Hellcat vs Spitfire - which would you take?

[parsifal]

Rememeber, however, that this is a research and development cost. research is one element of cost, and by most evaluations, relatively low expense. The problem is that research leads to design, and design is a bit of a black art. Not everyone can do it. Its a highly technical element, relying on both experience and flair at the same time.

The development side is much more managerial and in my opinion more costly in its establishment. In the case of the hellcat, you have the costs of building the factory (the biggest in the world to that time), employing and trainng a workforce of at least 20000 people, the materials costs, establishing the supply chain, and probably a lot of other things we havent thought of.

Bottom line is we dont have a final figure on the costs of R&D for the Hellcat. We have some circumstantial evidence......the 500million unnaccounted for in the 11% exapansion bill, the 300 million spent by the LW in 1940 on R&D, along with Hap Arnolds statements that the USAAF was matching them, and the costs of building factories in other countries being some of them. It didnt cost $1m to get the f6F to squadron service, but neither do I now think it cost $100m. I think its somewhere in between.

Im surprised, but I dont think we can satisfactorily answer this. But I guess this debate ended up being about testing whether people could think laterally or not. Is having the biggest, meanest fighter on the block necessary or the most important element to winning? I dont think it is. I think it is one element for victory, but ther are many others, and many of them are more important. One element of the war that I think caused it to be extended unneccessarily was the carrier drought that curtailed the US offensives in 1943 in the PTO. Thats really what this debate got fown to....not as much about the feasability. And, as I suggested above, it needs people to think a little outside their traditional comfort zones.

And of course, there are things mixed into this debate that are completely extraneous. I believe there aree some who dont want this issue debated rationally. Its fine, it comes with the territory. weve gotta stay focussed and unperturbed

 

[VBF-13]

We are saying stay on topic and play nice.

OK, I can see that puts me in kind of a spot. That is to say, just before this admonition, I obliged myself on some rationale on an off-topic digression this thread took over the past several pages. Namely, that was on the Japanese pilot-training programs throughout the years of the War. I'll let that go for the next big opportunity. However, let the record reflect, that's only because I know from a past thread you like Franziskaner beer. I wouldn't do it for anybody else.

PS:

 

[Njaco]

and somebody just got an infraction for the snarky post that was made after Chris and I warned everyone. This isn't a joke. I know we laugh and rib each other but some here have an agenda with other members that disrupts threads and causes friction. The Mods and Admins are done with it. If you can't at least respect each other, go find another sandbox to be nasty in - just don't let the cat bury you.

 

[parsifal]

You can always

1) Start another thread, and produce your evidence
2) PM the person that you want to quiz

Just some suggestions, to stop the rupturing of this thread


Even though Im probably one of the branded troublemakers, I can see the mods frustrations very clearly. Dont mess around any more, thats my advice

 

[VBF-13]

and somebody just got an infraction for the snarky post that was made after Chris and I warned everyone. This isn't a joke. I know we laugh and rib each other but some here have an agenda with other members that disrupts threads and causes friction. The Mods and Admins are done with it. If you can't at least respect each other, go find another sandbox to be nasty in - just don't let the cat bury you.

I wasn't making light of your admonition to play nice. For what it's worth...

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

You are not the one that got the infraction.

 

[VBF-13]

I know. It was the proximity, though, and I was joking. I just wanted him to understand I wasn't joking about not playing nice. I take that seriously, too.

 

[Jugman]

Parsifal read the section "Resources for Research and Development" in chapter five.

Total cost to get the F6F into production was in the range of $10-40M*. This is moot for three reasons:
1 Post Pearl Harbor money really was not an issue anymore.
2 This money would probably be spent on Grumman anyways.
3 What the Navy lacked most was means to get aircraft into combat. To get more fleet carriers earlier you need to go back to at least mid 1940.

 

[parsifal]

Parsifal read the section "Resources for Research and Development" in chapter five.

Total cost to get the F6F into production was in the range of $10-40M*. This is moot for three reasons:
1 Post Pearl Harbor money really was not an issue anymore.
2 This money would probably be spent on Grumman anyways.
3 What the Navy lacked most was means to get aircraft into combat. To get more fleet carriers earlier you need to go back to at least mid 1940.

