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I was in two mindsI fear your last 2 posts may well get dragged into the thread about the impact of additional RAF aircraft on the outcome of the Malayan Campaign and the British surrender of Singapore
A little ironicI might be stating the obvious, but in the tactical situations prevailing it should be a big advantage for the japanese fighters that their pilots' vision to the rear was superiour to the hurricanes.
Well said! I too had read Terence Kelly's book. A fine read it is, too.An interesting extract from Terence Kelly's book Spitfire and Hurricane Pilots at War:
These men no doubt came to accept the fable, which has long since taken root elsewhere, that the Hurricane, on which no doubt initially they pinned great hopes, was outclassed by the Zero. (Incidentally, much of the fighting believed to have been between Hurricane and Zero was in fact between Hurricane and Hayabusa. In many cases which follow where the name Zero is used, the aircraft could well have been an Oscar).
I have read book after book in which this nonsense about the superiority of the Japanese fighters is written. It simply was not so. The Hurricane was not outclassed by the Zero, or as we knew it, the Navy O or Navy Nought, nor by the Hayabusa. The Hurricane was at least the match of either machine and had the battles between them been fought on equal terms would have coped quite comfortably. Such was my opinion at the time and so it remains to the present day and although the majority of pundits appear to disagree I do at least have the support of the Commander of the 14th Army in Burma, Field Marshall Sir William Slim who in his splendid book Defeat into Victory states that: 'Speaking generally, all the Japanese fighters were inferior in performance to the Hurricane with the exception of the Navy O which was approximately equal to them.'
It is true that the Allied fighter squadrons in Singapore and the Dutch East Indies were largely eliminated by their Japanese opposite numbers but to discover why one has to look far beyond a comparison of the qualities of the aircraft involved. The Japanese won the air battle because they had a huge superiority in numbers (normally of the order of 8:1), because almost invariably they had the advantage of height and because most of their pilots were battle-hardened men - although admittedly against only negligible resistance from the Chinese. Over Singapore, the bomber formations were escorted by 50, 60, 70 or more Japanese fighters and, because of the ludicrous decisions of those who gave the orders, against these were pitted mere handfuls of Hurricanes as they became available for service. There were never 100 Hurricanes available for flying in Singapore, there were never 50 or even 20. There might perhaps, at best, be 12 at any juncture and usually there were less.
The first time 258 Sqn engaged the enemy, out of 48 Hurricanes which had flown off the Indomitable, exactly 8 were ready for combat. These 8, of whose pilots perhaps not more than two or three had ever fired their guns in anger before, had to climb up to attack a bomber force which was protected by a swarm of Japanese fighters just waiting for them. 2 Hurricanes were shot down and three of the remainder so badly mauled as to be, for the time being at least, unserviceable. In the course of a single hour, 8 had become 3. This was to become the pattern: Hurricanes taking off in petty numbers, often in the teeth of strafing fighters to engage swarms of the enemy comfortably ready to receive and deal with them.
As to the qualities of the two aircraft, the Zero certainly had advantages. It was manoeuvrable, it was marginally faster up to heights of about 15,000ft and it had a far longer range. Its mixed armament of machine guns and cannons roughly matched the 12 (but later 8 when 4 were removed to improve manoeuvrability and speed) machine guns of the Hurricane and while there are arguments about relative rates of climb, I have it on good authority that pilots from my own squadron escaped from Zeros by climbing away from them. The Hurricane for its part had several very distinct advantages. It had a better ceiling, the aircraft could take punishment which would have made the lightly-built Zero disintegrate, it was faster at higher altitudes and the pilot had the protection of resealing fuel tanks and an armour plate shield behind his back.
Thus it will be seen that tactics were the vital thing, that pilots must avoid giving battle in conditions where the advantages lay with the enemy. The Hurricane pilot must not start mixing it in dogfights at lower altitudes, the Zero pilot must avoid finding himself outmanoeuvred in terms of height. Early on this was little if at all appreciated by the Allies and possibly not by the Japanese. When my own squadron's 8 Hurricanes took off to challenge that first Japanese air armada not only were they force majeure choosing a battle ground which was the Navy O's ideal, but they were doing so on the assumption that should a dogfight ensue, the Hurricane being (as they had not been disabused) the world's most manoeuvrable modern fighter, the advantage would be theirs - for no one had briefed us on the Zero or even heard of the Hayabusa. When we flew off the Indomitable, it was to clear the Japanese wooden biplanes from the skies. I beg the reader not to believe this to be exaggeration.
