How did the Martlets rate against the European aircraft?

RCAFson said:

Well, see:
The Grumman Wildcat in FAA Service by Bruce Archer
and the entry for the Martlet III. Apparently the FAA received at least 40 Martlets with 4 x wing guns, a two stage, two speed engine, and fixed wings. However, even the F4F-3, after armour and SS tanks are added, weighed 7556lbs and still had only 1200hp. I'm not sure if any of the FAA F4F-3s saw combat, but these, prior to adding armour and SS tanks and the 6800lb Martlet I would have been quite spritely.

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Got home last night and checked AHT and other sources. AHT quotes over-load fighter (full gas and ammo) as 7,543 lbs, so your values appear more accurate than what I remembered (The Lundstrom quote is: "about 7,450 lbs." F4F-3A overload fighter is listed as 7,320 lbs.

Interesting are comparing the empty weight of the various marks: F4F-3: 5,426 lbs., F4F-4: 5,779 lbs., FM-2: 5,328 lbs.

VBF-13 said:

We had Evelyn Trainers in the U.S. for night vision training, and those were really no big deal to complete. Our Navy and Marine Corps pilots were also instrument rated when they got their wings. Our training program in 1943 was 18 months. I'm thinking yours must have been a lot shorter.

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I should have been clearer. Training night fighter pilots would have taken a lot of additional effort, effort that could not be spared during 1940. By 1943 RAF fighter traiing was very similar to USAAF training. In 1940 the no 1 priority was training enough pilots to fight in the BOB and wasn't nearly to the same standard.

The point I was trying to make was that the Blenhiems were not NF squadrons, a small number were but not the majority. And these I would replace in the front line with almost anything. Marlets, Buffalos, P36's or even Gladiators.

I did some research on RAF training in the BOB and if you are interested this is the link. http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/raf-pilot-training-hours-1940-a-25873.html

nuuumannn said:

There wasn't seperate 'night fighter training' as such, there was instrument flying and procedural training, but, depending on aircraft type meant that some were more suitable than others. It was discovered early on that the Spit wasn't as suitable as a night fighter compared to the Hurricane or Blenheim or Defiant. The Blenheim and Defiant had an added extra set of eyes, which increased the probability of seeing their prey; the Blenheim's biggest fault was that it was too slow. Extra Martlets would have helped, but why instead of Blenheims and Defiants? The issue was not capability, but shortage of pilots and aircraft.

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The RAF did have for the time qhite advanced training in night flying, they had to for Bomber Command. I also agree that the problem was a shortage of aircraft and more importantly pilots.

Blenhiems were basically sitting ducks for german fighters, be they Me 109 or Me 110, way too slow, heavy, underpowered and lightly armed. Defiants were also poor performers and very vulnerable. The whole concept of a turret fighter was wrong and had been so since WW1. When the Bristol fighter was first introduced they had neavy losses as they fought concentrating on using the gunner. They only worked when they fought like ordinary fighters leaving the gunner to clear the tail.

Glider said:

I did some research on RAF training in the BOB and if you are interested this is the link. http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/raf-pilot-training-hours-1940-a-25873.html

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Glider, thanks for pointing me to that thread. That's a very informative and nicely documented post!

Glider, nice post re the training.

Training night fighter pilots would have taken a lot of additional effort, effort that could not be spared during 1940.

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You are right to a degree, but 'night fighter squadrons', as you pointed out didn't exist; it was considered a part of the day fighter duties. In hindsight it is easy to say they could have extended the fighter training to cover better night techniques as employed by Bomber Command, but such a need was not considered necessary at that time - as fool hardy as this might seem. There's no counting for experience however and it took Fighter Command many anxious nights and failed interceptions before squadrons engaged in night fighter duties proved worthy - there was a big learning curve from mid 1940 to mid 1941.

Blenhiems were basically sitting ducks for german fighters, be they Me 109 or Me 110, way too slow, heavy, underpowered and lightly armed. Defiants were also poor performers and very vulnerable. The whole concept of a turret fighter was wrong and had been so since WW1.

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Again, it's easy to say this in hindsight, but at the time, these aircraft could not be spared and they were still considered to be useful. Withdrawing them would have reduced front line strength, with a shortage of aircraft, this is not an option. Any new aircraft acquired by the British would have been put in service alongside existing types, not instead of them. The failures of both these types are obvious in hindsight, but with the Defiant more so than the Blenheim, the tactics employed in their use was asking for trouble and had they been employed in the defence of northern airfields out of the range of single seat fighters they would not have the reputation they do. Nevertheless, the fact they weren't comes down to numbers.

Throughout the battle there was little questioning the qualitative ability of British equipment over German and regardless of any lack of faith in the Defiant, at no time did the British ever consider that this might change the direction of the battle.

Defiants were also poor performers and very vulnerable.

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This is arguable and not necessarily true (here we go again); it's an old perception that refuses to die. With correct tactics employed by 264 Sqn the Defiants had a far better chance of survival and did so against overwhelmingly superior numbers of enemy fighters.

