fastmongrel
1st Sergeant
I dont agree with you but its certainly an interesting proposal. I do agree with you that there was more stretch in the Wildcat.
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finally someone who might agree with me...
finally someone who might agree with me...
The closest direct contemporaries are the Spitfire Mk VIII and the F6F-3.
Spitfire VIII first entered service in Nov 1942, but didn't get into actual combat until June 1943
The F6F-3 first entered service in April 1943, but didn't get into combat until the end of August 1943.
Compared to the Hellcat, it has a minor speed advantage at all altitudes, significant advantage in climb and a significant disadvantage in range. .
When the might of the German army is only 21 miles away the obsession is understandable.the british were overly obseessed with defending the home territories for too long.
Well, depending on your enemy to be dumb enough not to improve their own aircraft significantly in 3-4 years is a pretty risky strategy.
The bulk of the better Japanese types show up in small numbers, late in the war and flown by poor pilots.
If the Japanese had fielded a sort of big wing Ki-44 (something half way between the Ki-43 and the Ki-84) as a REPLACEMENT for the Ki-43 in 1943 and had fielded a truly improved Zero (Kinsei engine) at about the same time, depending on the F4F certainly would have been a battle of attrition.
With the majority of aircraft losses often being operational in nature ( engine failure,running out of gas, bad landings, etc) one can look at combat losses two ways. One- it doesn't make much difference in actually capability since so few actual engage in combat. or two- you better concentrate on quality since so few of the planes built will actually engine the enemy, and if you try to overwhelm the enemy with numbers of poorer performing planes (needing 900 for combat instead of 600) then there are going to be another several hundred lost (along with some pilots) due to operational causes.
It wasnt lack of dockyard space that limited the military build up in the USN, it was money. The 1940 war program (as modified by the war emergency additions) called for the construction of 6 Iowas, 5 Montanas, 26 Essex, 6 Midway, over 60 CLs, 24 Baltimores, , 4 Des Moines, 4 Worcesters and 6 Alaskas. There were about 1000 DDs and DEs from memory. Of these hulls, more than 70% were started in some form or another. many were cancelled half constructed. For the Essex class, more than half were not laid down until 1943+, the very time when maximum demands were being made on US shipyards. The US had to delay the construction of approved designs, designs that proved to be absolute war winners, because there was insufficient money in 1940 to build them. Money being siphoned off to companies like grumman to design, build and set up production of aircraft like the Hellcat. nice to have, but hardly essential war materiel.
Scrap the F6F program, make do with the F4F, build carriers like hotcakes from 1940, and you will defeat the Japanese far earlier than historical.
Once again I ask for any direct evidence that the F6F program actually cost the USN 5 carriers, nor have you supplied any evidence that making do with an improved F4F and building it in larger numbers would have been a war-winning strategy and that it would have defeated the Japaneses far earlier.
How do you propose that the USN suddenly start churning out carriers like hotcakes in 1940, and what other programs would be sacrificed? For example, scrap the TBF and churn out "improved" TBDs?
I reiterate, extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.
Which carriers could have been available earlier if the Wildcat had been improved?
Once again I ask for any direct evidence that the F6F program actually cost the USN 5 carriers,
nor have you supplied any evidence that making do with an improved F4F and building it in larger numbers would have been a war-winning strategy and that it would have defeated the Japaneses far earlier.
How do you propose that the USN suddenly start churning out carriers like hotcakes in 1940, and what other programs would be sacrificed? For example, scrap the TBF and churn out "improved" TBDs
I reiterate, extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.
I hate to tell you, Short, but that's way overrated. If you know anything about U.S. Naval aviation training from January 1943 onwards, and you accept Parsifal's Japanese training hours in his Post #145, you'll see that, in a heartbeat. The Japanese aviators were well ahead of us in training hours in their combat aircraft of choice or assignment until around the middle of 1944. By the time the Kamikazes emerged, they had roughly half the hours we had, but still, were sufficiently endowed. Give the SBD and the F6F aviators around 90 training hours in those combat aircraft, and the TBF/TBMs a little more, while the F4F/FMs a little less. I'm not vouching for Parsifal's Japanese numbers. Accepting them, though, that's how it was.The bulk of the better Japanese types show up in small numbers, late in the war and flown by poor pilots.
