Hurricane Mk IIC vs. A6M2 Zero

[JoeB]

G'Day Joe, many thanks for the list mate, makes for interesting reading! Regarding the action of August 10, I have P/O Coombes and F/O Young (both 452 sqn) claiming the shared destruction of a Pete and claiming a second Pete as a probable. You can read their combat reports here - http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/flight-test-data/spitfire-vs-different-models-zeros-9133.html Note they both identify the ea as two Petes. As for Gordon, 31sqn never flew a mission against the floatplanes on this day, however on August 11th they did. On this raid the squadron claimed one floatplane "extensively" damaged in aerial combat and one damged on the ground. I also have a reference to Gordon making a claim on this day, however this is obviously incorrect.
Also see the above link for the beaufighter combat reports for the August 17th action.
Incidently, Beauforts from 7 sqn RAAF also claimed a handful of Jakes around this period. W/Cmdr Parson's crew damaged one on 15 Sep, while F/O Legges crew claimed a Jake destroyed on the 20th. Two months later on 11th of Nov, F/L Cox's crew claimed the destruction of a second Jake. Any info on these actions?

10 August:The RAAF reported time of 2359Z (ie. GMT) is not that far from the Japanese one of 0910 (I'm not sure exactly which zone that is, but it's local morning roughly speaking in both cases). There's not much question about the types which are indicated in JNAF shorthand, plus the 3 man crew of the Type 0 Recon and single pilot of the Type 2 are named, latter was Lt T Ikeda, the 934th's CO. Encountered 3 Spitfires claimed to have downed one. Again note the AE31 article (by Izawa and Shores) says the 'Jake' was downed, and on closer inspection there are other barely visible illegible entries in the report, and it actually doesn't give a return time for this flight, nor do I see the 'Jake' crew members featured in later flights (though Ikeda does appear later), so the report does not refutes a loss, but definitely a 'Jake' if so.
11 August: 934th's report shows 3 Type 2 (Rufe) and 2 Type 0 Observation (Pete) intercepting 6 Beaufighters (the correct number); 2 Japanese a/c damaged (it is not stated, or implied AFAICS, which type). Baeza draws the reasonable conclusion the Type 0's were damaged since that's what the other side claimed. The Air Enthusiast article but not Baeza says one Beaufighter was damaged. The Japanese claimed 1 Beaufighter downed plus 2 'probable''.
15 Sep: the first Type 0 Recon flight of the morning reported encountering a Beaufighter and was damaged.
20 Sep: there's an illegible entry for one Type 0 Recon flight and no return time given.
11 Nov: the second Type 0 Recon flight of the morning didn't return

None of the Beaufort incidents are covered in Baeza, and the AE article is mainly about Type 2's.

Joe

 

[Soren]

Colin1,

The top speed of the A6M2 M.21 was 533 km/h, so it was just as fast as the Hurricane.

 

[Vincenzo]

i think around 550 km/h (need check) the common figure ~530 km/h was not a max power

overboosted speed ~555 km/h, normal max ~508 km/h (maybe using british termonology at combat power and at climb power)

 

[fibus]

I wonder how the hurricane compares to the F4f Wildcat?

 

[Colin1]

The top speed of the A6M2 M.21 was 533 km/h, so it was just as fast as the Hurricane.

i think around 550 km/h (need check) the common figure ~530 km/h was not a max power

Well
which ever one it was, it wasn't good news for the Hurricane

 

[BombTaxi]

This is a very interesting match-up. The historical record speaks for itself - but the Hurri should have had a chance. it could defeat the Zero in a scissor fight, and the 4 20mm cannon fitted to the Hurri would make an almighty mess of any Zero they hit. OTOH, the Hurri was a tough old bird. The Bf109s of the BoB era carried a very similar armament to the Zero (2x 20mm cannon, 2x rifle caliber MGs) and Hurris were able to take some punishment from this battery. It would be very interesting to know the circumstances of the historical encounters - my gut feel is that the Japanese victories were helped by attacking from a position of advantage and maybe even suceeding in bouncing the Hurris. If the boot had been on the other foot, the Hurris might well have been able to do some serious damage with superior firepower and the ability to extend away in a dive - assuming the Zeros didn't catch them on the way back up...

