Hurricanes to Malaya, Buffalos to FAA

The other question with sending Buffalos to Russia is whether that was legally permissible. The US has always had strong laws related to military exports, and such was the case during WW2. One example is how the Belgian B339Bs were literally dragged over the border from the US into Canada so they could be onwards transported to Europe, which was an expedient workaround because Congress was opposed to providing arms to potential belligerents. Since the RAF Buffalos were a direct purchase, I think it highly likely that the contract included some clause that prevented the UK from onward selling/gifting the aircraft to a third party.

Aside from that, one has to remember that Russia was an ally of Nazi Germany until June 1941. There's no way Britain is providing armaments to Russia prior to that date...by which time, most of the RAF Buffalos have arrived in the Far East.

Shortround6 said:

By the time you get any Hurricanes to to Singapore after the Soviet invasion it is going to be too late.

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My proposal above is to keep all the Canadian made Hurricanes for the RAF and FAA. To meet Britain's commitment to the USSR all the Buffaloes are shipped to the Soviets. No Buffaloes or Hurricanes go to Singapore. The latter, as you accurately point out are not available in time, and the former have gone to the Soviets, so Malaya is SOL.

Though it would be interesting to keep a few carrier spec Buffaloes for CV training. Remove the armour, etc. to reduce undercarriage stress, and run a training flight onto whatever carrier was available.

Admiral Beez said:

My proposal above is to keep all the Canadian made Hurricanes for the RAF and FAA. To meet Britain's commitment to the USSR all the Buffaloes are shipped to the Soviets. No Buffaloes or Hurricanes go to Singapore. The latter, as you accurately point out are not available in time, and the former have gone to the Soviets, so Malaya is SOL.

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So you're sending Buffalos to the USSR when the latter is still an ally of Nazi Germany? Not gonna happen, I'm afraid. Unless your plan is to just store the Buffalos in the UK "just in case." Again, not sensible if you're at war....you'd just melt them down and use the aluminium for something more useful.

As pointed out, The Germans attack on June 22, 1941.

Soonest you can ship ANYTHING is June 23rd, 1941. When it is going to get there???????

The forces in Malaysia/Burma need more time train, doesn't matter if it is aircraft, artillery, ships/small craft or even rifles.
The longer the delay the less ready the troops will be even if you have nice shiny equipment sitting outside of packing crates.
This also depends a bit too much on the rectrospectroscope. We KNOW the war will start on Dec 7/8 1941.
If it war started on Nov 30th? and the plan calls for last minute shipments?

There were P-40s going to Russian in August 1941.

buffnut453 said:

So you're sending Buffalos to the USSR when the latter is still an ally of Nazi Germany? Not gonna happen, I'm afraid. Unless your plan is to just store the Buffalos in the UK "just in case." Again, not sensible if you're at war....you'd just melt them down and use the aluminium for something more useful.

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Melt them down and make Mosquitos from the aluminum.

Soviet Union was not a ally of the Germany, they get a agreement on poland/baltic, this is not a alliance

Vincenzo said:

Soviet Union was not a ally of the Germany, they get a agreement on poland/baltic, this is not a alliance

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True in a real sense, but they'd already partitioned Poland and the USSR was haranguing smaller nearby states much as the Germans had done, including invading Finland, seizing the Baltic states, and posturing for war over Bessarabia.

Prior to 22 Jun 41, the Brits were deeply suspicious of the Soviet regime and as a result I too think that the UK shipping any war materiel to USSR before Barbarossa would likely not have happened -- whether or not Stalin and Hitler had a formal alliance.

The Ribbentrop pact alone meant that any British kit sent to the USSR might end up being used against Brit-friendly neutrals.

This is true, and i'm agree
not for defend it but all the land the try to get was russian (of the russian state) before of WWI

Doesn't really change the point...there's no way Britain was gifting munitions to the USSR prior to 23 June 1941.

buffnut453 said:

Doesn't really change the point...there's no way Britain was gifting munitions to the USSR prior to 23 June 1941.

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and on this i'm agree

Vincenzo said:

Soviet Union was not a ally of the Germany, they get a agreement on poland/baltic, this is not a alliance

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Yes but the imports from the USSR were very important to Germany in 1940 to 22 June 1941. According to Wiki Nazi–Soviet economic relations (1934–1941) - Wikipedia
By June 1940, Soviet imports comprised over 50% of Germany's total overseas imports, and often exceed 70% of total German overseas imports.
Main items oil products, grains and wood products.
Soviets also helped the German aux. cruiser Komet to reach Pacific through the NE Passage.

