Hellcat vs Spitfire - which would you take?

[wuzak]

wuzak,

As far as I know the Seafire XV just missed WW2. So you have to change Cats to a Bear. I don't think you want to go there.
Jeff

Seafire F Mk. XV NS.493 which is representative of production Mk. XV aircraft subsequent to about the 100th aircraft was sent to this
Establisment for measurement of level speed performance and position error, and the results of these tests are dealt with in this Part of the Report.

Period of test - 13th-21st June 1944.

Seafire F Mk. XV Trials

 

[tomo pauk]

Great posts, wuzak and Aozora. The Allison manual is also available in our 'Technical' sub-forum.

 

[CORSNING]

Period of test - 13th-21st June 1944.

Seafire F Mk. XV Trials

wuzak,

If you continue to look through wwiiaircraftperformance.org you will find in the JAPAN section a report DATED: 26 January 1943. In this report the Tony I type three (Ki.61-1) is compared to the FM-2, F6F-5, F4U-1D, F4U-4, F7F-3 and the F8F. But the Bearcat did not reach operational service until after WW2 ended.


"No.802 Squadron became the first to use the Seafire Mk.XV when it reformed in England in May 1945. On 11 August the Squadron embarked on HMS Queen, ready to deploy to the Pacific, but a few days later Japan surrendered,".

Supermarine Seafire Mk.XV

Jeff

 

[GregP]

The Allison had mixed ratings. Some but not all of the P-39 and P-40 engines were sea level rated. Some P-38's used the same dash numbers as a P-40 variant, as the F4R was used in both the P-38 and the P-40K. The engine setup in the P-38 was turbocharged and the P-40K was not. The basic F4R did have a sea level rating but, in the P-38, it also had a rating when turbocharged at altitude. It is call turbo-normalizing and the critical altitude is where the turbocharger starts to fall off below the sea level rating.

So, while the F2, F5, F10, F15, F17, and F21 engines have a sea level rating, all the units installed in P-38's had turbochargers except for British Model 322 ordered without them. The turbo engines have a sea level rating and a critical altitude where sea level power can be maintained. Not all the numbers between F2 and F31 were used and there are 17 F series Allisons of which 6 are called "sea level rated" in non-turbocharged installations. The other 11 F series engine varieties are "altitude rated." The 18 varities of E series engines are similar to the F series internally except for the nose case to attach to a driveshaft instead of to a propeller, but all were altitude rated. So 6 of 17 F series varieties have a sea level rating and, if installed in a turbocharged P-38, also have a critical altitude where they continue to produce sea level power. That is NOT a "sea level rated" power system.

So, you have 35 E and F series engine varieties collectively (more if you count left and right turning engines separately), 6 of which are sea level rated in non-turbocharged installations. All the P-38 installations except the British-ordered Model 322 units had turbochargers and had rated altitudes where sea level power could be maintained, and all the rest of the 29 varities of Allison V-1710 were "altitude rated" whether turbocharged or not.

Aozora yoiu might have noticed in your bottom chart above that all the listing have a Mil altitude line. For the non-turbo planes it is usually around 12,000 feet. For the P-38's it is usually 25,000 feet. For the non-turbo engines, this is the altitude where the single stage supercharger will drop below rated military power if you go any higher. For the turbo planes, this is the altitude where the turbocharger cannot maintin military power if you go any higher.

I believe I stated in post #136 that the turbo V-1710's were all altitude rated. I didn't mention the sea level rated non-turbo units because I was thinking about adaptaion of the 2-stage supercharger to the Allison engine similar to the Merlin 2-stage installation specifically for European higher altitude use.

Wuzak, regarding you reply to my post #136, we're so far apart it probably not worth discussing it.

I DO agree the XP-39 turbo installation was poor and needed development. The P-39 was too small for much development, but it could have easily worked on the P-63 ... but turbos were in short supply anyway. The P-40 WAS intended for a turbo but never got it according to the designer. If he had the turbos, he could have found space for them, but he never had them for production use. In the P-38 turbo installations, the engine system (includes a significant portion of the airframe) is rated at altitude, not the turbocharger. Put the turbo on another engine and the altitude will change. The aircraft and systems have a collective single altitude rating.

Let's say it's not worth arguing over any further between us. Sorry you can't make the airshow. Looks like one of our P-38's might not make it, and it is based at Chino ... the former "Honey Bunny" seems to have a leaky propeller seal ... Hope they can get it fixed this week and make the flying portion of the show!

