Hellcat vs Spitfire - which would you take?

[VBF-13]

I think I can squeeze in right here. It wasn't only that, Don. The U.S. didn't need carriers. To turn this tide, we needed what we built, the F6Fs and F4Us. This War wasn't a carrier-war. Strictly-speaking, it was an aircraft-war, and our F4Fs were outclassed.

Maybe you need to jump out a little. The Battle of Coral Sea and Midway were Carrier-Aircraft war and by luck and crafty planning between Dec 7, 1941 and early June 1942 we manage to Not run out of Carriers. We brought what we had, and had we lost three and only killed two IJN carriers - Hawaii was toast and we begin all over again from West coast of US for a VERY long pacific war. Note that neither F6F or F4U (or B-17 or B-26) were factors but the F4F was crucial there and crucial at Guadalcanal - another pivot point that was crucial to preserve Australia from Japanese invasion.

Even after we had upgraded in the FMs, those were outclassed. And don't for a minute believe those F6Fs and F4Us racked up those batting averages against minor league pitching. The Japanese aircraft were still formidable. While their pilots had suffered a drop in terms of experience, understand, they had begun with vastly more experience. And, in terms of pilot-training, they still had more in that aircraft than our pilots had in ours, right up through around the middle of 1944. We just embarrassed that aircraft and those pilots so badly in those F6Fs and F4Us that to this day they're still making excuses for it. The problem with the F4Fs and FMs was, they couldn't "go upstairs." While they remained "downstairs," they couldn't out-turn the A6Ms. We very well could have built more carriers and flooded those and the skies with F4Fs and FMs, but that would have been about the dumbest thing we ever did. And, do you know what? That's probably why we didn't do it.

Short answer. No ground war, no Island campaign, no steady advance from Guadalcanal if US defeated at Midway.. and defeat is measured in Carrier-aircraft capability to project tactical security 200 miles from the fleet carrying troops, CB's, Supplies and landing craft.

F6F and F4U - marvelous fighters. Pretty useless with Fleet force projection to 'unmolest' itself' on the bottom in December 1941 through June 1942 in PTO - while German U-Boats are stretching Admiral King to the limit in the Atlantic.

From 7 December 1941 through 1 October 1945 we lost five carriers and six escort carriers and were already building carriers. On the performance of our early F4Fs you built up a house of cards and knocked it down and in so doing ignored what those F4F pilots, the aces, included, were telling us they needed. Chance-Vought and Grumman delivered that, and then our pilots delivered. It's not that hard.

 

[VBF-13]

Now, you have saved the design cost of the F6F - but you will probably expend more money on developing and improving the F4F.

The FMs are what you're looking to, there, Wuzak. They're the upgraded F4Fs. That's why Grumman, aware of those constraints, had to go from scratch.

 

[parsifal]

In 1941 they really didn't know what they would need by 1944/45. So, getting higher performance aircraft would have to be, as you say, prudent.

Agreed, doesnt affect any assessment of the net value of the hellcat to the allied victory. Neither does it cast dispersions on the excellence of the hellcat as an aircraft. Thats how we stuffed up your thread...I apologize once again.

In 1941 they also didn't know how many carriers they would need. Well, I suppose they already had a stab at it and commissioned the ones they thought were required.

The Americans in their planning leading up to the war actually did have a good idea of how many carriers they would need. There was a good deal of disquiet that the british would not survive in 1940, so the US began building what is called a "two Ocean Navy". A navy that could fight both the Germans and the Japanese single handedly. The US believed that the germans would eventually get around to building their vaunted "Z" plan, and it was known that the japanese already had 10 carriers, with the capacity for conversions for about 4 more. The Americans planned, in the event of a British surrender, to take large passenger liners and convert them to extermporised carriers. Initially it was planned to build an additional 6 Yorktowns, but with the abrogation of the treaty limits this was hurriedly changed to the Essex class. The research done on the liner conversions was not completely wasted, it was used in the design of the Escort Carriers, but because Britain did not collapse, there was no need to institute the emergency program. There was still a need to contain the Japanese, and in FY42 a further 4 Essex were authorised (this was greatly expanded to nearly 17 carriers by years end....it still wasnt enough....during that year a number of the Cleveland class CLs were taken iin hand for conversion to Light carriers). The USN knew that it needed carriers, lots of em, which makes the decision to build just one carrier in FY41 unexplainable.

So, how much did an F4F and F6F cost? I presume that if the F6F isn't proceeded with the the F4F with be produced instead of F6Fs at a ratio of better than 1:1. So how much money is saved in production? How much is saved in engineering cost?

Its a great question, and Im not going to pretend that I know the answer precisely. But I have an idea.

The Tiger tank is populalrly estimated to have cost around RM312K per copy. Thats probably a fair estimate, give ofr take. But in 1942, when the first 100 or so rolled off the lines, the cost per units was more than double that. As time progressed and the production run got biger, the establishment costs thinned out and the cost per unit came down.

