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wuzak
Captain
Actually, it was Spitfire vs F6f - which would you rather have as a pure fighter.
Hellcat vs Spitfire - which would you take?
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Actually, it was Spitfire vs F6f - which would you rather have as a pure fighter.
parsifal
Colonel
Done some preliminary investigation into the naval appropriations and ship construction costs. These are more online notes than anythng cohernet just yet, but i thought it worthwhile to post just the same....
Janes (1944) has the following entries regarding ship costs and naval appropriations
Naval appropriations
1943: $27.5 Billion
1944: $28.5 billion
1945: $24.1 Billion
Selected ship costs
Iowas BB $100,000,000
Midway Class: $74,000,000
Essex Class:: $68.9million
Enterprise (completed May 1938) $25.8 million
Alaska Class: $74 million
Baltimore CA: $39.3 Million
Cleveland CL: $31 million
Atlanta Claa: $23.2 million
Brooklyn CL (1938) $19.4 million
Fletcher DD: $11.4 million
Gato SS: $6.3 Million
:
April 20 1940 - Fairfax Newspapers (Aus reports the following)
U.S. NAVY PLANS.
Huge Appropriation.
BUILDING ACCELERATED.
I WASHINGTON, April 19. (A.A.P.)
The Senate approved the expenditure of $963,797,000 (£A301,I86,875), of the total provided when it passed the Navy Appropriation Bill. This sum is more than 2,000,000 dollars (£A625,000) below the figure approved by the House oi Representatives.
The Acting Navy Secretary, Mr Compton, reported that two battleships would be completed four months ahead of schedule, that submarine construction had been hastened by from two to six months, and destroyer construction from 1 to 7 months.
In February last the House of Representatives passed the bill, which involved the expenditure of $906,000,000 (£A301.875.000) A proposal to spend $1,000,000 dollars (£312,500) on improving the harbour at the Island of Guam in the Western Pacific, was eliminated.]
Conways
The proposed FY41 (June 1940 to June 1941) funded only 2 BBs (Bb63 and 64), a single carrier of new design (CV9), 2 Cruisers (CL57 and 58) 7 DDs and 7 submarines despite much larger authorised expansion. USN acquisitions went through a two stage process, basically authorisation to increase the fleet size (which flip flopped from ship numbers, to tonnages and then back again). However in April/May 1941 this program was expanded on orders from the president to a greatly expanded effort, and fully funded, which was the critical constraint at that time. This greatly expanded effort was not part of the above-mentioned procurement program.
On the basis of the above, the US spent about $460 million of its $963.7 Million exapansion program on ships, of which, just $68 million was for a single carrier. Allowing for small ships, that might expand to $500 million,give or take. Potentially that means they were spending up to $400 million on new aircraft. I wonder how much of that was spent on R&D, and how much of that $400million was spent on the F4U and F6F programs?
It should be noted that the fiscal appropriations are differnt to the strength authorisations that were enacted under the Vinson Bill of 14 June 1940. In that Act, for FY42 (beginning June 19410 a further expansion of the Fleet was authorised, but this was brought forward, and expanded by order of the president in April 1941.
I will post the summary of the Vinson Act, which carried the US to a wartime footing in the next post
Janes (1944) has the following entries regarding ship costs and naval appropriations
Naval appropriations
1943: $27.5 Billion
1944: $28.5 billion
1945: $24.1 Billion
Selected ship costs
Iowas BB $100,000,000
Midway Class: $74,000,000
Essex Class:: $68.9million
Enterprise (completed May 1938) $25.8 million
Alaska Class: $74 million
Baltimore CA: $39.3 Million
Cleveland CL: $31 million
Atlanta Claa: $23.2 million
Brooklyn CL (1938) $19.4 million
Fletcher DD: $11.4 million
Gato SS: $6.3 Million
:
April 20 1940 - Fairfax Newspapers (Aus reports the following)
U.S. NAVY PLANS.
Huge Appropriation.
BUILDING ACCELERATED.
I WASHINGTON, April 19. (A.A.P.)
