How good (or bad) was the P-38, really?

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Gentlemen,

In the Mighty Eight War Manual, by Roger Freeman, page 186, Freeman wrote "In late July 1944, the first P-38L's arrived in the UK. … When this model became available for combat units in August, only the 479th​ Group retained fighter P-38's in 8th​ Air Force and replacements it received were mostly low-hours P-38J's turned in by the units recently converted to P-51's."

If Freeman is correct (and I have no reason to doubt him) there is no chance the the L model was available for D-Day. IMHO, I would be surprised to find that any of the 8th's Fighter Groups took the L into combat. Corrections always welcomed.

Eagledad
Freeman was correct - but according to Robin Olds - that an L never darkened the doors of the 479th, only J-25. That is not to say Olds' memory was impeccable or that an L did not arrive in the ETO as only the 479th remained unconverted to P-51s of the former 8thAF P-38 FG. The J-15 and newer were in very high demand in MTO and the 1st, 14th and 82nd had just received J-15s in late June/July (from 8thAF and States). Not that I have all the data, but my first definitive L in combat ops was 474th in 9th AF in October.

Now for caveats. Olds sez J-15, MACRs say J-15s and J-10s for 479th, 55th and 364th. In Stanaway's History of the 479th FG, page 67, he states "There is no evidence that to suggest that 479th ever received a P-38J-25 subtype" - but curiously presents color plates of P-38L-1's for which there are no photos.. The IARCs of the P-38J-25 and Subs show arrival in late July but no disposition to 8th AF from Langford Lodge.
 
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Was not the Typhoon developed alongside the Tornado from the start?

The F18/37 fighter had 2 variants - one with the Rolls-Royce Vulture (the Tornado) and one with the Sabre (the Typhoon). Though they were largely the same, there were detail differences around the mounting of the engine.

The Tornado dies with the axing of the Vulture, but a couple of prototypes continued on, one having a Bristol Centaurus installed, another trialling counter-rotating propellers using the Vulture.
 
Was not the Typhoon developed alongside the Tornado from the start?

The F18/37 fighter had 2 variants - one with the Rolls-Royce Vulture (the Tornado) and one with the Sabre (the Typhoon). Though they were largely the same, there were detail differences around the mounting of the engine.

The Tornado dies with the axing of the Vulture, but a couple of prototypes continued on, one having a Bristol Centaurus installed, another trialling counter-rotating propellers using the Vulture.
It depends what you read, some spec documents suggest yes, but, having read the small print (below) I think those have been "tidied" somewhat. (the early formal
spec documents have only the numeric designation. no "name" at all). I have taken the view that the two snippets below show that the first time either type
was actually named was first the Tornado, and 2nd the Typhoon.

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Camm says he started work (before tenders went out) independantly, in late 1936 on a Hurricane replacement, he claims the first time he was aware of the Sabre was about Feb 1937. It was (he says) only later that the Air Ministry actually came up with a spec, and issued tenders.

Ooops sorry mods weve drifted off-course...
 
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Not sure if this is piling on - but the letter from Arnold to his Chief, Air Staff Barney Giles was written as he (Arnold) was heading for the hospital after second heart attack.

"This brings to mind very clearly the absolute necessity for building a fighter airplane that can go in and out with the bombers. Moreover, this fighter has to go into Germany. Perhaps we can modify some existing type to do the job. The P-38 has been doing a fine job from North Africa in escorting our B-17s 400 hundred miles or so. Whether this airplane can furnish the same escort against the GAF [German Air Force] on the Western Front is debatable.

Our fighter people in the UK claim they can't stay with the bombers because they are too slow [in cruise mode] and because they [the fighter escort] must have top speed by the time they hit the bombers. The P-38 is not notable for great acceleration, so perhaps it too will not be able to meet the FW's and 109's. About six months remains before deep penetrations of Germany begin. Within this next six months, you have got to get a fighter that can protect our bombers. Whether you use an existing type or have to start from scratch is your problem. Get to work on this right way because in January, '44, I want a fighter escort for our bombers from the UK into Germany".

Note: Important facts:
1. Written before July losses during Blitz Week and just before Eaker's subsequent appeal for both P-38s and Mustangs.
2. Performance testing of first P-51B-1 by NAA in May 1943 by Chilton were not only being reviewed AAF Materiel Command, but via 'back channel' to Arnold. When flown in 'Fighter Condition' w/o racks the P-51B-1 attained average of 450mph TAS at 29000 feet.
Perhaps more notable is long time Mustang 'barrier' MG Oliver Echols Chief Materiel Command went to Hucknall in August 1943. Do we suppose 'someone' lit a fire under him? Priorities for both NAA Mustang program and Packard 1650-3 were issued about the same time. Co-incidence? Note that Echols was never promoted again and went to Northrup in 1945.
3. Republic had responded to Giles earlier pleas for more internal fuel by stating that increasing fuel either in wing or fuselage was a major redesign effort requiring 8-12 months before production articles could be delivered. Note: The final production drawing for 70 gallon auxiliary fuselage tank for P-47D-25 was dated December 1943. The P-38J LE Kit drawing was dated August 1943.
4. Lockheed and NAA responded more favorably with preliminary study to install a fuselage tank behind cockpit (both) but P-38 design had more unfavorable CG issues. NAA, with experience of extra 54 gallons in gun/ammo bay rejected the diminished armament as a non starter - and showed MC that adding 18 gallons in leading edge was not very practical and held fast on the aft fuselage tank of 85 gal max (MC desired 200).
5. The NAA prototype test was in July, flown by Chilton - then repeated by Col Bradley to confirm. The Production dwgs were completed in August and first kits issued in October 1943 for P-51B-1, -5 and C-1. Both Lockheed and NAA kits arrived in US and ETO Depots late October.