In the case of the Hellcat, I wouldsay that overall, its cost was not much greater than the F4F. there wouldnt be much in it, put it that way. But its the first year of production that the cost really hits home. By 1943 the averge cost of a P-51 was about 60K USD. If we assume 50K for both the Hellcat and the F4F, we are not going to be too far off. However we also need to take into account the cost of developing the hellcat. it was a wartime development, unlike the F4F, so its development is not "free" in the same sense that the f4fs development can be considered "free". We dont actually know the development cost of the Hellcat, but its going to be somewhere between$100 and 200 million. For that first year of production - 1943, the cost of 1000 F4Fs will be $500 give or take ( in 1943 dollars). For the same Hellcats, in the same time frame,. but factoring in the estimated development costs, the overall cost of the 1000 F6Fs is about $700 million, or about 40% more

Now, you have saved the design cost of the F6F - but you will probably expend more money on developing and improving the F4F.

Ah yes, but improving an existing design costs a fraction the cost of building a whole new type from scratch. Developing a replacement for the Spitfire was far moreexpensive than improving the Spitfire

Any engineering resources you save at Grumman cannot be used to build your carriers - dissimilar skill sets required.

Agreed

So there must be some ship yards lying around during the war that are completely idle? A huge untapped workforce that is not dedicated to war production, ood production, or some other essential service?

There was plenty. The US had been developing shipyard capacity since 1933 for just this eventuality...a rapid expansion at short notice. In FY41 and FY42 (actually from April 1941), the navy at a stroke of a pen went from an replacement only to an 11% expansion program, followed 66 days later by a 70% increase in tonnage. It did this effortlessly and without any major hitches.

The constraqint was always money for the USN, not dockyard or labour capacity

Maybe the plan is to cut construction of other ships to free up resources? Liberty ships, perhaps? Destroyers, cruisers, battleships

?


USN was chronically short of shipping and DDs as well as modern cruisers in 1941. They should have scrapped the 6 Iowas completely and the 5 Alaskas they were planning, which would have given tham an additional $540 million for new construction. No argument they made mistakes in naval construction. But thats not the point. they also made mistakes pushing ahead with the Hellcat. Perhaps a delay, to builod three carriers (plus CV9) in FY41, delay development of the Hellcat until FY42, which would mean it start entering squadron service around June 1944, rather than November 1943. That would make no difference to the conduct of the war. having 3 additional carriers at the end of 1942 would have changed the war completely.

Where are you going to build carriers?

In the same yards that CV10-12 (authorised in the 70% xpansion plan of August 1940). There was absolutely no shortage of dockyard space for the USN in 1940....there was in 1942-3, but not in 1940

 

[Glider]

Sorry but I must disagree with any thought of delaying the F6. There are debates all around over the Zero vs the F4 but suffice it to say that the advantages of one were more than matched by the advantages of the other. However if you delay the F6 then you are talking about the F4 going up against the A6M5 which was a lot faster then the F4 (or FM2), daved as fast and maintained its advantage in agility.

You are giving the aerial advantage back to the IJN

As for the building of the BB's I can understand the Iowas going ahead. All the contracts for the purchase and build would have been signed and the cash saved would have been little and the shipbuilding capacity was in place. The Alaskas though I do agree were a huge waste of resources. More cruisers to give flexibility and AA cover would have been cheaper.

 

[parsifal]

Sorry but I must disagree with any thought of delaying the F6. There are debates all around over the Zero vs the F4 but suffice it to say that the advantages of one were more than matched by the advantages of the other. However if you delay the F6 then you are talking about the F4 going up against the A6M5 which was a lot faster then the F4 (or FM2), daved as fast and maintained its advantage in agility.

A6M5 did not enter significant squadron service until March 1944. From the end of the campaign in Guadacanal, until the introduction of the A6m5....about 13 months, the main operational type was the A6m3, which was midway between the A6m2 and the A6M5 in terms of top speed and gernal performance. But in reality there was not a lot of difference between the A6M5 and the earlier A6M2.

From the beginning of the war until mid 1943 the Japanese had lost 6200 aircraft. Their production and pilot training schemes was barely keeping pace with losses. This was against mostly types of indifferent quality.....F4Fs, and P-40s for the most part. More importantly, the quality of the pilots in that early part of the Pacific war was much higher than in the later part. These types were easily handling the challenges being thrown up by the Japanese throughour 1943. Mostly because after guadcanal and Kokoda, the Japanese were in extremely serious situation. They had about 100 fighters in Rabaul, and about 30 over New Guinea. Despite the fact that most bombing raids were unescorted, the Japanese air strength continued to rupture. There were a couple of noteworthy events in that period up to March 1944. The air strength in New Guinea was decimated, not by allied fighters, but by allied bombers. Allied bombers hit Hollandia and destroyed well over 100 aircraft in a single stroke. Allied bombers hit the Japanese transports at Bismarck sea, easily brushing past the escorting Zeroes and sinking many ships and destroyers. Finally, Halsey, at last with carriers available and amajor amphibious operation at empress Augusta Bay under threat from gathering Japanese seapower at Rabaul was forced to act and commit his carriers to a major raid of Rabaul. It was a success, but not because of thehellcat, and not because of the losses....It showed the japanese that rfabaul as a basae was no longer defensible....