The Senate approved the expenditure of $963,797,000 (£A301,I86,875), of the total provided when it passed the Navy Appropriation Bill. This sum is more than 2,000,000 dollars (£A625,000) below the figure approved by the House oi Representatives.
The Acting Navy Secretary, Mr Compton, reported that two battleships would be completed four months ahead of schedule, that submarine construction had been hastened by from two to six months, and destroyer construction from 1 to 7 months.
In February last the House of Representatives passed the bill, which involved the expenditure of $906,000,000 (£A301.875.000) A proposal to spend $1,000,000 dollars (£312,500) on improving the harbour at the Island of Guam in the Western Pacific, was eliminated.]
Conways
The proposed FY41 (June 1940 to June 1941) funded only 2 BBs (Bb63 and 64), a single carrier of new design (CV9), 2 Cruisers (CL57 and 58) 7 DDs and 7 submarines despite much larger authorised expansion. USN acquisitions went through a two stage process, basically authorisation to increase the fleet size (which flip flopped from ship numbers, to tonnages and then back again). However in April/May 1941 this program was expanded on orders from the president to a greatly expanded effort, and fully funded, which was the critical constraint at that time. This greatly expanded effort was not part of the above-mentioned procurement program.
On the basis of the above, the US spent about $460 million of its $963.7 Million exapansion program on ships, of which, just $68 million was for a single carrier. Allowing for small ships, that might expand to $500 million,give or take. Potentially that means they were spending up to $400 million on new aircraft. I wonder how much of that was spent on R&D, and how much of that $400million was spent on the F4U and F6F programs?
It should be noted that the fiscal appropriations are differnt to the strength authorisations that were enacted under the Vinson Bill of 14 June 1940. In that Act, for FY42 (beginning June 19410 a further expansion of the Fleet was authorised, but this was brought forward, and expanded by order of the president in April 1941.
I will post the summary of the Vinson Act, which carried the US to a wartime footing in the next post
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parsifal
Colonel
The Vinson Act of June 14 1940
"To establish the composition of the United States Navy, to authorize the construction of certain naval vessels, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the authorized composition of the United States Navy in under-age vessels as established by the Act of May 17, 1938 (52 Stat. 401), is hereby further increased by one hundred and sixty-seven thousand tons, as follows :
(a) Aircraft carriers, seventy-nine thousand five hundred tons, making a total authorized under-age tonnage of two hundred and fifty-four thousand five hundred tons.
(b) Cruisers, sixty-six thousand five hundred tons, making a total authorized under-age tonnage of four hundred and seventy-nine thousand and twenty-four tons.
(c) Submarines, twenty-one thousand tons, making a total authorized under-age tonnage of one hundred and two thousand nine hundred and fifty-six tons : Provided, That the foregoing total tonnage for aircraft carriers, cruisers, and submarines may be varied by thirty-three thousand four hundred tons in the aggregate so long as the sum of the total tonnages of these classes as authorized herein is not exceeded: Provided further, That the terms used in this or any other Act to describe vessels of designated classes shall not be understood as limited or controlled by definitions contained in any treaty which is not now in force.
Sec. 2. The President of the United States is hereby authorized to construct such vessels, including replacements authorized by the Act of March 27, 1934 (48 Stat. 503), as may be necessary to provide the total under-age composition authorized in section 1 of this Act.
Sec. 3. The President of the United States is hereby authorized to acquire or construct naval airplanes, and lighter-than-air craft, and spare parts and equipment, as may be necessary to provide and maintain the number of useful naval airplanes at a total of not more than four thousand five hundred, including five hundred airplanes for the Naval Reserve; and the number of useful nonrigid lighter-than-air craft at a total of not more than eighteen.
Sec. 4. The President of the United States is hereby further authorized to acquire and convert or to undertake the construction of seventy-five thousand tons of auxiliary vessels of such size, type, and design as he may consider best suited for the purposes of national defense.
