Improved Skua for FAA?

The RN originally intended to have Blackburn build Albacores. But the contract was switched to Swordfish because the jigs were becoming available from Fairey and less need for strategic materials. That enabled the aircraft to be available sooner which in 1939 was what the RN needed. In late 1939 Barracuda production wasn't scheduled to begin until April 1941 in succession to Fulmar production at Fairey Stockport.

yulzari said:

My point is that Blackburn itself had no uncommitted capacity and it's shadow committed to making a Fairey design. Boulton Paul did have it if the RAF ditched the turret fighter concept, which was losing support. Knowing both the Roc/Skua and the Defiant Boulton Paul would have acknowledged their capacity to turn out RAF Skuas but surely recommend FAA Sea Defiants and RAF dive bomber Defiants.

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The fascination with the Defiant boggles the mind.
Skua had a wing area 27% larger than a Defiant. The Defiant I was within 100lbs of the Skua. A Sea Defiant is terrible idea for landing on a carrier, this assumes you can actually get a MK I Defiant off the carrier. The Defiant MK I has only bit more power than the Skua, doesn't matter what it has at 16,000ft.

Yanking the turret out leaves you with a crap load of redesign work. You are not going to get a faster Hurricane by just taking out the turret. The Defiant was around 1 ton heavier than the Hurricane. In order to get the weight down you have go through pretty much the entire airplane and lighten up all kinds of structure.
Unless you are going for the dive bomber option (with the small wing?) and while you can do a lot of things if you really try, in this case why bother?

Where does the bomb go?
OK you can add 18in or so to the wing. Now you have bomb sandwiched in-between the oil cooler/air intake and the radiator.
For forward firing guns the space in the wings just outboard of the landing gear is where the the fuel tanks are.
Maybe you can use a pair of bombs under the wing but that tends to limit the ability to attack ships?
And we are back to the weight problem. You are using a plane with the same engine as a Hurricane (even going to the MK II of both types) that weighs hundreds of pounds more to carry the same load.

yulzari said:

But this is AH and hindsight. BP Skuas could have been in service sooner with the RAF though and with a better chance of defending themselves than the Advanced Striking Force Fairey Battles and Westland Lysanders.

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All three planes were bog slow and the chances of the forward firing guns making much of a difference is pretty slim.

Shortround6 said:

The fascination with the Defiant boggles the mind.
Skua had a wing area 27% larger than a Defiant. The Defiant I was within 100lbs of the Skua. A Sea Defiant is terrible idea for landing on a carrier, this assumes you can actually get a MK I Defiant off the carrier. The Defiant MK I has only bit more power than the Skua, doesn't matter what it has at 16,000ft.

Yanking the turret out leaves you with a crap load of redesign work. You are not going to get a faster Hurricane by just taking out the turret. The Defiant was around 1 ton heavier than the Hurricane. In order to get the weight down you have go through pretty much the entire airplane and lighten up all kinds of structure.
Unless you are going for the dive bomber option (with the small wing?) and while you can do a lot of things if you really try, in this case why bother?
View attachment 678131
Where does the bomb go?
OK you can add 18in or so to the wing. Now you have bomb sandwiched in-between the oil cooler/air intake and the radiator.
For forward firing guns the space in the wings just outboard of the landing gear is where the the fuel tanks are.
Maybe you can use a pair of bombs under the wing but that tends to limit the ability to attack ships?
And we are back to the weight problem. You are using a plane with the same engine as a Hurricane (even going to the MK II of both types) that weighs hundreds of pounds more to carry the same load.


All three planes were bog slow and the chances of the forward firing guns making much of a difference is pretty slim.

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Actually I agree with this but imagine that BP would promote their device over the Skua. After all they had done the P82 SeaDefiant as a competition alternative to the Roc already.The BP Skua is the fast and dirty solution. A dive bomber Defiant is the best driving out the modestly useful and turning up too late for the party.

If the RAF 'saw a blinding light on the road to Bentley Priory' then the Perseus's could be found off the Lysander production allocation and be in service in time to act in the BoF. All dive bombers or light bombers need escort or air dominance and the difference between the survival rate of Skua against Battle is small but would exist and take with them a few more Me 109s. FAA dive bombers did sterling work around Dunkirk.

The RAF would need to introduce a much faster response loop than just changing aeroplanes. Much as Home Defence was a whole system not just 'cool' fighters, the use of dive bombers needs it's own reporting/response cycle system integrated within the BEF. All you need to do is change the entire belief system of the RAF since it's inception…………

The fundamental problem the Fleet Air Arm faced was it had only reverted to Royal Navy control in 1937 and had missed out on the generation of doctrinal development that in the IJN and USN led to the A6M and F-4U Corsair respectively..

The hell you say? Yes, both those iconic designs came from design requirement let in early 1938!