The greatest impact on Japanese airpower (apart from the incessant grinding attrition being meted out day after day was in theseries of raids undertaken in November 1943. There were two elements to the raids, a land based component and the carriers strikes undertaken by Halsey. It offers the best insight as to the relative worth of the F6F against relatively competent enemy pilots, but it also marked the end of effective resistance in the South pacific, airpowerwise, despite a very credible defence by the Japanese

"Later that day, 78 Fifth Air Force planes–North American B-25s of the 3rd, 38th and 345th bombardment groups, escorted by Lockheed P-38s from the 39th and 80th fighter squadrons and the 475th Fighter Group–attacked Rabaul and were intercepted by 112 Zeros. Rabaul's air defenses, under the overall command of Rear Adm. Jinichi Kusaka, included three carrier groups that had been dispatched there just the day before, while their ships underwent refit in Japan. The caliber of the pilots was reflected in their performance. Warrant Officer Kazuo Sugino from the carrier Zuikaku's air group was credited with shooting down three enemy planes. Shokaku's carrier group included Warrant Officer Kenji Okabe, famed for scoring seven victories in one day during the Battle of the Coral Sea, but its star in the November 2 air battle was Petty Officer 1st Class (PO1C) Takeo Tanimizu, who scored his first of an eventual 32 victories by downing two P-38s. From light carrier Zuiho, Ensign Yoshio Fukui downed a B-25 but was then himself shot down, possibly by Captain Marion Kirby of the 475th Group's 431st Squadron. Fukui survived with a burned right foot and insisted on returning to action. The loss of nine B-25s and nine P-38s earned the November 2 raid a place in Fifth Air Force annals as 'Bloody Tuesday,' but the Japanese recorded 18 Zeros destroyed or damaged in addition to bomb damage to Rabaul's ground installations.

The Japanese needed a more powerful naval force to destroy the American beachhead. Admiral Mineichi Koga, commander of the Combined Fleet, dispatched Vice Adm. Takeo Kurita's Second Fleet, comprised of the heavy cruisers Takao, Maya, Atago, Suzuya, Mogami, Chikuma and Chokai, the light cruiser Noshiro and four destroyers, from Japan to Rabaul. Chokai and a destroyer had to be detached on November 4 to tow two transports that had been crippled by American air attacks to the northwestern Pacific base at Truk in the Caroline Islands. A Consolidated B-24 spotted the rest of Kurita's fleet off the Admiralty Islands and duly reported 19 ships heading toward the western entrance of St. George's Channel at Rabaul. The Second Fleet's arrival was bad news to Admiral William F. Halsey, commander of U.S. Navy forces in the Southwest Pacific. With most of the U.S. fleet preparing to invade the Gilberts, he did not have one heavy cruiser to oppose Kurita's powerful veterans. He did, however, have a small carrier detachment, Rear Adm. Frederick C. Sherman's Task Force (TF) 38, which had supported the bombardment of Buka and Bonis.

The carriers Saratoga and Princeton were fueling from the tanker Kankakee northwest of Rennell Island when Halsey sent them a dispatch on November 4, ordering, 'Task Force 38 proceed maximum formation speed [to] launch all-out strike on shipping in Rabaul and north thereof (order of targets: cruisers, destroyers). Retire thereafter….'

Rabaul was then believed to have as many as 150 aircraft–quite a hornet's nest for two carriers to stir up. Even the aggressive Halsey knew the risks involved, but Saratoga and Princeton were the only weapons at his disposal that had a realistic chance of neutralizing the threat to the Bougainville beachhead. Joined by the anti-aircraft cruisers San Diego and San Juan and nine destroyers, the flattops headed north.

The weather favored TF 38 when it arrived at its designated launching point, 57 miles southwest of Cape Tokorina and 230 miles southeast of Rabaul, on the morning of November 5. The sea was smooth, allowing the destroyers to keep station, while overcast skies lessened the chances of being observed by Japanese patrol planes. Saratoga's Air Group 12, headed by Commander Henry H. Caldwell, sent every plane it had into the sky–33 F6Fs, 16 TBFs and 22 SBDs. Princeton sent up 19 Hellcats and seven Avengers. Lieutenant Commander Joseph J. Clifton, leader of Saratoga's fighter squadron VF-12, later said, 'The main idea of the orders was to cripple all of them that we could rather than concentrate on sinking a few.'

Two hours after launching, the 97 planes reached their targets–Simpson Harbor, the inner anchorage at Rabaul, and the outer roadstead at Blanche Bay–and a curtain of AA fire. Again the Americans got a break from the weather, which was so clear over Rabaul that they could see for 50 miles. That was especially welcome under the circumstances, because although Sherman and Caldwell had trained their aircrews rigorously to hit moving targets, they had not had time to prepare a detailed plan of attack for the Rabaul strike–much of it was worked out by group and squadron commanders over their radios.

The Japanese already had a total of 59 A6M3 Zeros in the air, but they had expected the Americans to break into small groups as they neared the targets. Instead, Caldwell simply directed one large formation through the gantlet of AA fire, letting it split into smaller groups only at the last moment before making their attacks. Unwilling to go through their own flak, the Zeros milled around while 'Jumping Joe' Clifton's Hellcats went after them.