 

[parsifal]

Parsifal, the only part of that Wikipedia quote I referenced you're not agreeing with is this part: "The U.S. successes were not only attributed to superior aircraft."

Dont try to put words into my mouth. To clarify, I do agree with this.

You're agreeing with this part: "ut also from 1942 onwards, they faced increasingly inexperienced Japanese aviators."

Absolutely. In 1941, the average combat hours (ie not including training hours) for Japanese carrier aviators was over 800 hours. Their training times varied, but on average were about 500 hours. it took nearly three years for a japanese recruit just to get his wings, and another 2 years to get his Carrier qualifications. There was not a single avaitor embarked in 1941 with less than 5 years flying experience

By 1944 (January), IGHQ was reporting the average training time for Japanese pilots in the IJN was down to 150 hours. Sakai gives an anecdotal confirmation of what was happening in "Zero". by years end training times were down to less than 50 hours. Pillots were no longer receiving any operational training, they were just joining combat units and getting shot down in droves.

The sources for this are numerous, but if you want to source primary material, I recommend Kaigun Senji hensei yzuri, which are the quarterly returns and reports to Imperial Naval Headquaters, including their various training commands.

US pilots that had been trained prior to December 1941 had plenty of hours in training, but no combat experience. Pilots that entered the training schools from December 1941 through to December 1942 received about 250 hoiurs primary flight training, before getting assigned to an OTU for final training. They were receiving about another 150 hours or so in the OTUs before progressing to full fledged combat units. Aircrew qualifying for for carrier ops had about another 6 months or so of additional training. On average, it took about 12-18 months to train a pilot to combat standard, and about 18-20 months for carrier qualification.

The USN aircrews that fought in Phil sea had about 500 traiing hours and a further 4-600 hours of combat flight time
I forget the source for that but its an okay source....not a magazine article.

So in my opinion, there is no doubt, Japanese aircrew decreased dramatically in expereince, Allied aircrew were slower, but steadily imcreased in experience. and its experience that makes the difference in flying ability. By June 1944, we have allied crews with about 1000 hours of flight experience, up against Japanese crews, a few with a lot of expereince, but the majority with about 100 hours experience (and no combat experience).

As a matter of fact that's your whole rationalization for everything PTO, pilot experience. It's not only your rationalization for the successes of the Hellcats. Here, while ignoring everything Wildcat and others enumerated, it's your lock-stock-and-barrel rationalization for the failures of your own Spitfires. Here's what says that, these excised parts from your former reply:

Misquoting me again I see. Im not disagreing with Wildcat,and hes not disagreeing with me. He says, if you check back, that Zeroes were partof the problem. He adds a series of issues that also affected the Spit performance. He doesnt say that (japanese) pilot quality was not a factor, and ive known him lonmg enough to know that elsewhere he says exactly that.

I dont say that Pilot quality was the only issue. Neither do I say that airframe capability was not a factor. But what i do say is that pilot quality was a relatively important issue, whilst airframe quality was a less important issue. And I also say that there are many other issues that affected the outcome as well.

There is no persoanl crusade here, other than to keep the issues in perspective

So that you dont misquote me in the future

PILOT QUALITY IS NOT THE ONLY ISSUE AFFECTING THE OUTCOME OF AIR WARS

You're on a personal crusade to rationalize everything PTO in terms of pilot experience. That's what you come down to. That's why you isolated that factor and dramatized it as the one-size-fits-all rationalization for the failures of these Spitfires, as well, to the exclusion of everything else said

.

Nope, incorrect. Im not a persoanal crusade, except one, to get to the truth, and not let anyone pedal online propaganda as "the truth". Applies equally to the LW ra ra boys, and now , it seems, the USN ra ra boys.

Have another read of my previous poistings. If you do, you will find that I acknowledge pilot experience as a factor. Improved tactics is another. Numbers is another. Logistics is another. I did forget to mention good leadership. Then ther are other factors like which run a distant second. Among them is the quality of the aircraft being flown. you could add the US having the initiave, superior airfield construction, better fleet support, better SAR.

What I am saying, is that aircraft quality is not amajor determinant in achiving a winning position in an air war. There are plenty of examples where that is amply demonstrated, such as over Germany in 1944-5. Despite having superiority of certain types, like the Me 262, the germans were still losing aircraft at tn exchange rate of around 6:1 by years end.

And I in good faith credit your War heroes for their audacity and courage and you interpret that as a smart-crack.

Yes I do, because i dont think your compliments are genuine

Well, but of course. These were inexperienced pilots.

