Hellcat vs Spitfire - which would you take?

Great stuff, Bill.

The F4U, F5F, and FL were ordered at the same time (mid 1938 ). They all had their first flights in April-May of 1940. By which time there were FOUR Essex class carriers on order. By September there was an additional SEVEN. Money was not the issue. Even so, the total spent in FY40 on airframe, engine, and propeller R&D from all sources (government and private) was in the $30-$40M or one Yorktown class.


The only way to get more fleet carriers sooner is to free up slips. This can only be done by postponing or canceling battleships. That was not very likely to happen.

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Im not agreeing with your other comments, its just that we do need to move the debate along, and the issue is debateable.

However the above excerpt is clearly wrong, easily determined by just really basic checking. There were NOT four carriers laid down in April 1940 (or even 1941).... (discounting those actually completed from prewar orders, and even then, theree werent four under construction). The ships at issue are the Essex class, and just looking at ther commencement dates, for the first 5 in the series (the ones that did the majority of heavy lifting for the Navy) we get the following

"The fourth Yorktown (CV-10) was laid down on 1 December 1941 at Newport News, Va., by the Newport News Shipbuilding Drydock Co. as Bon Homme Richard; renamed Yorktown on 26 September 1942; launched on 21 January 1943, sponsored by Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt; and commissioned on 15 April 1943 at the Norfolk Navy Yard, Capt. Joseph J. ("Jocko") Clark in command" (DANFS)

USS Intrepid (CV11) was laid down 1 December 1941 (Wiki)
USS Hornet (CV12) was laid fown 31 August 1942
USS Franklin (CV13) was laid down 7 December 1942

"The fourth Ticonderoga (CV-14) was laid down as Hancock on 1 February 1943 at Newport News, Va., by the Newport News Shipbuilding Dry Dock Co.; renamed Ticonderoga on 1 May 1943, launched on 7 February 1944, sponsored by Miss Stepha nie Sarah Pell, and commissioned at the Norfolk Navy Yard on 8 May 1944, Capt. Dixie Kiefer in command" (DANFS again)

1 ship was authorized in April 1940, and a further 4 in July 1940. "Authorizing" is not commenced...there was a two stage process for ship funding in the US....authorization and then "voting" the funds. "Authorizing" meant the money was reserved, but not spent, "voting" meant the funds were actually taken "out of the bank" and spent. "Commencement would happen some time after "voting", and took time for the administration to catch up with thelegislature, and for materials and other resources to be allocated) As indicated above 1 ship (Essex) on the 19 April 1940, and voted FY41. This was the essex. Four ships were then authorized under the Vinson Bill, in June 1940, but not voted until FY42. To be fair, defence spending for FY42 was brought forward three months to April '41.

These ships (and others were laid down at the height of the naval expasion, when bill after bill was voted and shoip after ship was laid down. Roosevellt had been steadily expanding shipbuilding in the US since 1933, there was never much shortage in capacity until the shipping crisis of '42, and even then thanks to Kaiser, that was a crisis fairly well absorbed. Its a safe generalization to say that the US was never lacking in shipyard capacity during the war. What it lacked was money

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I think this thread has turned into a history quiz..............

Lack of carriers in the first 9 months of 1943 limited American offensive operations. As 1943 progressed, there was less and less of a shortage of F4F fighters. Some of the f4f groups that were deployed from islands in the Solomon Islands could have been deployed to carriers. IMHO it would have been wise to cancel the Alaska class large cruisers or two of the 4 South Dakota battleships. The Alaska was launched in December 1941 and only made it into service in 1945.

Njaco said:

I think this thread has turned into a history quiz..............

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Yes, we are off topic, yes we are curently in the rough, yes we are wandering aimlessly with no sense of direction, yes, there are muffled jabs going on at each other. Still hope the thread hangs in there. I keep thnking of my kid sons favourite movie "cars" and that car completely wrecked and being towed away, saying "dont retire me coach, i can still race!!!!

Dont you just love this place....

I never said they were under construction. I said they were ordered. From U.S Aircraft Cariers: An Illusrated Design History By Norman Friedman page 134:

The Essex class began with a single hull, planned in 1939 for construction under FY 41 program, to absorb tonnage still available under the vinson-trammeli act. That law authorized sufficient tonnage to bring the United States up to the totals allowwable under the Washington Naval Treaty, and so constituted a tonnagw limit even after the experation of that treaty. A 20 percent expansion program 0f 17 may 1938 added 40,000 tons to the originally permitted 175,000, providing for the Hornet and also fo 20,000 tons of new carrier, which became CV 9. Beside the statutory total tonnage limit, there was also a 23,000-ton limit on individual carriers imposed by the London Naval Treaty of 1936. The new Carrier design was funded under the FY 40 program for construction in FY 41.