Unsure what Arnold's sources for cited P-38 escort issues might have been - but they were spot on for highly contested airspace with equivalent performance fighters. Both MTO and SWP escort missions were more benign in nature due to large over water routes and safe (relatively) use of ferry tanks.

The sources for the above were largely extracted from well-sourced "Development of Long Range Escort", Study 136, by Boylon - and my own sourcing of NARA an USAFHRC file.
 
The P-38s problems with cold air over Europe were of somewhat short duration.
They were something of a self own to.

The early P-38s like the F and the G, while cockpit temp was miserable, didn't have the problems with the engines in cold air temps. In fact their intercoolers were too small and couldn't over the cool the air at high cruise settings or at least not as much as the P-38Js could. Off course these P-38s were never used in the ETO except for a few brief "fly over France" training missions before they were sent to North Africa. Nobody really knows how well (or poorly) they would have done.

P-38s didn't fly ETO high altitude escort missions until the late fall of 1943. 2nd fighter Group in the ETO didn't become operational until Dec of 1943. 16-17 months after the P-38 combat victories in Alaska. and about 16 months after the first few P-38s go into action on Guadalcanal.

By late 1943 Allison was fitting new intake manifolds to help solve the problem at the factory and starting to ship replacement manifolds for either field replacement or replacement at overhaul centers. Some of the "problem" had been anticipated with a change in the allowable fuel formulations in winter of 1942/43 and work had been being done to help solve it during the spring, summer and fall. They had anticipated some problems with both P-39s and P-40s but in practice they didn't have much, if any, trouble.

A change in flying technique in which the engines were run slower but used higher boost pressures also kept the intake temperature higher and that solved some of the problems.
This last took until the summer of 1944 to really implement as the AAC was flying the P-38 against the instructions of both Allison and Lockheed.
 
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The P-38s problems with cold air over Europe were of somewhat short duration.
They were something of a self own to.

The early P-38s like the F and the G, while cockpit temp was miserable, didn't have the problems with the engines in cold air temps. In fact their intercoolers were too small and couldn't over the cool the air at high cruise settings or at least not as much as the P-38Js could. Off course these P-38s were never used in the ETO except for a few brief "fly over France" training missions before they were sent to North Africa. Nobody really knows how well (or poorly) they would have done.

P-39s didn't fly ETO high altitude escort missions until the late fall of 1943. 2nd fighter Group in the ETO didn't become operational until Dec of 1943. 16-17 months after the P-38 combat victories in Alaska. and about 16 months after the first few P-38s go into action on Guadalcanal.

By late 1943 Allison was fitting new intake manifolds to help solve the problem at the factory and starting to ship replacement manifolds for either field replacement or replacement at overhaul centers. Some of the "problem" had been anticipated with a change in the allowable fuel formulations in winter of 1942/43 and work had been being done to help solve it during the spring, summer and fall. They had anticipated some problems with both P-39s and P-40s but in practice they didn't have much, if any, trouble.

A change in flying technique in which the engines were run slower but used higher boost pressures also kept the intake temperature higher and that solved some of the problems.
This last took until the summer of 1944 to really implement as the AAC was flying the P-38 against the instructions of both Allison and Lockheed.
You (knew) meant "P-38s" not "P-39s" and 20th FG as 2nd P-38 FG operational two months after 55th FG on October 15th 943.

To add - the 1st went operational with P-38G/F on August 29,1942. Fighter Sweep at unknown altitude. First escort mission aborted on 29 September. First complete escort 2 October to Meaulte, last to Lille on 9 October.
14th FG went operational on15 October - an escort to Le Havre and flew last (escort) on 25 October. The 82nd FG was training but yanked with 1st, 14th and 31st and 52nd in late October through November 1942.

As you noted the Intercooler design in LE was not capable of supporting more than 1000+ Hp for anything but take-off and brief cycles at MP. Kelley noted that as the reason for the new P-38J design. That said, the issues associated with 'over cooling in the early P-38J' were not reported in the P-38F/G/H for the reasons you cited.

I'm pretty sure LaVier's visit in Spring 1944 was the key to overturning the stupid AAF-ATS operating procedures for long range cruise - and implemented in March/April 1944.

No P-38 escort/fighter Sweep in ETO again until 15 October 1943, 55th FG Sweep over Dutch coast.
 
Thanks for the P-39 correction.

I was going from memory on LaVier's visit so thanks again for the correction.

