British had 4 main twin engine bombers in the late 30s and they had some different roles envisioned for them.
The Whitley was slow, but it was always (or almost always) thought of a a night bomber and it would use the cover of darkness instead of speed for protection.
The Wellington was thought of as a general purpose bomber or day bomber using power turrets for defense, not speed. Prototype went 235mph and the MK IC was good for 235mph.
The Blenheim was the "fast bomber" and it was in 1937 (260mph+)
So where does the Hampden fall in the line up?
In 1938 it was a day bomber. It was about 1/2 way between the Wellington and the Blenheim in speed and it didn't have the fire power of either.
It was "too slow" to run away and it didn't have the gun power to fight (turned out that the Wellington didn't either and it had a lot more firepower, depending on how much you believed the turret salesmen).

Blenheim in 1940 was too slow and two belt feed Brownings in a power mount were not enough out the back.
Wellington with two Browning in fore and aft power turrets and two more in a ventral turret or no ventral turret and a manual gun out each side was not enough.
Which leaves us with the Hampden and even doubling the upper and lower rear guns to twin Vickers K guns and the gunners using muscle power to aim the guns didn't have enough fire power and didn't have "speed/agility" of the Blenheim. Having great maneuverability for 18-21,000b bomber doesn't mean you can outmaneuver single engine fighter planes.
Using the same forward firing armament "suite" as the Fairey Battle on an 18-21,000lb bomber indicates somebody was not thinking.

British were desperate for aircraft in 1940 but continuing production of the Hampden into early 1942 was a waste of resources.
Germans not only stopped production of the Do-17/Do-215 in 1940, they were introducing the Do-217 at the end of 1940.
Turns out that a 320mph bomber in 1941, while much better, is still somewhat vulnerable in 1941.

a difference in speed of 10-12mph on a 245-255 Hampden is going to make no difference to it's survivability.

 

[yulzari]

British were desperate for aircraft in 1940 but continuing production of the Hampden into early 1942 was a waste of resources.
Germans not only stopped production of the Do-17/Do-215 in 1940, they were introducing the Do-217 at the end of 1940.
Turns out that a 320mph bomber in 1941, while much better, is still somewhat vulnerable in 1941.

a difference in speed of 10-12mph on a 245-255 Hampden is going to make no difference to it's survivability.

Production of the Hampden continued thus simply because the alternative was no production from the builders. The Halifax Group with it's multiple sub contractors, was spinning up and firms like English Electric going over to Halifax production but the materials and production line for the Hampden existed and continued making Hampdens until they too could turn over to Halifax production. The early 1942 Hampdens allowed aeroplanes to be delivered as opposed to no airframes. By then the Hampden was indeed not a desired airframe but better than nothing which was the alternative. Soon the same works were able to move to Halifax production but there is always a delay.

One might comment much the same for the Armstrong Whitworth Whitley which remained in production despite the decision to utilise their sheet metal airframe making skills in making Avro Lancasters. Until the works were in a position to make Lancasters they continued using the existing facilities and parts to keep on making Whitleys which were still a sound night time bomb lorry.

One might look at the Vickers Wellington. Very much a contemporary of both the Hampden and Whitley. It remained in production until after the war and in active use from Italy in 1945. In no way markedly superior to either of its 'heavy' contemporaries but still sound enough to be useful. If Vickers had a sheet metal workforce and tooling etc. doubtless they would have been put over to Lancaster production too.

Looking at the OP, the top speed of the Hampden was good for its period but not good enough to be a protection. The cruising speed is more relevant than the top speed as the best night time protection was to spend as little time over enemy territory as possible. This is not dissimilar to comparing carrier torpedo bombers. The top speed tells you nothing. The cruising speed is how they will fly on operations.

 

[Shortround6]

Production of the Hampden continued thus simply because the alternative was no production from the builders. The Halifax Group with it's multiple sub contractors, was spinning up and firms like English Electric going over to Halifax production but the materials and production line for the Hampden existed and continued making Hampdens until they too could turn over to Halifax production. The early 1942 Hampdens allowed aeroplanes to be delivered as opposed to no airframes. By then the Hampden was indeed not a desired airframe but better than nothing which was the alternative. Soon the same works were able to move to Halifax production but there is always a delay.

