Improved Skua for FAA?

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Frog said:
If the cheeses served are Munster, Maroilles, Pavé de Lille, Livarot, Avesnois & Camembert, it is forbidden to remove your mask.
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St. Felicien, accompanied by a half bottle Charpoutier-Banyuls. A silver coffee spoon is an excellent way to transport the ripest examples to the savouring mouth. Although a mother of pearl caviar spoon will also suffice.

In the case of the OP cheeses I presume that sodium citrate is added so that your masked customers can imbibe them through a straw?

At least one can be confident that the staff will not be taking the cheese straight from the refrigerator to the table like Anglo-Saxon savages.
 
I wonder if a development of the Fairey P.4/34:



Or Hawker Henley:



Would have made for a better option than the Skua?

Obviously the former led to the Fairey Fulmar, so we kind of know how it would have performed. And while not stellar, having it in service a couple of years earlier would have still been an arguable improvement over the Skua.

The Henley could arguable have been even better than both.
 
Problem is timing.

All three planes flew within a few months of each other, except the Skua already had the folding wing and bits and pieces for catapult launch and arresting landing.

Next thing is that the Skua was a dive bomber, in that it had dive brakes.


For some reason the land based dive bombers didn't have dive brakes. They could dive, they could pull out without breaking. They just may have had to pull out sooner/higher and have less accuracy. This assumes that the RAF ever funded a dive bomber sight for any of them.
Stressed for dive bombing and actually dive bombing the way the Americans and Germans and Japanese did it are not quite the same thing.

You could probably modify both planes to substitute for the Skua, the question is how long would it take and what was the availability of Merlin's at that particular time.
If Blackburn could not get Mercury radials because all available Mercuries were going to Blenheim production could you get Merlin II/III away from Hurricanes and Battles?
The engine availability thing may have swapped back and forth a few times over 1937-39. But you have to pick a plane and engine combo and stick with it.

And finally once you are done, is it really going to be any better than the Skua? Or should I say significantly better?

From wiki and is lacking in a few details.
"The first prototype Fulmar, which acted as a "flying mock-up", was powered by a single Rolls Royce Merlin III engine, which was capable of generating up to 1,080 hp (810 kW).[9]​ Flight testing revealed the prototype's performance to be relatively poor, the highest speed it could attain being 230 mph (370 km/h). Following the adoption of the more powerful Merlin VIII engine – a variant unique to the Fulmar and with supercharging optimised for low-level flight, as well as various aerodynamic improvements made to the airframe, the prototype's speed was increased to 265 mph (426 km/h) when flown at an altitude of 7500 ft (2286m)"

Now in 1937-38 the the Merlin made 1030hp at 16,250ft, not 1080hp.
The Speed of the prototype Fulmar is not given with an altitude.
The P. 4/34 was good for 284mph at 15,000ft (and perhaps a bit better at 17,000ft? see speeds for Hurricane I with same engine). Where did the 54mph go?
Or was the Fulmar prototype flying somewhere around 5,000ft to 7,500ft? A Hurricane I with a two pitch prop will loose over 30mph of speed when flying at 6500ft compared to 17,000ft. We don't know the answer for sure but something is off.

The production Fulmars got a different supercharger gear and they could make a lot more power down low than the Merlin III and that helped get the Fulmar back up to 255-265mph at the Altitudes the Skua did 225mph. Remember the Skua had 905hp at 6,500ft.

There is little doubt the P.4/34 and the Henley would have been a bit faster than the Skua but without the Merlin VIII the difference would have been a lot less marked at the 5-7,500ft altitude.
You could have made the Skua go faster by giving it an engine that peaked at 14,-15,000ft but it would have been slower at 5,000ft where more of the enemy spotter aircraft and bombers were.
 

Great post, as always SR. The other factor here is...in which areas would these aircraft improve over the Skua. All the complaints about the poor old Skua stem from its relative lack of performance against single-seat fighters. However, as a dive bomber it was pretty effective. Yes, it would have benefited from being able to lift a larger bomb but, apart from that, it was quite good.

