How Many Zeros?

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Hellcats picked them off like clay pigeons because they didn't have to "mix it up" with the Zeroes
A6M2 and Ki-27 could outclimb American fighter aircraft during 1942. Hence they had the choice to boom zoom or dogfight P-40s and F4Fs. That was probably key to success, especially for the relatively slow Ki-27.

F6F was faster and climbed better. That put the shoe on the other foot.
 
If you look at the specs on the Zero and the Wildcat you'll see they rated nearly the same in top speed with the Wildcat rating at a higher ceiling. The Zero's advantage over the Wildcat was in its acceleration and maneuverability (i.e., it could turn on a dime, giving it a tighter radius, enabling it to wind up on the Wildcat's tail), all due to its lighter weight. The supercharged Hellcats of course nullified that advantage.
 

Take a look at:

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/japan/intelsum85-dec42.pdf

specifically, paragraph 12. (Edit point 12, page9)
 
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I believe the Philippines was a MacArthur show and the Navy had little say.
 
This is fascinating. It's an actual field study. Let me go over this whole thing. In the meantime, on that specific paragraph, it's mostly my understanding, except that fourth sentence is a little cocky. Let me read this and get back to you. If you wouldn't mind explaining that fourth sentence while I'm at it, please do. It's just a little arbitrary, right now, so it seems.
 
OK, i got a sense of it. Here goes.

I always had it in the back of my mind that the Navy was looking for alternatives to the Wildcat and that they were even considering Army Air Force fighters before they ultimately gave the job to Grumman. The problem, of course, was that "Zeke." As a matter of fact, I mentioned that in another thread. I didn't just dream it up or read it on Wikipedia. I heard it in my Dad's flight club of retired of pilot vets. Well, this is the "smoking gun" on that, and thanks for it.

Now, look at what we were thinking at that time. It's in the last sentence in Paragraph 2. We were thinking we're looking for a "lightweight." Boy, did Grumman fool everybody!

That fourth sentence in that Paragraph 12 is still somewhat arbitrary to me, however. I know at high speeds the stick in the Zero stiffened up. At slower speeds that aircraft could out-turn anything in the sky and get right on its rear. If I heard that once from "the boys" in the club, I heard it a thousand times. And that Zero was deadly in a dogfight for it.

Now, maybe that fourth sentence is saying no apparent advantage in turning radius when compared to the Wildcat, I don't know. This data was supposedly from pilot observations in the study. But, think of it like this. At slower speeds, which aircraft is going to turn tighter, a lighter one or a heavier one? A Stearman will out-turn a Zero, simply because it's lighter.

All said, I still don't know that the turning radius wasn't a big advantage of the Zeroes. In a dogfight, now, I'm saying. Let's slow that speed down.
 

Actually, point 12 on page 9.
 
Actually, point 12 on page 9.
OK, that makes a difference. Like, one more paragraph difference.

Chalk up what I took the time to say on the turning radius to education, then.

On that Paragraph 13, specifically. Again, as I said in an earlier thread, the Corsair was just a complicated aircraft. Grumman's philosophy was, build it simple, and build it strong. The Hellcat had virtually no mechanical problems compared to the Corsair. Especially on a carrier-qualified aircraft, that's the bill of goods that sells. That's why, while we had the Corsairs, as well as the Mustangs, etc., Roosevelt went with the trusted manufacturer on the Wildcat for the Hellcats. And, Grumman delivered.

I don't know. Am I supposed to see anything else in that paragraph besides the fact that we had the Corsair before the Hellcat?

EDIT: Wait a minute. I think we're getting a little mixed up. Didn't I address your point in my last reply? Points or Paragraphs or whatever we want to call them 12 and 13 are on that same page, 9. And I think I just addressed them both, now.
 
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At slower speeds, which aircraft is going to turn tighter, a lighter one or a heavier one? A Stearman will out-turn a Zero, simply because it's lighter.

I think here you are referring to an aircraft's wing loading. The lower the loading means a lower stall speed in the bank which means a higher turn rate per speed if you have the power to maintain it. A lighter aircraft doesn't always have tighter turning ability....the He100 weighs 5512 lbs and a Spitfire Mk1 weighs 6600 but the He100's wing loading is 10 lbs higher per square foot and can't follow the Spitfire in a hard turn at the same speed.

A lot to winning a war or having a war winning design comes down to more right choices and less mistakes than you opponent. For example, the Zero's designer decided to go with the Sakae engine (980HP) instead of one from his own company for weight reduction wanting a "super maneuverable" aircraft. He succeeded but it was short lived and then couldn't catch up. What if he had installed the Kinsei 40 series (1040 HP)to start with? That means that by early 1942 the aircraft can upgrade to a Kinsei 54 (1200 HP) and by the end of 1942 to the beginning of 1943 to the Kinsei 62 (1350 HP).