 

[Marcel]

This is a very interesting match-up. The historical record speaks for itself - but the Hurri should have had a chance. it could defeat the Zero in a scissor fight, and the 4 20mm cannon fitted to the Hurri would make an almighty mess of any Zero they hit.

Were there canon-armed Hurricanes in the far east? I know of the MK.IIB's which had 12 MG's.

 

[Wildcat]

Sure were Marcel, I have the following squadrons being equipped with MkIIc's in Burma:-
RAF
5, 11, 28, 34, 42, 60, 113, and 123 squadron
IAF
1 and 9.
I may have missed some, please feel free to add to the list.

 

[Soren]

I'm very unsure of wether a Hurricane can win a scissors fight with a Zero. At low to medium speeds the roll rate turn rate of the Zero were excellent. At at low alt the Zero was also faster than the Hurricane, and possibly also at high alt.

A comparison between the early A6M2 and the later A6M5:

A6M2:
Top speed: 533 km/h
Climb rate: 3,150 ft/min

A6M5:
Top speed: 570 km/h
Climb rate: 4,500 ft/min

As one can see the only big improvement was in climb rate, where the Zero stayed competitive till the end of the war. In speed however it was quickly overtaken, ad by 1943 the USN's fighters were all faster.

 

[dennis420b]

I have to go with the Zero. But only in the one on one, with equal pilots. Tactics and operational conditions can change everything.

 

[ppopsie]

I wonder if the Merlin XX was fitted to the A6M2 airframe provided if a certain measure was taken to offset the CG problem. Engineer Jiro Horikoshi, chief designer of the Mitsubishi A6M fighter mentioned in the book "零戦" that he and the Navy badly wanted an engine with better high altitude capability for the Zero.

 

[buffnut453]

In the right circumstances Hurricanes might have been able to compete on even terms with Zeroes, but it was never demonstrated in action. Hurricanes and Zeroes met in combat 6 times for which both sides' losses are known (and only another 1 or 2 more where both sides' losses aren't known). The score in those combats was 6:38 in favor of the Zero, and the Zeroes won every combat. 5 in 1942 over Malaya, DEI and Ceylon, one other 5 December 1943 in the JAAF/JNAF combined raid on Calcutta, 0:3; Army Type 1 fighters downed or force the crash landings of another 6 Hurricanes in that raid also without loss to themselves (the Hurricanes downed 1 Army bomber).

Even using the Type 1 as proxy for the Zero, probably an optimistic assumption from the Hurricane's POV, the Hurricane's record v the Type 1 was also disastrous in the opening campaigns of 1942 and even as of late 1943 the Type 1's in Burma were at least holding their own in actual outcomes v Hurricanes, outscoring them more often than not, though by then there were at least some cases of combats actually won by Hurricanes v Type 1's (needless to say, measuring by British claims the Hurricane was pretty successful v the Type 1 by then, measuring by Japanese claims the Type 1 was overwhelmingly successful).

'Depends on pilots', of course that's the correct answer for almost any match up unless completely one sided, but there's no actual operational evidence of the Hurricane performing well against the Zero in combat, or even v the Type 1 on a consistent basis. The much better record of the F4F v the Zero is not proof IMO that the Hurricane would have done as well even with the same pilots and situation, because it neglects the real possibility that less tangible performance factors put the Hurricane at more of a relative disadvantage than in appears to be on paper.

Joe

Joe,

We've been around and around this subject before. The Hurricane did have a poor performance against the Type 1 in 1942-43 but in the overwhelming number of engagements, the Hurricanes were outnumbered and at an altitude disadvantage. As I keep banging on (and on, and on, and on) about, tactical conditions are pivotal and probably represent the "less tangible" factors to which you allude.

Cheers,
Mark

 

[renrich]

Just finished reading "Bloody Shambles" volume two which some on this forum have quoted from before, especially Joe B. Quite an eye opener. It appears that the Hurricane was inferior not only to the A6M but to the Ki 43, which only mounted two 12.7 MM MGs and had a Vmax of 320 mph, and also had it's hands full with the Ki27, a fixed gear fighter with a Vmax of 286 mph and had the awesome firepower of two 7.7 mgs. The Japanese pilots knew that one bullet in the coolant system of the Hurricane was sufficient to put the Hurricane out of action and they aimed for that system.