Replacing the Skua with the Henley or the Fairey proposal isn't going to give you a better fighter. It'll just give you a dive bomber that may (or may not) be better than the Skua. You'd still need a single-seat fighter in addition to either the Henley or the Fairey, with no guarantee that either of the latter 2 types would represent a big improvement over the Blackburn product.
 
Strictly the Fulmar prototype was the first production aircraft N1854 which flew in Jan 1940 and not the K7555 the second P4/34 prototype.

The second P.4/34 light bomber prototype, K7555, first flew on 19 April 1937 (the first prototype having flown in Jan that year). It was then tested at the A&AEE between 24 Sept and 11 Oct 1937. But before any of the P.4/34 prototype contenders had flown the Spec had been scrapped. Marcel Lobelle then tried to make something of his design by removing the underwing bomb racks and adding provision for guns in the wings to try to meet an emerging requirement, OR56, for an interim two seat naval fighter for quick production.

K7555 was chosen as a flying mock up of the new naval fighter design. After the late 1937 tests it was returned to the factory for modifications including shortening each wing by 8" fitting smaller ailerons and ejector exhausts. It then returned to the A&AEE in April 1938. ( It later went on to test items for the Firefly, like the Fairey-Youngman flaps and pneumatic brakes in 1940/41). It was then decided to pursue the design to create the Fulmar and a new Spec was written around the Fairey proposal. O.8/38 was issued to Fairey on 24 April 1938 calling for first deliveries in Sept 1939. The engine specified was a moderately supercharged Merlin 'H' (aka Merlin III). K7555 was then tested again in 1939 with a Merlin VIII.

O.8/38 called for a max speed of at least 230 knots for an operational height of 10,000 feet amongst other things.

Only then was the design further modified to incorporate folding wings, deck arrester hook, catapult hooks and dinghy necessary for naval service. The wing was revised to carry the 8 0.303" guns and larger flaps. The fuselage was modified to raise the cockpit to improve the pilot's view over the nose along with a change to the wing incidence. The tailplane was revised and mounted lower. None of these changes was made to K7555. That is why the N1854, the first production airframe, is considered the true Fulmar prototype.

So that little lot must have added a fair bit of weight to the original P4/34 flying mock up and can't have done the performance on the original engine much good at all. Hence the Merlin VIII.
 
Thank you.

We do still have some details that don't quite line up.

EwenS said:
The engine specified was a moderately supercharged Merlin 'H' (aka Merlin III)
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I am unclear on this one.
A Merlin III had 8.588 supercharger gears, The RR designation was R.M.1.S. The S stands for supercharged or fully supercharged.
There was an R.M.1.M moderately supercharged engine using 7.32 gears and it was rated at 1085hp at 9750ft.(P)It was never put into production and never got a MK number.
I have no idea if one was flown in the K7555 or not.
EwenS said:
K7555 was then tested again in 1939 with a Merlin VIII.
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The Merlin VIII used 6.313 gears and was the R.M.3. specification. At least according to the R-R Heritage Trust "The Merlin in Perspective"

Strangely enough the Merlin 30 was R.M.2.M and went back to the 8.588 supercharger gears but used a 9.75in impeller.
EwenS said:
O.8/38 called for a max speed of at least 230 knots for an operational height of 10,000 feet amongst other things.
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And 230kts is just about 265mph. The 10,000ft would line up pretty well with the phantom R.M.1.M engine though.

There may have been a bit of fooling around with cooling system with some of these engines, The R.M.1 used either glycol cooling or the pressure cooling system depending on MK number The R.M.1 was also the Merlin X 2 speed engine.

Just trying to get out that trying to make the Fulmar in 1938/early 39 may not have had the same engines available as what was available in 1940.

The Switch to the Fulmar (or Skua replacement) also saw the dive bomber requirement drop way. The Henley carried two 250lbs bombs in the bomb bay and while it may have been possible to adapt to a single 500lb with the trapeze it was a bot more work that had to be done. Likewise the K7555 had a pair of 250lbs under the wings would need a bit of modification to carry the 500lb SAP for anti ship duties.
When the dive bombing part went away I don't know. The ability to carry a bomb came back with the Fulmar but it may have been an after thought and not their the entire time?
The long range tank under the fuselage blocked carrying bombs?