Wrong again. The pilots of the Spitfire wing were the most experienced in the RAAF, led by the top scoring ace in the RAAF, Clive Caldwell. What they lacked was experience in the Spitfire. Caldwell had chalked up impressive victories in Tomahawks against the Germans, using turning fights to shot down many aircraft. he is credited with shooting down 5 German aircraft in one engagement.

Crediting them for their heroism is but tantamount to patronization. That's in effect how obsessed you are with that pilot experience rationalization.

Your assuming that I believe the Spitfire Wing to be an inexperienced outfit. It was not, at least against other opposition. What it lacked was experience in the Spit, and secondly, how to use the Spit against the Japanese.

The Spitfire Wing went into axction in March 1943, at a time the USNs reports on the Zeroes weaknesses were beginning to be circulated. I believe that Caldwell would have had access to these reports, but for whatever reason, he and his command chose not to follow the recommendations of that report. I am convinced that Caldwell, a man held in almost godlike awae in the RAAF, believed that with the Spit, he an his men could return to the turning manouvre battles that had yieloded such great results for them June-November 1941. They had fought the Japanese in 1942 armed mostly with P-40s , able to survive, but with meagre pickings. It seems almost certain that there was a belief that turning fights could be again utilized.
I believe

 

[GregP]

There are many of us in here that feel aircraft quality WAS a big factor ... along with the other factors. And many in here believe you could never achieve a position of superiority with and inferior aircraft and inferior tactics.

Since WWII is long since over, this is sort of supposed to be a diuscussion, not a dictatorship or a bar fight. You may be right and others may be right ... or neither may be right. We aren't fighting the war today, so it's tough to take 20-20 hindsight and come out with all the correct answers since the lessons can be interpreted differently depending on your resources available to respond.

Sometimes strong words generate stronger replies, demanding ever stronger responses on both sides where frank statement of opinion was intended originally. Ever happen to you? It's happened to me. I can easily post two sentences and somehow get 51 replies attacking my character, knowledge and integrity. Now THAT's a freindly response that will generate frank discussion, isn't it?

The Darwin Spitfires were lost in 1943 when Japanese tactics were already known by anyone who flew combat in the PTO. They blew it. As I recall they lost anywhere from 26 - 32 Spit V's while the inferior Japanese pilots and equipment lost a few bombers, 3 Zeros and 1 Ki-43. Did I get it wrong? If so, please let us know.

Maybe they weren't quite so inferior as generally thought.

Cheers to you down under.

 

[parsifal]

The quality of the aircraft does make a differnce, but it is not critical to winning an air war. There are many examples to prove that. Eastern Front is a great example, Defence of the reich is another. Air war over North Africa and Malta is another. British Carrier operations 1940-43 is another good example. Williason murray shows very clearly, further, that air to air action is not even amajor determinant of who wins an air campaign. Most losses arent even related to enemy fighters in most situations, so the quality of the fighters makes little difference as to who wins the air battle. Its as brutal as that.

The operations over Darwin and in that general TO are a perfect microcosm of how air wars are won. Despite the losses being heavily one sided....the RAAF and USAAF lost over 130 a/c Feb to November '43 whilst the Japanerse lost only 35, the campaign was a clear Alied victory. The Japanese aim had been to deny the allies the use of Darwin for any offensive operations in the air, in this they failed, with B-24s and Beafighters, B25s and some other major types able to mount sustained operations, including a highly successful mining operation off the main oil outlets of the NEI. In the finish the Japanese were forced to withdraw their air assets, having failed to deny the Allies the use of this forward base, despite having lost a fraction of the aircraft that the allies had lost. moreover, both the allies and the Japanese had lost the majority of their aircraft to causes other than enemy fighter action. It was a re-run of the RAFs campaign over France and the low countries 1941-3, dogged application of airpower despite the losses, and abslutely no evidence that superior fighters produce disproportionate losses. The Spitfires, by any sensible analysis, should have won the battle hands down if that were the case. Modern types are needed mostly to improve survivability, and also to improve the implied threat they impose, but in terms of actual losses, fighters dont amount to much.

And here is why I say that the Hellcat, whilst a superior design, and "nice to have" was anything but essential to victory for the USN. They could have done the job with Wildcats or even Buffaloes at a pinch. Neither of these later two types were so badly outclasssed that they were not capable of gradual improvement "to keep up with the japanese". What the Hellcat did, was give greater striking power in the FB role and improve survivability for the aircrew, but there is no evidence to support the claims they were critical to the US victory

 

[Wildcat]

Guys, I've started a new thread "spitfires over Darwin" as I believe it deserves greater discussion.