Dont know about the 10 million side, but 40 million seems at least plausible. Going back to 1940 is exactly where you need to go. Construction for the factory the factory for the Hellcat was begun in ealy 1941, the materials needed for its construction begun in 1940, and the workforce needed for construction (1940) and production (1941). Component manufactiuree began in January 1942, and the contrcts for serial production in mid 1942. Delivery of the first production hellcats was occurring by the end of 1942 and in a high levle of delivery by about April or May.

The development side occurred from the beginning of 1940, and was at a high rate of consumption by the ebeginning of 1941. That had to have been financed in FY41, which means the funds are set aside, or guranteed or whatever other mechanism the US administration was using to give surety to its aircraft builders, in 1940. The research for the development of this fighter was not voted until 1940, so in a sense you are right. if it hadnt been the F6F, that money would have been used to build something else....probably the Xf5f. But as i6t happened, it was used to build the f6F....

 

[Jugman]

The pre-war expansion of Gruuman had nothing to do with the F6F. The contract for the two F6F-1s is dated Jun 30, 1941 and the first production order for F6Fs is dated January 7, 1942. Work on plant #3 (the plant built specifically for the F6F) did not begin untill August.

Funding for new aircraft came from generals fund set aside in the budget for that purpose. Contracts typically were of the fixed-price pay-later variety. Untill the contract for the XF6F-1s was signed the F6F just wasn't a factor.

 

[parsifal]

I have to respectfully disagree that "nothing happened with the F6F until mid 1941". Design wise studies can be traced as far back as 1938 with changes in the F4F2, further design (and some development) continued with the R2800 development, and the extended wind tunnel test that were undertaken in 1939. There were monies allocated to the Xf5F project, and Grumman knew that it was going to need to expand its factory space, for the new fighter (whatever form that might take) from at least 1940, and the company was spendinding some money on the new factory from early 1940 on the new factory, and a lot of money on the building from at least japanuary 1941. It had begun training its workforce from the middle of 1941 and had begun component manufacture from January 1942. These are not small ticket items. It might be possble to argue on technical grounds that it wasnt the Hellcat, but it was expenditure that can be laid at the feet of what was to become the hellcat. it was, in effect, the Hellcat under another name.

Arguing that it was expenditure being absorbed by the company is another furphy that i have been waiting for someone to raise. Whether or not the expenditure was company funds or government funds is irelevant, as irrelevant as saying research not bearing the label F6F but eventually used as a critical element of the F6F, is not a cost that can be laid at the feet of the F6F. if it was used in the design and development of the F6F and its production, its a cost that needs to be acknowledged. if the money was private or public, it was national wealth still spent in a certain direction, and in a controlled wartime economy, like the US economy of 1940, every dollar counts.

There are no free lunches in wartime

 

[Shortround6]

and Grumman knew that it was going to need to expand its factory space, for the new fighter (whatever form that might take) from at least 1940, and the company was spendinding some money on the new factory from early 1940 on the new factory, and a lot of money on the building from at least japanuary 1941. It had begun training its workforce from the middle of 1941 and had begun component manufacture from January 1942. These are not small ticket items. It might be possble to argue on technical grounds that it wasnt the Hellcat, but it was expenditure that can be laid at the feet of what was to become the hellcat. it was, in effect, the Hellcat under another name.

Grumman went from producing F4Fs at 2-3 dozen a month to over 100 month during 1941, it also started producing Avengers during this time. This is one way they "trained" the larger work force. It is also the reason for early plant expansion, not hopes or plans for a future fighter contract.
Please remember that ALL Grumman production EXCEPT the F6F was shifted to other companies/factories. Including production of the J2F Duck.

Claiming that plant expansion or work force expansion PRIOR to the F6F contracts were due to the F6F is misleading.

Grumman had built something like 500 planes from it's start in 1930 up until Sept 1939. It was going to need to expand to handle the production needs just of the F4F and Avenger.

 

[parsifal]

David Anderton in his book "Hellcat" (Janes Publishing Company 1984) at Page 22 states that all hellcat production was undertaken exclusively by Grumnman, unlike most other grumman products, which were built under licence, particullarly General Motors or its subsidiaries. And almost all Hellcats were built in a new plant (the biggest to date in north america), built specifically for the new Grumman fighter that was eventually to be the f6F. ....work comenced on the construction of this plant in 1940, and it was completed in 1941.... ive paraphrased him, but this is an accurate rendition of his words.

i dont know, but this guy seems to be a recognized expert on the Hellcat. the book is a pretty good reference.