Something that came up on the Dinger Aviation .net pages was the claim that the Skuas operating around Scapa Flow in Sept 1939 had a lot of trouble being directed to aircraft that had been seen by ground observers. At the time the Skua did not have voice radio and only had radios that could be used with code. 1938-39 radio technology was not always what 1940 radio technology was and 1943-44 was almost another world.
The voice radio did exist, why the Skuas did not have it I don't know. Speculation is you need the extra black boxes, another separate antenna and the range is going to be rather short in any case.
This may or may not have anything to do with two seat fighter requirement.
Did the single seat biplanes have radios? what was their range? how far did the single seat biplanes fly from the carriers?
How far from the carrier did thy have to be to intercept a 120-150mph strike aircraft?
How far do you have to be to set up an intercept on a 200mph strike aircraft?
If you increase your "protection" radius by 50% you may increase the area you need to cover by double.

Just somethings to consider.
 
re the T.1083/R.1082 command & liaison set carried by the Skua

The T.1083/R.1082 combined command & liaison set was the standard FAA kit for multi-crew aircraft from about 1936, along with the R.1110 DF/receiver for homing on the Type 72 shipboard homing beacon. This equipment was carried by the Shark, Swordfish, Walrus, Skua, Roc, early Fulmar, and some early Albacore. (maybe others also?)

In the form carried by these aircraft the set was capable of CW, ICW, and R/T(voice) for air- to-air and air-to-ship communication. It also had a built in capability for acting as an intercom for the crew.

Where the myth began that it was not capable of voice communication between aircraft or air-to-ground I do not know, but it is possible that the myth started due to the equipment sometimes being used as a shipboard radio set. When it was used as ship-to-aircraft equipment it usually did not have the voice capability/equipment included, instead transmitting/receiving in ICW(Morse) for communication or CW for DF purposes. This was due to there being other much more capable shipboard R/T(voice) sets.

It began to be replaced in mid- to late-1940, although some aircraft kept the old set for some time while receiving an additional command set for R/T(voice) communications. The T.1083/R.1082 set was also used in many pre- and early-war RAF multi-crew aircraft.

This is the T.1083/R.1082 radio description page from the 1937 edition of the Pilot's Notes for the Swordfish Mk I:
 
I note, but make no comment, that the strike role of the Skua was taken on when it was being withdrawn by the Albacore, whilst the fighter one by the Fulmar. Also the Swordfish. The Albacore offered a small reduction in cruising speed but a fourfold increase in bomb load and greater range plus a torpedo capacity. The Fulmar covered the other roles with it's greater speed, range and firepower.

Out of curiosity I looked up the similar period peer Junker JU87 and found it to cruise little slower than an Albacore, have a shorter range and lesser bomb load. In some ways closer to a Skua than an Albacore but on more power. Of course it was made to meet a tactical army support role instead. Maybe a better Skua might have been an RAF dive bomber variant? Even the Roc ventured out over Dunkirk.
 
A lot of questions. Not sure I have all the answers but here goes.

CH radar coverage in north Scotland in 1939.
There was only a single CH radar station on Orkney in 1939. Others were added at Sumburgh in the Shetlands to the north and Thrumster to the south on the mainland by July 1940. A CHL station had also been added on Orkney by July 1940.

So any other direction was courtesy of the Mk.1 eyeball. And then the weather, particularly cloud, comes into play. Under cloud a ground observer might hear an aircraft but not see it. Or he might see it but an aircraft may not. Orkney does not have the best of the weather conditions in the autumn / winter part of the year as well as having limited daylight hours. Even in central Scotland in Dec-Jan it often feels like it never really gets daylight.

