Hurricanes to Malaya, Buffalos to FAA

[Admiral Beez]

If you want to send "stuff" from England to Singapore...there was a bunch of places that were all calling for help along the way and people were actually shooting at each other.

Getting ANYTHING more to Malaya by the summer of 1941 means a decision in late-1940, The threat being faced in the Far East was also unclear at that timeframe.

Fair points, and I did tell F Fatboy Coxy to expect such replies.

I'm afraid all you're going to get are replies telling you/us why your proposal would not, could not or should not have occurred. It's the nature of the house I'm afraid.

 

[buffnut453]

Fair points, and I did tell F Fatboy Coxy to expect such replies.

I find it interesting that you only pick out the points where I disagree with you but ignore those where our views align.

I actually like "what if" scenarios but they have to be based on some degree of reasonableness. A key indicator, for me, is whether the protagonists had enough information to make the decisions required for the scenario within the timelines necessary to change outcomes. In short, I try my very best not to apply the retrospectroscope. If that means I disagree with you, then so be it...but the alternative is "anything goes" which doesn't actually require a lot of thinking and ignores the challenges of bringing those scenarios to reality.

 

[GrauGeist]

I actually like "what if" scenarios but they have to be based on some degree of reasonableness. A key indicator, for me, is whether the protagonists had enough information to make the decisions required for the scenario within the timelines necessary to change outcomes. In short, I try my very best not to apply the retrospectroscope. If that means I disagree with you, then so be it...but the alternative is "anything goes" which doesn't actually require a lot of thinking and ignores the challenges of bringing those scenarios to reality.

I enjoy the challenge of a *what if* as it explores the realm of what may have happened by moving the chess pieces a bit differently.
As long as they remain in the realm of what was possible at that point in time.

We have the luxury of sitting back 75/80 years later with information, numbers and outcome of dicisions that either side did not have at hand back then, so for a genuine *what if*, you have to go back then and "use" what was available at the time, in order to work it out.

One of the forums greatest *what if* discussions happened here, and the amount of input and variables was impressive (including seeing Parsifal's knowledgebase at work):

https://ww2aircraft.net/forum/threads/german-gibraltar.20392/

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

Thank you for the replies, lots of good points. The idea of Hurricanes to Malaya, Buffalos to FAA, was more about exploring the idea of the Buffalo being in service with the FAA, which I think it could have been, considerably earlier than the Martlet. But as soon a I suggest that, the cry will be, you've denuded Malaya of its fighters. With the almost glut of Hurricanes being produced in 1941, and recognising they were no longer a premier fighter, some could have been sent to Malaya. It was talked about, strangely enough Admiral Tom Phillips was an advocate of the idea. This would have impacted on shipping, the distance from Liverpool to Singapore, around the Cape, is far far longer than Liverpool to Murmansk, for example, meaning you can ship a LOT more Hurricanes to Russia, although the Singapore run may be a safer journey. Another possibility on shipping Hurricanes to Singapore, could have been from the Canadian West Coast, across the Pacific, none of it requiringing convoying. But I digress.

Buffalos for the FAA. Using the F2A-3 data on wiki, the carrier version used by the USN, max take off weight is 7,159lb, with a 1,200 hp engine. I accept the FAA version might have been a bit heavier, how much armour do they have added? The Sea Hurricane, which is a bigger aircraft, has a max take off weight of 8,710 with a 1,185hp engine. which would suggest to me that the Buffalo would be a bit better, especially on smaller carriers, IE Eagle, Hermes and Audacity. Audacity shipped Martlets, but I think the FAA considered these their premier fighter, and may have settled on Buffalos for her role.

Lots of ifs and buts, starting with weights and engine ratings, burt te Buffalo was a smaller, lighter plane, a helpful point when shipping them on smaller carriers. They other point is I don't think the FAA was entirely swamped with extra aircrew, could some Buffalos have been used in a training capacity, or were aircraft like the Skua doing this role?

 

[Admiral Beez]

I enjoy the challenge of a *what if* as it explores the realm of what may have happened by moving the chess pieces a bit differently. As long as they remain in the realm of what was possible at that point in time.

