Hellcat vs Spitfire - which would you take?

[parsifal]

The point is. The Germans did not win air superiority, as is claimed, and the major losses had nothing to do with the fighting in the air. More aircraft were lost to "other causes" than were lost to enemy fighters. A lot more.


For the Germans to be able to validly claim air superiority they would need to be able to achieve, overall (ie not just fighter to fighter) heavily one sided losses against the Allies, and deny the allies the ability to undertake significant operations. neither of those two things happened. In the battles cited the Axis lost 19 a/c to the allied 21. thats an exchange ratio of 1:1 not 4:1. The allies at no stage in this period were inhibited from undertaking operations. The Germans, despite the obvious superiority of their fighters did not achieve anything significant on the ground, or at sea between June and December.


It would be useful to obtain a bigger dataset before attempting to call this. But on the basis of the very limited data provided, all this does is more or less reinforce what ive been saying.Despite obvious advantages in performance for the German Fighters (clapped out Hurricane Is versus brand new Me 109Fs, it should not be hard to work out who has the performance advantage here), loss rates were almost the same, and at no stage were the allies denied freedom of manouvre in the air.

 

[parsifal]

I admit to not getting that. By your numbers 12 single engined fighter losses against 3 is a win for the RAF?

Numbers are not relevant unless it can adversely affects operations in some way. If the Allies were able to complete ther mission, or deny the Germans the ability to complete their mission, it was a victory. I agree, however the fighter losses are disportionate. Then again, this is just another variation of the BoB. Perhaps the Hurricanes were going after the bombers and actting defensively against the Axis fighters.

Once again its the totals that are relevant, and i count 13 Allied losses to 16 Axis losses. With the data presented, you cannot draw any other conlcusions other than the losses were similar. No advanatage either way....the hurricanes were good enough to pull a draw at minimum.

As for the others it proved once again that the Ju87 when caught by fighters is very vulnerable and the 110 and Ju88 were always going to struggle against single seaters.

So why is it valid to discount some Axis losses from the air battle? I dont get that at all?????

Plus of course the Italians should not be ignored

Yep agree entirely. Italian pilots were probably the best of any nationality in the TO, but not the most agrressive.

 

[RCAFson]

Clearly this has nothing to do with the BOB. Also the Hurricanes took part in a number of missions that day and not all of them were to intercept Ju87's. Some were fighter escort convering bombers and others were fighter sweeps.

The BofB was won because FC shot down more bombers than the Luftwaffe could afford, and they thwarted the bomber's mission which was to destroy UK industry and cow the population. Similarly, the WDAF's mission was prevent the Axis bombers from destroying the 8th Army while allowing their own (including Hurribombers) to attack the Axis ground forces and in this they were generally successful.. Yes, there were other missions that day, and generally the Hurricanes gave as good as they got. It is also interesting to note that FAA Mk 1 Hurricanes were involved in a lot of the fighting.

 

[parsifal]

Precisely. the air battle is not the end, it is a means to the end. The fighter to fighter combats are even less relevant. They exist simply to aither ensure ones own bombers get through, or to deny the enmy bombers get through. Only in very rare situation does the numbers of fighters lost become an issue, like the losses are unable to be replaced, or the losses prevent freedom of action in subsequent operations. No evidence of that here, though the loss of 7 Ju87s must have hurt the Germans, given the numbers they had available. The loss of 12 hurricanes is more or less irrelevant to the allied capability. In the preceding months (June to November) they had received over 840 Single engined fighters, more than half of them Hurricane Is. Do you think they cared about the loss of 12 hurricane that day?

In that same period the Germans had received 58 Ju87s. The loss of 7 ju87s represented a loss of more than 10% of the likley available force structure. we dont know how many Stukas were damaged. No wonder the hurricanes were going for the Ju87s....it was one of the germans' achilles heels.

 

[RCAFson]

Once again its the totals that are relevant, and i count 13 Allied losses to 16 Axis losses.

In terms of airframe weight plus aircrew numbers, and thus cost, the Allies clearly won the exchange.

 

[DonL]

Simply ridiculous to the issue we are discussing here!
Analogy from Wildcat to Hellcat to Hurricane and Spitfire!
But you two can believe in your myths.

It realy absurd at fighter comparison discusion!