Radio range.
From a link I posted on the "FAA Seafire vs Corsair" thread, the TR9 HF radio set (T.1083/R.1082 combination) introduced to the RAF from 1933 and standard equipment until 1940 and beyond when VHF radios began to be introduced, had an HF voice transmission ground to air range of about 35-40 miles but only 5 miles air to air. Added to that the reception quality could be variable.

These sets were certainly fitted to the Sea Gladiators delivered from late 1938. Not sure about the earlier Nimrods.

Single seaters on carriers
These were unable to fly far from the carriers. Visual distance only or probably not much more. The RN had a poor view of RAF pilots being able to find their way back to a carrier, that being one reason for a two seat fighter in the first place.

Type 72 Homing Beacon
A trial installation of this equipment was made in 1933 with production versions installed in carriers from 1936.

In the US the first experimental YE beacon was installed in the Saratoga in May 1938. YE was fitted in Victorious in 1943 while she was in the Pacific and then more generally in the Ruler class CVE as well as being retrofitted to earlier ships, becoming standard in 1944.

Fighter protection of the fleet
The best explanation I can offer comes from Friedman's "Fighters Over The Fleet" who discusses a 1934 exercise reported in the annual RN document "Progress and Tactics":-

"In an exercise ('RY'), defensive aircraft patrolled 12nm from the fleet centre. Calculation showed that to be 100% effective in detecting attackers, eight aircraft would have to be arranged in 45° sectors at each height patrolled. In the exercise, however, only 5 aircraft were available. They were placed at 72° sectors, offering coverage of about 70 per cent of incoming raids in practice (roughly agreeing with the calculation). The 12nm depth was chosen because attackers were expected to sight their targets at 10-15nm, then work around on a circle to find an attacking position. Even if the whole circle was not covered, typical attacking practice would give scouts a good chance of seeing the attackers. In the exercise, high bombers were not detected. The conclusion was that the fleet needed air screens at two heights, to deal with high and low attackers or else an air screen plus a surface screen. Overall the exercise showed that 12nm was the minimum depth for an air-screen – and any greater range would have required many more aircraft.

One lesson learned from the exercise was that even a short war (in this case, 6.5 hours) imposed enormous wear on the aircraft and pilots, who flew a total of 110 hours on patrol. Many exercises, including those involving RAF flying boats, demonstrated the strain entailed by day after day of reconnaissance."

He goes on:-

"..although it was impossible to prevent enemy reconnaissance aircraft from sighting and reporting a fleet, every effort should be made to attack them as soon as possible: 'the fact of shadowing aircraft being shot down, in itself constitutes protection against attack.

Looking back, the important observation in the 1934 edition were that warning of impending air attack was difficult at best, that dive bombing was extremely difficult to counter and that attacks could be ruined by destroying shadowers (snoopers), without which they might not materialise at all……Later exercises showed that it might be difficult to deal with shadowers."

And then:-

"Exercises in 1935 called the value of fighter defence into question. In a 1935 Mediterranean Fleet exercise ('SE') fighters got into range of the attacking torpedo bombers only after the attackers were within fleet gun range. Fleet gunfire was considered so much more effective that such action was unacceptable. A later exercise showed that fleet could be saturated by well synchronised attacks and therefore that there was an urgent need for some form of anti-aircraft co-ordination….."

Mk.1 eyeball.
So much in this period relies on this extremly useful but limited piece of equipment. Attackers spotting the fleet. Defending aircraft spotting attacking aircraft. Ground/ship spotters spotting attackers using optical instruments like binoculars and gunnery rangefinders. And as noted the weather plays its part with the possibility of clouds obscuring the observers views. And while voice radio is available it is relatively short ranged and is unreliable.


Radio silence
The RN preferred to operate under conditions of radio (and radar) silence whenever possible until units were reasonably sure that they had been discovered. They had plenty of experience in WW1 tracking enemy forces by their radio transmissions (check out the Y service and development of shipborne MF/DF interwar and HF/DF during WW2). That persisted into 1945 on the Russian convoy operations for example. Crews that called up looking for homing signals to their parent carriers were not popular but were obliged to ensure that they were not lost.