I agree, but I think we need to be a little more openminded. Imagine if Force Z had never been sent to Malaya, which is entirely plausible since many in the decision tree thought it should not be sent. So, things go as they did, Malaya falls, etc., but HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse stay in the Atlantic and MTO throughout 1941. Then, in 2022 someone suggests, what if Churchill and the RN had decided in October 1941 to send its newest battleship and one of its last two surviving battlecruisers, the one with nearly zero effective AA, plus four old destroyers but with no CV to Malaya as deterrent against Japan. Our resident contrarians would jump from their chairs, leaping at their keyboards to declare this as madness outside the realm of what was possible at that point in time. We'd get the same arguments about army or aircraft deployments to Malaya, that these assets are needed elsewhere, where there is an actual war going on, the KM and Italian surface fleets are still a threat, that Britain didn't know the Soviets would stop the Germans outside Moscow that coming winter, etc, etc. But damn, Churchill did that very thing, and sent his latest battleship and one of his last fast battlecruisers, the one with almost no AA to Malaya, with no CV air cover.... to its doom, all because Churchill was so concerned about Tirpitz in Norway that he thought the Japanese would be equally shaken.

Don't get me wrong, a good what if needs to consider what could, should or would have been possible, but sometimes governments and their militaries do odd things... like invading the USSR without any good intel on how many tanks, guns and men you're going face, and without the trucks or means to fuel and supply your forces once they're far off, without winter clothing and with no inkling that the Soviets might move their factories outside the range of your bombers, etc. Or HMAS Sydney sailing up to Kormoran like it's a summer regatta rather than a war. Or HMS Glorious sailing along at a leisurely pace without a CAP aloft. The implausible and inexplicable is often quite possible.

One what'if I'd like to look at is what Britain would have done if they'd known in spring 1941, through codebreaking or other intel the true Japanese plans and likely late autumn 1941 timing for executing their attack on Malaya, the Philippines and DEI through rapid buildups in FIC, Thailand and Formosa, along with greater detail on the Pearl Harbour attack planning. Maybe there's nothing militarily Britain can change, IDK. Diplomatically things would be interesting.

 

[Shortround6]

Thank you for the replies, lots of good points. The idea of Hurricanes to Malaya, Buffalos to FAA, was more about exploring the idea of the Buffalo being in service with the FAA, which I think it could have been, considerably earlier than the Martlet. But as soon a I suggest that, the cry will be, you've denuded Malaya of its fighters. With the almost glut of Hurricanes being produced in 1941, and recognising they were no longer a premier fighter, some could have been sent to Malaya. It was talked about, strangely enough Admiral Tom Phillips was an advocate of the idea. This would have impacted on shipping, the distance from Liverpool to Singapore, around the Cape, is far far longer than Liverpool to Murmansk, for example, meaning you can ship a LOT more Hurricanes to Russia, although the Singapore run may be a safer journey. Another possibility on shipping Hurricanes to Singapore, could have been from the Canadian West Coast, across the Pacific, none of it requiringing convoying. But I digress.

Buffalos for the FAA. Using the F2A-3 data on wiki, the carrier version used by the USN, max take off weight is 7,159lb, with a 1,200 hp engine. I accept the FAA version might have been a bit heavier, how much armour do they have added? The Sea Hurricane, which is a bigger aircraft, has a max take off weight of 8,710 with a 1,185hp engine. which would suggest to me that the Buffalo would be a bit better, especially on smaller carriers, IE Eagle, Hermes and Audacity. Audacity shipped Martlets, but I think the FAA considered these their premier fighter, and may have settled on Buffalos for her role.

Lots of ifs and buts, starting with weights and engine ratings, burt te Buffalo was a smaller, lighter plane, a helpful point when shipping them on smaller carriers. They other point is I don't think the FAA was entirely swamped with extra aircrew, could some Buffalos have been used in a training capacity, or were aircraft like the Skua doing this role?

You may be able to swap some Hurricanes for Buffaloes.
Now the questions are how many and to what effect(and what kind)?
You only had a few experienced pilots per squadron. That doesn't change by fighter type. It doesn't change the early warning system/fighter ground control.