I would also note that the fuel available in 1942 and perhaps early 1943 in many theaters did not have the cold temperature problems the later fuel did. (and not all batches of the later fuel had the problem either)

Allowable lead was increased and higher percentages of heavy aromatics were allowed. It was these heavy aromatics that were separating out.
 
The bombers also got through when unescorted. No 8th AF raid was turned back because of enemy action.

The losses on unescorted missions were unsustainable, but that didn't stop them reaching their targets.
Donald Caldwell in "Day Fighter in Defense of the Reich" says that there was one 8 AF raid turned back due to enemy action. It was on March 8th 1943 in a B-24 attack on Rouen railyards.

BTW, as someone noted before (sorry, can't remember who was), the P-38 faced different quality of enemy pilots in ETO/MTO and PTO so it could had have an influence in how it was perceived: not so good vs stellar.
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Donald Caldwell in "Day Fighter in Defense of the Reich" says that there was one 8 AF raid turned back due to enemy action. It was on March 8th 1943 in a B-24 attack on Rouen railyards.

BTW, as someone noted before (sorry, can't remember who was), the P-38 faced different quality of enemy pilots in ETO/MTO and PTO so it could had have an influence in how it was perceived: not so good vs stellar.
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Absolutely the quality of opponent was better in the ETO than the PTO, and better early on than later on in both theaters.
 
Donald Caldwell in "Day Fighter in Defense of the Reich" says that there was one 8 AF raid turned back due to enemy action. It was on March 8th 1943 in a B-24 attack on Rouen railyards.

BTW, as someone noted before (sorry, can't remember who was), the P-38 faced different quality of enemy pilots in ETO/MTO and PTO so it could had have an influence in how it was perceived: not so good vs stellar.
View attachment 637466
Donald Caldwell in "Day Fighter in Defense of the Reich" says that there was one 8 AF raid turned back due to enemy action. It was on March 8th 1943 in a B-24 attack on Rouen railyards.

BTW, as someone noted before (sorry, can't remember who was), the P-38 faced different quality of enemy pilots in ETO/MTO and PTO so it could had have an influence in how it was perceived: not so good vs stellar.
View attachment 637466
Don accepted the account at face value. In the VIII BC mission report the 44th BG lost 2 lead crew in the head on attack shortly after the IP and bomb run - and the rest of the 44th proceeded to the target with the 93rd BG in trail. According to both BG mission reports the M/Y at Rouen was bombed. The account in DFinDOR was extracted from JG26 War Diary account. The 93rd BG, also attacking Rouen M/Y, bombed successfully - so how may we conclude that the "8th AF was turned back"?

Also in 44th BG mission report was acknowledgement that bombing was 'lousy' as the trailing B-24s behind the two downed lead a/c were prepared to 'bomb on lead' and were unprepared to bomb individually.

Another question for the thoughtful, "If the 44th BG was completely devastated and breaking up formations to escape - how weren't many more B-24s claimed by JG 26"?
 
Absolutely the quality of opponent was better in the ETO than the PTO, and better early on than later on in both theaters.
And yet, only ONE ace had 5 victory credits in the P-39 - in the SWP at Guadalcanal? Further, in defense of the poor P-39 record - the IJN pilots they flew against in 1942 were outstanding. That said the P-40 was far more successful air to air in all Theatres save Soviet Union.
 
Don accepted the account at face value. In the VIII BC mission report the 44th BG lost 2 lead crew in the head on attack shortly after the IP and bomb run - and the rest of the 44th proceeded to the target with the 93rd BG in trail. According to both BG mission reports the M/Y at Rouen was bombed. The account in DFinDOR was extracted from JG26 War Diary account. The 93rd BG, also attacking Rouen M/Y, bombed successfully - so how may we conclude that the "8th AF was turned back"?

Also in 44th BG mission report was acknowledgement that bombing was 'lousy' as the trailing B-24s behind the two downed lead a/c were prepared to 'bomb on lead' and were unprepared to bomb individually.

Another question for the thoughtful, "If the 44th BG was completely devastated and breaking up formations to escape - how weren't many more B-24s claimed by JG 26"?
Thanks for the correction. Always learn some thing new in this forum.
 
The Allied air forces (Navy/Army) in the New Guinea/Guadalcanal area were up against the Tinian Air Group between March and November '41 - hardly low quality pilots...
The P-38 debuted in december 1942 and, IIRC, from "Fire in the Sky" and by your post, the best JNAF pilots were already dead or out of those operational areas.

BTW, the opposition been better in ETO/MTO doesn't mean that in the PTO was bad.
 
The P-38 debuted in december 1942 and, IIRC, from "Fire in the Sky" and by your post, the best JNAF pilots were already dead or out of those operational areas.

BTW, the opposition been better in ETO/MTO doesn't mean that in the PTO was bad.
The initial P-38 combat were against both JAAF and IJN units There were still plenty of good pilots flying against the first P-38 units in the SWP
 
The Tinian Air Group was moved home (to Japan) in November '42, being replaced by the veteran 6th Air Group (redesignated 204th Air Group).

So yes, the P-38 arrived after the TAG was reassigned, but the level of experience was equalled by the replacement Air Group.
 

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