This is somewhat true. HP was ending Hampden production in the summer of 1940 and switching over to Halifax production about the same time. It did take English Electric until Aug 1941 to complete their first Halifax, obviously construction started a number of weeks earlier. And yes, there were many subcontractors who were given orders about the the same time the main plant was given orders so there is a lot of "stuff" in the works at many different locations making shutting things down hard.

One might look at the Vickers Wellington. Very much a contemporary of both the Hampden and Whitley. It remained in production until after the war and in active use from Italy in 1945. In no way markedly superior to either of its 'heavy' contemporaries but still sound enough to be useful.

This is not quite true. Yes the Wellington was in production and was useful to the end of the war, although in different roles.
However..........
Several engine changes from the 1000hp (roughly) Pegasus engines used in the early versions.
The MK II got 1145hp Merlin X engines (401 built)
The MK III got 1375hp Hercules engines in mid/late 1941. (1519 built)
The MK IV got 1200hp P&W R-1830s (201 built)
Skipping the handful of high alitidue planes they ended with the
MK X with 1675hp Hercules engines. (3804 built)
There are a bunch of Coastal Command versions but the above list shows the progress in power that allowed the Wellington to stay useful. The Hampdens kept the Pegasus engines to the end. The Wellingtons also had enough room in the fuselage to hold radar, large bombs, dual torpedoes, extra crewmen for training or old ones to be used as transports.
Perhaps the Hampden could have been given higher powered engines, except their weren't any. There were better airframes to stick the better engines in.
The skinny fuselage also meant it could not be adapted for many of the other roles. The 10-20mph that the skinny fuselage gave the Hampden wasn't enough to make much difference in operations and it meant you could not use the plane for roles that needed more equipment or more men in the crew.

If Vickers had a sheet metal workforce and tooling etc. doubtless they would have been put over to Lancaster production too.

Vickers also needed a new factory. Much of the space used for sub assemblies was too small to deal with large subassemblies even if the the main assembley area would hold large aircraft.

Looking at the OP, the top speed of the Hampden was good for its period but not good enough to be a protection. The cruising speed is more relevant than the top speed as the best night time protection was to spend as little time over enemy territory as possible.

This is true but cruising speed is a lot harder to find and often max cruising speed was not used on operations and at times even max weak mixture was not used, depending on desired range. Max speed is pretty much max speed by definition. Cruising speed is what speed you get at the desired range and fuel burn that gives you the desired range, time over enemy territory and reserves to find your own air field.

What most (all?) air forces thought they could do (fly at speeds in daylight) in Aug 1939 turned out to be somewhat wrong by Oct/Nov 1939 and mostly wrong by June of 1940 and totally wrong by Sept 1940. This put numerous large wrenches into operational planning and production/procurement planning and training planning.
For the British this meant that the Wellingtons with 2 (or more?) power turrets were considered not suitable for unescorted daylight missions over enemy territory. They became night bombers almost over night or perhaps I should say they became only night bombers and not general purpose bombers (some squadrons had night training). And this was in Dec 39/Jan 1940.
The "extra" speed of the Hampdens was not going to allow them to do daylight missions either, at least in anything less than desperate circumstances.

And once they had painted large areas of the wings (even just the bottoms) and fuselage with the flat black paint (drag), fitted flaming dampening exhaust pipes (more drag) and fitted IFF antennas (more drag) in 1940 on any bomber what the book figures speed were in 1939 was not what the service planes could do in the summer/fall of 1940.

 

[yulzari]

I agree with the above but do note that the Armstrong Whitworth Whitley remained in production until the summer of 1943.

An aeroplane does not have to be leading the front line to make a useful contribution. The Hawker Henley filled a vital role of high speed target tug servicing anti aircraft units in training with representative targets when there were no others to do the job, until the Defiants left front line service as night fighters.

Even the much derided Blackburn Botha at least allowed training on a period representative twin when there were no alternatives without removing those alternatives from period front line service. I acknowledge its faults nevertheless and even the makers complained that it was under powered. One might note how the Wellington went on to provide this service when superseded over Germany and, in Vickers Varsity form (via the Viking and Valetta), continued to provide a trainer role until 1976.