I would also take a look at the "glut" of Hurricanes produced in 1941, sure there several thousands. I don't have the figures for Hurricanes but they built about 2250 P-40s in 1941, almost of 1100 of them in the last 4 month (ALL P-40D &E), how many were in combat theaters in Dec 1941?

The idea of Canadian Hurricanes also needs a very careful examination.
For starters Packard built 45 Merlins in 1941, 26 in Dec and 10 in Nov so you can right off any idea Canada shipped Hurricanes with Packard engines to the West Coast, loading them on freighters and sending them to Singapore.
I have even seen one account (an obvious misprint ?) that claims that Canada built it's first Hurricane with Packard engine in Jan 1940, over 6 months before Packard even got a look at the blueprints.
Most accounts claim that about 1/3 of the Canadian Hurricanes were built with Packard engines and the rest of the Canadian Hurricanes were shipped without engines but that changed over the years. Early production was 100% British built Merlin's but I don't know how many they shipped to Canada in the early years. Most stories also also claim that the Hurricanes that were sent to England with Packard engines had the engines pulled (to use in bombers?) and the Hurricanes had their engines replaced by Merlin XX engines.

Now perhaps the British might have been able to send Merlin's to Canada, have them fitted in an appropriate number of Hurricanes and have them 100% equipped with combat gear (most of were not, radios and other gear (guns?) were fitted after they were uncrated in England) and sent off from the Vancouver docks. But this is a decision made by the British and not a short circuit made by one Commonwealth country helping out another one and bypassing the British.

Once we find the monthly production totals from Canada it can be judged how likely this scheme actually is. Any Hurricane needed has to be loaded onto the dock in Vancouver in Sept at the latest to do any good in Sept. So you can write off the 1/3 or more of the production total from Canada (which was probably higher per month than the earlier months)

Ok I have some production numbers.

K5083 - Aircraft Production Summary

So far it looks like at best 680 Hurricanes were built in Canada during the time available. Perhaps as little as 430 were available.

 

[EwenS]

There was a thread on here a few months ago about Canadian production Hurricanes. Seems most of the 1941 deliveries to the UK were fitted with Merlins on arrival in the UK as very few were available in Canada.

Hawker Hurricane production and variants, Britain and Canada

Main references, RAF Contract Cards and Serial Registers, Ministry of Aircraft Production Monthly Statistical Bulletin (March 1942 to December 1945) and 1945 Statistical Review. British National Archives AIR 19/524, US War Production Board report. Sensationalist headline, no mark IIE, X, or XI...

ww2aircraft.net

The information I have is that P-40D for the USAAF was 23 airframes in July 1941 followed by 820 P-40E Aug 1941-May 1942. The first P-40Es reached the Philippines in time for the outbreak of war with Japan.

There were 560 RAF Kittyhawk I in Aug-Dec 1941 followed by 1,500 Kittyhawk IA between Dec 1941 and May 1942. The first squadrons in the ME began to receive Kittyhawk I in Dec 1941.

 

[Shortround6]

Wiki must be taken with a large dose of salt.
It is getting better but

Buffalos for the FAA. Using the F2A-3 data on wiki, the carrier version used by the USN, max take off weight is 7,159lb, with a 1,200 hp engine. I accept the FAA version might have been a bit heavier, how much armour do they have added? The Sea Hurricane, which is a bigger aircraft, has a max take off weight of 8,710 with a 1,185hp engine.

Wiki often lists max loads instead of common loads and when you are comparing different models things get complicated real quick.
The F3A-3 at 7,159lbs included a pair of 100lb bombs. F2A-3 also had armor, self sealing fuel tanks and BP glass

A British 339E had a "normal" gross weight of 6112lbs. A Finish 239 went around 5300lbs.
The British 339E had an 1100hp engine and not the 1200hp that the F2A-3 had. It was not a question of military power or any other book keeping trick or magic mechanics "boosting" the power. The R-1820 in the F2A-3 used a completely different model of the R-1820 with a different crankcase, different crankshaft, different cylinders, different cylinder heads and so on. the 399E made about 100hp at any altitude vs the F2A-3.
The engine in the 339E was good for around 800hp in the hi teens (max RPM ) when the engine was running at 59 degrees and when new. The engines in the 339E were not new, they were overhauled ex-airliner engines. Apparently not a good job (or somebody was making excuses.) An A6M2 was 'supposed' to make 950hp at 13,800ft (at 59 degrees?) so the 339E was in trouble to begin with.