A couple of examples from the Japanese experience in 1942 helps highlight some of the difficulties in pre radar days and with limited radios (not all Japanese fighters carried them in this period):-

Operation C in the Indian Ocean
9 April 1942 – 9 Blenheims from 11 squadron RAF attacked the Kido Butai off Ceylon. The first warning the Japanese had, despite having a CAP of 20 A6M overhead, was when their bombs fell close to Akagi & Tone. The CAP then shot down 4 Blenheims as they left for home. Unfortunately the 5 survivors ran into the returning Japanese strike force and its escorts. Only 3 made it back to base with one crash landing and the other 2 badly shot up.

A report from the Hiryu after this operation noted that it was exceptionally difficult to sight targets at over 5,000m (16,400ft) due to the limitations of the spotting glasses and gun director optics.

The first Japanese prototype radar installation was made on the battleship Ise in May 1942.


Battle of Midway
5 June 1942 – the Japanese CAP, while plentiful and added to at the start of the USN assault, lacked fighter direction and had a habit of bunching up with everyone going after the same threat simultaneously, and leaving little or nothing to challenge other threats arising shortly thereafter.
 


Thank you both.

This does go a long way in explaining the problems/realities of the time.

I may not have understood the passage from Diggers Aviation site but we can put together a reasonable explanation. The Skuas had voice radios, but perhaps the ground observers/controllers did not or the radios were of limited range and could not maintain consistent contact with fighters. You might have had ground observers trying to use a phone to call the command center which would then use it's radio/s to try talk to the aircraft. Ground observer of the aircraft could be a number of miles from the radio? Having each ground observer having their own radio might make things difficult with too much cross talk, you only have a very limited number of frequencies to use at any one time. Having the rear seater trying to communicate via code and then relay the message by intercom to the pilot was also less than ideal.

This is a radio/communications problem and has nothing to do with the type of aircraft being used except that a single seat plane is going to have even more difficulties.

I notice in the description of radio on the Swordfish a short section on the "trailing" aerial, section 6. It was this aerial that would be used for the longer distances and the aerial could be controlled in length using the winch. This would be to suit the aerial to the frequency being used but small changes of frequency probably didn't require tuning. However even the Swordfish was carrying a spare aerial cable reel to be fitted in case the aerial in use was lost/carried away. The work a few minutes for gunner/radio operator but for a single seat aircraft? Possible if the spare was carried but more difficult while flying the plane?

For the fleet exercises I am guessing they were using the Nimrods as fighters and whatever Torpedo planes they had at the time, performance didn't very that much. A faster fighter could cover a somewhat larger arc/area and still get into firing position but things don't look that good. IF the enemy strike planes have better performance than the 1934/35 biplanes then the defending fighters have less time to perform the interception. They need to be flying further out with more planes to cover the arcs or they need higher performance or both. And without a radio beacon to find the carrier flying further away from the carrier to increase the interception distance starts to increase aircraft/crew losses even without enemy action.

The Skua seems to have been a decent solution to the problems of the mid to late 30s. It seems to have performed well, even if not great, against the intended aircraft targets (non single seat fighters). Part of it's problem was inconsistence of policy. It was conceived/ordered when they were coming up with the idea of going to the ship board gun solution of defense.
There weren't enough Skuas to provide an effective air defense and they didn't show up in time to work on much in the way of tactics.
And they had changed their mind just about when the war broke out and the last 50 planes were completed as target tugs at the factory.
Likewise the RAF had hobbled the Skua with their flip flop on dive bombing. From going from, "this might be a good idea and it needs investigating" to "this is very bad idea and it needs to dropped forthwith " was only a few years and caught the Skua and the Henley between design and actual production. Apparently they only brought back dive bombing or gave lip service to it to quiet critics after the Germans used it Poland and low countries.
The navy had been asking for a dive bombing sight/system for a number of years but the RAF never came up with one after spending a few years in development. The Henley got shunted off to target towing land before the 1st production aircraft showed up.
Again, note that the Fulmar was a 2 seat fighter that could bomb. It was not a dive bomber that could fight or even a 2 seat fighter that could dive bomb. At least in the way that USN dive bombers could dive bomb.