So I dont think it is misleading to say the factory was built for the Hellcat. maybe a little incorrect, since it might well have been used to build the f5F instead, had that fighter been adopted, but good enough. If the choice on the navy fighter had been XF5F, instead of the Hellcat, we'd be sitting here arguing about the F5f rather than the F6F. but that isnt how things panned out. It was the hellcat that was selected (for good reason), the design and research for the hellcat began well before 1941 (Source: "F6F Hellcat" by Hal Andrews, http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/hist-ac/f6f-5.pdf). It doesnt matter that the new fighter was the Hellcat. The Navy already had a new fighter in the XF4U under design. They decided that was too risky and embarked on the development of at least two other prototype designs that i know of....the F6F and the F5F, both of which i think were done at the expense of carrier construction. I think a better priority would have been to continue development of the F4U, delay development of the F6F until FY42 increase production of F4f (which was done in existing factory space from the summer of 1941 anyway) abandon Essex production in FY 41, and instead build 4 Yorktowns instead of the measely 1 Essex they actually authorised.

The net difference in terms of revenue expenditure for FY41 should be relatively neutral. The Essex cost nearly $70m to design and build, we think the total cost of the hellcat was about $10-40million, probably closer to $40m, A Yorktown cost about $25-30 million per copy in 1940-1 dollars, and putting existing designed and ready aircraft about a further $4m per ship. Thats a total cost of about $116m, compared to $124m for a single essex and a similar number of Hellcats (320). But the clanger is that there would be carriers available at a time when historically the US did not have carriers. planes on decks is worth far more than planes with no carriers, and carriers (in fighting trim) delievered early, when the enemy has none, is a war winner in my opinion.

 

[Shortround6]

Grumman Wildcat production: 1988 aircraft from Sept 1937 to May 1943.
Eastern Aircraft delivers the bulk of the F4Fs but doesn't deliver the first one until August 1942.

Grumman Avenger production: 2293 from August of 1941 to December 1943.
Eastern Aircraft production: 7546 from Nov 1942 to Sept 1945.


Production Contract for F6F placed Jan 7, 1942 , 5 months before first flight of a prototype.

It takes one heck of a crystal ball gazer to break ground on a factory in 1940 for a plane that won't be ordered for another year and half.

Since the Navy didn't get into talks with General Motors (Eastern Aircraft) until AFTER Pearl Harbor it is also a little difficult to figure out back in 1940 WHO would be making the other Grumman products while the "new" factory built the "future" fighter.

It wound up that Eastern and other companies took over the rest of the Grumman products and it wound up that F6F production stayed at the Bethpage plant but claiming that was the "plan" in 1940 is quite a stretch.

 

[VBF-13]

Grumman Wildcat production: 1988 aircraft from Sept 1937 to May 1943.
Eastern Aircraft delivers the bulk of the F4Fs but doesn't deliver the first one until August 1942.

Grumman Avenger production: 2293 from August of 1941 to December 1943.
Eastern Aircraft production: 7546 from Nov 1942 to Sept 1945.

Production Contract for F6F placed Jan 7, 1942 , 5 months before first flight of a prototype.

It takes one heck of a crystal ball gazer to break ground on a factory in 1940 for a plane that won't be ordered for another year and half.

Since the Navy didn't get into talks with General Motors (Eastern Aircraft) until AFTER Pearl Harbor it is also a little difficult to figure out back in 1940 WHO would be making the other Grumman products while the "new" factory built the "future" fighter.

It wound up that Eastern and other companies took over the rest of the Grumman products and it wound up that F6F production stayed at the Bethpage plant but claiming that was the "plan" in 1940 is quite a stretch.

This is a good analysis. Let me add just a little detail to it. First, let's understand some overall rationale.

The A6Ms were whipping us in dogfights. They were maneuverable, long-ranged and fast. Even while employing special tactics so as to not have to play to their strengths, our F4Fs were barely coping. We had the machine on the books to turn the tide, namely, in the F4U, but those still needed refinement. In the meantime, Grumman's new concept, the XF6F, was gathering momentum. It was billed to be able to go into production very quickly, once the green light was given. Although it resembled the F4F, it was a completely new design, right down to the last nut and bolt. The Navy placed its first order on June 30, 1941, more than five months out from our entry into the War, and Grumman turned its entire Bethpage plant to it. The first flight took place only one year later, on June 26, 1942, and production planes were coming off the line only five months after that. As the designers and engineers refined and perfected it, the very first prototypes were virtually hand-built by the company's most skilled tradesmen.

