drgondog
Major
Not really 'correcting' as I just pointed out that the JG 26 claim was 'odd' as two Bomb Groups were together and both bombed Rouen according to 8th AF mission reports.
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Not really 'correcting' as I just pointed out that the JG 26 claim was 'odd' as two Bomb Groups were together and both bombed Rouen according to 8th AF mission reports.Thanks for the correction. Always learn some thing new in this forum.
Was there/ could there have been a diversion, as per Mission 1 on 17 Aug 1942? Six B-17s flew up the coast while twelve went to Rouen?Not really 'correcting' as I just pointed out that the JG 26 claim was 'odd' as two Bomb Groups were together and both bombed Rouen according to 8th AF mission reports.
Well, 6th Kokutai was partially deployed to Rabaul on August 21st 1942 and sustained losses prior to been renamed 204th in November 1st and suffered some 20 pilots lost in the remaning months of 1942.The Tinian Air Group was moved home (to Japan) in November '42, being replaced by the veteran 6th Air Group (redesignated 204th Air Group).
So yes, the P-38 arrived after the TAG was reassigned, but the level of experience was equalled by the replacement Air Group.
Yes, missed the JAAF involvement in late 1942, thanks.The initial P-38 combat were against both JAAF and IJN units There were still plenty of good pilots flying against the first P-38 units in the SWP
Not sure how can it be in a War Diary (that was meant to be written the day of the events or a couple after at most) that it was the only time during a struggle that lasted for nearly 3 years (and 2 of them after the day of the attack) and involved other units of the Jadgwaffe all over western and central Europe.Don accepted the account at face value. In the VIII BC mission report the 44th BG lost 2 lead crew in the head on attack shortly after the IP and bomb run - and the rest of the 44th proceeded to the target with the 93rd BG in trail. According to both BG mission reports the M/Y at Rouen was bombed. The account in DFinDOR was extracted from JG26 War Diary account. The 93rd BG, also attacking Rouen M/Y, bombed successfully - so how may we conclude that the "8th AF was turned back"?
Also in 44th BG mission report was acknowledgement that bombing was 'lousy' as the trailing B-24s behind the two downed lead a/c were prepared to 'bomb on lead' and were unprepared to bomb individually.
Another question for the thoughtful, "If the 44th BG was completely devastated and breaking up formations to escape - how weren't many more B-24s claimed by JG 26"?
Lots of eventual aces got their first victory(s) in P-39s. Japanese pilot quality was at their peak during this period. Plenty of aces in Russia. P-40s were good planes with top cover. Tough, maneuverable with heavy firepower.And yet, only ONE ace had 5 victory credits in the P-39 - in the SWP at Guadalcanal? Further, in defense of the poor P-39 record - the IJN pilots they flew against in 1942 were outstanding. That said the P-40 was far more successful air to air in all Theatres save Soviet Union.
Lots of eventual aces got their first victory(s) in P-39s. Japanese pilot quality was at their peak during this period. Plenty of aces in Russia. P-40s were good planes with top cover. Tough, maneuverable with heavy firepower.
I replied to a comment.There's a thread for this already, no?
You were aware, perhaps, that the "loss of 20 pilots" on 1 November was when the Tinian Air Group (who numbered 20 pilots at the time) was transferred back to Japan from Rabaul?Well, 6th Kokutai was partially deployed to Rabaul on August 21st 1942 and sustained losses prior to been renamed 204th in November 1st and suffered some 20 pilots lost in the remaning months of 1942.
With an intended strenght of 60 fighters, an educated guess of some 80 pilots in the roster I think won't be too unreal to asume, so a 25% loss in pilot strenght in two months will be pretty noticiable, specially given the previous losses as 6th Kokutai and the japanese tendency to use veteran pilots in operations, having rookie pilots few ocasions to gain experience, widening the gap between 1st class pilots and rookies.
So yes, TAG was replaced by a veteran unit. But the pilot quality was the same? I doubt it.
EDIT: info for 6th/204 th Kokutai from "JNAF Fighters units and their aces 1932-1945" from Hata, Izawa and Shores.
Yes, missed the JAAF involvement in late 1942, thanks.
Not sure how can it be in a War Diary (that was meant to be written the day of the events or a couple after at most) that it was the only time during a struggle that lasted for nearly 3 years (and 2 of them after the day of the attack) and involved other units of the Jadgwaffe all over western and central Europe.
After reading the Narrative of the 44th BG, to me is clear that this BG was diverted from it's original bomb run and wasn't able to bomb the primary target.
BTW, 2 planes shot down over enemy territory and one more crashed in UK from a total of 16 attacking planes is a 18'75% loss rate in an escorted raid all the way to the target.