The FAA stated the war with a miss mash of types totally unsuited to carrier warfare and the work of people with often not a single ounce of carrier aviation understanding.
See the British still issuing design requirements for fighters with a navigator in the belief it was 'too complex' a task for a pilot on his own to navigate long distances over water while the JN and and USN had standardised on single seat fighter types.

Both the IJN and USN had come to the conclusion in the latter half of the 30's that any naval fighter had to have performance at least as good - and ideally better - than land based fighters it was going to face.

Clayton Magnet said:

re-read post 269 from R Reluctant Poster
The "fighter" SBD has been blown out of proportion

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The big advantage the USN possessed in the SBD was it had a good enough performance to act as a secondary fleet defence 'fighter' which was indeed one of its its secondary roles.
It was more than good enough to tangle with confidence with enemy bombers - and had a good ability to defend itself against fighter types. Its performance in the role was good enough to instil confidence in its pilots to 'have a go'.

Macandy said:

The fundamental problem the Fleet Air Arm faced was it had only reverted to Royal Navy control in 1937 and had missed out on the generation of doctrinal development that in the IJN and USN led to the A6M and F-4U Corsair respectively..

The hell you say? Yes, both those iconic designs came from design requirement let in early 1938!

The FAA stated the war with a miss mash of types totally unsuited to carrier warfare and the work of people with often not a single ounce of carrier aviation understanding.
See the British still issuing design requirements for fighters with a navigator in the belief it was 'too complex' a task for a pilot on his own to navigate long distances over water while the JN and and USN had standardised on single seat fighter types.

Both the IJN and USN had come to the conclusion in the latter half of the 30's that any naval fighter had to have performance at least as good - and ideally better - than land based fighters it was going to face.

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I can't disagree that losing a decade of doctrinal and maritime air power theory undoubtedly hurt the FAA. However, the example you provide as "evidence" is completely wrong on a number of levels.

First off, the primary carrier-based fighters prior to the Skua and Fulmar were the Hawker Nimrod and the preceding Fairey Flycatcher. Those aircraft spanned the period 1923-1939 so entirely cover the pre-war period...and BOTH were single-seat fighters.

Secondly, neither the Skua nor the Fulmar had a navigator. They had a telegraphist air gunner. All navigation was done by the pilot.

There were two doctrine-driven RN carrier problems that emerged from the 1920s and 1930s. First was the relatively small size of the carriers themselves, which drove requirements for multi-role aircraft like the Skua. The second was the determination that carrier aircraft would be too far offshore to encounter single-engine fighters. Both those issues can be laid squarely at the door of the "battleship admirals" who never integrated aircraft carriers into their planning. It could be argued that the lack of FAA aircrew being promoted to admiral rank had an impact on that but, let's face it, no FAA pilot was EVER going to attain the highest ranks in the RN. To do that you had to be a ship driver (still true today).

Macandy said:

The fundamental problem the Fleet Air Arm faced was it had only reverted to Royal Navy control in 1937 and had missed out on the generation of doctrinal development that in the IJN and USN led to the A6M and F-4U Corsair respectively..

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The decision to transfer the FAA from RAF to Admiralty control came out of the Inskip Report which was published at the end of 1937. BUT the actual transfer of responsibility took place on 24 May 1939, just over 3 months before war broke out.

Reluctant Poster said:

The prowess of the SBD as an ersatz fighter is greatly exaggerated.

A large part of the SBDs claim to fame is the battle of Coral Sea. I was always puzzled by the extremely high USN claims for Zeros shot down during this battle. If these numbers were remotely true the Zero easily wins the title of the worst fighter of WWII. In fact, it would qualify as one of the worst aircraft of all time. A pilot would be safer in a BE2 flying over the Western Front during Bloody April.

A while ago I did an accounting for the Zeros at Coral Sea on May 8 based on Lundstrom's book "The First Team". The claims of Zeros shot down by the USN were extraordinarily high, a total of 32 plus an Me 109! Clearly this could not be the case Zeros considering that the Zuikaku started the day with 19 operational Zeros while the Shokaku started with 18 for a total of 37.

Each of the carriers contributed 9 Zeros for bomber escort with the rest reserved for CAP. During the battle over the Japanese force SDBs claimed 11 Zeros destroyed with the F4Fs claiming 4 more.

The reality was far different. Two of Shokaku's CAP Zeros were shot down with both pilots killed and 3 accompanied her as CAP as she withdrew from the battle. I am not sure what their ultimate fate was. I presume they ditched. The remainder landed on Zuikaku. None of Zuikaku's CAP were shot down. Lundstrom credits the 2 Zeros shot down to F4Fs. Note that only 16 of the 19 Zeros actually took part in the battle.