EDIT: We knew the F4Fs would have trouble with the A6Ms, that's why we were building better aircraft, that's the bottom-line.

 

[parsifal]

Grumman Wildcat production: 1988 aircraft from Sept 1937 to May 1943.
Eastern Aircraft delivers the bulk of the F4Fs but doesn't deliver the first one until August 1942.

Which fits nicely with the timetable for the projected new carriers. Bringing a new source of F4Fs online meshes perfectly with the strategy. Arrivin

Grumman Avenger production: 2293 from August of 1941 to December 1943.
Eastern Aircraft production: 7546 from Nov 1942 to Sept 1945.

Not sure of the relevancce of this.....

Production Contract for F6F placed Jan 7, 1942 , 5 months before first flight of a prototype.

USN began looking for aa replacement to the F4F in 1938, not 1942. Everybody knew big orders were coming from the times of the planned expansions and before that even.

It takes one heck of a crystal ball gazer to break ground on a factory in 1940 for a plane that won't be ordered for another year and half.

No, not at all. The British had anticipated similar requirements and implemented their shadow factory sytems even before designs had been finalised. Everyone knew that expansions were coming. If it hadnt been the F6F, it would have been an F5F, or an improved F4F. If Gruman had not done anythng, it probably would have been an F4U.

Since the Navy didn't get into talks with General Motors (Eastern Aircraft) until AFTER Pearl Harbor it is also a little difficult to figure out back in 1940 WHO would be making the other Grumman products while the "new" factory built the "future" fighter.

Nobody knew. But everybody knew that anexpansion was coming, and everybody knew that they had to be ready if they wanted a share of the gravy train

It wound up that Eastern and other companies took over the rest of the Grumman products and it wound up that F6F production stayed at the Bethpage plant but claiming that was the "plan" in 1940 is quite a stretch.

What can I say....your statements are in direct contradiction to the quoted source. Much as i respect your knowledge you should be able to understand why I would prefer a printed source. Your basis for saying "not possible" dont wash, because other allied nations were using exactly the same principal....build a factory, THEN find a design to build in it. My country' DAP plant was built on exactly that principal. It still a cost that should be attributed to the development cost of the winning design.

 

[parsifal]

This is a good analysis. Let me add just a little detail to it. First, let's understand some overall rationale.

The A6Ms were whipping us in dogfights. They were maneuverable, long-ranged and fast. Even while employing special tactics so as to not have to play to their strengths, our F4Fs were barely coping. We had the machine on the books to turn the tide, namely, in the F4U, but those still needed refinement. In the meantime, Grumman's new concept, the XF6F, was gathering momentum. It was billed to be able to go into production very quickly, once the green light was given. Although it resembled the F4F, it was a completely new design, right down to the last nut and bolt. The Navy placed its first order on June 30, 1941, more than five months out from our entry into the War, and Grumman turned its entire Bethpage plant to it. The first flight took place only one year later, on June 26, 1942, and production planes were coming off the line only five months after that. As the designers and engineers refined and perfected it, the very first prototypes were virtually hand-built by the company's most skilled tradesmen.

EDIT: We knew the F4Fs would have trouble with the A6Ms, that's why we were building better aircraft, that's the bottom-line.

There is no evidence to support that in a strategic sense. i have no problem in conceding or acknowledging that the F4F was outclassed in a dogfight situation. But in all the major enagements that the F4F was in its element (fleet defence) and it grappled the A6M, the F4F, in numbers of aircraft (not just the A6M, but also the aircraft that mattered....the Kates and Vals being escorted) the Wildcat was doing better than holding its own. it was winning. Aircraft similar or inferior to the F4F had put the Japanese on the rack by early 1943, and there is absolutely no evidence to support the notion that things were going to change soon. None.

The idea that hellcat "won the air battle" is one of those urban myths. They did a lot of excellent work, but by the time they arrived on the scene in Septemeber, the Japanese were already on the canvas as far as losing air superiority was concerned. It had been won by the bombers, and the very aircraft you are claiming as not having any chance against the japanese. The reason....back to where this all started...having a fighter that is the biggest and meanest on the block does not gurantee air superiority. In fact its a relatively minor issue unless you have other factors working for you. Loss rates dont change much either if the force was an enlarged F4F force compared to a smaller, later F6F force.