Ignoring the curtain of AA shellfire, Caldwell led his group across Crater Point in order to swing upwind of the enemy ships. Then his SBDs deployed and the TBFs went down low to start their torpedo runs. By then, the Japanese ships were either steaming for the harbor entrance or taking evasive action. One heavy cruiser fired its main 8-inch gun battery at the TBFs. As they pulled up from their attacks, the SBD and TBF pilots found themselves dodging over or around ships for four or five miles. Miraculously, all but five fighters and five bombers emerged from the wild melee, although most of the survivors suffered some damage. Casualties amounted to seven pilots and eight crewmen killed or missing.

Caldwell, who had been directing the dive bombers from above, found himself and one of Princeton's Hellcats being chased by eight Zeros. His rear turret was disabled and his photographer, Paul T. Barnett, was dead, but Caldwell managed to fend off his attackers with his nose machine gun. Lieutenant H.M. Crockett of Princeton's VF-23 took more than 200 hits in his Hellcat–and a few in himself–yet he managed to land aboard Princeton without flaps, while Caldwell brought his Avenger back to Saratoga 'with one wheel, no flaps, no aileron and no radio.'

Total American losses in the attack came to 13 aircraft–far fewer than the 49, including 20 probables, claimed by the Japanese. While the Hellcat pilots were credited with 21 victories and the TBFs and SBDs claimed another seven, the Japanese recorded the loss of only two Zeros and their pilots: PO1C Hiroshi Nishimura from Zuikaku, and Zuiho's Chief Petty Officer Kosaku Minato".(Source History Net.com and World War II magazine) - see next post for comment.

 

[parsifal]

(from previous post)
So in summary, other aircraft had destroyed or disabled over 20 Zeroes,, zeroes that were being flown by competent piloits for the last time, the best the Hellcats could do was destroy just two aircraft. Hardly a critical contribution to the war effort. eventually, of course, they did, but only after the hard work and sacrifice had so softened the Japanese up as to make them vulnerable. Essentially all the hellcats were doing was moving in to take the credit and clean up the kudos.

You are giving the aerial advantage back to the IJN

Absolutely not. The Americans very nearly gave the initiative away in early 1943 when they ran out of carriers. Only by the most extraordinary efforts by the 5th and 13th AFs and the RAAF (and some RNZAF) units was it just possible to maintain pressure on the Japanese. If carriers had been available at that point, a lot more pressure would have been posible....The Hellcat certainly did NOT turn the tide of the air battle in the pacific. That honour goes to the US carriers and their 1942 air groups. The Japanese were prevented from recovery, not by the efforts of the Hellcat groups, but by the unceasing, and costly sacrifices made by the B-24s, B-25s Beauforts and A-20s (and other strike aircraft) that just kept attacking no matter what. It was not won by a group of johny come lately Hellcats that arrived late for the party, and at the beginning were inneffective.

By postponing the Hellcats entry, for 1943 you are giving up the loss of a very few aircraft. By adding a few moree carriers with F4fs as the fighter component, you are maintaining the pressure at a time when the japanese cannot effectively resist.

As for the building of the BB's I can understand the Iowas going ahead. All the contracts for the purchase and build would have been signed and the cash saved would have been little and the shipbuilding capacity was in place.

The Iowas were not authorized and financed until FY41 and FY42. A couplewere authorized FY43 but were cancellled along with the Montanas. The US could just as easily have ordered carriers in place of the Iowas. You could have 3 or 4 Yorktowns for every one Iowa. That makes no sense in my book

 

[Aozora]

We dont actually know the development cost of the Hellcat, but its going to be somewhere between$100 and 200 million. For that first year of production - 1943, the cost of 1000 F4Fs will be $500 give or take ( in 1943 dollars). For the same Hellcats, in the same time frame,. but factoring in the estimated development costs, the overall cost of the 1000 F6Fs is about $700 million, or about 40% more

You're waaaaay overestimating design and development costs, by at least a factor of 100. For instance, in 1934 the Air Board granted Boeing $275,000 for the design and development of the Boeing Model 299 the prototype of four engine heavy bomber which later became the B-17 - an additional $400,000 came out of Boeing's own funds: designing and developing the prototype took 153,000 man hours and $675,000. 1940 Contract for designing Northrop XP-61 = $1,367,000. Contract for designing and developing P-47 = $550,512. Grumman F7F = $1,077,400. $100 to 200 million for the F6F, which was basically an extrapolation of the F4F using many of the same construction techniques and design features and which would have been able to use the same tooling? = yougottabekiddingright!?

Assuming the F6F-3 cost $50,000 thus 1,000 x 50,000 = 50,000,000 ie; 50 million not 500 million.

O

 

[Shortround6]

A6M5 did not enter significant squadron service until March 1944. From the end of the campaign in Guadacanal, until the introduction of the A6m5....about 13 months, the main operational type was the A6m3, which was midway between the A6m2 and the A6M5 in terms of top speed and gernal performance. But in reality there was not a lot of difference between the A6M5 and the earlier A6M2.