Of the Zeros accompanying the strike, none were shot down, 1 ditched and 3 landed on Zuikaku but were pushed over the side to make room for incoming aircraft. The other 14 all landed safely on Zuikaku. In contrast, the F4Fs claimed 1 Me 109 and 9 Zeros shot down with the SDBs claiming a further 6 Zeros. To quote Lundstrom "From a correlation of Japanese and American sources, it appears reasonable that the F4Fs actually shot down no Zeros , but perhaps splashed three dive bombers and one torpedo plane, while the SBD crews accounted for no Zeros, but downed one dive bomber and five torpedo planes – total ten Japanese aircraft destroyed by aerial engagement. American anti aircraft fire from the ships likely destroyed one dive bomber and two torpedo planes." My emphasis in bold.

On that day the SBDs claimed to have shot down 17 Zeros 1 Val and 1 Kate. The reality according to Lundstrom was 0 Zeroes 1 Val and 5 Kates.

Going back to the previous day and the attack on Shoho the SBDs claimed to have shot down 5 Type 96s and 1 Val. The reality was 0 Type 96s and 0 Vals. F4F did shoot down 1 Zero and 2 Type 96s.

In the battles leading up to Coral Sea the SBDs claimed to have shot down 6 Type 96s when in fact they shot down 0.

Total SBD claims up to and including Carol Sea:
17 Zeroes actual 0
11 Type 96 actual 0
2 Vals actual 1
1 Kate actual 5
31 total actual 6

For the entire war SBDs claimed to have shot down 75 fighters and 39 bombers vs a loss of 40 SBDs in air to air. The above numbers put a serious dent in those claims

A summary of the Japanese Attack on TF 17 at Coral Sea where the SBDs were used as low-level fighters:

F4Fs
20 participating 3 shot down
Zeros 9 claimed 0 shot down
Me 109 1 claimed 0 shot down
Vals 4 claimed 3 shot down
Kates 1 claimed 1 shot down

SDBs
23 participating 5 shot down
Zeros 6 claimed 0 shot down
Vals 1 claimed 1 shot down
Kates 1 claimed 5 shot down

The Zuikaku finished the day with 24 fully operational Zeros, 1 easily repaired Zero and at least 2 heavily damaged Zeros. That leaves 1 not specifically accounted for by Lundstrom, which was likely a badly damaged Zero aboard the Zuikaku.

In summary the F4Fs claimed to have shot down 13 Zeros (and a 109) when in actual fact they shot down 2 and the SDBs claimed 17 Zeros when in fact they shot down zero Zeros. With 3 of Zuikaku's Zeros remaining on deck during the battles over the Japanese task force, if the claims are taken at face value the USN shot down virtually every Zero they saw. This was plainly not the case. The incredible over claiming of Zeros (a factor of 15 to 1) can be attributed to two factors: the USN overall over claimed by a factor of almost 4 and they tended to claim everything they shot at was a Zero. To be fair the Japanese pilots were even more optimist in their claims.

I haven't had the chance to look at the numbers at Midway in detail where the Japanese did lose 13 Zeros. Lundstrom credits 12 of those to F4Fs with 1 possibly shot down by an SBD or TBD.

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Although I can't find the SBD claims for Midway, I did go through Lundstroms "The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign" and found a similar story.
At Eastern Solomons the SBDs claimed 6 Vals but actually shot down 0.
At Santa Cruz they claimed 15! Zeros during the strike on the Japanese but actually shot down 0.
At Santa Cruz during the strike on the Americans they claimed
2 Zeros actual 0
9 Vals actual 2
2 Kates actual 0

I haven't found an actual kill of a Zero by an SBD in Lundstrom's books with exception of the one possible kill at Midway. I have found claims for 11 Type 96s and 34 Zeros that can be discounted. That's reducing the SBD claims against fighters by more than 1/2 without looking at all the data. The claims against Vals and Kates do seem to be closer to the mark.

I did make a couple of mistakes in my previous post. SBDs claimed 31 bombers not 39 and they lost 43 in air to air not 40. I should also point out that this is for carrier-based SBDs only.

Land Based Marine squadrons lost 96 SBDs in air to air and claimed 22 fighters in return (no bombers)
Land Based Navy SBDs lost 17 in air to air and claimed 10 fighters (no bombers).

buffnut453 said:

Secondly, neither the Skua nor the Fulmar had a navigator. They had a telegraphist air gunner. All navigation was done by the pilot.

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The Skua was manned by a pilot and a TAG.

But the Fulmar was manned by a pilot and an Observer. The latter handled both navigation and the operation of the radio equipment from the rear cockpit. The Observer was necessary to allow the aircraft to fulfill it secondary reconnaissance role

buffnut453 said:

It could be argued that the lack of FAA aircrew being promoted to admiral rank had an impact on that but, let's face it, no FAA pilot was EVER going to attain the highest ranks in the RN. To do that you had to be a ship driver (still true today).

