GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
B-29 ops against Japan started in July of '44 in limited numbers from China then ceased in January of '45.Indeed, any combat aircraft has its dangers when it goes into combat. Warships as well.
Richard B. Frank in his book Downfall - The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire says this, Appendix B, p. 363:
" The material price to the United States in the strategic bombing of Japan was remarkably modest. "
Cited:
414 B-29s for all operations lost
Air crew casualties 2,897 of which 2,148 dead
Air crew captured 334 of which 262 survived
. . . .
Britain's Bomber Command, 8,953 a/c lost and 55,500 air crew killed 1939-45
USAAF in Europe at least 25,000 air crew killed, heavy bomber losses 10,152
. . . .
Granted there were many carrier based sorties against Japan as well, and tactical bombers from Okinawa.
In the Pacific, B-29s started operations from Saipan in October '44 (in limited numbers), then moved to the Marianas in November '44.
It wasn't until February of 1945 that the B-29 was committed in force against Japan.
So the lower numbers of lost B-29s can be summed up by a few factors:
Shorter operational window.
Lower numbers committed for the better part of the year they saw service.
Japanese (Army and Navy) lack of a quantity of dedicated interceptors.
Lack of substantial AA artillery and concentration as well as AA command and control.
Meanwhile, in Europe, the USAAF started bombing operations in August 1942 with B-17s and June 1942 with B-24s.
So the B-17s and B-24s had a higher loss rate due to being in service two and a half years longer, in larger numbers and were against an enemy that had extremely accurate AA artillery as well as Artillery direction and concentration.
Add to this, extremely effective dedicated interceptors and their command and control.