From the beginning of the war until mid 1943 the Japanese had lost 6200 aircraft. Their production and pilot training schemes was barely keeping pace with losses. This was against mostly types of indifferent quality.....F4Fs, and P-40s for the most part. More importantly, the quality of the pilots in that early part of the Pacific war was much higher than in the later part. These types were easily handling the challenges being thrown up by the Japanese throughour 1943.

And this is pretty much the heart of the matter. The Japanese not only dropped the ball on aircraft development, they kicked it out of bounds high up into the stands.

We know NOW that the F4F may have been able to soldier on but if the Japanese had been a bit more on the ball (or stopped chasing pie in the sky fighters) depending on the F4F could have turned out very badly.

The Zero went from a 950-1000hp engine to a 1130hp engine very soon and then stalled for almost 4 years (actually did stall, the A5M8 never made production). Depending on the Japanese to NOT develop a 1300-1400hp Zero in 1943-44 would be poor planning.

Similarly the JAAF dropped the ball and kicked it out of bounds. over 5,000 Ki 43s were 3-4,000 too many. Depending on the Japanese to KEEP a 1100hp two gun fighter as their MAIN fighter until 1944 would also be poor planning on the US part.

The US would still have won but it would have been a much harder, more costly battle.

 

[parsifal]

You have got to be kidding. Youve omitted the cost of setting up the dies and presses, the costs associated with setting up the factory spaces and delivery systems, the costs of developing trainers and training systems. Moreover comparing development costs in 1934, under peacetime conditions has no relationship to developing under the streeses of wartime conditions.

We once had to develop a new fridge handle for a domestic refrigerator. It cost over a million dollars just in design work and a further five million in setting up the production lines to assemble that. Thats from the 1970s, and my source was my late father.

The B-29 cost $3 billion in 1940s dollars to develop

http://forum.armyairforces.com/Desi...arison-B29-Superfortress-to-Manhattan-m218316

Some typical costs for aircraft types is available here

Price of WW2 Aircraft | C Strohmeyer's Weblog; Life, Business

For the Hellcat there was a bit of an issue, they needed to develop new engines to make it fly, which had to have added costs to the basic development.


The following article is also worth a look. Relevantly it states

"On a mid-1941 visit to Great Britain, General H.H. Arnold assured the British that
the United States would not lag behind the great air powers of the world in the quality of
its equipment. Thus in May 1941, the Materiel Division urged manufacturers to push for
full exploitation of research and development. Once the United States entered into war,
the renewed need for production resurfaced. The dilemma of the search for the "more and
better" weapons was overshadowed by the "quantity versus quality" issue"


Thats intersting, because given the timing of the statemnent, it was a comment obviously directed toward the amounts of money being spent by the Germans in their R&D budget. In 1940 the germans wewre spending 1 in 5 of their Luftwaffe budget on R&D. In 1940 they allocated RM5200 million to the LW, which means they were spending about RM1.0 Billion on R&D. Converting RM to dollars is very difficult, but a rate of about 3 to 1 is probably as good as any. At that rate the Germans were spending $300 million or so on R&D alone each year, so it makes a lot of sense that the USN would spend $2-300 million on their reseaerch given Hap Arnolds comments.

http://www.taphilo.com/history/WWII/USAAF/stats/warproduction.pdf

As far as me not being able to add up, well, ill give you that one...

 

[parsifal]

And this is pretty much the heart of the matter. The Japanese not only dropped the ball on aircraft development, they kicked it out of bounds high up into the stands.

We know NOW that the F4F may have been able to soldier on but if the Japanese had been a bit more on the ball (or stopped chasing pie in the sky fighters) depending on the F4F could have turned out very badly.

The Zero went from a 950-1000hp engine to a 1130hp engine very soon and then stalled for almost 4 years (actually did stall, the A5M8 never made production). Depending on the Japanese to NOT develop a 1300-1400hp Zero in 1943-44 would be poor planning.

Similarly the JAAF dropped the ball and kicked it out of bounds. over 5,000 Ki 43s were 3-4,000 too many. Depending on the Japanese to KEEP a 1100hp two gun fighter as their MAIN fighter until 1944 would also be poor planning on the US part.

The US would still have won but it would have been a much harder, more costly battle.

DG said the same thing, more or less,and I had to agree with him. As i agree with you. Ive modified my position a little because of that.......there isnt a need to abandon the Hellcat, but it wasnt absolutely necessary in August or September 1943. There is a stronger case for later in the war, but not mid-'43. Moreover Roosevelt was saying exactly what Im saying.....dont delay production pursuing unrealistic new designs......make do with the designs you have for the moment.

No denying that from the perspective of 1940, the USN needed the Hellcat. But ther is also no denying they needed more cariers, lots of em, and fast. In this regard it was the Americans that dropped the ball. Ordering just one carrier as war clouds were looming.....what were they thinking!!!!!

Like all these things, some kind of bal;ance is really what was needed. Thats why im saying dont cancel the F6F.....its way too effective to allow that, but defer it until after CV9, 10 11 and 12 had been voted into the budget. Better yet, cancel the Essex class and build repeat Yorktowns in 1940. At half the cost of an essex, they are the best value carriers the US ever produced.