Juha3 said:

Yes but the imports from the USSR were very important to Germany in 1940 to 22 June 1941. According to Wiki Nazi–Soviet economic relations (1934–1941) - Wikipedia
By June 1940, Soviet imports comprised over 50% of Germany's total overseas imports, and often exceed 70% of total German overseas imports.
Main items oil products, grains and wood products.
Soviets also helped the German aux. cruiser Komet to reach Pacific through the NE Passage.

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Yes but this is also a consequence of their international status

There are three comments that recur in the discussions about not supplying Hurricanes to the Far East theatre in 1941 that need some scrutiny.
1. The number of squadrons retained in the U.K., with 99 for late 1941 often being quoted; and
2. The "glut" of Hurricanes available in 1941, usually on the basis that 200 were sent to Russia late in the year.
3. The numbers of fighter pilots that could have been saved in late 1941 by FC not operating over France.

So let's put those points to the test.

At the beginning of Feb 1941 there were 60 single engined day fighter squadrons in FC (38 Hurricane and 22 Spitfire). By the beginning of May it had grown to 64 (split 36/28). In the expectation that the Luftwaffe would soon return to daylight bombing of Britain, Sholto Douglas believed he needed 80 single engined day fighter squadrons.

At its peak at the beginning of Sept there were 74 (split 30/44 H/S), before falling to 70 (split 12/58 ) at the beginning of 1942.

So where does the 99 come from?

Having had a look at the FC OOB for May 1941 which I have to hand, total FC strength was 83 squadrons not the 64 noted above. But that includes 15 night fighter, one anti aircraft co-Operation unit, a communications unit plus a Whirlwind squadron (263) and a Canadian squadron training on Tomahawks. Extract those and it leaves the 64 core Hurricane/Spitfire units.

But that doesn't tell the whole story. Between May and Dec 1941 28 new single engined day fighter squadrons joined FC (9H, 17S plus one Whirlwind and one Tomahawk) and some squadrons changed equipment from H to S. In addition a number of New night fighter squadrons formed. The monthly formations from May were Hurricanes 1/2/2/2/1/1/0/0. The Spitfire formations were 4/4/3/1/0/0/5/0. To reconcile the numbers, this means that 21 squadrons left FC in 1941.

By mid-year, with the Luftwaffe threat not emerging, 6 were released for the Middle East. In Aug, 2 went to North Russia to protect the convoy terminus in the Kola Inlet area and did not become operational again in the U.K. until Jan 1942. There were 7 shipped to the Middle East between late Oct/early Nov 1941. En route their plans were changed and about 1.5 ended up in Malta and the rest in the Far East in early 1942 by various routes following the outbreak of war with Japan. I haven't traced the other 7 but they too must have gone to the ME at some point.

While Malta had a single Hurricane squadron in May 1941 more formed on the island as more aircraft were flown in. By the end of the year there were 3 (not including the 1.5 flown in in Nov which were absorbed eventually into the existing squadrons to make up for losses). In total, 1941 saw 329 Hurricanes flown to Malta from carriers at Gibraltar. As the desert battle allowed, more were supplied from Egypt.

Then we have the Middle East itself, remembering that that included everything from the battlefront in Egypt (and Greece) through to Iraq and Iran in the east and Sudan and Aden in the south. In May 1941 there was a Hurricane squadron in Greece, 8 spread across the ME plus a Tomahawk squadron in Palestine. Large reinforcement took place during the summer of 1941 ahead of Operation Crusader in Nov. By the start of that Operation there were 15 Hurricane and 5 Tomahawk squadrons in theatre, with 348 Hurricanes and 102 Tomahawks on hand.

Add to that attrition during the year, reserves, aircraft in transit (most Hurricanes were being shipped to Takoradi in West Africa and flown to Egypt) and the numbers of Hurricanes required in 1941 soon builds up.

As for pilot losses, well yes it is always better not to lose people, but again how true is it. FC pilot losses
Jan-Jun 1941 Operational 149 accidental 205
July-Dec 1941 Operational 392 accidental 368.