 

[DonL]

The quality of the aircraft does make a differnce, but it is not critical to winning an air war. There are many examples to prove that. Eastern Front is a great example, Defence of the reich is another. Air war over North Africa and Malta is another. British Carrier operations 1940-43 is another good example. Williason murray shows very clearly, further, that air to air action is not even amajor determinant of who wins an air campaign. Most losses arent even related to enemy fighters in most situations, so the quality of the fighters makes little difference as to who wins the air battle. Its as brutal as that.

This is to my opinion a wrong overall summary, because it only functions, if one enemy is much stronger in economics and supply.
If both enemys are equal in economics, supply and training, the whole statement and summary is obsolete, because then the better weapon system and tactics are decisive.
You can only fight an attrition war if you are stronger.

This is one reason why to my personal opinion Montgomery was only an average to poor general, because he only could fight attrition battles.

 

[Aozora]

Wrong again. The pilots of the Spitfire wing were the most experienced in the RAAF, led by the top scoring ace in the RAAF, Clive Caldwell. What they lacked was experience in the Spitfire. Caldwell had chalked up impressive victories in Tomahawks against the Germans, using turning fights to shot down many aircraft. he is credited with shooting down 5 German aircraft in one engagement.
Your assuming that I believe the Spitfire Wing to be an inexperienced outfit. It was not, at least against other opposition. What it lacked was experience in the Spit, and secondly, how to use the Spit against the Japanese.

Well this is wrong for a start - the Spitfire Wing (sometime nicknamed "Churchill Wing") was composed of two English based Australian Spitfire squadrons, that had fought over Europe, 452 and 457(RAAF) Squadrons, as well as 54 Sqn, also English based with experience over Europe.

Nonetheless, the two RAAF Spitfire squadrons in the UK - No 452 under the command of seven victory ace Sqn Ldr Raymond Thorold-Smith, and No 457, led by Sqn Ldr Ken James - together with the RAF's experienced No 54 Sqn, under Sqn Ldr Eric Gibbs, were ordered to move to Australia. Accordingly, No 452 Sqn was withdrawn from operations on 23 March 1942 while No 457 ceased active operations on 31 May. (Osprey Aircraft of the Aces 87: Spitfire Aces of Burma and the Pacific, Thomas, page 7)

Seems to me there's a lot of heat being generated in this debate, but not much light:

The Spitfire wing's performance on this date (2 May 1943) would generate a great deal of ill-informed and unjustified criticism, much of which emanated from Australia's US allies. (Thomas, 13)

'I pulled away to port and to the rear, and finding I had only 22 gallons of fuel left I returned to base, landing with just two gallons to spare.'

This was a problem that many of the pilots faced during the mission, and most landed having been airborne for almost two hours - a long time in a Spitfire VC that relied exclusively on internal fuel. Bob Foster also commented to the author for this volume on the effect Zero-sens had on the tactics employed by No 1 Fighter Wing;
'As far as the Zero was concerned, the Spitfire VC had the advantage of speed and could out-climb and out-dive it. However, as with any other Allied aircraft, it could not match the Japanese fighter for manoeuvrability - one didn't try to "mix it" with the Zero. The escorts were always a menace, which meant that at least one squadron had to be detached to deal with them, leaving fewer to attack the bombers - hence the losses suffered by the latter were not as high as they might have been.'

In spite of all the criticisms made by those less informed following the action of 2 May 1943, the experienced Tim Goldsmith was confident that the tactics that had been used on the day were sound, and after his rescue he concluded his combat report by stating 'the strategical and tactical set-up for the wing immediately prior to the attack, organised by Wg Cdr Caldwell, was, in my opinion, 100 per cent perfect'. Nonetheless it had been a chastening experience for No 1 Fighter Wing. (Thomas 15)

Re GregP's comments "26 - 32 Spit V's while the inferior Japanese pilots and equipment lost a few bombers, 3 Zeros and 1 Ki-43. Did I get it wrong? If so, please let us know."

With the change in Japanese priorities in the face of Allied successes elsewhere in the Pacific, the 12 November raid was the last time that the
Australian mainland was attacked, although occasional reconnaissance sorties continued. John Smithson's successes meant that in nine months
of action No 1 Fighter Wing had been credited with a total of 65 enemy aircraft destroyed* for the loss of 15 pilots in combat. Although standby was maintained, the war had now largely moved away. Whilst the Spitfires would see further action, the reality was that by early 1944 there were few Japanese aircraft left in the Southwest Pacific. (Thomas 26)

*Include several Ki-46s which had been almost invulnerable until the arrival of Spitfires.