 

[drgondog]

Sorry but I must disagree with any thought of delaying the F6. There are debates all around over the Zero vs the F4 but suffice it to say that the advantages of one were more than matched by the advantages of the other. However if you delay the F6 then you are talking about the F4 going up against the A6M5 which was a lot faster then the F4 (or FM2), daved as fast and maintained its advantage in agility.

You are giving the aerial advantage back to the IJN

As for the building of the BB's I can understand the Iowas going ahead. All the contracts for the purchase and build would have been signed and the cash saved would have been little and the shipbuilding capacity was in place. The Alaskas though I do agree were a huge waste of resources. More cruisers to give flexibility and AA cover would have been cheaper.

Glider - the F4U was in production. USN designated it the Ensign Killer as it struggled in Sea Trials, even as Brits approved it - but one simple fact remains. The USN could have done very well with F4U on carriers in late 1942/early 1943 and never missed a beat to the end of the War.. more operation accidents? - Yes. .. better air to air capability vs IJN in 1943?... - Hell Yes. Simplified logistics? - Yes.

I'm not disagreeing your argument of F4F vs F6F, just pointing to a better alternative relative to a.) procurement dollars, and b.) significant leap in Fleet Air performance earlier than F6F.

 

[wuzak]

I don't have much infor on development costs.

Except these from American Secret Pusher Fighters of World War II:

The XP-54 preliminary engineering data and wind tunnel models were purchased by the USAAC for $39,700. The initial contract cost for building the XP-54 was $647,343.

The USAAC requested that the XP-54 feature a pressurised cabin. This was added later with a fixed price contract of $125,000.

Still less than $1m for an aircraft that is far more complicated than the F6F.

The XP-55 phase 1 contract (engineering data and powered wind tunnel model) was $44,000.
The Army weren't convinced so didn't continue teh program at that time. Curtiss proceeded with a small scale test bed with their own funds. Eventually the USAAC started the program up again and contracted $1,222,894 with Curtiss for 3 prototypes and 1 mockup.

The initial contract cost for the XP-56 was $361,500, for one prototype. A second prototype was added to teh program, but I can't see for what cost just at the moment. The program, like the others, had major cost overruns. Nearly $240k in additional funding was required. But the XP-56 was a highly experimental aircraft which used new materials (magnesium) and new manufacturing techniques (truly stressed skin monocoque, all welded using a process Northrop had to invent!).

 

[Aozora]

You have got to be kidding. Youve omitted the cost of setting up the dies and presses, the costs associated with setting up the factory spaces and delivery systems, the costs of developing trainers and training systems. Moreover comparing development costs in 1934, under peacetime conditions has no relationship to developing under the streeses of wartime conditions.

As far as me not being able to add up, well, ill give you that one...

No, you've got to be kidding to say that setting up dies and presses etc, plus factory space etc cost at least 100 times that of design and development, when much of the available tooling and factory space was already available - the biggest costs would be transferring production of the F4F and TBM to General Motors and building a new plant, no 3, for the Hellcat. As an example of building a new factory from scratch in 1940 it cost Ford $14.3 million to build and tool up a huge new factory for the R-2800.

Setting up and resetting dies and presses, which were already in use for the F4F, would not have cost hundreds or even tens of millions because they are not being built from scratch - taking your fridge handle analogy, it would cost, say, 5 times the cost of Hellcat design and development. In total your $700 million, give or take, is still waaay over the likely costs of design, development, production and distribution of the first 1,000 Hellcats

And I did include other design and developments costs, including the F7F which was a little more complex than the F6F, and was designed and developed under the "stresses of wartime conditions"

For the Hellcat there was a bit of an issue, they needed to develop new engines to make it fly, which had to have added costs to the basic development.

The R-2800 had already been designed and developed and was already flying and well tested in several thousand aircraft. The -10 and propeller used by the F6F-3 was identical to the -8 already being used by the F4U, except for a downdraft carburettor.

 

[parsifal]

so the germans are spending $300 million on development, your claiming the US was spending pin money to develop their crop of aircraft. I take it therefore that Hap Arnold lied to the british, and the Americans are genius's able to develop all aircraft for next to nothing (except the b-29, which cost billions for some inexplicable reason), sorry im not buying what your tryng to sell. if that were the case, we would see aircraft types in WWII every 6 months instead of trying to spin existing types out for 20 years or more, even in WWII

 

[Glider]

Glider - the F4U was in production. USN designated it the Ensign Killer as it struggled in Sea Trials, even as Brits approved it - but one simple fact remains. The USN could have done very well with F4U on carriers in late 1942/early 1943 and never missed a beat to the end of the War.. more operation accidents? - Yes. .. better air to air capability vs IJN in 1943?... - Hell Yes. Simplified logistics? - Yes.

I'm not disagreeing your argument of F4F vs F6F, just pointing to a better alternative relative to a.) procurement dollars, and b.) significant leap in Fleet Air performance earlier than F6F.

Hard to disagree with this.

