parsifal
Colonel
so, what is your opinion on their training times
Hellcat vs Spitfire - which would you take?
- Thread starter wuzak
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Glider
Captain
I have taken an interest in the different training programs that were put in place and would appreciate a source for the training receieved by the Japanese forces both Army and Navy if you have one.
It does seem a leap in faith to state that both sides had smilar training. There was a period between 1940 and 1942 when RAF training wasn't as complete and comprehensive as the USAAF. This changed as resources buuilt up and we were no longer alone in the fight with Russia.
Comparing Japanese and RAF training I do not pretend to know the details but I do know that the RAF had far fewer problems than the Japanese forces. Fuel wasn't a problem, by early 1942 training bases, equipment and trainers both manpower and aircraft were not an issue. There were two main reasons for this. By late 1940 the UK were geared up to training 7,000 pilots a year up from 300 a year in 1935 Japan wasn't close. The books that I have read on this all mention that the training may have been in theory good but the numbers were low as training as in the Luftwaffe didn't have the same priority.
So if you could point me to a source for your comments I would appreciate it.
parsifal
Colonel
Shattered Sword has some comments about the issue, which Ive already posted. You can also get some preliminary idea of the japanese problems from the following
Imperial Japanese Navy Air Force in WWII
This guy gives an opinion that I basically agree with
Pilot training in WW2 | Forums
Our own Forum has a number of threads, including this one
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/wwii-naval-pilot-training-426.html
Being an American centric site, it plays up the strengths and advantages of deflection shooting. In my opinion, ddeflection shooting was just one trick in a whole range of techniques. It was not especially important, and wasnt a uniquely american consept. And the japanese used it far more than is suggested in that thread.
The US Navy produced an Intell report in December 1942, entitled "Tactical Training and Trends" which is partly reproduced at Lone Sentry. It states in part
"The Japanese Army and Navy have two classifications for their pilots and bombardiers, namely: "Division I" and "Division II". This classification is based on combat experience, initiative, and combat ability.
The pilots and bombardiers of Division I usually have had approximately 4 years combat experience in China. This Division totals about 1,500 pilots, including Army and Navy.
The performance of the personnel of Division II is not comparable with that of Division I, as was demonstrated during the Port Darwin bombardment of March 19 when the pilots and bombardiers of Division I, in one flight of 18 bombers, sank 11 of 17 ships on their first time over, from a height of 24,000 feet. Meanwhile, the personnel of Division II were indiscriminately bombing the airfield and hangars. Recent reports have indicated that the Japanese, in order to conserve their first-line pilot strength, are sending out their less-experienced pilots on routine missions with the leader alone coming from their first-line group.
The first-line Japanese pilot is well trained and resourceful, and handles his plane in a skillful manner; he will initiate attack, is aggressive in combat, and is a fighting airman not to be underestimated. It is also noteworthy that they will change their methods with alacrity whenever they find their aerial operations successfully countered. They are alert, and quick to take advantage of any evident weakness. A disabled plane will receive more fire than other planes in formation. Stragglers are sure to be concentrated on, and a gun not firing is a sure point of attack. Several instances have also been reported where our airmen have been machine-gunned from Japanese planes while parachuting to earth. Our airmen should delay opening the parachute when forced to leave the plane.
While there is little information available concerning the number of pilots being trained in Japan, conservative estimates placed this figure at 360 per month prior to December 7, 1941, and concluded that there were at that time approximately 9,750 trained pilots, many of whom had seen service in China. It is estimated that the Japanese have lost approximately 400 planes per month for the first 5 months of the war. Thus the rates of loss and replacement are approximately the same. The above estimated Japanese losses and production of pilots apply to a period when very little opposition was encountered by the Japanese, and it is safe to assume that when the United Nations undertake a more determined offense, the losses will be at a substantially higher rate. It is reasonable to assume that the Japanese have anticipated this and have increased the production of trained pilot personnel to meet this expected higher monthly loss. Therefore, a fair inference would be that Japan must at the present time be turning out, at the minimum, 600 to 700 new pilots per month in order to take care of losses and provide for expansion of the air forces.