The Sea Hurricane gross weight includes a pair of 90imp ferry tanks. They may have taken out ammo to fill the ferry tanks?

 

[Greg Boeser]

Dan Ford's website has a list of differences between the USN F2A-2 and the B-339E as ordered by the British Purchasing commision.

 

[buffnut453]

I agree, but I think we need to be a little more openminded.

Well, that cuts both ways. On the preceding page I suggested I had a scenario that would generally get after the intent of the OP. You flagged that post as "optimistic" and then never commented on the scenario that I proposed.

It seems you're only interested in scenarios that require little more thought than "someone should have done something" (e.g. Britain was "spineless" for not invading Thailand/invading or occupying FIC/attacking Japanese ships in the Gulf of Siam; sending Hurricanes from Canada to Singapore without recognizing where the pilots and groundcrew will come from). It also seems you have a gripe with me (hence labelling me "contrarian") because I want to apply more thought to the problem and actually work out what was feasible given the structural limitations in place (and, no, you can't wave a magic wand and remove structural issues...that's why they're called structural).

Imagine if Force Z had never been sent to Malaya, which is entirely plausible since many in the decision tree thought it should not be sent. So, things go as they did, Malaya falls, etc., but HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse stay in the Atlantic and MTO throughout 1941. Then, in 2022 someone suggests, what if Churchill and the RN had decided in October 1941 to send its newest battleship and one of its last two surviving battlecruisers, the one with nearly zero effective AA, plus four old destroyers but with no CV to Malaya as deterrent against Japan. Our resident contrarians would jump from their chairs, leaping at their keyboards to declare this as madness outside the realm of what was possible at that point in time.

Well, Force Z was madness. Sending an unbalanced Naval force as a deterrent makes no sense. However, the deployment was founded on pre-war planning which formed the entire premise for defending the Singapore Naval Base. Percival's entire defensive approach was based on holding onto the Naval Base long enough to get reinforcements in sufficient numbers to turn the tide. Such a scale of reinforcement could not happen without additional Naval forces beyond those provided by Force Z. Yes, sending an imbalanced fleet was a poor decision but at least it aligned with British defence doctrine and planning.

There is a big difference between doing something crazy or illogical, but which aligns with established plans and procedures, and doing something which doesn't align with established planning and procedures. Having reviewed many of the summary documents produced in Whitehall during 1940-1941, it's pretty clear that Government staff had a pretty solid handle on what was happening globally, and on the priorities that should be afforded to each theatre. They did that based on the knowledge they had at the time, so anyone should be rather cautious of second-guessing the decisions and motives behind them.

One what'if I'd like to look at is what Britain would have done if they'd known in spring 1941, through codebreaking or other intel the true Japanese plans and likely late autumn 1941 timing for executing their attack on Malaya, the Philippines and DEI through rapid buildups in FIC, Thailand and Formosa, along with greater detail on the Pearl Harbour attack planning. Maybe there's nothing militarily Britain can change, IDK. Diplomatically things would be interesting.

But Japan didn't know it was going to attack southward in the spring of 1941. This comes back to one of those structural issues that I keep banging on about. British intelligence assessments were actually remarkably accurate in characterizing either a northward push into Russia or a southern advance into Malaya, Singapore and the NEI.

It's really hard for intelligence services to detect adversary intentions if the adversary doesn't have an established decision in place. Contingency planning for all options (Pearl Harbor, Malaya, Thailand, FIC, Russia) was underway in the spring of 1941 but that doesn't mean that a course of events had been decided. Such contingency planning continues to be a routine part of military planning activities today as a bulwark against being surprised. Detecting all of those planning activities would lead the British intelligence staffs to exactly the same conclusions that they reached in the real chain of events...that Japan could go south or north.