On Indomitable, we knew nothing of either aircraft and the first intimation the Zero even existed was gleaned amongst the gloomy, defeatist attitude which hung like a pall over Singapore on that evening when we landed at Seletar a mere 36 hours before we were to be in action.
So we were dribbled away piecemeal. Hurricanes would be ferried up in batches from Java only for some to be damaged landing across the deep ruts left by Flying Fortresses at the midway refuelling airfield known as P2 near Palembang or jumped by waiting Navy O's or Hayabusas whilst taking off or landing. Strength could never be built up sufficiently for properly planned defence. And tactics were hardly a matter for discussion when the one thought hammering at the mind of each of perhaps half a dozen scrambled pilots racing with thudding hearts to their Hurricanes was that with a horde of Japanese mere minutes away from Singapore he must somehow gain height before they came down en masse and clobbered him.
The alternative to this useless waste of valuable men and machines to no real purpose, was, to my knowledge at the time, put forward by only one senior RAF officer, Wing Cdr Harold Maguire, who, as previously mentioned had been my CO at 56 OTU at Sutton Bridge and was now in command of the proposed 266 Wing to be formed from 232, 242, 258 and 605 Sqns. His plan was that the entire force of Hurricanes should be withheld until all aircraft were operational, all pilots locally knowledgeable and a coherent tactical scheme had been formulated. Had his wise counsel been accepted, his plan adopted, quite different pages would have been written in the Operational Record Books.
The truth is that Hurricane pilots have said time and again that they had no problems engaging zeros and we're usually caught on the ground and the zeros had numerical advantage. Zero could not follow a hurricane in a dive because it's wings would fold over the cockpit. FACT. Listen to pilots not historians or myth makers.In the right circumstances Hurricanes might have been able to compete on even terms with Zeroes, but it was never demonstrated in action. Hurricanes and Zeroes met in combat 6 times for which both sides' losses are known (and only another 1 or 2 more where both sides' losses aren't known). The score in those combats was 6:38 in favor of the Zero, and the Zeroes won every combat. 5 in 1942 over Malaya, DEI and Ceylon, one other 5 December 1943 in the JAAF/JNAF combined raid on Calcutta, 0:3; Army Type 1 fighters downed or force the crash landings of another 6 Hurricanes in that raid also without loss to themselves (the Hurricanes downed 1 Army bomber).
Even using the Type 1 as proxy for the Zero, probably an optimistic assumption from the Hurricane's POV, the Hurricane's record v the Type 1 was also disastrous in the opening campaigns of 1942 and even as of late 1943 the Type 1's in Burma were at least holding their own in actual outcomes v Hurricanes, outscoring them more often than not, though by then there were at least some cases of combats actually won by Hurricanes v Type 1's (needless to say, measuring by British claims the Hurricane was pretty successful v the Type 1 by then, measuring by Japanese claims the Type 1 was overwhelmingly successful).
'Depends on pilots', of course that's the correct answer for almost any match up unless completely one sided, but there's no actual operational evidence of the Hurricane performing well against the Zero in combat, or even v the Type 1 on a consistent basis. The much better record of the F4F v the Zero is not proof IMO that the Hurricane would have done as well even with the same pilots and situation, because it neglects the real possibility that less tangible performance factors put the Hurricane at more of a relative disadvantage than in appears to be on paper.
Joe
There are many 1v1 flight tests between planes these mock combats were flown and results well known. I really do not care for writers who distort the truth or sentimental attachment. Japanese pilots like there german counterparts did not like the idea of been shot down by Hurricanes and swore that it was spitfires even when spitfires were not in their sector.I have voted that it depends on the pilots.
Having read many ww2 pilots accounts of aerial combat there often wasn't a dogfight in the conventional sense of the word. Many kills or aerial victories were scored as a result of the element of surprise, and or altitude advantage. The Hurricane did not perform well at high altitude according to Tom Neil's account in his book "Gun Button to Fire".
If two equally experienced pilots went up against each other one on one i wouldn't be surprised if the Zero came out on top owing to its legendary maneuverability. However the Zero's very real disadvantage lay in its unprotected fuel tanks and lack of armor protection for the pilot.