In Japan it has been the tradition that Naval officers are of a higher type than officers of the Army, and it has been observed that in planes of corresponding type, the naval pilot is much harder to combat, and that apparently the materiel, quality of personnel, and training in the Naval Service are of a higher standard than in the Japanese Army Air Forces. However, morale is undoubtedly high in both services".
This article is also worth looking at
Failure of the Japanese pilots training program | Military History Forum
Just few ideas from someone who doesnt know, and hasnt a clue
Njaco
The Pop-Tart Whisperer
Stop with the sarcasm and can we please keep everything to one post.
Yeah I told them to play nice as well. I love being ****ing ignored over and over, thread after thread. Same **** different thread.
parsifal
Colonel
More than happy to move back on topic. we have drifted a lot.
One of the biggest advantages conferred onto the Hellcat in relation to the Spitfire was its effective combat radius. Im not so sure. According to Nijbour in his book on the Seafire, Seafires undertook operations whilst attached to the BPF out to 180 miles. The Hellcats they had embarked were rated as having a combat radius of 230 miles. Ive seen one or two instances where this range extendded out to 260 miles. I have not seen any operational evidence of sorties in real combat beyond that range.
Yet the combat range of the Seafire is often quoted as having a combat range of 400 miles, whilst the Hellcat is out to 870 miles. Ive never heard of Hellcats in normal operation undertaking strikes at that range. Some sources even claim the Hellcat as having a range of 1200 miles.
So what is the truth about the combat ranges of these aircraft. Seems to me that the range of both types is wildly erratic from reality.
One of the biggest advantages conferred onto the Hellcat in relation to the Spitfire was its effective combat radius. Im not so sure. According to Nijbour in his book on the Seafire, Seafires undertook operations whilst attached to the BPF out to 180 miles. The Hellcats they had embarked were rated as having a combat radius of 230 miles. Ive seen one or two instances where this range extendded out to 260 miles. I have not seen any operational evidence of sorties in real combat beyond that range.
Yet the combat range of the Seafire is often quoted as having a combat range of 400 miles, whilst the Hellcat is out to 870 miles. Ive never heard of Hellcats in normal operation undertaking strikes at that range. Some sources even claim the Hellcat as having a range of 1200 miles.
So what is the truth about the combat ranges of these aircraft. Seems to me that the range of both types is wildly erratic from reality.
- Thread starter
- #348
wuzak
Captain
Are those ranges or radii?
parsifal
Colonel
well I like the diversion. not even sure what the secomnd attachments say, but it looks very interesting.
All i can say is that when the BPF was stepping up to deliver strikes on the japanese mainland in 1945, its seafires were able to undertake offensive operations out to the 180 mile mark. these were fighter escort missions. The fleets Corsairs and Hellcats were able to undertake similar fighter escort missions out to 220 or 230 miles ( to be honest I forget which). When operating in the FB role the seafire was very short legged (I dont have the figures), whilst the american types were about 150 miles (again, not completely sure, would have to check).
I am not aware of any operational strike by Hellcats, American or british, that were carried out beyond the 260 mile range that i mentioned earlier. Im more than happy to sit back and be corrected, but actual strikes and historical events would need to be produced. its all very well to bring out the fuel consumption rates and capacitires, but these are really not establishig the operational ranges of the types. you can only really do that by looking at their service histories.
All i can say is that when the BPF was stepping up to deliver strikes on the japanese mainland in 1945, its seafires were able to undertake offensive operations out to the 180 mile mark. these were fighter escort missions. The fleets Corsairs and Hellcats were able to undertake similar fighter escort missions out to 220 or 230 miles ( to be honest I forget which). When operating in the FB role the seafire was very short legged (I dont have the figures), whilst the american types were about 150 miles (again, not completely sure, would have to check).
I am not aware of any operational strike by Hellcats, American or british, that were carried out beyond the 260 mile range that i mentioned earlier. Im more than happy to sit back and be corrected, but actual strikes and historical events would need to be produced. its all very well to bring out the fuel consumption rates and capacitires, but these are really not establishig the operational ranges of the types. you can only really do that by looking at their service histories.
Shortround6
Major General
As has been noted in the F6F in Europe thread (and in others) a LOT of the ranges bandied about are yardstick ranges. and not true ranges or operational ranges.