For anyone interested in Japan's decision-making in 1941, I can't recommend highly enough the book "Japan's Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences", edited by Nobutaka Ike which clearly shows the muddled thinking that was happening in Tokyo throughout 1941. Japan only decided on war in November 1941...so how are British intelligence services supposed to divine that knowledge in the spring of that year?

 

[MikeMeech]

You may be able to swap some Hurricanes for Buffaloes.
Now the questions are how many and to what effect(and what kind)?
You only had a few experienced pilots per squadron. That doesn't change by fighter type. It doesn't change the early warning system/fighter ground control.

I would also take a look at the "glut" of Hurricanes produced in 1941, sure there several thousands. I don't have the figures for Hurricanes but they built about 2250 P-40s in 1941, almost of 1100 of them in the last 4 month (ALL P-40D &E), how many were in combat theaters in Dec 1941?

The idea of Canadian Hurricanes also needs a very careful examination.
For starters Packard built 45 Merlins in 1941, 26 in Dec and 10 in Nov so you can right off any idea Canada shipped Hurricanes with Packard engines to the West Coast, loading them on freighters and sending them to Singapore.
I have even seen one account (an obvious misprint ?) that claims that Canada built it's first Hurricane with Packard engine in Jan 1940, over 6 months before Packard even got a look at the blueprints.
Most accounts claim that about 1/3 of the Canadian Hurricanes were built with Packard engines and the rest of the Canadian Hurricanes were shipped without engines but that changed over the years. Early production was 100% British built Merlin's but I don't know how many they shipped to Canada in the early years. Most stories also also claim that the Hurricanes that were sent to England with Packard engines had the engines pulled (to use in bombers?) and the Hurricanes had their engines replaced by Merlin XX engines.

Now perhaps the British might have been able to send Merlin's to Canada, have them fitted in an appropriate number of Hurricanes and have them 100% equipped with combat gear (most of were not, radios and other gear (guns?) were fitted after they were uncrated in England) and sent off from the Vancouver docks. But this is a decision made by the British and not a short circuit made by one Commonwealth country helping out another one and bypassing the British.

Once we find the monthly production totals from Canada it can be judged how likely this scheme actually is. Any Hurricane needed has to be loaded onto the dock in Vancouver in Sept at the latest to do any good in Sept. So you can write off the 1/3 or more of the production total from Canada (which was probably higher per month than the earlier months)

Ok I have some production numbers.

K5083 - Aircraft Production Summary

So far it looks like at best 680 Hurricanes were built in Canada during the time available. Perhaps as little as 430 were available.

Hi
Information on Hurricane production in Canada is included in 'Canadian Aircraft since 1909' by Molson & Taylor, the couple of relevant pages below:

I hope that is useful.

Mike

 

[buffnut453]

The idea of Hurricanes to Malaya, Buffalos to FAA, was more about exploring the idea of the Buffalo being in service with the FAA, which I think it could have been, considerably earlier than the Martlet.

Actually, I'm pretty sure the Buffalo couldn't have been in FAA service "considerably earlier" than the Martlet. The first Martlets received in the UK were ex-French G36 models which arrived around the same time as the few ex-Belgian Buffalos. Both types were tested and the Martlet, dubbed "MkI" was deemed superior. It entered squadron service in September 1940 and achieved its first air-to-air victory on Christmas Day of that year.

The Martlet MkI lacked folding wings so the British ordered a MkII variant that had folding wings. The Martlet MkIIs started arriving in the UK in March 1941 which, ironically, was exactly the time that RAF-ordered Buffalos (B339E) started arriving in Singapore. Reverting the B339E to be carrier-capable would almost certainly have delayed the delivery, unless such a decision was made in the autumn of 1940.

With the almost glut of Hurricanes being produced in 1941, and recognising they were no longer a premier fighter, some could have been sent to Malaya. It was talked about, strangely enough Admiral Tom Phillips was an advocate of the idea. This would have impacted on shipping, the distance from Liverpool to Singapore, around the Cape, is far far longer than Liverpool to Murmansk, for example, meaning you can ship a LOT more Hurricanes to Russia, although the Singapore run may be a safer journey. Another possibility on shipping Hurricanes to Singapore, could have been from the Canadian West Coast, across the Pacific, none of it requiringing convoying. But I digress.