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It would perhaps be truer to say that during the inter-war period but not since.

Virtually everyone involved with the RNAS got transferred to the RAF on 1 April 1918. The first FAA courses for aircrew began in 1924. At that point Observers and about 50% of the pilots were to come from the RN. But beyond a certain point the prospects for promotion in an RN flying position were limited. Add to that, it took a Midshipman about 22 years to rise to the rank of Captain and then another 8 or so to gain enough seniority to command a carrier, you see why the RN carriers at the start of WW2 were commanded by individuals without service flying experience (D'Oly Hughes who commanded Glorious when she was lost in 1940 was actually a qualified pilot having gained a civilian PPL). So someone joining around 1910 involved in aviation would have gone to the RAF in 1918.

Those who were on those earliest FAA courses only began to receive carrier commands from 1943/44, usually in the form of escort carriers, as RN naval aviation expanded as they gained the appropriate rank and seniority. The one exception I have found was L D Macintosh, who opted into naval aviation part way through his career, qualifying first as an Observer and later as a pilot, and got command of Eagle in June 1942, then Victorious and then Implacable. He retired from the RN as a Vice-Admiral in 1950.

2 RN naval aviators have reached the dizzy heights of First Sea Lord, the most senior position in the RN, since WW2. The first was Sir Casper John who joined the RN in 1917 and was FSL between 1960 & 1963.

More recently Sir George Zamballas, a naval helicopter pilot, was FSL between 2013 & 2016

Many other individuals with service in RN naval aviation have reached the highest ranks in the RN. But having the experience of being a "ship driver" is an essential qualification for any carrier captain. You don't simply go from piloting an aircraft to captaining the carrier.

While the USN have adopted a policy post-war of having their carriers commanded by naval aviators, they too cut their "ship driving" experience on smaller vessels.

EwenS said:

The Skua was manned by a pilot and a TAG.

But the Fulmar was manned by a pilot and an Observer. The latter handled both navigation and the operation of the radio equipment from the rear cockpit. The Observer was necessary to allow the aircraft to fulfill it secondary reconnaissance role

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Thanks for the correction, Ewen, but that still points to lack of aircraft capacity within the carriers themselves, which drove requirements for multi-role aircraft. Sticking with a dive bomber replacement that could also do reconnaissance, rather like the SBD, was probably a better option than giving the Fulmar a reconnaissance role...which requires a bunch of features that actually contradict the requirements of an effective fighter (e.g. stability).

buffnut453 said:

Thanks for the correction, Ewen, but that still points to lack of aircraft capacity within the carriers themselves, which drove requirements for multi-role aircraft. Sticking with a dive bomber replacement that could also do reconnaissance, rather like the SBD, was probably a better option than giving the Fulmar a reconnaissance role...which requires a bunch of features that actually contradict the requirements of an effective fighter (e.g. stability).

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Clearly you've forgotten much of my post #212 on the Seafire v Corsair thread that you liked.

In terms of aircraft numbers what are you comparing with what and when? Several points worth noting:-