In fact, in the section about the attack on Ceylon, it was noted that the only fighter the British had in that area that had close to an even chance against the A6M was the Martlet, which unfortunately did not get into action during that battle.

Kind of gives one a new perspective about the debates online in this forum about fighter armament.

 

[Shortround6]

Or a new perspective on pilot skill.

that one sides pilots flying a slower aircraft with two .303 mgs could aim for and hit a portion of the enemy aircraft only a few feet square more often than their opponents, armed with 8/12 such MGs or with 4 cannon could hit the unarmored cockpit or non- self sealing fuel tanks or oil cooler of the Claude.

How long before that one bullet in the radiator put the Hurricane out of action?
10 seconds?
20 seconds?
3 minutes?

 

[Colin1]

How long before that one bullet in the radiator put the Hurricane out of action?
10 seconds?
20 seconds?
3 minutes?

I'd give him 15 - 25 seconds, depending on how hard he was gunning it before he got hit

 

[renrich]

At that stage of the war, (first six months) the IJN pilots were among the best trained in the world. More often than not, however, the Allied fighters in SE Asia were pitted against JAAF pilots and many of the British pilots were veterans of the war in Europe, North Africa and the Med. What is interesting to me is that the Japanese fighters, except for the A6M, fitted with what was considered sub-standard armament by European standards, were quite successful in shooting down, "rugged" fighters like the Hurricane and the P40 and bombers such as Blenheims, Hudsons and all the other types of aircraft the Allies used. As far as tactics were concerned the IJN pilots were trained to use the same tactics in their A6Ms as the AVG had been trained in by Chennault. That is to say, Boom and Zoom tactics, not dogfighting as popularly assumed although the A6M excelled in dogfighting.

 

[buffnut453]

Actually, the IJAAF units the Hurricanes were facing were amongst the most combat experienced - the 64th and 50th Sentais. During most combats, the Ki-43s significantly outnumbered the Hurricanes and for most of 1942 it was the IJAAF which took the offensive to the British and hence could concentrate their fighter force whereas the RAF had to defend everywhere at once. With numerical advantage, and frequently a tactical altitude advantage, it's not too surprising that the Ki-43 bested the Hurricanes during 1942-43.

 

[proton45]

I have "sometimes" wondered what effect it would have had on the war if Japan had been able to produce more A6M fighter's and trained pilots. Even with the "zero's" shortcomings, Im wondering if greater numbers of trained pilots and "fresh" A6M fighters might have influenced the tactical outcome of some "late war" engagements...

 

[renrich]

It was stated over and over again by British pilots that the Hurricane was inferior to the Ki43 in air to air combat, not to mention the A6M. In 43-44-45, when the tide turned and the Allies took the offensive and had numbers advantages the Hurricane, (those not replaced by P47s) were continually outclassed by Ki43s. Additionally the Hurricane, in SE Asia, had servicability issues caused by glycol leaks.

 

[Colin1]

An interesting extract from Terence Kelly's book Spitfire and Hurricane Pilots at War:



These men no doubt came to accept the fable, which has long since taken root elsewhere, that the Hurricane, on which no doubt initially they pinned great hopes, was outclassed by the Zero. (Incidentally, much of the fighting believed to have been between Hurricane and Zero was in fact between Hurricane and Hayabusa. In many cases which follow where the name Zero is used, the aircraft could well have been an Oscar).

I have read book after book in which this nonsense about the superiority of the Japanese fighters is written. It simply was not so. The Hurricane was not outclassed by the Zero, or as we knew it, the Navy O or Navy Nought, nor by the Hayabusa. The Hurricane was at least the match of either machine and had the battles between them been fought on equal terms would have coped quite comfortably. Such was my opinion at the time and so it remains to the present day and although the majority of pundits appear to disagree I do at least have the support of the Commander of the 14th Army in Burma, Field Marshall Sir William Slim who in his splendid book Defeat into Victory states that: 'Speaking generally, all the Japanese fighters were inferior in performance to the Hurricane with the exception of the Navy O which was approximately equal to them.'