Sec. 5. There is hereby authorized to be appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury of the United States not otherwise appropriated, such sums as may be necessary to effectuate the purposes of this Act, including not to exceed $35,000,000 for shipbuilding ways, shipbuilding docks, and essential equipment and facilities at naval establishments for building or equipping any ship, herein or heretofore authorized, and, in addition, not to exceed $6,000,000 for essential equipment and facilities at either private or naval establishments for the production of armor or armament: Provided, That equipment and facilities procured for the production of armor or armament pursuant to the authority contained herein may be leased, sold, or otherwise disposed of, in the discretion of the Secretary of the Navy, when no longer required for use under naval contract.
Sec. 6. The allocation and contracts for construction of the vessels herein authorized as well as the procurement and construction of airplanes and spare parts, shall be in accordance with the terms and conditions provided by the Act of March 27, 1934 (48 Stat. 503), as amended.
Sec. 7. Vessels of the following categories shall hereafter be deemed under age until the number of years indicated have elapsed since completion : Battleships, twenty-six years ; aircraft carriers and cruisers, twenty years; other combatant surface craft, sixteen years; submarines, thirteen years.
Sec. 8. The construction, alteration, furnishing, or equipping of any naval vessel authorized by this Act, or the construction, alteration, furnishing, or equipping of any naval vessels with funds from any appropriation available for such purposes, contracts for which are made after June 30, 1940, shall be in accordance with the provisions of Public Law Numbered 846, Seventy-fourth Congress, approved June 30, 1936, unless such course, in the judgment of the President of the United States, should not be in the interest of national defense.
Sec. 9. For the purpose of modernizing the United States ships New York, Texas, and Arkansas, alterations and repairs to such vessels are hereby authorized at a total cost not to exceed the sum of $6,000,000. This sum shall be in addition to the total appropriation expenditures for repairs and changes to each of these vessels as limited by the Act of July 18, 1935 (49 Stat. 482; U. S. C, title 5, sec. 468a).
Sec. 10. The provisions of section 4 of the Act approved April 25, 1939 (53 Stat. 590, 592), shall, during the period of any national emergency declared by the President to exist, be applicable to naval public works and naval public utilities projects in the Fourteenth Naval District for which appropriations are made or authorized : Provided, That the fixed fee to be paid the contractor as a result of any contract entered into under the authority contained herein, or any contract hereafter entered into under the authority contained in said Act of April 25, 1939, shall not exceed 6 per centum of the estimated cost of the contract, exclusive of the fee, as determined by the Secretary of the Navy.
Sec. 11. In the discretion of the President, there is hereby authorized and established a Naval Consulting Board of seven members to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from among eminent civilians in the fields of industry, science, and research, to serve during the pleasure of the President. This Board is hereby authorized to make recommendations to the Secretary of the Navy in any matter concerning the Naval Establishment and the national defense. The members thereof shall serve without compensation, but shall be reimbursed for all expenses incurred incident to their travel and employment as members of the Board. There is hereby authorized to be appropriated out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, not to exceed $25,000 to effectuate the purposes of this section.
Approved, June 14, 1940".
If the 79000 tons of authorized carriers had been brought forward to fiscal year FY41, the US would have received three carriers at roughly the same time as CV9. The commissioning date for Essex was December 1942, whilst the following ships were May 1943 and september 1943. These three ships in total would have cost $204 million dollars. If repeat yorktowns had been accepted, i estimate the cost of tese ships in 1941 dollars to be about $40-50 million a copy, or a total of $120-150 million dollars. The US could have had these ships and simply delayed the f6f program by a few months. They could have had three extra carriers by aboiut April 1943 and ensured the defeat of Japan at a critical moment. F6F arrivals might have been delayed by something like 4 or 5 months.
It was just a matter of re-ordering priorities, and i think it was a golden opportunity missed. The US should have built their carriers first and then their uber fighters if they really felt the urge to build them. They could have done without themn completely, but there was no knowing that in 1940.