The German designed Handley Page Hampden provided a valuable role as a minelayer and then torpedo bomber, filling the gap until the Beaufort was available in quantity. Just as the Vickers Wellington did in the Mediterranean.

 

[Shortround6]

I agree with the above but do note that the Armstrong Whitworth Whitley remained in production until the summer of 1943.

The Whitley was never supposed to operate in daylight as a bomber. It also carried a lot more bombs and fuel than Hampden or even a Wellington. Not as good as a 4 engine bomber but very good for a 1940-41 twin. It was shuffled off to Coastal Command and ASW work where it's low speed was not important but it's range and roomy fuselage for radar was important.

The amount of drag on some of these planes was huge and some of them could not maintain altitude on a single engine. A major failing on a number of British twins.

The Hawker Henley filled a vital role of high speed target tug servicing anti aircraft units in training with representative targets when there were no others to do the job, until the Defiants left front line service as night fighters.

The Henley may have performed a vital role, it also killed a lot of crewmen.
With the MK III air towing sleeve speed was about 265mph but due to a high rate of attrition on the engines speed was soon limited to 220mph which limited the usefulness of the training to some extent for fighter pilots.
They built 200 of them entering service at the end of 1939, production stopped in mid 1940. By October 1940 there were 130 aircraft on charge when they were given to the Anti-Aircraft Co-operation units and squadrons. With the larger drogue target speed was about 200mph at near full throttle and engine problems skyrocketed. How fast the crew could release the target drogue was important regarding how serious the crash was. In June 1942 there were about 40 Henley's still on charge.
It seems like a cover-up. We ordered the things, now what do we do with them??? The Defiant with just about the same engine didn't seem to have quite the same trouble towing targets although target towing was hard on most engines.

Even the much derided Blackburn Botha at least allowed training on a period representative twin when there were no alternatives without removing those alternatives from period front line service. I acknowledge its faults nevertheless and even the makers complained that it was under powered.

Another plane where the losses suffered by the crews being trained may have been almost as bad as combat. The under powering meant that depending on load (fuel/crew/armament) it could not maintain altitude with one engine out.
Blackburn Aircraft since 1909 has a listing of all the Botha's lost but it only tells part of the story. Like No 8 Bombing and Gunnery school, Evanton. lost 9 aircraft. 4 of which "crashed into the sea" with no reason as to why. No 3 Radio School Prestwick lost 10 aircraft. 5 of which landed in the sea and 1 crashed on the Beach and another was engulfed by the tide. No explanation of what the plane was doing on the beach to be engulfed by the tide.
From this small sample we might conclude that the answer to Botha safety was simple. Don't fly over water!
We can find out the results, we don't know many of causes.

One might note how the Wellington went on to provide this service when superseded over Germany and, in Vickers Varsity form (via the Viking and Valetta), continued to provide a trainer role until 1976.

The Wellington (and Whitley) could provide better pilot training, and better training for just about any other job as there was often room for an instructor near the work station/position.
For some radio or radar instruction there could be one instructor and multiple students taking turns in one flight. The Hampdens 3 ft wide fuselage didn't allow that.
Granted the US A-20 bomber didn't allow for it either.

The Lockheed Hudson is supposed to have the nickname "old Boomerang" as it always came back. This might be true or it may be another 1950s legend/story?
Most (but not all) Hudsons had a better power to weight ratio than most British twins and most of the later Hudsons had feathering propellers which added several thousand feet to the single engine ceiling. Smaller (lower drag), thousands of pounds lighter (except against the Blenheim) with more powerful engines means the Hudson could stay in the air on one engine a lot easier than most British twins. Battle damage and weather could erase that advantage.

 

[HP52]

This is somewhat true. HP was ending Hampden production in the summer of 1940 and switching over to Halifax production about the same time. It did take English Electric until Aug 1941 to complete their first Halifax, obviously construction started a number of weeks earlier. And yes, there were many subcontractors who were given orders about the the same time the main plant was given orders so there is a lot of "stuff" in the works at many different locations making shutting things down hard.