Mission profiles and requirements can drastically shorten ranges. For carrier use how much of an allowance is made for time on station or time in combat area and how much time is allowed for finding the carrier upon return and orbiting while the aircraft are recovered. Being the last one/s down could be a white knuckle experience, especially if an earlier landing crack-up had fouled the deck for a while.
Going over the operational histories shows us what the planners thought were prudent ranges to operate over with acceptable risks.
Mission profiles and requirements can drastically shorten ranges. For carrier use how much of an allowance is made for time on station or time in combat area and how much time is allowed for finding the carrier upon return and orbiting while the aircraft are recovered. Being the last one/s down could be a white knuckle experience, especially if an earlier landing crack-up had fouled the deck for a while.
Going over the operational histories shows us what the planners thought were prudent ranges to operate over with acceptable risks.
parsifal
Colonel
I agree with all of what you say. but again, i cant think of a single instance where hellcats operated in a combat mission further at ranges greater than 260 miles, and the more usual range was 230 miles. I know that the Seafire was used repeatedly at ranges out to 180 miles. That means, in my book the Hellcat had an effective range dvantage over the Sefire of 50-80 miles
parsifal
Colonel
Parsifal, I don't have much time right now, but I'll get into this. I'll at least explain better where I'm coming from. Right now I just want to make a few other replies, and get out. Don't go away, or I'll come looking for you, lol.
Sarcasm is a means of expressing a point. All Parsifal is saying by that is he thinks I'm off my nut. I can take it. He's not getting personal and I'm not offended. For what it's worth...
We are saying stay on topic and play nice.
What were we talking about?First a gratuitous diversion...
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Conslaw
Senior Airman
As I recall, on the last day of the Battle of the Philippine Sea (Marianas), the day after the main US strike, there was talk of sending only F6Fs on a long-range bombing strike against the fleeing Japanese fleet. The reason why F6Fs only were to be sent was that F6Fs flying at their best economical speed with a drop tank and a 500 lb bomb would get to the Japanese fleet quicker than a strike by TBFs. SB2C and SBDs were out of the question. A quicker strike was a shorter strike with the range between the fleets opening by as much as 50 miles per hour. I can't remember if they actually sent out a strike, but the fact that it was even considered showed that in some cases the combat radius of the F6F was longer than the dive bombers and the torpedo planes.
The total program cost of the B-29 was about $3 billion. To put $3,000,000,000 in proper context, this is about 2.5 times the total direct expenditures spent on aviation by the Army from FY1921 through FY1941!
The cost of actually desgining an aircraft is largely labour cost. I don't have any figures but a rate between $1-2 per man-hour seems about right. Add to this the cost of building the prototypes (including any static test frames, mockups, and scale models),flight testing, and tooling.
As of September 6, 1940 Boeing had contracts worth at least $3.7M related to the B-29. This is for 2 XB-29s, a static frame, a mockup, and wind tunnel data. The third XB-29 and the 14 YB-29s probably add another $15-20M. So development cost was ~$20-25M range.
I very much doubt the F6F cost more than $1M to design. This is about all the money that would be saved. The Grumman factory was going to be expanded reguardless if the F6F goes into production. Even if the expantion didn't take place, the decision was made after Pearl Harbor. To late to increase carrier production. In any event you must sacrifice light cruisers or merchant ships to get more carriers.
I strongly recommend everyone read: The Army Air Forces in World War II Vol. VI: Men and Planes . It's a long read though.
The cost of actually desgining an aircraft is largely labour cost. I don't have any figures but a rate between $1-2 per man-hour seems about right. Add to this the cost of building the prototypes (including any static test frames, mockups, and scale models),flight testing, and tooling.
As of September 6, 1940 Boeing had contracts worth at least $3.7M related to the B-29. This is for 2 XB-29s, a static frame, a mockup, and wind tunnel data. The third XB-29 and the 14 YB-29s probably add another $15-20M. So development cost was ~$20-25M range.
I very much doubt the F6F cost more than $1M to design. This is about all the money that would be saved. The Grumman factory was going to be expanded reguardless if the F6F goes into production. Even if the expantion didn't take place, the decision was made after Pearl Harbor. To late to increase carrier production. In any event you must sacrifice light cruisers or merchant ships to get more carriers.
I strongly recommend everyone read: The Army Air Forces in World War II Vol. VI: Men and Planes . It's a long read though.