 

[parsifal]

didnt quite work out the way you thought Quacker?

It is very relevant to determine the role of fighters in the overall airpower equation. fighters are there for two main purposes.

1) Deny the enemy the ability to undertake air missions except at unreasonable and unsustainable cost
2) Assist your own strike aircraft to survive long enough to complete their mission.

Anything else is just big boys playing with their toys

Regards

Quacker

 

[Glider]

The Axis air forces did not get air superiority simply because they didn't have the numbers, that is clear. It had nothing to do with the quality of the pilots or the aircraft.

To ssay that on a day when however you look at it the RAF lost far more fighters than the Axis airforces. On a day when the vulnerable Ju87's sufferred heavy losses and the other Axis losses were also aircraft well known to be vulnerable to single seat fighters. Is proof that the Hurricane and P40 were a good match for the Me109 is a leap I cannot see.

To sum up, the RAF had air superiority because they had the greater numbers, but the 109 was a better fighter by some margin over the P40 and Hurricane.
It isn't the case that the the RAF had air superiority because they had fighters that were close to the quality of the 109.

 

[parsifal]

Id agree that neither side had air superiority. Not as sure about the numbers, though highly likley that the RAF had a big and clear advantage.

However to get this back to the point at issue. The claim is that if your fighters are heavily outclassed you are going to sufffer big losses. From ther it depends on how you view the issue. if you want to compare fighter and fighter, like quackers, then in this case ther is a big differnce, and this does suggest obsolescence of the hurricane. I dont have any argument there on that score. However I dont see that as relevant, and further it is not necessarily the case either. It may well be the case the Allied fighters were more or less ignoring the Axis fighters and were going for a specific target....probably the Ju87s by the look of it. Viewing the airpower effects overall there is little difference in the loss numbers, and that kinda vindicates the RAF, and helps to prove the hypothesis. Going for superiority of fighter design is more or less meaningless and pointless in the overall scheme. Except in some very specific and unique situations. this aint one of em. The British and the Germans came away with similar losses. The Germans suffered most of their losses in their strike aircraft, the Allies suffered their losses mostly in their fighter formations. As a percentage of their respective force structures, the Germans suffered a loss rate of about 12% from their Ju87s in the TO, the Allies suffered 1.4% from their available Hurricanes in the TO. That is not a defeat. its a victory iun fact. The Germans are going to run out of bombers far quicker than the Allies are going to run out of fighters. 10 more raids like that, and the allies wont even need to get airborne....the Germans can fly off, go round in circles for a while, whilst the allied fightes stay home an drink tea, because after 10 combats like that., there are no bombers to worry about.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

didnt quite work out the way you thought Quacker?

Is it necessary to resort to name calling?

 

[parsifal]

Is it necessary to resort to name calling?

No problems , I was having a pointed joke with him, after this....

Parsifal is very busy to claim almost unachievable claims for the Allied, but deny obvious what ifs for the axis, to me this are claims from a quacksalver.

I didnt even know what a quacksalver was, when i looked it up I just laughed. I thought"very clever...obvious attempt at insult, but i like it", hence giving it back to him for him to enjoy as much as I have.

Theres heat in this kitchen, I know, but its like a game at the moment. im enjoying it

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

I missed that post. Carry on...

 

[VBF-13]

Your claims with the aircraft carriers are simply wrong, you can't speed up building a ship with money, if workermen work already 24 hours a day in a 3 worhshift. (3 x 8 hours = 24 hours)

I think I can squeeze in right here. It wasn't only that, Don. The U.S. didn't need carriers. To turn this tide, we needed what we built, the F6Fs and F4Us. This War wasn't a carrier-war. Strictly-speaking, it was an aircraft-war, and our F4Fs were outclassed. Even after we had upgraded in the FMs, those were outclassed. And don't for a minute believe those F6Fs and F4Us racked up those batting averages against minor league pitching. The Japanese aircraft were still formidable. While their pilots had suffered a drop in terms of experience, understand, they had begun with vastly more experience. And, in terms of pilot-training, they still had more in that aircraft than our pilots had in ours, right up through around the middle of 1944. We just embarrassed that aircraft and those pilots so badly in those F6Fs and F4Us that to this day they're still making excuses for it. The problem with the F4Fs and FMs was, they couldn't "go upstairs." While they remained "downstairs," they couldn't out-turn the A6Ms. We very well could have built more carriers and flooded those and the skies with F4Fs and FMs, but that would have been about the dumbest thing we ever did. And, do you know what? That's probably why we didn't do it.