This is not quite true. Yes the Wellington was in production and was useful to the end of the war, although in different roles.
However..........
Several engine changes from the 1000hp (roughly) Pegasus engines used in the early versions.
The MK II got 1145hp Merlin X engines (401 built)
The MK III got 1375hp Hercules engines in mid/late 1941. (1519 built)
The MK IV got 1200hp P&W R-1830s (201 built)
Skipping the handful of high alitidue planes they ended with the
MK X with 1675hp Hercules engines. (3804 built)
There are a bunch of Coastal Command versions but the above list shows the progress in power that allowed the Wellington to stay useful. The Hampdens kept the Pegasus engines to the end. The Wellingtons also had enough room in the fuselage to hold radar, large bombs, dual torpedoes, extra crewmen for training or old ones to be used as transports.
Perhaps the Hampden could have been given higher powered engines, except their weren't any. There were better airframes to stick the better engines in.
The skinny fuselage also meant it could not be adapted for many of the other roles. The 10-20mph that the skinny fuselage gave the Hampden wasn't enough to make much difference in operations and it meant you could not use the plane for roles that needed more equipment or more men in the crew.

Vickers also needed a new factory. Much of the space used for sub assemblies was too small to deal with large subassemblies even if the the main assembley area would hold large aircraft.

This is true but cruising speed is a lot harder to find and often max cruising speed was not used on operations and at times even max weak mixture was not used, depending on desired range. Max speed is pretty much max speed by definition. Cruising speed is what speed you get at the desired range and fuel burn that gives you the desired range, time over enemy territory and reserves to find your own air field.

What most (all?) air forces thought they could do (fly at speeds in daylight) in Aug 1939 turned out to be somewhat wrong by Oct/Nov 1939 and mostly wrong by June of 1940 and totally wrong by Sept 1940. This put numerous large wrenches into operational planning and production/procurement planning and training planning.
For the British this meant that the Wellingtons with 2 (or more?) power turrets were considered not suitable for unescorted daylight missions over enemy territory. They became night bombers almost over night or perhaps I should say they became only night bombers and not general purpose bombers (some squadrons had night training). And this was in Dec 39/Jan 1940.
The "extra" speed of the Hampdens was not going to allow them to do daylight missions either, at least in anything less than desperate circumstances.

And once they had painted large areas of the wings (even just the bottoms) and fuselage with the flat black paint (drag), fitted flaming dampening exhaust pipes (more drag) and fitted IFF antennas (more drag) in 1940 on any bomber what the book figures speed were in 1939 was not what the service planes could do in the summer/fall of 1940.

We are all forgetting the single seater pilot heading west from UK who found himself being left behind as he was overtaken by a Wellington!

Jet powered wellington

Soo Most of you will know this Plane But For Those Guys Who dont know it here it is. By November 1940 Rover's work was considered of vital importance and from that point onwards there was no doubt that improvement and proving of the Whittle machine was of great national importance. The German...

ww2aircraft.net

 

[MiTasol]

Timing of service use and closeness of performance and capability makes these two instantly comparable, timing of production doesn't change that. Remember both aircraft were well and truly in service and were being used in bombing raids against each other's territory simultaneously in 1940. You can go into the specifics all you like, but it doesn't really change my assessment of the two aircraft given the rather broad criteria I chose.

You can't compare the B-23 with the Hampden and Do 17. Totally different weight class, not only that, but both the Hampden (first flight 1936) and Do 17 (first flight 1934) predate the B-23 (first flight 1939) by several years, which makes a big difference when comparing performance and service use. Again, though, you have to ask the question, how combat worthy were those B-23s in 1940? Like the Bolo, not very, and only 38 were built in total. Also, I never said the Bolo was backward, it was a thoroughly modern bomber before the war but its performance was just not a match with its European contemporaries by 1940, which, making general performance comparisons highlights the disparity, which was the point of what I did.

To those two summaries I would add that the Hampden was known for it's manoeuvrability whereas the B-18, being a DC-3 derivative, almost certainly had DC-3 manoeuvrability and that is not great. The DC-3 roll rate in particular is snail paced if depending on ailerons and not that quick with a big pair of boots on the rudder pedals.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Hudson I in February 1943, 450 delivered, 135 effectives (30%), in Jane 1944, 422 delivered 84 effectives (19.9%). (83 losses during evacuations). Delivery numbers adjusted to remove some sent direct to Dominion Governments.