Please don't try and say the Spitfire Wing overclaimed by some 2,000%...

 

[bobbysocks]

you can wage a war with inferior hardware as long as you have overwheling numbers or resources more vast than your enemy. from what i read of the eastern front the LW usually always outscored the VSS. but when the VSS lost 25 planes they replaced them with 50. when the LW lost planes...or more importantly pilots they were hard pressed to get trained replacements. had the VSS been as hamstrung as the LW and not able to replace planes and pilots as they did....something would have had to drastically change.

 

[GregP]

From "Hellcat versus Spitfire" to Montgomery? Now that's what I call an on-topic discussion ...

 

[RCAFson]

Well then, I'd have to agree that the F6F could do a land plane role. BUT, it would probably not do it as well as a fighter that was designed from the start as a point defence interseptor. The F6F was designed for shipboard operation. That means a lot of extra size and weight compaired to a land based interceptor. If it had been designed as such it would probably have looked more like a F8F.
Compairing the Hellcat to the Spitfire V seems off a little. They are nearly 2 years appart from entering operational service. It is hard to take the large Hellcat and strip it down to point interceptor. So it seems to me the best way to compair is to rig up the Spifire for carrier duty and then compare: Seafire III.
Height in meters / Speed in mph / Climb in fpm.

Height...Seafire III......F6F-5
S.L.......303/2500....318/3500
.1,000...318/2525....322/3440
.2,000...334/2550....333/3380
.3,000...348/2574....345/3180
.4,000...349/2590....358/2955
.5,000...344/2435....373/2605
.6,000...338/1960....376/2225
.7,000...330/1575....390/1835
.8,000...321/1175....383/1435
Maximum velocities: Seafire III 351/10,500ft. F6F-5 392/19,200ft.
Flight weights are: Seafire: 6,750-7,100 lbs. F6F-5: 12,406-12,420 lbs.

NOTE 1: In TAIC REPORT NO. 17 The F6F-5 reached 409 mph/21,600ft.

All performance figures are from wwiiaicraftperformance.org. One odd note: the Seafire speed figures are at +16 lbs. boost and the climb figures are at +9 lbs. boost. I do not know if the Seafire was cleared for +16 lbs. boost with the Merlin 50 engine.

You can find the climb figures here:
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/f3.jpg
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/lf3.jpg

It seems to me that the F6F-5 came along somewhat later than the Seafire III (full production was late April 1944 according to Dean). The Seafire III Merlin engines were always cleared for 16/18lb boost. Seafire III testing was done with the snowguard in place, but this was removed on combat aircraft, plus combat aircraft had more efficient exhaust stubs, and were about 10mph faster than the above numbers

Boscombe Down tests of the F6F-3 showed the following:

Climb performance
Max. rate of climb in Main supercharger gear = 2260 ft/min at 5400 feet.
Max. rate of climb in Aux. Lowspeed supercharger gear = 1880 ft/min at 20500 feet.
Time to reach 10,000 ft. = 4.65 minutes
Time to reach 20,000 ft. = 10.0 minutes
Change gear height = 9200 feet
Level speed performance
Max. T.A.S. at max. permissible power (rich mixture) = 315 mph (274 knots) at 2000 ft. in Main supercharger (314mph from 4000-8000ft)
Max. T.A.S. at max. permissible power (rich mixture) = 371 mph (322 knots) at 18700 ft. in Aux. Low Speed supercharger.
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f6f/fn322.pdf

Note that the same test showed that the F6F-3 was not suitable, at that point (Sept 1943), for high altitude interceptions because of the R2800's problems with high altitude magneto failures, which IIRC, also effected the P-47.

 

[redcoat]

This is one reason why to my personal opinion Montgomery was only an average to poor general, because he only could fight attrition battles.

If he was only average to bad, you have to wonder how bad were the ones before him were !!!!!

ps: It also brings into question how good Rommel and the other German generals were if they were continually getting beaten by a 'poor' general

 

[DonL]

If he was only average to bad, you have to wonder how bad were the ones before him were !!!!!

ps: It also brings into question how good Rommel and the other German generals were if they were continually getting beaten by a 'poor' general

Every trained monkey can fight an attrition battle, if he had superior numbers of troops, tanks, artillery and aircrafts and the supply to replace this superior numbers!