The abovementioned is sometimes referred to as the "11% expansion program". It was soon overtaken by successive and massive expansions to the naval building program, most significantly the "70% expansion program" which was authorized August 1940 (but Im unsure when this part was actually funded)
The following is a pretty good list of the various expansions in the USN naval building programs
http://www.shipscribe.com/shiprefs/usnprog/fy3941.html
which makes a bit of a mockery of the claim that the US was somehow hardpressed in termsof dock space and or labour to absorb these expansions in their building programs. The facts are they did expand what they were building, and didnt incur significant delays due to cramped dockyards or shortages of labour. this was not Nazi Germany ("muddle heaven"). The US had been planning for and arranging its dockyards since at least 1933 for the ability to massively expand at short notice. The program worked very smoothly, but it could have been even better.
"To establish the composition of the United States Navy, to authorize the construction of certain naval vessels, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the authorized composition of the United States Navy in under-age vessels as established by the Act of May 17, 1938 (52 Stat. 401), is hereby further increased by one hundred and sixty-seven thousand tons, as follows :
(a) Aircraft carriers, seventy-nine thousand five hundred tons, making a total authorized under-age tonnage of two hundred and fifty-four thousand five hundred tons.
(b) Cruisers, sixty-six thousand five hundred tons, making a total authorized under-age tonnage of four hundred and seventy-nine thousand and twenty-four tons.
(c) Submarines, twenty-one thousand tons, making a total authorized under-age tonnage of one hundred and two thousand nine hundred and fifty-six tons : Provided, That the foregoing total tonnage for aircraft carriers, cruisers, and submarines may be varied by thirty-three thousand four hundred tons in the aggregate so long as the sum of the total tonnages of these classes as authorized herein is not exceeded: Provided further, That the terms used in this or any other Act to describe vessels of designated classes shall not be understood as limited or controlled by definitions contained in any treaty which is not now in force.
Sec. 2. The President of the United States is hereby authorized to construct such vessels, including replacements authorized by the Act of March 27, 1934 (48 Stat. 503), as may be necessary to provide the total under-age composition authorized in section 1 of this Act.
Sec. 3. The President of the United States is hereby authorized to acquire or construct naval airplanes, and lighter-than-air craft, and spare parts and equipment, as may be necessary to provide and maintain the number of useful naval airplanes at a total of not more than four thousand five hundred, including five hundred airplanes for the Naval Reserve; and the number of useful nonrigid lighter-than-air craft at a total of not more than eighteen.
Sec. 4. The President of the United States is hereby further authorized to acquire and convert or to undertake the construction of seventy-five thousand tons of auxiliary vessels of such size, type, and design as he may consider best suited for the purposes of national defense.
Sec. 5. There is hereby authorized to be appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury of the United States not otherwise appropriated, such sums as may be necessary to effectuate the purposes of this Act, including not to exceed $35,000,000 for shipbuilding ways, shipbuilding docks, and essential equipment and facilities at naval establishments for building or equipping any ship, herein or heretofore authorized, and, in addition, not to exceed $6,000,000 for essential equipment and facilities at either private or naval establishments for the production of armor or armament: Provided, That equipment and facilities procured for the production of armor or armament pursuant to the authority contained herein may be leased, sold, or otherwise disposed of, in the discretion of the Secretary of the Navy, when no longer required for use under naval contract.
Sec. 6. The allocation and contracts for construction of the vessels herein authorized as well as the procurement and construction of airplanes and spare parts, shall be in accordance with the terms and conditions provided by the Act of March 27, 1934 (48 Stat. 503), as amended.
Sec. 7. Vessels of the following categories shall hereafter be deemed under age until the number of years indicated have elapsed since completion : Battleships, twenty-six years ; aircraft carriers and cruisers, twenty years; other combatant surface craft, sixteen years; submarines, thirteen years.
Sec. 8. The construction, alteration, furnishing, or equipping of any naval vessel authorized by this Act, or the construction, alteration, furnishing, or equipping of any naval vessels with funds from any appropriation available for such purposes, contracts for which are made after June 30, 1940, shall be in accordance with the provisions of Public Law Numbered 846, Seventy-fourth Congress, approved June 30, 1936, unless such course, in the judgment of the President of the United States, should not be in the interest of national defense.