 

[Aozora]

so the germans are spending $300 million on development, your claiming the US was spending pin money to develop their crop of aircraft. I take it therefore that Hap Arnold lied to the british, and the Americans are genius's able to develop all aircraft for next to nothing (except the b-29, which cost billions for some inexplicable reason), sorry im not buying what your tryng to sell. if that were the case, we would see aircraft types in WWII every 6 months instead of trying to spin existing types out for 20 years or more, even in WWII

R D quite clearly means more than R D on designing and building prototypes; it includes the whole range of aeronautical research including designing and building engines, which, during the 1930s/40s, was a lot more expensive than designing airframes, research into aerodynamic theory and development etc etc. How do you think NACA, for example, was funded? I'm not buying your $700 million for one fighter - well over twice the entire German R&D budget for their entire aircraft industry.

The B-29 cost so much because everything about it was brand new; physically, aerodynamically and in engineering terms almost everything had to be designed from scratch, tested and developed for production, including developing and attempting to de-bug the engines alongside of the aircraft. Several new factories - not just one, each much larger than the Grumman plant for the F6F. Also five airfields built in China at a cost of $200 million because of the graft and corruption endemic to the process, while there were other unknown costs on top of that, plus developing the supply lines in areas where there was no logistical support for an aircraft like the B-29: after the China debacle the whole lot had to be moved to the Marianas with new airfields, yet more supply lines etc etc. - the B-29 was a whole new ball game compared with designing and building a fighter which was using existing design and construction techniques and a well developed engine.

Please, point me to WW 2 aircraft which were designed to suffice for 20 years.

 

[VBF-13]

Glider - the F4U was in production. USN designated it the Ensign Killer as it struggled in Sea Trials, even as Brits approved it - but one simple fact remains. The USN could have done very well with F4U on carriers in late 1942/early 1943 and never missed a beat to the end of the War.. more operation accidents? - Yes. .. better air to air capability vs IJN in 1943?... - Hell Yes. Simplified logistics? - Yes.

I'm not disagreeing your argument of F4F vs F6F, just pointing to a better alternative relative to a.) procurement dollars, and b.) significant leap in Fleet Air performance earlier than F6F.

You're painting with way, way too broad a brush. Beware of the conclusions you reach.

Let's get back to the carriers and the F4Fs, for a moment, and touch again on that theory. On the carriers, are we playing a game, or do we really want to know? If we really want to know, we think of things like this. You referenced earlier our performance at Coral Sea and Midway. We lost carriers, there, sure. They didn't get the Enterprise, did they? You guys go on about our sacrificing carrier-building for the F6F. What do you think we were doing? We commissioned the Princeton and Essex in 1942, the Franklin and Independence in 1944, and a plethora of other, lighter carriers, in between. We were building carriers. The way this theory goes, we stopped. On the F4Fs, improve them? How? They ended up through two manufacturers, and they couldn't be improved, but marginally. Grumman knew that. That's why the F6Fs.

Now let's get to this pilot-training advantage the U.S supposedly had over these poorer-trained Japanese pilots as also referenced in Wikipedia of all things and totally-unsupported in fact (follow the citation, and see it for yourself). I already went over that, but evidently it didn't get across. Again, go back to Parsifal's post #145. Look at "150 hours," in January 1944. What do you think that was, they took somebody off the street and put him in a Zeke and he's a pilot? That was after three months on trainers, which was after three months on biplanes, which was after three months physical training, which was after three months classroom instruction--or, if it wasn't that, that's close enough to what it was. That "150 hours" was 50 hours more than the U.S. pilots had in our combat aircraft. In January 1944, they were still ahead of us in pilot-training. If you can trust that "150 hours," that's what that means.

Let's finish here with the Zeke. It could turn inside anything. It was also very, very hard to hit. Think of trying to hit a falling feather. Those are the kinds of descriptions I've heard, over and over. And, it had longevity. It was built right, that's why. Credit the manufacturer for that. Hell, I have a 27-year-old Mitsubishi TV. I wouldn't trade it for anything.

PS: I debate TVs, too...

 

[Glider]

USAAF Training was about 260 hours and the USN a bit more than that as they had to deck qualify which obviously took extra time and practice. There were some comments earlier in the thread about there being slack in the RAF training scheme. The only reply I can give is that I wish it was so. From roughly the end of the BOB to mid 1942 RAF training wasn't as good as the US training but after that it at least matched it. If there was any slack in the RAF system it was used to try and fill the gaps in the training given.

 

[parsifal]

R D quite clearly means more than R D on designing and building prototypes; it includes the whole range of aeronautical research including designing and building engines, which, during the 1930s/40s, was a lot more expensive than designing airframes, research into aerodynamic theory and development etc etc. How do you think NACA, for example, was funded? I'm not buying your $700 million for one fighter - well over twice the entire German R&D budget for their entire aircraft industry.

I agree that engine development was a significant cost area in the research side of the equation, but I dont buy the argument that the R2800 was an "off the shelf" design so it doesnt enter into the cost analysis for the Hellcat. The fact that this engine was used in other aircraft does represent a cost saving overall, but in the context of 1940-42, the only other aircraft that were using it....albeit in an experimental way, were the P-47, F4u and F6F. Even though R2800 was designed for Kartvelli's, and the F4U preceded the F6F in terms of prototype development, it was the hellcat that was either the first, or one of the first types to use it operationally. Further, Grumman wasted more than 18months trying to perfect the "Turbosupercharged" R2600.