By that time, however, it was clear that the U.S. Navy needed much more rapid expansion. The "Two Ocean Navy" Act of 14 Jun 1940 provided for three more carriers (CVs 10-12)-which had already been ordered under CNO directive of 20 May. Upon the fall of France, Congress voted an additional 70 percent expansion, with another seven fleet carriers (CVs 13-19) being ordered under a 16 August 1940 directive. Two more initial series, CVs 20-21, were ordered under a further expansion program, just after the outbreak of war on 15 December1941. hull nos. 22 through 30 were absorbed by the Independence-class conversions of light-cruiser hulls, and the first eleven ships absorbed the available slips for the first two years of the war....

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Do you have anything to support your belief?

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You got anything to refute that?

zjtins said:

You got anything to refute that?

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I take that to be a no, you don't have anything to support your view.

I take that to be a no, you don't have anything to support your view.

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Back at you

Guys, this thread is on a cliff edge. the mods are watching. If the thread has to go out, make it something relevant at least. "Back at you" is just childish rubbish.

Pick it up guys........please......

Jugman said:

I never said they were under construction. I said they were ordered. From U.S Aircraft Cariers: An Illusrated Design History By Norman Friedman page 134:

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Thats basically sying the same thing.....but not very clearly. To get a better understanding of how the US acquisition apparatus worked at that time, I recomend Conways, at page 88 gives pretty good explanation, which runs as follows

In US practice Congress authorised the funding to build ships. and then votes the funds as they became available. Voting of the funds occurs in a fiscal year, therefore building programs are referred to as FY25 etc. FY 41 was from June 1940 to June 1941.

After being authorised AND then voted (by bill of congress, the President then had to enact that bill in order to get ships started. In 1940 and 1941 (FY41 and FY42) the president brought forward the authorisation dates, to allow some construction to be undertaken earlier than it should.

The treaty limits by 1939 were largely of academic value by 1939. Many of the participants were already at war by 1939, so whilst the US gave passing deference to it,it really didnt affect the shipbuilding process at all in terms of tonnages. What the treatry system did do was lock the US into building already existing designs that were largely treaty designs. they did this to speed up the construction and delivery times....by orders of the Navy secretary the Navy ordered repeat designs of existing trety ships rather than delaying deliveries whilst designs exploiting the full design possibilities were worked up. later in the war there were exceptions to this, but, except for the Alaskas, this was not the case in 1940.

What the Navy did with its ships....largely freeze the designs to speed up deliveries, it should have done with aircraft deliveries. The US fielded the best ships of any combatant IMO, yet these ships were treaty designs, which frustrated many admirals, because they were denied the latest and best ships that coud have been designed. The Navy secretary should have applied the same principal to aircraft in my opinion....ordering repeat orders for existing designs rather than delaying and awaiting the delivery of more modern types. The US surface fleet was able to win its war convincingly with existing designs, so to could the air arm have won their war with more or less the existing designs of 1941. Better designs could have waited and there would have been no effect on the US capability, and the US could have maintained a great deal of pressure when it counted.

So, even though the Navy was planning for a greatly expanded naval program as early as 1938 (something Ive already spoke about) the Essex was not authorised until FY41, and a further three not until FY42. This is reflected in the laying down dates of these ships....Essex was not commenced until April 1941, and the others, not until well into 1942.

FY41 was never 1939. It refers to what is authororized for the period June 1940 to June 1941. Ships dont usually appear or commence before that (with one or two exceptions when the president directly intervened). Sometimes, if money was short, a ship authorised in one FY could be delayed to a following year, but genereally the US was bringing construction forward in the lead up to war.

Despite all that, the actuall commencement dates for the Essex was as they were, and this had little or nothing to do with 1938-1940. The USN planned expansions from that date, but the funding was not really authorised until much later.

Njaco said:

I think this thread has turned into a history quiz..............