1. Most of the RN carriers designed inter-war had hangar capacity for 36 (Furious & Illustrious class) or 48 (C&G & Implacables) aircraft as designed. The experimentals, Argus, Hermes and Eagle had less (the disadvantage of being a leader in the field of carrier development in WW1). But the RN was committed to these WW1 ships before the reconstruction of Furious was even considered and her redesign proved to be a bit of an eye opener for the RN in terms of aircraft numbers. Ark of course had more (60).
2. After the experimental Langley, with her 34 aircraft many of which were broken down to be stored deep in her holds not in the hangar, the US decided it wanted 39,000 ton carriers before Washington for its role in the advance across the Pacific. The RN felt smaller ships suited its needs better. Both had good reasons for their decisions. They both went to the Washington Conference and broadly both came away with what they wanted.
3. US carrier airgroups are inflated pre-war because of the reserve aircraft they were forced to carry for the war they intended to fight over ever increasing distances across the Pacific as they moved further & further from their bases in Hawaii & the West Coast. So Lex and Sara are rated at 100 in 1936 (data from Friedman). But 30 (30%) of those were reserves either triced up in the hangar roof or otherwise broken down for storage and not immediately available for action. Ranger (an experiment in trying to squeeze a Lex sized airgroup into a hull half the size proved to be a folly) as built in 1934, 114 of which 38 (33%) were reserves. That practice was stopped in 1942 as it was found to be inherently dangerous under wartime conditions. Britain didn't have that constraint due to its worldwide network of bases to operate from and pick up replacement aircraft from.
4. British carrier capacity was determined by how many would fit in the hangar. The US by how many would fit on the flight deck for their preferred "deck load strike". Why? Because wood and canvas aircraft of the 1920s and 1930s wouldn't have lasted 5 mins on deck in some of the waters that the RN had to operate in. And of course providing the aircraft was an RAF responsibility even though the RN paid, and the RAF didn't want to acquire naval aircraft. Maintaining servicability of aircraft parked on deck in northern waters remained a problem right through to the end of the war. Much less so in the IO and Pacific. And when it came to 1936 keeping them in a protected hangar meant that the strike force was more likely to survive an enemy attack that it was thought couldn't be defeated by defensive fighters. The RN did however begin to adopt deck parks from late 1940.
5. Both nations were affected by aircraft numbers being reduced as aircraft grew in size during the 1930s.
6. Comparison with the Essex class, which is often made, is not appropriate as, while that design began pre-war, it ended after the outbreak of war when all the Treaty limits went out the window. One objective of its much larger design was to restore the air group size to previous levels. But there were limits. By 1945 it was felt that an Essex air group with 105 aircraft was too big to be handled efficiently. And the size of the Midway airgroup caused concern even before they were laid down. So numbers alone are not the answer. The RN did however acccept by 1942 that fleet carrier capacity needed to increase and that was incorporated in the Audacious class.
7. As for the armoured deck, well the US looked at that too while designing both the Yorktowns and the Essex but preferred greater aircraft numbers for the war it expected to fight. The RN recognised that on a Treaty limited hull you could have aircraft capacity (Ark) or protection (Illustrious) but not both. It took the USN 45,000 tons on a Midway to get both.
8. USN exercises showed that its carriers had to get their first strike in successfully or they would be disabled or sunk, in all liklihood very far from home.
9. One of the reasons for having an Observer in many FAA aircraft was that the RN felt that RAF pilots were not so well trained as naval officers in navigation. It formed a part of every naval officer's basic training before he even got to learn to fly. Given the Bomber Command experience early in the war maybe that is true! Again a reflection of the RN not having control of FAA pilot training.
10. Your favourite SBD arose from a hurried redesign of an earlier aircraft (the BT-1) in early 1938. The first production models (SBD-1/2) came off the production line in small numbers from April 1940 without self sealing fuel tanks. It didn't gain that feature until the SBD-3 variant arrived in March 1941. By then the Skua was in the last days of its front line service. The Albacore, capable of dive bombing, had been in service for over a year. If it hadn't been for the outbreak of war then the Barracuda would have been about to enter production. And as I've noted in other posts the combination of torpedo & dive bombing in the one airframe actually makes sense because of the attack profile developed by the RN between the wars. And look at what I have posted before about the origins of the two seat fighter in the RN.

Ultimately, as I have said before, both nations built the type of ships that they felt would best suit their needs based on the knowledge and experience that they had. But the experience of the early war years changed everything. And ultimately only the US had the industrial capacity to react to thos echanges quickly enough to have an effect on the otcome of WW2.

Ah Hah! Wood and canvas aircraft?

Does the Skua even need improving? Given effective (single seat, monoplane, retractable undercarriage, folding wing) fighter escort and a good AP bomb the Skua could have served effectively into end of 1942. As it was, four squadrons of Skuas out of Ceylon along with or instead of the Blenheims on that day Nagumo forgot to put up sufficient CAP might have been successful.

Yes, a 225 mph (max) bomber carrying a single 500 lb. bomb is going to present challenges, but it's the lack of an effective escort fighter in sufficient numbers that's the real issue. Second issue is the lack of crews to fly all the Skuas, Swordfish, Albacores, Fulmars, etc… something had to be discarded.

yulzari said:

The RAF would need to introduce a much faster response loop than just changing aeroplanes. Much as Home Defence was a whole system not just 'cool' fighters, the use of dive bombers needs it's own reporting/response cycle system integrated within the BEF. All you need to do is change the entire belief system of the RAF since it's inception…………

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Hi
The RAF at its inception during 1918 were well aware of the need of a rapid reporting/response cycle as can be seen in the documents of the period, for example from 'Notes on Corps Squadron Work during the Somme Offensive August 1918':


Also from '13th Wing Special Operation Order No.12' dated 24th September, 1918:

And from a 66th Division 'Instruction No.2, Issued under Divisional Order No.92' (issued down to Platoon Commanders), dated 6th October, 1918:

All documents from UKTNA.
So working within the bounds of available technology the RAF Corps aircraft used W/Telegraphy to call for artillery or FGA or other Corps aircraft to make attacks on enemy troop concentrations (and also use their own weapons against them). They could also attract the attention of other air assets to the enemy concentration by firing a red flare and also warn the troops on the ground with other pyrotechnics. The FGA (mainly Camels) would operate from Advance Landing Grounds, where they could also be re-armed and refuelled, therefore speeding up the air support process. Also late 1918 the RAF also used telephony equipped aircraft to send messages back informing of the enemy forces situation.
One of the main problems for air support for the Army in the 1930s was that it was not decided to send a substantial Expeditionary Force to France until not long before war was declared, which meant not even the Army knew what they would require.