The Skua was also stuck in the level of development at Aug-Oct 1938. Only minor modifications were made after that time of the sort that could be done in service or at maintenance units. This makes it's actual achievements even more impressive. Or rather it's crews achievements.
 
Hey EwanS,

re "From a link I posted on the "FAA Seafire vs Corsair" thread, the TR9 HF radio set (T.1083/R.1082 combination) . . ."

T.1083/R.1082 combined command & liaison set was not the TR.9 command set. (This part edited to remove incorrect information.)

The TR.9 series had the following combinations of Transmitters and Receivers.

TR.9 (Transmitter Type D/Receiver Type D). The transmitter had only 1 HF channel.
TR.9A (T.1096/R.1097). The transmitter had only 1 HF channel.
TR.9B (T.1102/R.1103). The transmitter still had only 1 HF channel, but incorporated connections for the 'Pipsqueek' DF/IFF device (as did all subsequent models). The 'Pipsqueak' device interrupted voice transmission.
TR.9C (T.1121/R.1103). The transmitter still had only 1 HF channel, but it used crystal control (as did all subsequent TR.9 sets).
TR.9D (T.1119/R.1120). The transmitter introduced a 2nd HF pre-set crystal controlled channel. Channel 1 was for R/T(voice), Channel 2 was dedicated for use with 'Pipsqueak' DF/IFF. Used by RAF, CC, and FAA. (Note - the T.1118 could be substituted for the T.1119, but was not common.)
TR.9F (T.1138/R.1120). As for the D model, but not used with 'Pipsqueak', giving 2 channels for R/T. Incorporated mods for intercom. Used by RAF multi-crew aircraft.
TR.9G (T.1394/R.1395) as for the D model, but incorporated mods for intercom. Used by RAF night fighters and FAA multi-crew aircraft.
TR.9H (T.1396/R.1395) as for F model but single channel, with mod for remote switching.
TR.9J (T.1397/R.1398) as for F model, with mod for remote switching. Used by CC multi-crew aircraft.
TR.9K (T.1399/R.1400) as for F model, but no mods for intercom. Used by RAF in small aircraft (ie gliders, utility, small transport, etc).
TR.9L (T.1401/R.1402) as for F model. Used on small ships and boats whose duties included Air/Sea Rescue.
 
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Edited my post#313 to correct information (ie the T.1083/R.1082 combination was not designated TR.1091)

Also added info for TR.9(no suffix).
 
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Perhaps that's where our improved or second version of the Skua should be directed, to the RAF. From 1939-40 the Stuka showed the RAF what land based dive bombers could do in Poland, France and the Low Countries. Build a new version of the Skua without folding wings, arrestor hook (and the hook's internal bracing), catapult fittings, etc. for the RAF. If the RAF could make use of the Vengeance in SEA, they can make earlier use of the Skua.
 
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The jigs etc. were with Boulton Paul to make the Roc. Blackburn having no space left whilst they moved on to build Bothas and Swordfish etc. and develop the unmentionable device. Boulton Paul would doubtless suggest a dive bomber Defiant and switch Defiant production from turret fighters to dive bombers. The RAF were having cold feet over the turret fighter anyway.

BTW & OT the cold feet should have been an opportunity to switch also to a Sea Defiant but that would be another thread. Using the Skua as a model, a Sea Defiant in the dive bomber/fighter role.Still a two seater but less turret and with wing mounted armament.Thus a Merlin powered 300mph clean Skua. Folding wing for the FAA and fixed for the RAF.
 
yulzari said:
The jigs etc. were with Boulton Paul to make the Roc. Blackburn having no space left whilst they moved on to build Bothas and Swordfish etc. and develop the unmentionable device.
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But just how true is that statement about the jigs?

Skua production began in mid-1938 and Blackburn continued to deliver Skuas until Oct 1939. Over half the 190 production Skuas left the factory after March 1939.