Pure numbers of losses don't reveal the operational tempo. At the beginning of 1941 FC was exhausted and needed to recover. By late year it was on the offensive. Nor do they take account of the fact that if a pilot bales out uninjured over Britain fighting a defensive battle he is not "lost" but if he bales out over France on an offensive mission he will probably be captured if not killed, but is still classed as "lost".

It also takes no account of pilot experience. Due to the Battle of Britain FC pilots were rushed through OTUs with training time being cut, and lacked experience on arriving on front line squadrons. And experience continued to fall in the early part of 1941 as tour expired BoB pilots were replaced. Even in March 1941some pilots were leaving OTUs with less than 20 hours experience such was the demand for their services. More OTUs were set up in early 1941 (increase from 3 in Jan to 8 in July) and the training time increased again but bad weather slowed the training process in 1940/41. So while the OTUs churned out 1324 pilots in the first half of 1941 that increased to 2387 in the second half of the year. Those were the pilots going as replacements to existing units and to form those many new units both in the U.K. and overseas (incl those that went to Malaya to fly those awful Buffalos!).

But ultimately training time only counts for so much. If the enemy won't come to you then you need to go to the enemy, otherwise skills atrophy anyway. And as far as the Chiefs of Staff were concerned, even in Autumn 1941 after the invasion of Russia, there was still a threat of invasion. That didn't reduce until into 1942.

As for shipping aircraft to Russia, if not there then it would have been the Middle East as that was the region that had been determined in mid-1941 should have the greatest priority. Those early aircraft delivered in 1941 were used to equip 6 Soviet fighter regiments in the north of the country, with training from the RAF pilots of 151 Wing (those 2 squadrons sent out in Aug 1941).

Amongst the aircraft received in Middle East June-Dec 1941.

By sea from Britain 302 Hurricanes and 22 Tomahawks.
By air from Takoradi 612 Hurricanes
From the USA 256 Tomahawks to Sept followed by 197 Kittyhawks from Nov. First of the latter were received by squadrons in Dec 1941.

So that is 914 Hurricanes, 278 Tomahawks and 197 Kittyhawks.

The 6 squadrons sent out to Malta/ME in April /May 1941 were 80,213,229,238, 260 to ME and 249 to Malta.

17,135,136,232,242,258 & 605 left U.K. for ME late Oct/early Nov and diverted en route.

Still trying to locate my "missing" 7 squadrons.

Basically You have a wide window of opportunity from about the middle of May to Sept to figure out that the Germans pose a much reduced threat to Great Britain itself and the time it would take to actually get the aircraft to Singapore in time to do anything.

The actual window would be less as some of the Planes going to the Mid-east, as you have shown, would be competition with the 6 squadrons leaving in May-April.

With the adventure in Greece and Crete diverting peoples attention The window for Hurricanes and Tomahawks gets even smaller.

Only the very first planes/squadrons to Russia would stand any chance of making it to Singapore if diverted.

It might have been possible to send a a squadron (or two?) depending on how things had worked out (better results over Malta? Better results over the Western Dessert? ) but I am not seeing the whole replacement of the entire force of Buffaloes.

The Idea of using them as carrier fighters should be given up. Using the retrospectroscope it is a worse idea than it looks at first glance.
VF-2 was the only Navy squadron to use the F2A-3 aboard a carrier during peace time. They started using them from Oct 14th when the Lex sailed for Pearl harbor with 17 active duty air craft and 5 spares.
By Dec 3rd VF-2 reports that they have ceased all operations until enemy contact becomes imminent.
They report that they have 3 landing gear strut failures on normal landings and 12 progressive failures had started on other planes out of 17 planes. They had also lost 3 planes in operational accidents but no pilots were lost.

If you can't operate F2A-3s from the largest flight deck in the world (866ft)

and speed of 33 knots The chance of using Buffaloes from smaller carriers, even a slightly lighter version, doesn't look very good at all.

You sure you are not using your retrospectroscope re May-Sept 1941?

The last major night blitz on London was mid-May after which the Luftwaffe was moving the bomber units east in time for Barbarossa. So a month to move them east - and a month to move them back if needed. It took a minimum of two months to move units to/from the ME/FE.

Then look at what was happening in Russia. The expectation in both British and US govt circles in summer 1941 was of a total Soviet collapse. But it took until Aug/Sept for the German advance to begin to run out of steam. It then had to be renewed at the end of Sept with the advance on Moscow. Britain was so concerned about the possibility of collapse that it was formulating a contingency plan to send army divisions, with RAF support, into the Caucasus if required, to deny the oil fields to the Germans in the event of a breakthrough (that was what 4 of the Hurricane squadrons in Oct/Nov were earmarked for). If the USSR does fall, how quickly could the Germans switch troops and air forces back to the west? While invasion might not happen in the latter part of 1941, the threat might have been renewed in early 1942 in the event of a Soviet collapse in 1941.