Mike

EwenS said:

The decision to transfer the FAA from RAF to Admiralty control came out of the Inskip Report which was published at the end of 1937. BUT the actual transfer of responsibility took place on 24 May 1939, just over 3 months before war broke out.

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Yes, I'm well aware of the date of formal administrative transfer.
However, the Admiralty started drafting orders on the direction of naval aviation from the start of 1938 - but having no experience 'in house' - aviation was the RAF's responsibility and only the most mediocre pilots were drafted to the Fleet Air Arm by the RAF , basically defaulted to carrying on as before and ordering outdated concepts developed by the RAF such as torpedo fighters and twin seat fighters.

The RN had done no experiments along the lines of the US Navy's Fleet Problems from 1922-1940 to drive and develop doctrine.
Royal Navy doctrine such as it had was no further improved from what it had developed by 1918 - ie, the primary role of naval aviation was to scout for the Battleships, then provide spotting for the Battleships big guns, ( See the Swordfish, Torpedo Spotter Reconnasance) and as an afterthought, carry some mediocre fighters to shoo away any enemy observation or torpedo planes. There was no doctrine of carriers as a strategic weapon conduction strikes against land targets and dominating air space.

An excellent read, the US Navy entered WWII with a fully worked up and modern war winning carrier aviation doctrine.

Amazon product ASIN 178039392X

Didn't the RN come up with better fighter direction?

Macandy said:

Yes, I'm well aware of the date of formal administrative transfer.
However, the Admiralty started drafting orders on the direction of naval aviation from the start of 1938 - but having no experience 'in house' - aviation was the RAF's responsibility and only the most mediocre pilots were drafted to the Fleet Air Arm by the RAF , basically defaulted to carrying on as before and ordering outdated concepts developed by the RAF such as torpedo fighters and twin seat fighters.

The RN had done no experiments along the lines of the US Navy's Fleet Problems from 1922-1940 to drive and develop doctrine.
Royal Navy doctrine such as it had was no further improved from what it had developed by 1918 - ie, the primary role of naval aviation was to scout for the Battleships, then provide spotting for the Battleships big guns, ( See the Swordfish, Torpedo Spotter Reconnasance) and as an afterthought, carry some mediocre fighters to shoo away any enemy observation or torpedo planes. There was no doctrine of carriers as a strategic weapon conduction strikes against land targets and dominating air space.

An excellent read, the US Navy entered WWII with a fully worked up and modern war winning carrier aviation doctrine.

Amazon product ASIN 178039392X

Fleet problem - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

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The RN did not perform so badly with them at Taranto.

Macandy said:

Yes, I'm well aware of the date of formal administrative transfer.
However, the Admiralty started drafting orders on the direction of naval aviation from the start of 1938 - but having no experience 'in house' - aviation was the RAF's responsibility and only the most mediocre pilots were drafted to the Fleet Air Arm by the RAF , basically defaulted to carrying on as before and ordering outdated concepts developed by the RAF such as torpedo fighters and twin seat fighters.

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Well when your involvement has been limited to the deck operations side of naval aviation for the last 20 years and you have none of the necessary decision making structures in place for deciding what is needed in the future, it is kind of difficult to make immediate changes. Organisational change doesn't happen overnight. Much as you might dislike the notion, change takes time. A new Air Division had to be set up within the Admiralty. New Departments to handle Air Personnel, Air Material (incl aircraft acquisition) and Aircraft Maintenance and Repair.And until you have complete control of an organisation changing it is in fact impossible.

And remember that the RN began in 1939 with almost nothing in terms of support. They received 4 airfields in Britain. They had to plan for how they could support what they had around the world, let alone the expansion that was already in the pipeline for the new carriers then building. So you find papers in the archives in the first half of 1939 about new facilities at home and abroad for repair & maintenance of naval aircraft. That is in addition to looking at aircraft production numbers, the numbers of slots on carriers and projections through until 1942 under various scenarios.

Aircraft acquisition policy is just one aspect and one where the RN was probably least experienced because that had been reserved to the RAF and Air Ministry, and defended jealously. Forming new staff requirements for everything needed, including aircraft, was the responsibility of the Directorate of Air Material created in Jan 1938. And you very rarely design and get a new aircraft into production in 18 months. So what do you do until you can decide exactly what you want? Just cancel everything in the pipeline? Or continue with what is already planned until you are clear about the new direction of travel? And by late 1939 the Admiralty had concluded that a new direction had to be found for its fighters. Hence all the confusion with industry as to what was actually being sought to fulfill N.8/39 and N.9/39.