Conclusion: F6F was a fantastic but unneccessary fighter. USN made poor choices in production prioorities to acquire it. By which time the hard work had already been done by other aircraft.

 

[Shortround6]

Not sure of the relevancce of this.....

USN began looking for aa replacement to the F4F in 1938, not 1942. Everybody knew big orders were coming from the times of the planned expansions and before that even.

Nobody knew. But everybody knew that anexpansion was coming, and everybody knew that they had to be ready if they wanted a share of the gravy train

What can I say....your statements are in direct contradiction to the quoted source. Much as i respect your knowledge you should be able to understand why I would prefer a printed source. Your basis for saying "not possible" dont wash, because other allied nations were using exactly the same principal....build a factory, THEN find a design to build in it. My country' DAP plant was built on exactly that principal. It still a cost that should be attributed to the development cost of the winning design.

I don't think your explanation washes very well.

The relevance of the Avenger production is to show that Grumman had way more orders for aircraft than it could meet with it's exiting prewar plant. Grumman was still getting orders for the J2F Duck, it was getting orders for the G-21 Goose and G-44 Widgeon and orders for the Wildcat and Avenger were in much greater numbers than any previous Grumman orders. It needed a bigger plant JUST to meet the existing and anticipated F4F and Avenger orders.
Grumman ALREADY had the designs to fill the new factory space. The fact that three of the designs had to be farmed out to other companies to MAKE space for F6F production should show that the Plant that built the F6F was NOT a plant in search of a product.
By the time the first few F6F production aircraft are rolling out the factory door (Dec 1942) Grumman is making about 100 Avengers per month and had been making 90 or more F4F's a month since March 42.

Without this factory that you claim should be charged to the F6F costs the US Navy would have been in very dire straights indeed to fill it's existing carrier flight decks in late 1942/ early 43.

Perhaps the cost of converting the GM automobile plants should be charged to the F6F (or what ever theoretical F4F replacement you come up with) but that cost comes way too late to make any difference in carrier construction.

 

[parsifal]

At what point after May 1942 was the USN ever shoirt of F4Fs. At what point did the Avenger become an effective torpedo bomber. The latter was a very effective aircraft but it was not effective in its allotted role until well after 1943. There were no shortages of F4Fs after Coral Sea that I know of. The factory was NOT essential to the American war effort, or at least, not as essential as securing a better supply of carriers.

Its not my explanation either. You are arguing with the author of a pretty solid reference. good luck with that. I notice not a shred of evidence to support your claims incidentally. funny that....

 

[parsifal]

Another source for you to have an argument with

Dispatch Archive


Relevantly it states "All Hellcats were manufactured by Grumman at the Bethpage, Long Island plant. Grumman, already building F4F Wildcats, TBF Avengers, and J2F Ducks, was forced to expand their facilities and their workforce to meet the needs of the Navy for its newest fighter."...which suggests the plant was expanded primarily to accommodate the new fighter, not meet any expansion of the existing programs. Some sources also say it was a brand new plant built from the ground up. is that incorrect. if so, what is your source?

yhis source also disagrees with your timeline for Eastern Aircraft produced F4Fs

http://weaponsandwarfare.com/?p=4960

Relevantly it says

"The final production variant built by Grumman was the long-range reconnaissance F4F-7 with increased fuel capacity, camera installations in the lower fuselage and armament deleted. Only 20 were built, but Grumman also produced an additional 100 F4F-3s and two XF4F-8 prototypes. With an urgent need to concentrate on development and production of the more advanced F6F Hellcat, Grumman negotiated with General Motors to continue production of the F4F-4 Wildcat under the designation FM-1. Production by General Motors' Eastern Aircraft Division began after finalisation of a contract on 18 April 1942, and the first of this company's FM-ls was flown on 31 August 1942. Production totalled 1,151, of which 312 were supplied to the UK under the designation Martlet Mk V (later Wildcat Mk V)."

Admittedly production did not get underway until the end of August, but its what it doesnt say that is interesting. Negotiations did not start until January 1942...if factory 3 had not been expanded and orders received pre-war , there is no reason not to expect grumman to have entered into a licence agreement with eastern before January/ April. It could just as well have been january/April 1940 or january April 1941. We are back to where we stsrted...factory number 3 was expanded to meet the expoected demands of the new fighter project, which is exactly what it did.