 

[redcoat]

Every trained monkey can fight an attrition battle, if he had superior numbers of troops, tanks, artillery and aircrafts and the supply to replace this superior numbers!

There must have been a great shortage of trained monkeys in the Allied armies in the early part of the war then.

 

[parsifal]

Attrition wars are influenced by outright numbers, but outright numbers are not solely the preserve of good production. If that were the case the germans who were the second most powerful economy in the world, would have won the war. They were several orders of magnitude stronger than the Soviet economy for example. Against the Americans, one has to remember that nearly 60% of US production never left the continental US. Against Britain, the British economy was exhausted by 1944, and the british were overly obseessed with defending the home territories for too long. Britain in 1940-41, it was heavily outgunned by the German economy. The Japanese economy was much smaller, but it still had potential to reach respectable proportions, but was hampered by poor usage of shipping and poor home organization.

Wars of attriution do need a solid production base, but they also need careful planning and a good overall support base. otherwise that production is just wasted. As the Germans found in 1944.....Another example of attrition wars that might considere is again German, but this time one that they almost won. in the Atlantic, the germans came to within an ace of winning the war, using a lesser amount of resources. had the allies not reorganized their ASW and convoying efforts, despit numbers, they would have lost. In the end, they achieved numbers and organizational advantages, and woon the critical battle of the war.

Aircraft types whilst important dont make a huge difference in an attrition battle. the LW enjoyed huge qualitative advantages on the eastern front, and over Africa. but like all things, quality comes at a price. Are you better off having all your eggs in relatively few baskets, or a large number of eggs in many baskets? The problem with the "few good eggs" model in the context of WWII is that both the many eggs and the few eggs are subject to losses that are mostly independant of quality or enemy action Most aircraft are lost due to wear and tear, flak damage, weather, getting lost, landing or take off accidents or the like. Its different today, where every aircraft is a major investment. In 1940-45, aircraft were cheap and expendable, and the numbers count for much. If you have numbers, you can assume a ready supply of replacement airframes and pilots,and other materials like fuel and ammunition. if you dont, you are going to lose.... eventually.

And for the Hellcat argument, I am not disputing that the aircraft was excepitional. it performed its role better than any other aircraft in the war. but was it worth it. Development and production of the F6F came at a cost, exactly what that cost i have no idea. Lets say, however that it cost the equivalent of 5 Essex Class carriers. Lets say that instead of developing the Hellcat, the Americans had built 5 extra carriers, and simply opted for an improved Wildcat airframe. And then they went into battle at Phil sea.....with abother 400 Wildcats over the 500 or so Hellcats they historically fielded (in other words 900 average fighters compared to 500 exceptional fighters). Would they have done better, worse, or about the same? history shows us, time and again in the war, that where a force had the numbers, and the support echelons to support that advantage, they would win every time (I admit there are limits....going to war with biplanes in the jet age isnt going to work...at some stage you do need to invest in technology in order to "keep up with the jone's) . There is not one instance I can think of strategically where an opponent that opted to forego the numbers advantage in favour of technical superiority, actually won their battle strategically. They might run amok for a time but were always brought to ground in the finish.

 

[bobbysocks]

probably was. how many peace time promoted generals started off the war and ended up being replaced because they couldnt cut the mustard?

 

[GregP]

What about the badly outnumbered Swedes who fought off all intruders with their teenage king leading the charge? What about the American Revolution? What about the British who outfought numerically-superior opponents in their empire for centuries? Lots of African tribes gained voctory over numerically superior opponents due to being able to spring an anbush under cover of the jungle. In these smaller cases, it is both strategic and tactical becasue the forces are small enough that a battle can encompass all the resources ... so tactics and strategy amount to the same thing.

Wars of attrition are awful and the people who start them should be executed after the war is over. The idiots who start them are somehow never among the "attrited," but should be.

Regardless of sthrength, a superior technology will give even the smaller side a winning edge today. A single city with MIRV nuclear missiles could probably get makor concessions from most countries around the world. Glad there aren't many of THOSE!

Generally, I agree, but am not sure WWII qualifies since modern weapons were being employed. Up through WWI ... yes. Once weapons progressed far enough for trench warfare to become inpossible ... maybe not. Once general airlift and air power came on the scene, I think tactical employment of the assets became much more important than the sheer number of assets.

 

[parsifal]

I would very much like to debate those examples you mentioned greg, but to take a leaf out of your book I think we should try and keep the discussion a bit more relevant.

For the record I dont agree with your historical analogies, but my comments were in the context of WWII examples. Before and since, there may be exceptions.