Sec. 9. For the purpose of modernizing the United States ships New York, Texas, and Arkansas, alterations and repairs to such vessels are hereby authorized at a total cost not to exceed the sum of $6,000,000. This sum shall be in addition to the total appropriation expenditures for repairs and changes to each of these vessels as limited by the Act of July 18, 1935 (49 Stat. 482; U. S. C, title 5, sec. 468a).
Sec. 10. The provisions of section 4 of the Act approved April 25, 1939 (53 Stat. 590, 592), shall, during the period of any national emergency declared by the President to exist, be applicable to naval public works and naval public utilities projects in the Fourteenth Naval District for which appropriations are made or authorized : Provided, That the fixed fee to be paid the contractor as a result of any contract entered into under the authority contained herein, or any contract hereafter entered into under the authority contained in said Act of April 25, 1939, shall not exceed 6 per centum of the estimated cost of the contract, exclusive of the fee, as determined by the Secretary of the Navy.
Sec. 11. In the discretion of the President, there is hereby authorized and established a Naval Consulting Board of seven members to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from among eminent civilians in the fields of industry, science, and research, to serve during the pleasure of the President. This Board is hereby authorized to make recommendations to the Secretary of the Navy in any matter concerning the Naval Establishment and the national defense. The members thereof shall serve without compensation, but shall be reimbursed for all expenses incurred incident to their travel and employment as members of the Board. There is hereby authorized to be appropriated out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, not to exceed $25,000 to effectuate the purposes of this section.
Approved, June 14, 1940".
If the 79000 tons of authorized carriers had been brought forward to fiscal year FY41, the US would have received three carriers at roughly the same time as CV9. The commissioning date for Essex was December 1942, whilst the following ships were May 1943 and september 1943. These three ships in total would have cost $204 million dollars. If repeat yorktowns had been accepted, i estimate the cost of tese ships in 1941 dollars to be about $40-50 million a copy, or a total of $120-150 million dollars. The US could have had these ships and simply delayed the f6f program by a few months. They could have had three extra carriers by aboiut April 1943 and ensured the defeat of Japan at a critical moment. F6F arrivals might have been delayed by something like 4 or 5 months.
It was just a matter of re-ordering priorities, and i think it was a golden opportunity missed. The US should have built their carriers first and then their uber fighters if they really felt the urge to build them. They could have done without themn completely, but there was no knowing that in 1940.
The abovementioned is sometimes referred to as the "11% expansion program". It was soon overtaken by successive and massive expansions to the naval building program, most significantly the "70% expansion program" which was authorized August 1940 (but Im unsure when this part was actually funded)
The following is a pretty good list of the various expansions in the USN naval building programs
http://www.shipscribe.com/shiprefs/usnprog/fy3941.html
which makes a bit of a mockery of the claim that the US was somehow hardpressed in termsof dock space and or labour to absorb these expansions in their building programs. The facts are they did expand what they were building, and didnt incur significant delays due to cramped dockyards or shortages of labour. this was not Nazi Germany ("muddle heaven"). The US had been planning for and arranging its dockyards since at least 1933 for the ability to massively expand at short notice. The program worked very smoothly, but it could have been even better.
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parsifal
Colonel
yes, I see. my apologies. The thread has developed as it hs. hopefully this discussion will run its course and will get back on track. I apologise for my part in this.