This means from the beginning it would not have any fuselage guns and the space used by the magazines would be a larger fuel tank with the wing having four guns as the later A6M5 models. It would be interesting to see if the designer would have opted for armor and tank protection with the extra power to compensate. This describes the A6M8 of 1945 which was outclassed by that time but what about late 1942?
 
Generally, the heavier the aircraft, the wider the turning radius, by virtue of the fact that it's simply harder to turn a heavier than a lighter aircraft at the same speed and centrifugal forces. But, that said, I definitely hear you. One of the big differences between the F4F and the F6F was indeed the lower wing loading on the F6F. I'm not familiar with your examples, but that doesn't matter. I'm on board with what you're saying on how the aircraft design figures into this.
 
At high speed there's more then one way to turn. Aircraft which roll well such as F4U and Fw-190 can perform a vector roll and I don't think weight matters too much.
 
A careful examination of the first year in the PTO shows that when facing its usual, early opposition (most commonly, the P-40E and Buffalo) the A6M dominated the skies. The one aircraft that might have salvaged some success from the debacle was the Hurricane mark IIB which arrived late in the campaign (~Late January) and was subsequently, due to a variety of limitations, committed piecemeal and in such small numbers that nowhere could its impact be felt through the fall of Java. The P-40Es were overwhelmed in the PI by the initial A6M onslaught and then, like the Commonwealth Hurricanes, deployed to Java late and in relatively small numbers. The next stage of IJ activity in the PTO were the many raids on Darwin through the Spring into early summer of 1942. These long range attacks from Koepang in Timor, foreshadowed those made on Henderson Field at very long range on fairly well defended airfields. The Darwin raids were not countered with any consistency and rarely effectively by the well supplied three squadrons of USAAF P-40s that were defending the city and surrounding airstrips. (Over New Guinea, the Australians fought their own air battles with the P-40 as their domestically employed air force slowly built up. (I am sure others here can describe this process with far more accuracy and detail than I). Then comes the Guadalcanal campaign, primarily defended by the relatively mediocre-performing Marine F4F-4s and for the first time, the IJ air assault is blunted effectively. What's going on here? Is it just improved tactics that induced Lt. Col. Joe Bauer to tell his pilots, "When you see Zeros, dogfight 'em!" Was his exhortation marine moral boosting bluster, or was his comment an astute recognition of a significant change in a fundamental parameter? In August and September, the F4F-4 had arrived on the scene in significant numbers providing air defense of henderson Field. Its p*ss-poor climb rate is compensated by RADAR and the extraordinary coastwatcher network throughout the Solomons. For the first time, the IJN A6M escorts and bombers are facing an aircraft that can reach an equal or higher altitude than that flown by the A6M escorts and in numbers sufficient to counter the attacks. The IJ tactics hadn't changed since their basically successful attacks on the PI, Darwin and Java, and perhaps to a lesser extent Malaya which was more the domain of the Ki-43 Oscar. I believe if you replace the F4F with an equal number of Hurricanes (assuming they were as rugged), you get essentially the same result. But it was the F4F-4 with the two stage supercharged P&W engine that made the difference. That's why, I believe, if the F4F isn't the most underrated fighter of the 2nd WW, it may be the most under-appreciated. JMHO
 
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Before I go flying out of here I have to get back to that field study RCAFson gave us and just point this out. A field study is just that, it's an ideal. Provided the Zeroes cooperated in combat, the study was meaningful. The problem was, while the number one and number two recommendations in the study were, never attempt to dogfight the Zeroes, and never maneuver with them under 300 mph unless you were on their tail, those were tall recommendations for the Wildcats, as the top speeds of both those aircraft was right around 300 mph. Grumman knew that, too, as the Wildcats were their product. Grumman also knew about the difficulties the Wildcats had in trying to avoid dogfighting the Zeroes, and rather diving on them. The Wildcats, with their higher ceilings, could approach at higher altitudes. However, if they didn't hit anything in that initial gravity-accelerated dive, the Zeroes had little difficulty catching them on the way up. And, that's why we needed that Hellcat. Field recommendations, notwithstanding.
 
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The Wildcats are under-appreciated, I agree with that. Before setting Grumman on the Hellcat, the Navy, if it didn't look at every single alternative we had, it looked at a lot of them, and none of those did.
 
To the old fighter pilot adage, "speed is life," I'd add if someone hasn't already done so, "altitude is victory (or can be)" probably more so in early WW2 than later or now. Of course, the quantities are interchangeable by converting potential energy to kinetic, as you (VBF-13) pointed out: in a dive.
 
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FW Tactics: Basics
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