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There's a purpose behind this "history," Chris. It's to discredit the record of the F6Fs based on nothing better than opinions of Japanese incompetence. Just as with the record of the P51s, the presumption should be reasonably-competent opposition. Japan had as many people as Germany to train their pilots and manufacture their aircraft, as those populations were virtually identical. Somebody wants to rebut that presumption and say German incompetence was the decisive factor in the record of the P51s, the burden is on them to come forward with evidence, not personal opinion, and not hearsay opinion. Further, don't shift the burden. Don't say, in effect, if you don't believe the boats and planes in the Bermuda Triangle were abducted by alien spacecraft, prove otherwise. That's another thing you see going on, here, when this relentless campaign gets stuck for evidence.

Yes, this is off-topic. Yes, I said I'll let it alone. Somebody insidiously started it back up, again, though, didn't he? This time, I mean it. I don't care, anymore.

Confucius say, "Young man not know much."

It seems to me it would be a huge reach to say the Hellcat's record rests entirely on the substandard quality of the IJN and IJA airforces; it was obviously an excellent carrier plane. But that doesn't mean it's not valid to examine the quality of the opposition as ONE factor in the Hellcats success. After all, the original question was comparing the Hellcat to the Spitfire, and as for the most part they fought in different theatres, comparing the opposition they faced is reasonable. Certainly during the time they served simultaneously the Hellcat would seem to have a kill loss ratio several times better the Spitfire (or at least no-one seems to be claiming 19:1 for the British fighter). Was it then several times better in terms of overall performance. And if not, what other factors, including the quality of the opposition, contributed to the Hellcats record?
Re the previous post, my understanding is that later in the war Japan was effectively blockaded. Wouldn't it have been at a serious disadvantage in manufacturing potential? Also, prewar Germany was besotted with aviation and prepped large numbers of young men as future pilots, whereas the Japanese Airforces were conceived as small, highly trained forces without the same consideration for the infrastructure required to replace ongoing aircrew losses. And wouldn't it be fair to say that the Spitfire in the ETO was facing for the most part competitive designs in the Fw190 and (with qualification)Bf 109, whereas the Hellcat was facing predominantly obsolescent designs, with a much higher proportion of them being unarmoured light and medium bombers?
The degree to which any of these factors contributed to the Hellcat's much higher kill/loss record may be debatable, but to dismiss them wholesale seems to leave us with a very dicey conclusion; that there was nothing in the tactical situation the Hellcat faced that contributed to it's stellar record and its success in air to air combat relative to the spitfire is a reflection of it's superiority as a fighter. This is much easier to refute; show me the figures! What characteristic or performance parameters of the Hellcat made it better? Was it faster, more manoeuvrable, better climbing to a degree that might have made it more effective than the Spitfire by a factor of several times, even had it been transposed to 1944 Europe?. If the answer is no it is reasonable to then ask; what other factors might have contributed to that vaunted 19:1 figure? And aside from the different tactical situations, which must include an assessment of the opposing forces, what else was there?

The Hellcat was at the right place at the right time. It was a great plane that could dish out punishment and also take a great deal and still bring its pilot home. Grumman was known for making durable fighters. The Hellcat was the right combination to defeat most Japanese aircraft and hold its own against the Frank and George. The Spitfire was a great plane also. It was made for a different set of circumstances. Comparing the two is very much apples and oranges. But if I had to pick one I'm taking the Hellcat. Why? Durability. I'm sure the Spit could take some hits. But few fighters could take what a Hellcat could and still come home.

Coyote said:

The Hellcat was at the right place at the right time. It was a great plane that could dish out punishment and also take a great deal and still bring its pilot home. Grumman was known for making durable fighters. The Hellcat was the right combination to defeat most Japanese aircraft and hold its own against the Frank and George. The Spitfire was a great plane also. It was made for a different set of circumstances. Comparing the two is very much apples and oranges. But if I had to pick one I'm taking the Hellcat. Why? Durability. I'm sure the Spit could take some hits. But few fighters could take what a Hellcat could and still come home.

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I think the idea with the Spitfire was to use its performance and agility to avoid getting hit.

wuzak said:

I think the idea with the Spitfire was to use its performance and agility to avoid getting hit.

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This is true. But don't under-estimate the agility and performance of the Hellcat. While not on the level of a Spit, she could turn and burn.

Apples and oranges indeed. Choosing one over the other requires us to define the circumstances in which we might make the choice, given that the two aircraft were designed for different purposes. The Spitfire was surely the better front line interceptor and air superiority fighter, the Hellcat was very much the better carrier fighter, which necessarily involved air to ground capability. Great planes both. but while I'm happy to agree that the Spitfire could never have done what the Hellcat did in the PTO, I also think it's a major stretch to suggest the Hellcat could have replicated its Pacific performance in the ETO.