It is true that the Allied fighter squadrons in Singapore and the Dutch East Indies were largely eliminated by their Japanese opposite numbers but to discover why one has to look far beyond a comparison of the qualities of the aircraft involved. The Japanese won the air battle because they had a huge superiority in numbers (normally of the order of 8:1), because almost invariably they had the advantage of height and because most of their pilots were battle-hardened men - although admittedly against only negligible resistance from the Chinese. Over Singapore, the bomber formations were escorted by 50, 60, 70 or more Japanese fighters and, because of the ludicrous decisions of those who gave the orders, against these were pitted mere handfuls of Hurricanes as they became available for service. There were never 100 Hurricanes available for flying in Singapore, there were never 50 or even 20. There might perhaps, at best, be 12 at any juncture and usually there were less.

The first time 258 Sqn engaged the enemy, out of 48 Hurricanes which had flown off the Indomitable, exactly 8 were ready for combat. These 8, of whose pilots perhaps not more than two or three had ever fired their guns in anger before, had to climb up to attack a bomber force which was protected by a swarm of Japanese fighters just waiting for them. 2 Hurricanes were shot down and three of the remainder so badly mauled as to be, for the time being at least, unserviceable. In the course of a single hour, 8 had become 3. This was to become the pattern: Hurricanes taking off in petty numbers, often in the teeth of strafing fighters to engage swarms of the enemy comfortably ready to receive and deal with them.

As to the qualities of the two aircraft, the Zero certainly had advantages. It was manoeuvrable, it was marginally faster up to heights of about 15,000ft and it had a far longer range. Its mixed armament of machine guns and cannons roughly matched the 12 (but later 8 when 4 were removed to improve manoeuvrability and speed) machine guns of the Hurricane and while there are arguments about relative rates of climb, I have it on good authority that pilots from my own squadron escaped from Zeros by climbing away from them. The Hurricane for its part had several very distinct advantages. It had a better ceiling, the aircraft could take punishment which would have made the lightly-built Zero disintegrate, it was faster at higher altitudes and the pilot had the protection of resealing fuel tanks and an armour plate shield behind his back.

Thus it will be seen that tactics were the vital thing, that pilots must avoid giving battle in conditions where the advantages lay with the enemy. The Hurricane pilot must not start mixing it in dogfights at lower altitudes, the Zero pilot must avoid finding himself outmanoeuvred in terms of height. Early on this was little if at all appreciated by the Allies and possibly not by the Japanese. When my own squadron's 8 Hurricanes took off to challenge that first Japanese air armada not only were they force majeure choosing a battle ground which was the Navy O's ideal, but they were doing so on the assumption that should a dogfight ensue, the Hurricane being (as they had not been disabused) the world's most manoeuvrable modern fighter, the advantage would be theirs - for no one had briefed us on the Zero or even heard of the Hayabusa. When we flew off the Indomitable, it was to clear the Japanese wooden biplanes from the skies. I beg the reader not to believe this to be exaggeration.

On Indomitable, we knew nothing of either aircraft and the first intimation the Zero even existed was gleaned amongst the gloomy, defeatist attitude which hung like a pall over Singapore on that evening when we landed at Seletar a mere 36 hours before we were to be in action.

So we were dribbled away piecemeal. Hurricanes would be ferried up in batches from Java only for some to be damaged landing across the deep ruts left by Flying Fortresses at the midway refuelling airfield known as P2 near Palembang or jumped by waiting Navy O's or Hayabusas whilst taking off or landing. Strength could never be built up sufficiently for properly planned defence. And tactics were hardly a matter for discussion when the one thought hammering at the mind of each of perhaps half a dozen scrambled pilots racing with thudding hearts to their Hurricanes was that with a horde of Japanese mere minutes away from Singapore he must somehow gain height before they came down en masse and clobbered him.

The alternative to this useless waste of valuable men and machines to no real purpose, was, to my knowledge at the time, put forward by only one senior RAF officer, Wing Cdr Harold Maguire, who, as previously mentioned had been my CO at 56 OTU at Sutton Bridge and was now in command of the proposed 266 Wing to be formed from 232, 242, 258 and 605 Sqns. His plan was that the entire force of Hurricanes should be withheld until all aircraft were operational, all pilots locally knowledgeable and a coherent tactical scheme had been formulated. Had his wise counsel been accepted, his plan adopted, quite different pages would have been written in the Operational Record Books.