There is an saying "act in haste, repent at leisure". And yes there is a balance to be struck and it would have been nice to have had things go faster. But everyone was working to a schedule that didn't foresee a war in Europe until about 1944. That included Hitler. The way things snowballed from Autumn of 1938 was just not in anyone's plans.

Macandy said:

The RN had done no experiments along the lines of the US Navy's Fleet Problems from 1922-1940 to drive and develop doctrine.
Royal Navy doctrine such as it had was no further improved from what it had developed by 1918 - ie, the primary role of naval aviation was to scout for the Battleships, then provide spotting for the Battleships big guns, ( See the Swordfish, Torpedo Spotter Reconnasance) and as an afterthought, carry some mediocre fighters to shoo away any enemy observation or torpedo planes. There was no doctrine of carriers as a strategic weapon conduction strikes against land targets and dominating air space.

An excellent read, the US Navy entered WWII with a fully worked up and modern war winning carrier aviation doctrine.

Amazon product ASIN 178039392X

Fleet problem - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

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Well the truth is that for the USN, IJN and the RN the battleship was king throughout the inter-war period and everyone was focussed on how to destroy those of the enemy. The carrier was simply an enabler to allow that to happen. But the tactics used as a means of enabling were different because the circumstances faced by each navy were different and for the USN changed over time.

Between the wars the USN planning for a war against Japan was based around War Plan Orange which involved an advance across the Pacific to break the blockade of the Philippines. In the 1920s the carriers were closely linked to the battle fleet. By the 1930s, the carriers would operate individually and independently of the battle fleet, each with its own cruiser escorts, to firstly locate an enemy fleet and secondly to destroy his carriers to stop them from finding the US fleet. So firstly reconnaissance / scouting which while essential was difficult (Fleet Problem XI in 1930. 4 days of futile searching by both sides!). And the weapon to disable/destroy the enemy carriers grew to be the dive bomber (which itself grew out of hanging bombs on fighters). And fighters were to try to ensure that an enemy did not get the first hit in on its own vulnerable carrier i.e. attempting to control the airspace above their own ship within the limitations of the day. The spotting function was moved entirely to floatplanes on cruisers and battleships because the carriers were operating independently away from the battle fleet. As I noted the expectation for the USN was that its carriers would probably very quickly be disabled/destroyed. For a time in the early 1930s the USN virtually abandoned the torpedo bomber viewing it as ineffective.

Using single carriers to attack places like Los Angeles and the Panama Canal, while spectacular, only served to demonstrate how vital it was to keep an enemy away from the vulnerable US coast. The real drive for USN carriers to attack land targets in the 1930s was to assist the Fleet in capturing enemy island outposts during a slow advance en route across the Pacific to relieve the Philippines and not "strategic" targets like the Panama Canal. And then the danger to them was the carrier strike aircraft being outranged by the land based variety or the same problem faced by the RN.

Inter war the RN expected to operate in much more confined waters under attack from land based bombers and outwith the range of the fighters of the day. And except against Japan wasn't going to encounter other carriers. So the role of the carrier could be much more focussed on attacking the enemy battle fleet. They weren't going to be supporting land campaigns or becoming involved in strategic bombing. Those were roles for the independent RAF, something not present in the USA. And the RN never lost faith in the torpedo, seeing it as the primary airborne weapon to at least slow down an enemy fleet. The purpose of the two seat fighters and later dive bombers was effectively flak suppression to allow the torpedo bombers to carry out that task.

Like the USN the RN did carry out annual exercises, usually with the Atlantic and Mediterranean Fleets in combination. They just didn't give them grand names like "Fleet Problem". And in those exercises they did seek to develop carrier tactics far beyond that achieved in 1918.

Night flying from carrier decks became a regular feature of FAA operations from the mid-1920s and explains why the FAA could carry out night operations from the earliest days of WW2. That necessitated development of appropriate flight deck lighting etc. From as early as 1928 Britain had begun to experiment with multi carrier forces. That had to include flying off, forming up concentration of aircraft for attack and orderly and safe return to the right ship. And they sought to use those multi carrier groups to seek out the enemy, not at sea, but where he thought he was safe, in his own ports. In 1932 for example the air groups from Courageous & Glorious combined to attack the Med Fleet in a Greek harbour (shades of Furious at Tondern in 1918 but on a far greater scale and a precursor to Taranto in Nov 1940 and Pearl Harbor in 1941). The IJN began multi carrier operations with the formation of the Kido Butai in April 1941 and the USN not until 1942.

Ah I hear the cry! If only they had bigger carriers in the first place. But what is better? A single flight deck that the USN expected to lose almost immediately or multiple decks offering an increased chance of survivability if only by splitting the attention of the attacking force?