 

[RCAFson]

I think I can squeeze in right here. It wasn't only that, Don. The U.S. didn't need carriers. To turn this tide, we needed what we built,

With respect, IMHO, the tide turned at Midway and it was only for the lack of 1 or 2 more carriers that the IJN CVs weren't fully wiped out in the carrier battles at Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Your claims with the aircraft carriers are simply wrong, you can't speed up building a ship with money, if workermen work already 24 hours a day in a 3 worhshift. (3 x 8 hours = 24 hours)

Although you had 3 shifts, there were overlaps as many plants during WW2 in the US had employees working 10 - 12 hour shifts 6 days a week, sometimes 7. I had family members who worked in defense plants during WW2, sometimes they didn't get a day off for 6 months!

 

[drgondog]

I think I can squeeze in right here. It wasn't only that, Don. The U.S. didn't need carriers. To turn this tide, we needed what we built, the F6Fs and F4Us. This War wasn't a carrier-war. Strictly-speaking, it was an aircraft-war, and our F4Fs were outclassed.

Maybe you need to jump out a little. The Battle of Coral Sea and Midway were Carrier-Aircraft war and by luck and crafty planning between Dec 7, 1941 and early June 1942 we manage to Not run out of Carriers. We brought what we had, and had we lost three and only killed two IJN carriers - Hawaii was toast and we begin all over again from West coast of US for a VERY long pacific war. Note that neither F6F or F4U (or B-17 or B-26) were factors but the F4F was crucial there and crucial at Guadalcanal - another pivot point that was crucial to preserve Australia from Japanese invasion.

Even after we had upgraded in the FMs, those were outclassed. And don't for a minute believe those F6Fs and F4Us racked up those batting averages against minor league pitching. The Japanese aircraft were still formidable. While their pilots had suffered a drop in terms of experience, understand, they had begun with vastly more experience. And, in terms of pilot-training, they still had more in that aircraft than our pilots had in ours, right up through around the middle of 1944. We just embarrassed that aircraft and those pilots so badly in those F6Fs and F4Us that to this day they're still making excuses for it. The problem with the F4Fs and FMs was, they couldn't "go upstairs." While they remained "downstairs," they couldn't out-turn the A6Ms. We very well could have built more carriers and flooded those and the skies with F4Fs and FMs, but that would have been about the dumbest thing we ever did. And, do you know what? That's probably why we didn't do it.

Short answer. No ground war, no Island campaign, no steady advance from Guadalcanal if US defeated at Midway.. and defeat is measured in Carrier-aircraft capability to project tactical security 200 miles from the fleet carrying troops, CB's, Supplies and landing craft.

F6F and F4U - marvelous fighters. Pretty useless with Fleet force projection to 'unmolest' itself' on the bottom in December 1941 through June 1942 in PTO - while German U-Boats are stretching Admiral King to the limit in the Atlantic.

 

[parsifal]

I think I can squeeze in right here. It wasn't only that, Don. The U.S. didn't need carriers.

Unbelievable. Are you saying that if the Japanese had carriers, and the US chose, or lost their carriers, and did not build any, they could still win. If so, are you serious. Lets just look at the implications of this for a mnute. How would the US provide logistic support to it forward bases, including Hawaii if the Japanese have 10 carriers, and they have none. How does their fleet get around? An aircraft, even an F4 Phantom or F-15 Eagle, is useless if it lacks the fuel, the ammunition the construction materials, to build and supply airfields. Without a carrier fleet, the US isnt able to undertake effective force projection into enemy territory.

The nearest equivalent we have here is the 1943 situation, where neither side had an effective carrier fleet. Even with massive material superiority, the Allies struggled to control or make headway against the Japanese. And that was without either side having carriers. If the Japanese had a significant carrier force and the allies did not, the allies simply could not mount any offensive operations whatsoever,and would have been hard pressed to hold any ground the Japanese wewre truly determined to take.

Without carriers the US would have been forced to sue for peace on the japanese terms

To turn this tide, we needed what we built, the F6Fs and F4Us. This War wasn't a carrier-war. Strictly-speaking, it was an aircraft-war, and our F4Fs were outclassed.