Check back on the post where I made that statement. I prefaced that by saying, and have said it several times now, that I have no idea of the actual savings that could be made by not proceeding with the Hellcat development and production program. all ive said is that I thought it would be substantial, and suggested it might be as much as the equivalent of 5 carriers. Im not claiming it, just suggesting that it might be that much.
It cost coca Cola about $6million USD in the '60s to develop the aluminium ring pull can for soft drinks. care to estimate what it might cost to develop an aircraft with exactly 28 cranks to work the undercarriage might cost.
The Japanese fought the f4f and its derivatives for the entire war. there is no evidence that the F4F was inneffective or outclassed by the japanese at any stage. There is no evidence to provide as far as winning the war earlier, because it never happened. how can i provide you with evidence of something that was never done?: What I can show you is that initiative and momentum in military operations counts for a lot. beyond that, you are on your own..
There is a difference between scrapping the Hellcat and scapping the TBF programs. TBDs were clearly obsolete in 1940, F4fs were not. That should have been apparent in 1940, if proper systems analysis had been undertaken and proper intell reports listened to. I have already indicated that there is a severe danger in not proceeding with the f6f, but history does show that the F4F was an adequate fighter until the end of the war....the TBD was not (an effective torpedo bomber).
My claims are this. There is no evidence of the P-40 or the F4F being at serious disadvantage in the air war. There is no evidence that fighter combats were the main reason for Japanese defeat. Japan was defeated in the air, and comprehensively, because of a whole range of factors. Fighter performance counts for little in terms of overall losses, provided your fighters remain competitive. Having the best on the street is nice to have, but not cruciaal. In the pacific carriers were the critical determinant of who would win. In early 1943 the Allies had just about run out of carriers, and this slowed the pace of offensive operations and gave the Japanese a breather that then allowed them to string the war out for several years. Give the allies several more carriers at that critical moment in the war, and they would shorten the war. It would not matter if the carriers had Wildcats or Hellcats embarked, because at that moment the japanese had next to no fighters to resist them, and those that they did have did not make the F4F at all obsolete. the F4F continued to be effective at least until 1945. Not outstanding, but good enough. Later when they (the Japanese) did have more fighters, they were lacking in other areas, such as logistics and replacements (pilots and machines) and their pilots were of poor quality. In that scenario, the quality of the fighters is of minimal importance. Kepping the pressure up is of major importance. The question is...did the American screw the pooch by not building more carriers....did they make this choice so that they could have an unneccessary fighter? I think they did.
My claim is this;
Your formula, more carriers, more F4Fs, does not guarantee that the Pacific War would end a year earlier, or that the Island Hopping campaigns would have met with success. That's only your unsupported belief.
As you have also admitted you have no idea whether dropping the F6F program would have allowed funding for more carriers, so I don't know why you bothered to bring that red herring up because it is a meaningless "argument". I could argue, with more evidence, that the money the Navy would have wasted on more carriers and F4Fs would have been better spent on developing effective submarine and aircraft torpedoes, and building more submarines, as well as developing a far more effective strategic and tactical use of submarines. THAT would have beaten the Japanese even more quickly, because the submarine campaign truly did have the potential to give the US all the initiative and momentum it needed..
Your formula, more carriers, more F4Fs, does not guarantee that the Pacific War would end a year earlier, or that the Island Hopping campaigns would have met with success. That's only your unsupported belief.
As you have also admitted you have no idea whether dropping the F6F program would have allowed funding for more carriers, so I don't know why you bothered to bring that red herring up because it is a meaningless "argument".
..I could argue, with more evidence, that the money the Navy would have wasted on more carriers and F4Fs would have been better spent on developing effective submarine and aircraft torpedoes, and building more submarines, as well as developing a far more effective strategic and tactical use of submarines. THAT would have beaten the Japanese even more quickly, because the submarine campaign truly did have the potential to give the US all the initiative and momentum it needed
My claim is, where are the manpower and recources to built this carriers faster?
Parsifal is very busy to claim almost unachievable claims for the Allied, but deny obvious what ifs for the axis, to me this are claims from a quacksalver.
The US in 1940 had nasically the same shipbuilding potential that it had in 1942. There was plenty of unused capacity in 1940, but fiscal restrictions limited the size of the build.
From one Quacksalver to another I guess