Aozora, you're on this carriers-issue, and I'm not going to purport, here, to throw you off track on it. On this next logical issue, though, provided that carriers-issue is licked, namely, this F4F issue, I'll offer this. This F4F, of course, as we're all well-aware, was a Grumman product, a Grumman aircraft. Chance-Vought, in other words, knew about the issues relative to these F4Fs. Leroy Grumman knew about those issues much more intimately than anybody, though, including, I'll even propose, the U.S. Navy Department. As such, I'll submit, when, as early as 1941, the F6F was in concept development, that said something, meaningful, relative to this F4F issue. Just off the top of my head, fitting an engine into those that could get that aircraft up higher and quicker, radically beefing-up the undercarriage to improve its stability and enable it to withstand harsher landings, grooving the wing-loading for better maneuverability and performance while dive bombing, as well as just fitting the hydraulics into there, were very big issues. In other words, sure, one can propose anything one wants, but it's not as though those issues weren't already considered and resolved. Grumman weighed those issues relative to its product well before the F4Fs even tangled with the A6Ms. Let's make up our minds on those issues but in the light of giving that manufacturer its due diligence on same, I'm saying.
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CORSNING
Tech Sergeant
Hellcat/Spitfire. Well I guess it all boils down to if you are an Admiral or a General........Period!
There, that's all I got to say about that.
Goodnight Guys, Jeff
There, that's all I got to say about that.
Goodnight Guys, Jeff
buffnut453
Captain
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Njaco
The Pop-Tart Whisperer
You guys argue over the goofiest crap. Its Hellcat vs Spitfire - which would you take?
Well whatever it was now it's Hellcat vs. Spitfire - wouldn't you rather have carriers and Wildcats?
Personally I like: "Hellcat vs. Spitfire: We don't question peoples service."
parsifal
Colonel
If im going to have my service record questioned because ive taken a different view to the conventional wisdom, i reserve the right to react vigorously. not outside the forum rules...that means no biting back, but it does mean I have the opportunity to present my case, and stick it to em, albeit in a positive way.
If Im not allowed to defend myself in at least that way 9ie constructively) then there is something very wrong in this place.
If Im not allowed to defend myself in at least that way 9ie constructively) then there is something very wrong in this place.
My comment was not directed at you. You did nothing wrong.
parsifal
Colonel
okay, sorry about that. surely you can at least appreciate my tetchiness, if not condoning it
Well whatever it was now it's Hellcat vs. Spitfire - wouldn't you rather have carriers and Wildcats?
Bloody Wildcats! Pooh and wee in the gardens, yowling in the middle of the friggin' night right next to the window, spray their friggin' marker pee over the back door. Screw Wildcats and give me Spitfires any day!
To tell you the truth neither do I appreciate it too much when I make a flattering comment and I'm accused of insincerity by somebody who happens to think he's a human lie detector. But maybe that's just me.
Faster than a speeding bullet. More powerful than a locomotive. Able to leap tall buildings in a single bound. Look! Up in the sky! It's a bird! It's a plane! It's...a Hellcat!
Enough said.
Ok guys, lets get this back on track. One last time, lets keep it civil...
parsifal
Colonel
The whole point of the position Ive taken is that essentially whilst the helcat was an excellent aircraft, was it a necessary aircraft. I dont think ive done enough to say or claim "case proven". in reality you can never do that with a hypothetical. That principal applies whether you are changing cigarette brands, or replacing your current fighters with a new, as yet unproven fighter (eg the JSF). You never really know what will happen until you try it.
But what I think should be ovious is that the hellcat was not 'low hanging fruit". It came at a cost, i think a big one, one that added to the length of the war, because it had to, to a greater or lesser extent, rob the US of other weapons that it also needed at a critical juncture. Its a fair argument to point out that my perfect 2013 hindsight wasnt available in 1940. But that isnt the point either. Whilst I have gone off topic a little in assuming which of the two aircraft was the most valuable, rather than just the best straight up performer, I am merely pointing out that it wasnt all beer and skittles with the Hellcat. It had its downsides when it became a part of the US inventory. you could say the same thiing about the US iowas....they were expensive, and put a big hole in the US budget, but there you have it.
So, the hellcat came at a price, was it worth it. Thats a matter of opinion. i dont think it was
What about the Spitfire? well, thats a tough one for me because of my commonwealth and British biases. I cant be as hard on the Spit because of that. But I think I wouldhave to say that Spit had faults of its own. I think they were different though to the hellcats. I think the Spitfire was absolutely necessary to the allies through to 1942, in the same way as the Mustang was from 1944. The allies needed the Spitfire in the early stages to survive. in a defensive war, fighters assume greater importance for obvious reasons, and in reality there was nothing available that could quite do what the Spit was able to do. certainly not the hurricane.