Excerpt from the web 8th Air Force Operations Home
View attachment 637509
Pdf doc extracted from the web HOME
That they did and they held the line, more out of pilot skill rather than the performance of their machines, but the US was not going to maintain aerial superiority with a 1:1.5 or 1:2 kill ratio (depending who you reference). For the sake of repeating myself, all that changed the last week of December 1942Lots of eventual aces got their first victory(s) in P-39s. Japanese pilot quality was at their peak during this period. Plenty of aces in Russia. P-40s were good planes with top cover. Tough, maneuverable with heavy firepower.
I replied to a comment.
Perhaps I expresed badly. 204th Kokutai lost 9 pilots in combat and 11 in in accidents between November 1st, when It was renamed, and December 31st.You were aware, perhaps, that the "loss of 20 pilots" on 1 November was when the Tinian Air Group (who numbered 20 pilots at the time) was transferred back to Japan from Rabaul?
P-40s WERE top cover for P-39s.Lots of eventual aces got their first victory(s) in P-39s. Japanese pilot quality was at their peak during this period. Plenty of aces in Russia. P-40s were good planes with top cover. Tough, maneuverable with heavy firepower.
This is interesting - unfortunately my storage of 8th AF Mission Summary Reports are archived in storage. First comment. I have no reason to believe or disbelieve the above narrative but will note that it is not in the format of the Group Intelligence reports sent to 8th AF HQ. From memory, admittedly poor at my age. the Mission Reports even that early had evolved to a short synopsis of the Landfall. IP time, ToT, Rally Point Time and Landfall out with a paragraph to describe notable events (similar to the above narrative). Also included in all Mission summaries by BG and FG were statistics of # dispatched, # effective (dispatched less early returns) and summary data regarding Lost, Damaged/written Off, Damaged, KIA, WIA as well as claims for E/A destroyed.Well, 6th Kokutai was partially deployed to Rabaul on August 21st 1942 and sustained losses prior to been renamed 204th in November 1st and suffered some 20 pilots lost in the remaning months of 1942.
With an intended strenght of 60 fighters, an educated guess of some 80 pilots in the roster I think won't be too unreal to asume, so a 25% loss in pilot strenght in two months will be pretty noticiable, specially given the previous losses as 6th Kokutai and the japanese tendency to use veteran pilots in operations, having rookie pilots few ocasions to gain experience, widening the gap between 1st class pilots and rookies.
So yes, TAG was replaced by a veteran unit. But the pilot quality was the same? I doubt it.
EDIT: info for 6th/204 th Kokutai from "JNAF Fighters units and their aces 1932-1945" from Hata, Izawa and Shores.
Yes, missed the JAAF involvement in late 1942, thanks.
Not sure how can it be in a War Diary (that was meant to be written the day of the events or a couple after at most) that it was the only time during a struggle that lasted for nearly 3 years (and 2 of them after the day of the attack) and involved other units of the Jadgwaffe all over western and central Europe.
After reading the Narrative of the 44th BG, to me is clear that this BG was diverted from it's original bomb run and wasn't able to bomb the primary target.
BTW, 2 planes shot down over enemy territory and one more crashed in UK from a total of 16 attacking planes is a 18'75% loss rate in an escorted raid all the way to the target.
Excerpt from the web 8th Air Force Operations Home
View attachment 637509
Pdf doc extracted from the web HOME
Table 88 of the AAF Statistical Digest lists numbers of PR aircraft in theaters vs Germany. Typically the F4/5 are less than 1/2 of the total numbers of 1st line PR aircraft. There are a couple of months where it was greater than 1/2. The numbers of F6s are greater than the numbers you quote reaching 205 in May 1944. The 8th AF also had Spitfires and Mosquitoes. Elliot Roosevelt pushed hard for Mosquitoes which he felt were the best reconn platform.That would be doubtful even perhaps possible?
It might very well have been true for a certain year or for the theater up until a certain date?
There were about 90 Allison powered F-6 A&B recon planes, and another 90 F-6C (P-51B & C) built. details are not always firm.
They did build/convert around 136 P-51Ds to F-6Ds but that was not until the fall of 1944. The F-6K is too late.
Not at all knowledgeable about what the light/medium bombers were doing or if photos taken on bombing missions for damage assessment count as PR photos.
As was the legendary Adrian Warburton .On the subject of PR types, Saint-Exupery was flying a French F-5B when he went MIA in 1944.