The Anglo-Soviet Agreement was signed in July. While war materials were supplied to the USSR from Aug, the first Lend Lease Protocol with the USSR was not signed until the beginning of Oct.

So I don't think it was necessarily so clear in May-Sept 1941 that the possibility of invasion was much reduced. Deferred perhaps. Only after the Soviet resistance stiffened ahead of the German advance on Moscow in late 1941 until it was finally stopped during the winter, can the threat of an invasion of Britain be confidently thought to be over.

I agree.
For the proponents for the plan the earlies that could be proposed was May, when Luftwaffe operations slowed down, a lot. The British still had to figure out why.
But the Luftwaffe was taking an interest in Malta.

After Sept the shipping times dictate the ability of the British to move any significate numbers of planes to Singapore.

An online shipping calculator says (at 10kts) 34 days from Liverpool to Singapore through the med.
Going by way if Capetown it takes 48 days.
Will the frighter/s need to refuel?
Will they have to reduce speed because of weather?
Are they running solo or in convoy (and zig-zagging)

How long does it take to unload?

It is only about 31 days from Vancouver but that assumes you even have serviceable Hurricanes in Canada to send.
Like the already mentioned engines, guns, radios, oxygen equipment etc that were often fitted when Canadian aircraft were uncrated once they had reached England.

OK, just sticking with the Buffalo for now, and ultimately working to having a small squadron of about six aircraft flying off HMS Hermes, some time in 1941, and leaving any issues about Hermes alone, for another day, another thread, I'm thinking this.

Right from the beginning the FAA was struggling with a fleet fighter, and a training program to expand the number of pilots. Secondly, because many of her aircraft carriers could only carry a small complement of planes, they wanted them to fulfill multi roles, the Swordfish/Albacore did this well in the TSR role, but the Skua was a failure in the dive bomber/fighter role. So first question is how early can we safely say the FAA knew they had to go down a fighter only path. I look at the Sea Hurricane and the Martlet, indicating they did want this, and then look at the purpose built Fairey Fulmar, and think they still didn't get it.

Quick look at the Buffalo, first production model, F2A-1 was in service early December 1939, but the manufacturer was beset with problems, only delivering 11, before the rest of the production run, in a modified version, went to Finland. The F2A-2 comes out, with a better engine, and a small improvement in performance, but still lacks self sealing tanks and pilot armour. I'm not sure when these were being delivered, my guess is some time in 1940.

OK, trying to keep things in chronological order, the British establish the British Direct Purchase Commission, in January 1940, creating it from the existing British Purchasing Commission, which had been in place since pre-war. So I assume they were able start work pretty quickly. Fall of France, June 1940, and importantly for this discussion, Belgium, sees the RAF appraise the 32 undelivered Belgian aircraft, which are a de-navalized F2A-2, now called the B-339, with the arrestor hook and liferaft container removed, the tail slightly extended, and most importantly an engine 200 hp less than the F2A-2, with a corresponding drop in performance. Then the RAF added their bits to it, making it even heavier and slower. And accepted secondhand rebuilt engines to spec. This was becoming a dog, but this was the RAF looking for alternative land based fighters. Our search is for a carrier based fighter.

Now, big question, can the FAA accept a fighter without armour and self sealing tanks in 1940, which is what the Skua lacked, in theatres other than the Mediterranean, as an accomplice to the Fulmer which was entering service. If so, the US version F2A-2 could have been quickly ordered, at the beginning of 1940, hopefully production running straight after the US Navy order, which as I said, being delivered in 1940.

48 days is at the bottom end. For example:-

WS10 sailed 30/7/41. The WS10B element arrived Bombay 20/9/41 (52 days). WS10 X arrived Aden 27/9/41 with ships then sailing independently to Suez arriving 1-4/10/41 (63-66 days).

WS11 sailed from Liverpool 30/8/41 & Clyde 31/8/41. After various reorganisations main part dispersed off Aden 19/10/41 (50-51 days). Singapore element arrived 6/11/41 (68-69 days).