No evidence to support that. The experiences of the RN clearly disprove that. Despite being chronically equipped with inferior fighters, and heavily outnumbered to boot, and faced by an opponent far more numerous and as dangerous as the japanese, the British did not lose a single carrier to air attack (except the inneffectual Hermes), and managed to challenge control of enemy controlled waters to the point of changing an entire campaign. Without carriers it was at the least, very difficult to excercise sea control. Exactly the same applies in the Pacific.

Having the Hellcat and F4U were big advantages, but not having a carrier was critical to the outcome of the war....F4Fs did have the runs on the board, and Japan was already in deep trouble ever before the Hellcat or the Corsair had time to make an effect. There is no evidence that Hellcats were responsible for their impressive killtallies, simply because of the performance of the aircraft. None. There is plenty of evidence, that the F4F, in the environments of the later ewar period were still effective aircraft, more than able to complete their allotted tasks and more than able to be effective, and chalk up reasonable kill tallies of their own.

The Pacific war was a war of aircraft, thats true, but the aircraft was so much more than a group of pilots poncing around from island to island shooting up japanese bases, or shooting down aircraft.

Even after we had upgraded in the FMs, those were outclassed.

Agreed, but what were the bad effects arising from that. I can show you many examples of Wildcats continuing to be very effective despite that obvious obsolescence.

And don't for a minute believe those F6Fs and F4Us racked up those batting averages against minor league pitching. The Japanese aircraft were still formidable. While their pilots had suffered a drop in terms of experience, understand, they had begun with vastly more experience.

Completely agree

And, in terms of pilot-training, they still had more in that aircraft than our pilots had in ours, right up through around the middle of 1944.

And yet, until about March 1944the major body blows to Japanese capability had been achieved by carriers armed with F4fs. This just serves to underline the fact that the hellcat, despite its obvious superiority, was not really needed to prosecute the japanese. Not so for the Carriers. They proved to be absolutely critical at every stage of the war.

We just embarrassed that aircraft and those pilots so badly in those F6Fs and F4Us that to this day they're still making excuses for it.

I dont think the japanese have got much to be embarrassed about. At iwo, for example, what do you do when you are hit by concentrated raids of 5 or 600 aircrafdt, each one of them with a pilot that on average has 10x the experience your group has, and still outnumbering you by more than 10:1 as well. If the Japanese had not been given the opportunity to recover after the '42 campaigns, the war would have eneded earlier, with or without the Hellcat. The Hellcat was one part of the US victory, but in the end, it was not a critical or essential part. There was no way of knowiung that early in the war,m but thats how it finished panning out.

The problem with the F4Fs and FMs was, they couldn't "go upstairs." While they remained "downstairs," they couldn't out-turn the A6Ms.

So what. To engage enemy fleets, the strike aircraft had to get low, all the action occurred below 10000 ft. Its a disadvantage, but a disadvantage that meant absolutely nothing to the outcome of the major battles.

We very well could have built more carriers and flooded those and the skies with F4Fs and FMs, but that would have been about the dumbest thing we ever did. And, do you know what? That's probably why we didn't do it.

One could argue with equal force that the dumbest thing the US ever did was forego carrier production in FY'41 so that they could design and build an aircraft they didnt really need. They took the path they did, because that was the prudent thing to do. Thats not what this discussion is about. Weve got it wrong anyway, but it has evolved into "was the hellcat necessary to win the war?" Answer is "No". To the supplementary issue youve raised in your last posting, "Carriers were not really necessary to win the war?" Are you kidding of course they were.

 

[wuzak]

One could argue with equal force that the dumbest thing the US ever did was forego carrier production in FY'41 so that they could design and build an aircraft they didnt really need.

In 1941 they really didn't know what they would need by 1944/45. So, getting higher performance aircraft would have to be, as you say, prudent.

In 1941 they also didn't know how many carriers they would need. Well, I suppose they already had a stab at it and commissioned the ones they thought were required.

So, how much did an F4F and F6F cost? I presume that if the F6F isn't proceeded with the the F4F with be produced instead of F6Fs at a ratio of better than 1:1. So how much money is saved in production? How much is saved in engineering cost?