General Arnold presented drawings of the Mosquito to 6 manufacturers, one responded with comments. If there was really a serious note to procure (more) or produce Mosquitoes by the AAF, someone "would have" put out a solicitation with a dollar amount to manufacturers.Table 88 of the AAF Statistical Digest lists numbers of PR aircraft in theaters vs Germany. Typically the F4/5 are less than 1/2 of the total numbers of 1st line PR aircraft. There are a couple of months where it was greater than 1/2. The numbers of F6s are greater than the numbers you quote reaching 196 in May 1944. The 8th AF also had Spitfires and Mosquitoes. Elliot Roosevelt pushed hard for Mosquitoes which he felt were the best reconn platform.
The USAAF did get 100 PR XVIs out of 400 produced.General Arnold presented drawings of the Mosquito to 6 manufacturers, one responded with comments. If there was really a serious note to procure (more) or produce Mosquitoes by the AAF, someone "would have" put out a solicitation with a dollar amount to manufacturers.
Gentlemen,
In the Mighty Eight War Manual, by Roger Freeman, page 186, Freeman wrote "In late July 1944, the first P-38L's arrived in the UK. … When this model became available for combat units in August, only the 479th Group retained fighter P-38's in 8th Air Force and replacements it received were mostly low-hours P-38J's turned in by the units recently converted to P-51's."
If Freeman is correct (and I have no reason to doubt him) there is no chance the the L model was available for D-Day. IMHO, I would be surprised to find that any of the 8th's Fighter Groups took the L into combat. Corrections always welcomed.
Eagledad
The initial P51Bs were actually delivered to the RAF. The 354th flew their first missions in P51s repossessed from the RAF. There was a major breakdown in communication in the USAAF chain of command.Difficult to explain in short answer. Politics, Bureaucracies and incompetence played a role. Inexperience played a role. Lack of foresight played a role.
Some Edits below for context:
1. IMO, while Eaker inherited Monk Hunter (Spaatz pick) to run VIII FC. Hunter, like Spaatz, and like Eaker served in AAC when heavy bombardment matured into high altitude fast attack and operating above existing Pursuit designs - in the late 1930s. Their vision of future escort was that of Destroyer protecting cargo convoys - fence out threats but always remain close. That said, the conundrum was the belief that only twin engine aircraft were perceived feasible for long range escort - but concept remained through XP-75. The VIII Service Command in 1942 was staffed by combat rookies trying to learn from RAF (when they occasionally listened). The problems experienced with P-47C and P-38F led Service Command to form an Air Technical Services department in late 1942- with shining star Maj Cass Hough. That said, Hunter did place a request to Brits to produce 75 and 110 gallon tanks (Jan/Feb 1943) but either Hunter or Eaker failed to manage the process - even if Air Services was ultimately responsible.
2. Pre-war, the use of auxiliary external fuel was solely for ferry - combat use was specifically codified as 'verboten'. The directive to 'change our thinking' was driven by Arnold in January 1942 in his Fighter Conference to drive Fighter Range and Performance but operational pursuit aircraft in AAF inventory were only P-38, 39 and 40. MC was nudged in March but only the 60 and 75 gal steel combat tanks were even in test in summer of 1942. The 110 and150 had not started testing. Prior to the Fighter Conference Kelsey and Johnson collaborated to provide extended range for the F-4, specifically in December 1941. Additionally Lockheed designed a 150 and 300 gal steel Ferry tank.
The Mustang was not in the inventory but Edgar Schmued/NAA execs were not beholden to AAF Materiel Command restrictions and designed Low Level Attack Pursuit (A-36) with dual purpose external racks and internal plumbing. The A-36 Design Specification stipulated dual fuel/bomb pylon in Dec 1941. External bomb racks were designed and tested quietly with tacit approval by AAF-MC on P-38E as kits in December 1941 and production article in P-38F. Neither NAA nor Lockheed design provided for pressurization system for external tanks but the plumbing was designed for both to accommodate 15,000 feet.
3. Wright Field tested for performance - not operational suitability. Eglin Field was just emerging in the role of operational suitability. B-17s, B-24s, P-38s and P-47s entering combat operations in 1942/early 1943 had not been suitably tested at high altitude - nor had AAF-MC as yet delivered on either the 60 or 75 gallon combat tank. Only Ferry tanks were being produced - in limited quantities. The P-47C was delivered without the center keel/bomb rack capable of carrying both bomb and fuel tanks - but neither 38 or 47 had pressurization systems to feed from external tank to engine.
Contrast versus A-36 and P-51A which inherited many constructive requirements from RAF on NA 73/83 and 91 prior to first flight of NA-73X in October 1940. NOTE NO BUREAUCRATIC interference from AAF-MC - "not invented here'. The pressurization was solved by Cass Hough, followed by production insertion on P51B-5 in Nov 1943. But neither P-38J nor P47D had production article until approx March-April 1944.