Table uses All Hudson versions

Feb-43​	Jun-44​	Feb-43​	Jun-44​	Feb-43​	Jun-44​
Henley	Henley	Botha	Botha	Hudson	Hudson	Location
38​	58​			3​	2​	Fighter Command
					5​	Bomber Coomand
		5​		221​	60​	Coastal Command
56​				2​		Army Co-op command
9​		162​		6​	5​	Flying training
		46​	23​		1​	Technical training
20​	5​	253​	37​	228​	251​	Repair/research/store/in transit etc.
				619​	225​	Overseas
	5​	10​	23​	10​	43​	Instructional/synthetic trainer/transfer
74​	130​	103​	497​	573​	640​	Category E Britain
				169​	360​	Category E Overseas/In transit
3​	3​	1​				Admiralty
					104​	Lost in evacuation
	1​			106​	10​	Unaccounted for
200​	202​	580​	580​	1937​	1706​	Total
61.50​	31.19​	80.34​	10.34​	55.70​	32.18​	% still available

Botha a 1936 contract for 242 from Blackburn Brough, another 1936 contract for 234 revised to 200 from Blackburn Dumbarton, contract for 164 from Brough in 1939, revised a few times, ended up at 138. Brough production August 1939 to June 1942, Dumbarton October 1939 to June 1941. Botha are reported to have done 308 combat sorties 10 August to 6 November 1940 with 608 squadron which had them June to November, 1 loss on operations and 1 not on operations, but no entry for Botha in Coastal Command Statistics, maybe some of the 26 sorties, 232 hours under miscellaneous in 1940. 24 (Communications) squadron had some Botha May 1941 to October 1942 while 502 squadron added Botha to its Anson in August 1940, added Whitley in September, dropped Anson in October and Botha in November.

Botha declared obsolete in August 1943, Botha stocks
466 in Feb-43
436 in Mar-43
418 in Apr-43
361 in May-43
335 in Jun-43
287 in Jul-43
242 in Aug-43
117 in Sep-43
82 in Oct-43

Lots of build more current type orders placed end 1939 and early 1940. There had to be a very good reason to alter British aircraft production mid 1940 to mid 1941, Hampden, Handley page September 1938 to August 1940 (orders placed in 1936 and 1938), English Electric March 1940 to March 1942 (75 ordered in 1938, 150 in 1939, 125+420 in 1940)

Canada (2 production groups), original contract in 1939, orders were 80+20+60, with plans to use US engines on the final 80, 11 airframes November 1940 to January 1941 then 149 more April 1941 to June 1942, 85 sent to Britain arriving October 1940 to August 1942

Handley page started Halifax production in October 1940, English Electric in September 1941.

Halifax orders
100 Handley Page, 1937
100 Handley Page, 1938
200 English Electric, 1939
And so on.

 

[MikeMeech]

Hi
Reference 'cramped' conditions inside the Hampden, comment from an article, 'Tinfish Hampdens', in 'Aeroplane Monthly' of November 1989 by former Hampden pilot I.H. Masson:

To illustrate the area concerned (#32 rearwards, also note narrow access over the bomb bay to narrow hatch under #58), part of an 'Air International' cutaway:

The Torpedo Hampdens were replaced with Beaufighters, initially the Beaufighter VI Interim Torpedo Fighter (and later the TF Mk. X) from the end of 1942. These types also replaced the Beaufort in the torpedo role.
As for the Hudson 'Boomerang', a cartoon from 'Seek and Strike, The Lockheed Hudson in World War II' by Andrew Hendrie, page 37, probably not totally accurate of course:

I hope that is of interest.
Mike

 

[MikeMeech]

Hi
A wartime drawing from 'Flight', shows a different angle of the Hampden and a position for the navigator behind the pilot:

Mike

 

[MikeMeech]

Hi
A wartime drawing from 'Flight', shows a different angle of the Hampden and a position for the navigator behind the pilot:
View attachment 846563
Mike

 

[NevadaK]

Everything the Hampden did was "leisurely" like a summer day in Buckinghamshire.