WS12 sailed from Liverpool / Clyde 29/9/41. Arrived Colombo 23/11/41; Singapore 28/11/41 (56-61 days).

WS12X sailed from Halifax 10/11/41. Arrived Bombay 27/12/41 (48 days). This was an unusual convoy in that it comprised 6 fast US troopships leaving from the Canadian side of the Atlantic. They lifted troops that had first travelled across the Atlantic to Halifax. So you need to add that journey in as well.

WS12Z sailed from Liverpool & Clyde 12/11/41. Various reorganisations en route resulting in 3 elements. Dispersed off Suez 4/1/42. Arrived Bombay 6/1/42. Singapore 13/1/42 (54-63 days).

WS14 sailed from Liverpool & Clyde c9/12/41. Again broke into 3 parts at Durban. Dispersed off Aden 22/1/42; arrived Bombay 28/1/42; Batavia 3/2/42 (45-57 days).

These were the fast troop convoys to the ME/FE for the last 6 months of 1941. The arrangements were complicated after they reached Freetown with ships dropping out or joining at various ports round Africa. Occasionally a ship would stop off in Durban to rejoin a later convoy so extending its journey time further. The Suez bound elements dispersed off Aden, sailing independently after that to time their arrivals in Suez to ensure not too much shipping was in that port at the same time to reduce exposure to enemy action and avoid overloading the dock facilities. So add 2-3 days for that.

Fatboy Coxy said:

OK, just sticking with the Buffalo for now, and ultimately working to having a small squadron of about six aircraft flying off HMS Hermes, some time in 1941, and leaving any issues about Hermes alone, for another day, another thread, I'm thinking this.

Right from the beginning the FAA was struggling with a fleet fighter, and a training program to expand the number of pilots. Secondly, because many of her aircraft carriers could only carry a small complement of planes, they wanted them to fulfill multi roles, the Swordfish/Albacore did this well in the TSR role, but the Skua was a failure in the dive bomber/fighter role. So first question is how early can we safely say the FAA knew they had to go down a fighter only path. I look at the Sea Hurricane and the Martlet, indicating they did want this, and then look at the purpose built Fairey Fulmar, and think they still didn't get it.

Quick look at the Buffalo, first production model, F2A-1 was in service early December 1939, but the manufacturer was beset with problems, only delivering 11, before the rest of the production run, in a modified version, went to Finland. The F2A-2 comes out, with a better engine, and a small improvement in performance, but still lacks self sealing tanks and pilot armour. I'm not sure when these were being delivered, my guess is some time in 1940.

OK, trying to keep things in chronological order, the British establish the British Direct Purchase Commission, in January 1940, creating it from the existing British Purchasing Commission, which had been in place since pre-war. So I assume they were able start work pretty quickly. Fall of France, June 1940, and importantly for this discussion, Belgium, sees the RAF appraise the 32 undelivered Belgian aircraft, which are a de-navalized F2A-2, now called the B-339, with the arrestor hook and liferaft container removed, the tail slightly extended, and most importantly an engine 200 hp less than the F2A-2, with a corresponding drop in performance. Then the RAF added their bits to it, making it even heavier and slower. And accepted secondhand rebuilt engines to spec. This was becoming a dog, but this was the RAF looking for alternative land based fighters. Our search is for a carrier based fighter.

Now, big question, can the FAA accept a fighter without armour and self sealing tanks in 1940, which is what the Skua lacked, in theatres other than the Mediterranean, as an accomplice to the Fulmer which was entering service. If so, the US version F2A-2 could have been quickly ordered, at the beginning of 1940, hopefully production running straight after the US Navy order, which as I said, being delivered in 1940.

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Remember the RN only got full control of the FAA in May 1939. On 5th July 1939 they issued new specs for two fighters N.8/39 (2 seater) and N.9/39 (turret fighter). By the end of the year their thinking had changed based on war experience to date, leading to all sorts of industry confusion. Long story short, Jan 1940 the design that resulted in the Firefly was chosen, the turret fighter dropped and a new design for a single seater selected from Blackburn that emerged, in completely different form from that initially envisaged and even a different role, as the Firebrand. And from that time a requirement for an interim design, based on the Spitfire also arose. But of course the RAF has priority for Spitfires, leading to an order for the Martlet from the US.

I doubt the FAA would have accepted a new aircraft without armour and self sealing tanks for entry in 1940 or later. This was becoming standard on RAF aircraft around the same time.