Now, you have saved the design cost of the F6F - but you will probably expend more money on developing and improving the F4F.

Any engineering resources you save at Grumman cannot be used to build your carriers - dissimilar skill sets required.

So there must be some ship yards lying around during the war that are completely idle? A huge untapped workforce that is not dedicated to war production, ood production, or some other essential service?

Maybe the plan is to cut construction of other ships to free up resources? Liberty ships, perhaps? Destroyers, cruisers, battleships?

Where are you going to build carriers?

 

[Aozora]

One could argue with equal force that the dumbest thing the US ever did was forego carrier production in FY'41 so that they could design and build an aircraft they didnt really need. They took the path they did, because that was the prudent thing to do.

Why assume that carriers were sacrificed in favour of building one particular model of fighter? It would be more logical to assume that the USN didn't build more carriers in FY '41 because they required more battleships, cruisers, destroyers etc. Also not forgetting that battleships were still considered to be more important than carriers in USN doctrine right up until Pearl Harbor, which forced a rethink.

 

[parsifal]

Why assume that carriers were sacrificed in favour of building one particular model of fighter? It would be more logical to assume that the USN didn't build more carriers in FY '41 because they required more battleships, cruisers, destroyers etc. Also not forgetting that battleships were still considered to be more important than carriers in USN doctrine right up until Pearl Harbor, which forced a rethink.

Im not assuming, but there is some extrapolation in there. The only ones doing the assuming here are you guys, who have produced nothing and just keep mouthing the same dogmas ovber an over again with absolutely nothing to support your positions.

Some pages back i posted figures for the budget of FY41 (the "11% Construction plan) and the subsequent Vinson plan (the so called "70% expansion plan") which was to become the build plan for FY42 but was brought forward to April 1941.

In FY 41 the Americans gave 960 million USD to the Navy. Of that they spent 406 million on major warship construction . They allocated around 50 million to base upgrades and other ancillary work. Just one carrier, or 68 million, was authorised

The rest we dont exactly know how was spent, but aircraft procurement and development was in there somewhere. Rough rule of thumb is that aircraft taken from the shelf at that time cost around 20-30K USD per copy (new aircraft are a different matter....rough rule of thumb for the 1st year of production of a new type is about 50-60K USD, including development and setting up production costs....rough but something to work from). In FY41, the Navy received about 500 new aircraft, give or take, which on the above figures would cost them around 20 million USD.

After all that we are still left with 520 million unaccounted for. There arent many things left in the bottom of the tin. There mighht have been a few million spent on light forces like PT boats and ASW ships, but not much more. There might have been an expansion of training facilities....Ive no idea how much, buct say 50million. We still have $450 million or so left unaccounted for. The only major ticket item I can think of is R&D of which aircraft development has to be high on the list.

Lets say that $300 million of that $450 million unaccounted budget was spent on aircraft development. What aircraft are under development. The Corsair had flown in 1939, but was still being worked on. Hellcat was a major ticket item for research in FY41. The Americans were also working on improvements to existing designs and the TBF. Not sure about the Helldiver, but lets assume yes.

I cant give you a figure for the cost of hellcat development, but it has to be substantial. its not just the cost of the aircraft, it the tooling up costs, as well . Given the proportion of US naval aircraft production that was devoted to the Hellcat in 1943....the first year of fruition for the money spent on its development in 1940-41, one can validly claim that at least 50% of that $300million was spent getting the Hellcat up to par and on carrier decks. Roughly 60% of US carrier aircraft production in 1943 was Hellcat production, so I am being conservative.

If the US spent $150 million on Hellcat production, they could have put an additional 6 Enterprise style carriers into production. if they had wanted to put F4fs and , SBD (and not worried about a torpedo bomber at all) they would have needed at least another 1000 aircraft ordered (to cover training and normal wear and tear). That adds another $40 million to the budget, so in reality they could have added 4 or 5 Enterpise cl;ass (at 1938 prices....if the cost had gone up the number would be less. Lets be conservative and say they build 3 additional carriers with F4F and SBD airgroups. These ships are off the shelf design and will be appearing before the completion of CV9 (the Essex). They are smaller, less well protected, but easier to build.

3 additional carriers, with airgroups at the end of 1942 is a game changer. A new fighter in 1944 (basically) is good, but not essential
1I assume