What were the succesful tactics for Defiants?

Basically form a defensive circle and then reduce altitude. The guns provided mutual protection keeping German fighters off the tail of each aircraft in the circle while reducing altitude prevented the vulnerable undersides from being attacked. It was quite effective, indeed Me110s employed the same tactics when engaged by RAF single-engined fighters.

It was called the Lufbery Circle and was proven to be effective in combat on the 28th and 31st of May when 264 Sqn Defiants went into action against 30 Bf 109s on the 28th and a force of 70 Bf 109s escorting bombers on the 31st, although there was a sqn of Spits and Hurris there on the 31st as well. On both occasions only three Defiants were lost; on the 31st, two of those collided with each other.

Since this thread is about the Martlet/Wildcat I'm gonna continue in another thread...

VBF-13 said:

Glider, thanks for pointing me to that thread. That's a very informative and nicely documented post!

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Thank you for the comment. If you want to look at RAF training during the war and compared to the USAAF the following may be of interest.
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/raf-pilot-training-ww2-26347.html

nuuumannn said:

Since this thread is about the Martlet/Wildcat I'm gonna continue in another thread...

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Nuuumannn, do you have a link to that thread? Thanks.

Edit: I found it.

Glider said:

Thank you for the comment. If you want to look at RAF training during the war and compared to the USAAF the following may be of interest.
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/raf-pilot-training-ww2-26347.html

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You're welcome. I looked at your source-link in this, too, going back to the cadet program, and, perhaps not surprisingly, while it's very generalized, it does roughly mimic the Navy curriculum.

RCAFson said:

Well, see:
The Grumman Wildcat in FAA Service by Bruce Archer
and the entry for the Martlet III. Apparently the FAA received at least 40 Martlets with 4 x wing guns, a two stage, two speed engine, and fixed wings. However, even the F4F-3, after armour and SS tanks are added, weighed 7556lbs and still had only 1200hp. I'm not sure if any of the FAA F4F-3s saw combat, but these, prior to adding armour and SS tanks and the 6800lb Martlet I would have been quite spritely.

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Just looked carefully at the Grumman green sheets I obtained from the Grumman Historical Center (email: ngc600history@aol.com) These sheets list the grumman aircraft delivered to the customer with date and aircraft type and Bureau number.

While it is not a complete list of grumman aircraft delivered, it does list the 81 G36A A/C delivered to the FAA between 7/27/40 and 10/28/40 (in US norm of mm/dd/yy). It also lists the 100 Martlet II A/C delivered to the FAA between 3/4/41 and 4/6/42. However it lists the latter as AM054 through AM063 (10 A/C) as G36A and the remaining AM964 through AM999 (36 A/C) and AJ100 through AJ153 (54 AC) as G36B. This strongly suggests to me that The first 10 Martlets delivered to the FAA in the initial order of 100 were built to the same specs as the F4F-3 in every respect EXCEPT the engine which would appear to have been either the Wright R-1820-40 (aka R-1830-G205A) or the P&W R-1820-S3C-4G. either with a single-stage, 2 speed Supercharger. This also is consistent with all the histories I've read except Archer's. My guess is the P&W is the engine; being consistent with the remaining 90 A/C delivered.

Page 18 of the Green Sheets lists 18 of the Martlet III/F4F-3A A/C delivered to the FAA starting in 3/18/41 including only the USN Bureau Numbers of 3875 through 3890 delivered 3/31/42. UNfortunately they did not send me the green sheets for the remainder of the F4F-3A production or the initial batch of F4F-3 production with Bureau numbers 1844 through 1896.

Bottom line: No F4F-3s were delivered to the FAA until they sent pilots to the states in 1942 for training. These aircraft were used by the FAA but eventually repatriated to the USN.

Hi all,

Sorry to have joined belatedly, but I just stumbled upon this forum. I believe the issue ought to be asked on two levels, strategically and tactically. The Martlets had strong points that made them desirable strategically, (ease of maintenance, adequate overall performance, good armament, incredible durability) but were no match, ceteris paribus, for top British and German fighters of the same era. Of the Italians, only the Regianne 2000 would have offered credible opposition in 1940-41, with their in-line successors being superior. Also, the Wildcat was designed for naval operations and it is unfair to compare it to superior but more fragile terrestrial types. A good case in point, is the Sea Spitfire which was a dream to fly and fight in, but a dog on and off carriers.

Welcome, Nikaki! Got a question for you. What, specifically, do you think handicapped the Martlets? I agree on how you described them, and that they were certainly built to take a licking.

A Grumman Martlet naval fighter of No 888 Squadron Fleet Air Arm taking off from the deck of HMS FORMIDABLE in the Mediterranean.

Fleet Air Arm Grumman Martlet fighters from No.888 Squadron in flight.

Great photos. I wonder what the assignment was. Sometimes they mark that on the backs of the original photos and sometimes they don't. After all, these weren't taken with an iPhone camera.