This is an area where I think there was some wriggle room. Given the relative strength of Fighter Command in early 1941 compared to the summer of 1940, one could argue that there was excess capacity that could have been employed elsewhere. We're still butting up against the problem of priorities...and Malaya was the absolute bottom of the pecking order. Also, if we're going to send brand new airframes to Singapore rather than formed squadrons, then we need to find the personnel from somewhere. I don't see Australia or New Zealand contributing more aircrew to the defence of Singapore, so we have to take trained personnel from somewhere else. Again, Fighter Command is the most logical source but we're still hitting the problem of when that decision could be made to effect an operational benefit in Singapore. I don't see any way that London would make such a call in late-1940 given what was known at the time.

 

[Shortround6]

Thank you.

So 408 Hurricanes through June and 73 through July and Sept.

 

[buffnut453]

Thank you.

So 408 Hurricanes through June and 73 through July and Sept.

Yes, but to get airframes to Singapore we're probably looking at the 35 airframes produced in Oct-Dec 1940 and the 147 built in Q1 of 1942. Now, that's still double the number of Buffalos on Far East....so getting those aircraft to Singapore would represent a significant bolstering of the defences. However, it's the decision process to get them there that forms the biggest stumbling block.

 

[Shortround6]

I don't see any way that London would make such a call in late-1940 given what was known at the time.

The major change was in May of 1941 (?). That was when the night blitz ended as the Germans flew off to prepare for the attack on the Soviet Union.
The Germans lost 48 bombers in April and the night fighters claimed of 96 German planes in just the first 2 weeks in May so getting rid of numbers of fighters to Malaya may not be a high priority until they know the German bombers are gone.

I agree with you, I am giving them the absolute best case scenario. Worst cases counts how long to actually get to the stuff off the docks, assemble it, test fly it and get the bugs out of it before you can declare it operational and even to train on the equipment.

Singapore was in better shape than Rangoon but it took the AVG over 2 months to assemble their P-40s then fly then to the Chinse bases, It took another 3-4 months before the AVG went into action and the Chinse were fighting the Japanese at the time.

 

[EwenS]

The Martlet MkI lacked folding wings so the British ordered a MkII variant that had folding wings. The Martlet MkIIs started arriving in the UK in March 1941 which, ironically, was exactly the time that RAF-ordered Buffalos (B339E) started arriving in Singapore. Reverting the B339E to be carrier-capable would almost certainly have delayed the delivery, unless such a decision was made in the autumn of 1940.

The 71 Martlet I (10 were lost in transit from the US) from the French Order were received between Aug and Oct 1940.

Britain placed an order for 100 Martlet II. 10 were delivered with fixed wings in March 1941 and were later retitled Mk.III along with 30 received in the Middle East in March/April 1941 from the Greek order. There was then a pause while Grumman developed the folding wing. The remaining 90 Martlet II were delivered, with folding wings, between Oct 1941 and April 1942. The first group from this batch were delivered to the UK in Dec 1941 when HMS Illustrious returned to the UK. These formed the basis of the equipment of 3 squadrons that went to the Far East in Feb / March 1942 aboard Formidable & Illustrious. The rest of the batch then followed direct to the Far East in early 1942.

 

[buffnut453]

The 71 Martlet I (10 were lost in transit from the US) from the French Order were received between Aug and Oct 1940.

Britain placed an order for 100 Martlet II. 10 were delivered with fixed wings in March 1941 and were later retitled Mk.III along with 30 received in the Middle East in March/April 1941 from the Greek order. There was then a pause while Grumman developed the folding wing. The remaining 90 Martlet II were delivered, with folding wings, between Oct 1941 and April 1942. The first group from this batch were delivered to the UK in Dec 1941 when HMS Illustrious returned to the UK. These formed the basis of the equipment of 3 squadrons that went to the Far East in Feb / March 1942 aboard Formidable & Illustrious. The rest of the batch then followed direct to the Far East in early 1942.