Im reasonably certain now that the figures you are quoting are for prototype deliver, and not the development costs. Case in point is the b-17. The individual unit cost of a B-17, mid 1943 was $201000 USD without communications or armament. Some sources say the cost was in excess of $350000. I suspect the huge differences arise from either the time scale, or what you were actually buying. But I dont think it valid to try and claim that the development work needed to get the very first Type 299 (in adjusted 1940 dollars) was less or even slightly more than the unit costs of the completed design. There are hidden costs you are choosing to ignore here

Very much the case with the Hellcat. Its development stems back to the F4F2, extends through to the aerodynamic studies for the F4U, must take into account the immediate predecessor of the hellcat, the XF5F, which eventually completely foundered, though parts of the work done on it were used in the Tigercat. There were three XF6F-1 prototypes that I know of, and i belive similar numbers of XF6F-2 9only based on a photo, I admit that is captioned "XF6F-2 in flight, and shows threee of them....maybe youve got better data on that) and a similar number of XF6F-3s. If the numbers of protoypes comes to 9.....$50000 dollars aint going to cut it for even one prototype. And thats without even looking at the technology development.

Ive managed to dig out the history of plant number 3. I'll give a bit more backgropund tonite, but I can tell you it cost a lot more than $14 million. It was begun in 1941, aimed at employing 20000 workers in that one plant, and was complete or nearly complete at the end of 1941. It wasnt comissioned until June 1942, but was already undertaking component manufacture from January. That makes sense...the company would be busy training its workforce , which would include plant executives, skilled labour, semiskilled labour and unskilled labour. Involved in a secondary way would be the construction workers actually building the plant....it took almost a year to complete, and the various tradesman and other workers needed to actually set up the production lines . Iam not certain but its easy to see that at least 30000 workers, either directly or indirectly would be invollved in the construction and in training and eventual component manufacture for at least two year. Kets be conservative and assume the average wage of each worker was $20 per week, and only 20000 on average were employed in setting up the factory. 100weeks x 20000 workers x $20 per week is $4000000 for astart (and that doesnt include things like materials costs, licence fees, goivernment charges and the like). Not part of the research budget, but most definately part of the development basket. And remember, production of the F6F till the end of 1941 was an astounding 10 aircraft......by how many workers?

As for me claiming $700 million for one type. I never claimed that. I said my best guesstimate of the US Navy's R&D budget was $520 million, of which I thought $250million was an appropriate estimate for aircraft R&D. Note thats R and D...two separate bits to consider. I said that the F6F was a major part of that estimated $250million, and thought it not unreasonable to attribute a $100million cost. Given how the discussion has gone, im prepred to concede that it was probably not as high as $100million. But less than a million? Rubbish!!!!

The B-29 cost so much because everything about it was brand new; physically, aerodynamically and in engineering terms almost everything had to be designed from scratch, tested and developed for production, including developing and attempting to de-bug the engines alongside of the aircraft.

No argument that the Superfortress was a massively more complex project than anything that preceded it, but everything you are saying about the B-29 can be applied (albeit with less vigoiur) to the F6F program.

Several new factories - not just one, each much larger than the Grumman plant for the F6F. Also five airfields built in China at a cost of $200 million because of the graft and corruption endemic to the process, while there were other unknown costs on top of that, plus developing the supply lines in areas where there was no logistical support for an aircraft like the B-29:

There was only one factory for the F6F, but it was the biggest to date that had been constructed. Why is the b-29 subject to all those other constrictions, and not the F6F (or any other type). sorry, this explanation just does not cut it.

after the China debacle the whole lot had to be moved to the Marianas with new airfields, yet more supply lines etc etc. - the B-29 was a whole new ball game compared with designing and building a fighter which was using existing design and construction techniques and a well developed engine

.


These are not development costs, once out the factory it becomes an operational cost. F6F had similar, but less intense issues of its own. Its just that Grumman was very good at solving their problems (pity they cant do that today)

Please, point me to WW 2 aircraft which were designed to suffice for 20 years.

Spitfire, Me109, P-47, F6F, F4U, P-51. Admittedly some of these were not a full 20 years, and admittedly some were completely redesigned during their life cycle, but on the basis that it only costs "about $50K" to produce a new type in the 1940's why the hell did the owners of these designs stretch them well beyond what their original design specification. the answer is because designing and developing a completely new type is a very expensive excercise, and it was far cheaper and easier to strech existing designs rather than bring in new ones

 

[Aozora]

Mmmm, yeah, guess I can accept up to $100 million - where you threw it way out and made things look a little sqiffy was your $700 million for development + 1,000 F6Fs; as for 1,000 F4Fs costing $500 - yeaeeah the USN would have cheered F4Fs costing 50¢ each! However, as with the Spitfire v Hurricane debate I would suggest there were, historically, more constructive alternatives to retarding the development and service introduction of the Hellcat.