But, did the Brits hang onto the Spit too long. Offensively it had severe limits, mostly because of its range. Should the british have ditched the Spit after 1942 and built (probably) US aircraft like the Mustang under licence? Would they have not been better served with hoards of British built Mustangs, rather than hords of British built Spits. Whereas the problem with the hellcat was when its carreer should begin, the problem with the Spitfire was when its career should end.
But what I think should be ovious is that the hellcat was not 'low hanging fruit". It came at a cost, i think a big one, one that added to the length of the war, because it had to, to a greater or lesser extent, rob the US of other weapons that it also needed at a critical juncture. Its a fair argument to point out that my perfect 2013 hindsight wasnt available in 1940. But that isnt the point either. Whilst I have gone off topic a little in assuming which of the two aircraft was the most valuable, rather than just the best straight up performer, I am merely pointing out that it wasnt all beer and skittles with the Hellcat. It had its downsides when it became a part of the US inventory. you could say the same thiing about the US iowas....they were expensive, and put a big hole in the US budget, but there you have it.
So, the hellcat came at a price, was it worth it. Thats a matter of opinion. i dont think it was
What about the Spitfire? well, thats a tough one for me because of my commonwealth and British biases. I cant be as hard on the Spit because of that. But I think I wouldhave to say that Spit had faults of its own. I think they were different though to the hellcats. I think the Spitfire was absolutely necessary to the allies through to 1942, in the same way as the Mustang was from 1944. The allies needed the Spitfire in the early stages to survive. in a defensive war, fighters assume greater importance for obvious reasons, and in reality there was nothing available that could quite do what the Spit was able to do. certainly not the hurricane.
But, did the Brits hang onto the Spit too long. Offensively it had severe limits, mostly because of its range. Should the british have ditched the Spit after 1942 and built (probably) US aircraft like the Mustang under licence? Would they have not been better served with hoards of British built Mustangs, rather than hords of British built Spits. Whereas the problem with the hellcat was when its carreer should begin, the problem with the Spitfire was when its career should end.
stug3
Staff Sergeant
I think the FM-1 2 sort of fits parsifal's scenario as they were developed for the smaller escort (Jeep) carriers and were refined to accentuate the most practical qualities of the Wildcat. They also served til the end of the war.
- Thread starter
- #220
wuzak
Captain
If the British wanted to use their Mustangs, which they did get from the US, in the same role as the USAAF did, then maybe it was a better choice to retool to make them.
But if they wanted to do that, why wouldn't they have put more effort into making long-range Spitfires?
The main difference between the Mustang and the Spitfire in terms of range was the amount of fuel they carried. Spits didn't carry much compared to the Mustang.
But as has been stated here before, the Spitfire VIII was tested in a configuration which would have enabled it to perform long range escorts, at least as far as Berlin. By both the UK and the US.
Some tweaks here and there would have reduced the Spitfire's drag, and extended its range. I think drgondog has shown in the past that one area that Spitfires suffered compared to Mustangs was in the angle of the windscreen. Another is the 20mm cannon barrels protruding - remove them and reduce the drag (though, would you rather have 2 x 20mm + 2 x 0.50"s/4 x 0.303"s? or 4 x 0.50"s?). These moves would also increase top speed - the cannon barrels were worth about 8-10mph. Re-engineer the radiator ducts with more optimal entry and exit sizes (IIRC Smith said the outlets were too big) and have fully adjustable radiator flaps (2 positions of the Spitfire IIRC).
A lot of these things were relatively minor changes. Certainly not as much of a change as required to bring the Mustang into production in the UK.
The ultimate would be, of course, to get the XIV with long enough range to escort to Berlin, or further. Or to bring forward Mk 21 production. If long range was a desired feature of British aircraft the new wing for the 21 surely would have featured far more tankage?