Not all the issues regarding LR escort modifications were caused by MC. AAF MC proposed (Jan 1943) to Lockheed and Republic that they modify the P-38/47 to carry more external ferry tank fuel, but also that P-47 be equipped to employ wing racks and plumbing for ferry tanks. Lockheed complied quickly but Republic failed to produce the wing mods until April 1944. When General Barney Giles pressed Lockheed, NAA, Bell, Curtiss and Republic to add more internal fuel - July 7, 1943 - NAA tested first fuselage fuel tank on July 18, Lockheed in September, but Republic took until the D-25 was delivered in ETO FGs in May 1944 to add 70 gallons to fuselage tankage.
While the P-51B proceeded with AAF-MC blessings it was NEVER contemplated by either MC or AAF-HQ as anything but a continuation of A-36, P-51A and General Saville - Chief Air Defense - was The decision maker for combat allocations dutifully assigned ALL Mustangs to TAC. To this day it is inexplicable that Eaker agreed to let the P-51B got to 2nd TAC without a fight - it took Spaatz, Arnold and Eisenhower face to face with Portal to extract from Leigh-Mallory.,
4. Too many folks point to Kenney as example of early deployment of external tanks on P-47 and ask why not for VIII AF? The answer is pretty simple. The SWP with long flights over water were essentially 'unmolested' en-route and 180 degrees from ETO threat experience, where our fighters were under threat 26 miles (or thereabouts) from England. Applying Kenney Doctrine to ETO would have resulted in a lot of 'crispy' P-47s IMO. Cass Hough was every bit as capable as Pappy Gunn.
5. As to VIII Air Technical Services not having 'A team' to solve Major P-38 design flaws for operating at high altitudes? Unfair. Kelly Johnson was very aware in 1942 of the limitations of wing installed intercoolers to support HP > 1000Hp - but Lockheed engineers and MC engineers/procurement did not receive a whiff of the major high altitude issues confronting operational P-38s in ETO until late 1942. Recall that all ETO P-38s were shipped to Africa before cold weather set in in ETO. Also, for the Eaker 'haters', he was bitter about having his planned, requested and approved priority for P-38 as first choice escorts pulled from him two months after first combat ops. You can directly trace losses during Big Week through Schweinfurt to the absence of P-38 escort - warts and all.
Additionally, Allison was delivering better engines with more HP than the Intercoolers on E/F/G/H could support - and the early J was a disaster as far as high altitude engine/intercooler/turbo powerplant operations. VIII ATS did not have the Depot capacity to re-engineer the P-38 Powerplant configuration - also not in their job jar. They succeeded admirably in modifying existing P-47C/D with pylon wing/fuel feed but took more elapsed time for single mod than production of 30+ P-47s in the US.
Shortround covered the major issues clearly and exhaustively above.
According to Bodie P38 L s didn't come off the assembly line until July 1944. I would be surprised if any showed up in the UK before AugustGentlemen,
In the Mighty Eight War Manual, by Roger Freeman, page 186, Freeman wrote "In late July 1944, the first P-38L's arrived in the UK. … When this model became available for combat units in August, only the 479th Group retained fighter P-38's in 8th Air Force and replacements it received were mostly low-hours P-38J's turned in by the units recently converted to P-51's."
If Freeman is correct (and I have no reason to doubt him) there is no chance the the L model was available for D-Day. IMHO, I would be surprised to find that any of the 8th's Fighter Groups took the L into combat. Corrections always welcomed.
Eagledad
Targeting the Reich is an excellent study of PR in WWII.Difficult to say, apart from the dedicated unarmed PR spitfires there were many converted fighters performing a similar role to the Mustangs which generally had a camera too. By October 1942 there were 5 Mosquito PR squadrons. What is impossible to believe is that the total effort by all RAF and USA types that werent P-38s amounted to just 10% of the total. It isnt supported by the history of RAF Medmenham (later Allied Central Interpretation Unit (ACIU)) RAF Medmenham - Wikipedia
Not quite 'false', but the RAF did 'Reverse Lend Lease' many of the early FZ series (early P-51B-5) beginning late in December and many of the P-51B/C-1 destined for RAF (many FX/FB series) were diverted to 354th and 357th FG before delivery to RAF per agreement between Portal and Arnold. The early transfer dates of record from RAF inventory to 9th AF were last week of December 1943.The L
The initial P51Bs were actually delivered to the RAF. The 354th flew their first missions in P51s repossessed from the RAF. There was a major breakdown in communication in the USAAF chain of command.