Thanks for the details. So, yes, reverting the RAF Buffalos to be carrier capable would have delivered more single-seat fighters to the FAA earlier...but they still wouldn't have folding wings which limited their utility.

The following note from July 1940 illustrates the thinking within the FAA:

ADM 1/11207

To CinC Home Fleet 6/7/40

American types currently available: Grumman F3F-2; Brewster F2A-1

Both obsolescent. Grumman F4F is current type. 81 of these have been offered to this country.

This a/c was thoroughly inspected and flown in America by a most experienced FAA pilot, and was later seen in operation by a member of the Naval Staff who spent a week in the USS Saratoga last summer.
They concluded that, while it is a good aeroplane of its class, it is not designed to meet the far more stringent seagoing requirements of the FAA (which include wing-folding and navigability), and is inferior for shore based interceptor duty to current RAF types.

All USN fleet fighters are under-gunned.

As none fold, unsuitable for any but Furious.

For all other Fleet Fighter sqns, Fulmar is considered a better all around a/c than the American or RAF types because of its combination of heavy armament, first class navigability and communications, and long endurance. Its speed is adequate for attacking all contemporary German bombers and shadowers. It will go into all carriers.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Hi all, Hurricanes to Malaya, Buffalos to FAA, how would that work for the Royal Navy. How well can the Buffalos do for the FAA, and where would they deploy them?

If we send all the Buffaloes to the FAA that likely means no single seat fighters whatsoever for Malaya. Had the Buffalo not been available this is likely what would have occurred, since Hurricanes are a no go. Even the Gloster Gladiator will be wanted in the MTO.

But if you can indulge me, my vote is for Britain to give all the Buffaloes to the Soviets and to keep all/most of the promised CC&F Hurricanes for themselves, including a priority for FAA Sea Hurricanes, shown below in production In Fort William.

Of course the non-folding Sea Hurricane is only suitable for the lifts on HMS Indomitable, Furious, Eagle and Argus. Had Courageous and Glorious have survived into 1942 they would have been more suitable Sea Hurricane platform, though their small avgas storage would be an issue.

But anyway, send the Buffaloes to the USSR, keep the Hurricanes from Canada for the RAF and FAA. That'll give the Buffalo-flying Finns something to think about.

 

[Shortround6]

In the summer of 1940 that was true.
The .50 cal guns fired at 600rpm (at best) so they were firing at 40rps compared to the 160rps of the eight ,303 guns.
The British were getting .50 cal ammo that was around 300fps slower than what they would be firing in 1942. In fact it was only about 100fps faster than the .303 ammo.
And they didn't have any incendiary ammo approved for it. .303 did have incendiary even it was in short supply.

 

[Shortround6]

If we send all the Buffaloes to the FAA that likely means no single seat fighters whatsoever for Malaya. Had the Buffalo not been available this is likely what would have occurred, since Hurricanes are a no go. Even the Gloster Gladiator will be wanted in the MTO.

But if you can indulge me, my vote is for Britain to give all the Buffaloes to the Soviets and to keep all/most of the promised CC&F Hurricanes for themselves, including a priority for FAA Sea Hurricanes, shown below in production In Fort William.

View attachment 654792

Of course the non-folding Sea Hurricane is only suitable for the lifts on HMS Indomitable, Furious, Eagle and Argus. Had Courageous and Glorious have survived into 1942 they would have been more suitable Sea Hurricane platform, though their small avgas storage would be an issue.

But anyway, send the Buffaloes to the USSR, keep the Hurricanes from Canada for the RAF and FAA. That'll give the Buffalo-flying Finns something to think about.

Trouble is you are going back to your super rushed time table again.
Russians are not going to get anything June 23rd 1941. and that is promises.

June 1941 is when the freighters at Rangoon were unloading the P-40s. They went into action on Dec 20th 1941.

By the time you get any Hurricanes to to Singapore after the Soviet invasion it is going to be too late.
The US was starting to ship P-40Es direct from the factory to the Philippines starting Aug 19th 1941.
They already had P-40s in the Philippines which had arrived on May 16th.