On the other hand Boulton & Paul had begun to deliver production Rocs in March 1939 and had delivered at least 40 before the final Skuas rolled off the production line. Roc production continued until Aug 1940.

The Blackburn built Swordfish were not built at the Blackburn Brough factory but at a new shadow factory at Sherburn-in-Elmet constructed for that purpose. The contract for them was awarded in Nov 1939 and the first production aircraft first flew on 1 Dec 1940. That factory used many of the Swordfish jigs from the Fairey production line that had moved on to Albacore production.
 
Timing.
The time to build "improved" Skua's was in 1939-40. Deciding to built improved Skuas in the Summer of 1940 is too late if any major modifications are to be done.

A Vengeance weighed as much empty as a Skua did loaded.
The Skua did not have a good bomb load even by 1940 standards. Using it in over land operations without improving protection was asking for a loss rate very close to what the Blenheim's, Battles and Lysanders suffered in France.

The other big Problem (read HUGE) was that the RAF didn't what to do with close support aircraft in 1940. They didn't know how to use them in an effective manner.

This is something that is consistently overlooked in the Luftwaffe's use of the Ju 87. It wasn't that the Ju 87 was really that good. It was that they had worked out a way to use it.
Luftwaffe had officers acting as forward controllers attached to the unit's that were supposed to get air support. The Officer had a vehicle, some times an armored half track, with the correct radios to talk to the aircraft. These officers also advised the Ground commanders what the Luftwaffe support units could and could not do and helped advise on target selection. If they Luftwaffe could only provide a certain number of strikes on a given day they didn't want to use them on unimportant targets, or targets that could be handled by regular artillery strikes. These Officers could, at times, direct the strike aircraft by radio onto the target while observing the target from the ground.

In the Spring of 1940 the RAF couldn't even figure out how to proved fighter escort for the strike aircraft let alone pick targets that weren't hours old. The RAF was often not participating in the battle at the front lines but trying to bomb/attack supply routes dozens of miles behind the lines.
The British Tommy's could see the German aircraft bombing and strafing them, they couldn't see the British aircraft doing anything to help them. (some fighters attacking the German bombers'?) They may have been but there was no shift in morale.

Something else the Skua needed if it was going attack land targets, a bombsight.
You may be able to stick a piece of gum on the wind screen and line up the plane with 500ft long ship. It doesn't work so well on pill boxes or artillery in woods or other targets in cover.

Note that this has very little to do with the Skua as an airplane, There were things that could have been 'fixed' (Fuel tank protection?) on the Skua and things that could have been improved (Pegasus engine?) but you aren't going to get large improvements in results if you don't change the doctrine/tactics. Throw in weapons, If you are going to attack land targets you you need something beside that 500lb SAP bomb.

Forget futzing with the wing and hook support structure. Bolt the wing in place if you want, unbolt the hook. leave the rest alone. Spending hundreds if not thousands of hours recalculating stresses and redrawing parts to save a few dozen pounds wasn't worth it. Just keep building what you are already making.
 
Nevertheless Boulton Paul had to make Rocs as Blackburns could not. Just as Blackburn got the Swordfish shadow contract because Fairey were giving up on the Swordfish and moving on to the Albacore and further looking towards the Barracuda. It might have been Blackburn made Albacores but the delay to set that up was by-passed by Fairey passing on the Swordfish production line. The Blackburn design capacity was over burdened which was no help with their performance spending the war trying to make the unmentionable, unsuccessfully.

My point is that Blackburn itself had no uncommitted capacity and it's shadow committed to making a Fairey design. Boulton Paul did have it if the RAF ditched the turret fighter concept, which was losing support. Knowing both the Roc/Skua and the Defiant Boulton Paul would have acknowledged their capacity to turn out RAF Skuas but surely recommend FAA Sea Defiants and RAF dive bomber Defiants.

But this is AH and hindsight. BP Skuas could have been in service sooner with the RAF though and with a better chance of defending themselves than the Advanced Striking Force Fairey Battles and Westland Lysanders.

Whether either would have been a good idea is a WI matter (shades of Father Jack's' that would be an ecumenical matter').
 
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