So again we come back to different navies facing different threats, or perceiving the same threat in a different way, and having to formulate solutions to meet them. And really until the mid-1930s all nations are experimenting and developing carriers, the best types of aircraft to operate from them and the best tactics to employ. Yes from being the world leader at the end of WW1 the RN fell behind in carrier operations. But of the Big 3 carrier nations in WW2, it was the only one not to have full control of its naval air service during the inter-war period.

a few observations on the events.

There were a lot of changes going on. Especially in aviation. While a 1932 torpedo bomber was a large improvement over a 1922 torpedo bomber the possibility of 1942 torpedo bombers were in another world (or could have been, 6 Avengers at Midway?). The Avenger used an engine almost 4 times more powerful than the FAA torpedo bombers of the 1920s.
Grumman was NOT responsible for the MK 13 Torpedo.
Dive bombing was not a tactic until the very late 20s or early 30s. Yes a lot of planes had dropped bombs while diving. However the over 60 degree dive (and approaching 90 degrees) that allowed for a number of seconds of continuous aim that was mark of the 1920s/30s experiments and US colonial actions was a dividing line.

In some ways the ships is use were the results of the Washington treaties. Bespoke ships didn't show up until the mid 30s. or designs for them in the early 30s. The Hulls chose the carriers and not the other way around. It wasn't until the Ranger and Yorktown (1937) show up that the US was getting a handle on desired size of carriers. Likewise the Ark Royal didn't get into operation until 1939. And these mid 30s carriers were still restricted by treaties and not actual operational requirements. A lot of theories, like lots of little carriers vs a few big ones but nobody knew. The small British carriers were too small and too slow by the 30s to compare to a ship larger than the Glorious.

A lot of the exercises during the 20s and 30s were judged by referee's, some whom had biases of their own and sometimes the rules of the exercise were biased to begin with. For instance one reason that US Submarine performance was rather poor at the beginning of the war was the US sub commanders were overly cautious. Sometimes the exercise rules stated a sub was assumed sunk if a surface ship sighted it's periscope. Getting your sub "sunk" on exercise could affect chances of promotion in the peace time navy.

Anti-aircraft fire was weighed very heavily in favor of the ships guns in many of these exercises. The gunnery men were working on better systems but they were working a bit slowly and in some cases were trying too hard. The US spent years working on the 1.1 in AA gun and wound up with an unreliable mount of extreme complexity. However in their goal of best is the enemy of good, the 1.1 had the ability to skew the barrels left and right in order to track dive bombers. If you point a normal gun up at high elevation it is vary hard to track a target diving at the gun. Normal traverse swings the guns off target.
The US had the 5in/38 and was the best in the world in that regard (which may not be saying all that much until the proximity fuse showed up) but it was heavily criticized by surface fire advocates for not having enough range or firing in too high an arc for good surfaces shooting. However nobodies destroyers had the fire control equipment (or the ship stability) to fire at longer ranges anyhow. Another triumph of theory over practicality.


A lot this stuff seems to be part coincidence.
The RN had small groups of planes, attacking in daylight against the supposed superiority of the AA guns might have meant failure. Attacking at night would severely hamper the AA guns. But trying to attack at night without radar in the planes also has it's own problems, Dropping flares by a few planes to illuminate the targets was one solution.
You also had navies were the same navy couldn't agree on what was needed. The US allocated eight .50 cal machine guns to each pre 1938 battleship for much of the 1930s.
They had a couple (2?) of 3in guns and eight 5in/25s (actually a pretty good weapon ). However the airplane guys were planning on using fighters to strafe the AA guns and drop light bombs for suppression to allow the dive bombers and torpedo bombers to have a better chance of success. In the 1930s the big AA guns had no shields or tubs. Crews were totally exposed. The 3in and 5in guns could not traverse fast enough to follow close in aircraft. the entire close range AA defense was up to those eight .50 cal guns in single mounts.
Dive bomber defense was wishful thinking. The dive bombers were going to be dropping their bombs from about the max practical range of the .50 cal guns.
the 5in guns fired time fuses in salvos. the 5in guns fired at 15-20rounds per minute. A dive bomber doing 300mph in the dive is dropping at almost 1500ft in 3 seconds.

It calls for some very good range estimation and fuse setting. and not much shooting time.
The US was fitting four of the quad 1.1in guns to each large ship in 1940-41. By 1940-41 the USN Navy was using fighters with four or six .50 cal guns per plane. so the AA gun crews were in trouble.

RN was sort of in the same boat, The light AA sucked and the heavy AA was biased too much toward surface fire. This can be seen by the losses suffered when operating in range of land based air. But changes of this type needed some real changes in thinking and in evaluating real needs or better interpretations of test results.