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It is not backwards, it does limit options however.Maybe the RNs concentration on torpedo attack instead of dive bombing is not as backward as sometimes suggested.
The 5in guns were getting an increasing supply of proximity fused projectiles.Earlier I mentioned the change in AA.
Extreme examples are things like the USS North Carolina class. They went to the Pacific with 6 quadruple 1.1 guns (upgraded from 4) in late 1942 with an assortment of of .50 cal MG and 20mm. By late spring or summer of 1943 both ships had the 1.1s landed and 10 quadruple 40mm Bofors guns replacing them and by August of 1943 both ships (?) had 15 quad mounts. The .50 cal MGs had pretty much disappeared and the number of 20mm guns were around 50+ to 64. A lot of the ships newer than the North Carolinas got pretty heavy AA batteries to begin with and a number of the older ships saw extensive changes.
The Japanese never saw such extensive upgrades. They tried to do what they could but they didn't have the manufacturing base.
I recommend reading Rob Stuart's 6 articles on the Japanese activities in the Indian Ocean in 1942. He is currently the foremost researcher on this, from both British and Japanese sources, and his articles do cover the Japanese bomb loads. I have noted previously that only 6 of the 85 aircraft dispatched to sink Hermes got land attack bombs. That piece of information came from one of Rob's articles.From Wiki so who knows.
"Before the Indian Ocean raid, the established doctrine regarding attack against ships was to arm all D3A1 dive bombers with semi-AP bombs. On 5 April 1942, an IJN carrier force attacked Colombo on Ceylon with half of its complement, while the other half was kept in reserve for strikes against ships. Since a second strike against Colombo was deemed necessary, the dive bombers of reserve force were rearmed from semi-AP bombs to land bombs. When British heavy cruisers were spotted soon afterwards, the reserve force was sent with a portion of D3A1 dive bombers armed with land bombs. In the subsequent attack, land bombs unintentionally proved very effective in suppressing the anti-aircraft fire from the ships. As a result, the doctrine was modified in order to intentionally equip the first few D3A1 dive bombers with land bombs. This new method was already implemented for the attack that sank HMS Hermes just four days later, and continued to be used from then on.[7]"
The Germans were using a mix of bombs and when they went after Illustrious & Formidable they did use some 1,000kg bombs on the Stukas. Illustrious suffered one such hit and Formidable 2. You will find details of these and the various damage reports over on the Armoured Carriers website.Might very well be wrong. I don't know what the Germans and Italians were using in the Med but it may have been an assortment. The damage assessment of the Illustrious tends to say that 3 different sizes of bombs were used from 250kg to 500kg with one 1000kg bomb. The types may also have been mixed.
The Royal Navy was a full 2 years ahead of the USN. I have posted this link before in which Commander Taylor describes his experiences in the RN in 1939 and 40My understanding, and I'm certainly amenable to correction, is that the RN pioneered radar-vectoring of carrier-borne fighters, prior to any other navy in the world. If memory serves, one of the lessons the USN picked up from USS Robin was the more efficient use of radar in this mission.
HiThe Royal Navy was a full 2 years ahead of the USN. I have posted this link before in which Commander Taylor describes his experiences in the RN in 1939 and 40
USN fighter direction was copied from the Royal Navy. To this day the jargon used is what the British taught them.
Was Hermes the only carrier at sea sunk only by dive bombers?The US air attacks reduced the 4 carriers at Midway to little more than smoking wrecks but they were all still afloat and theoretically could have been saved.
Hermes is the only confirmed direct loss to dive-bombers alone. Detailed article on her loss hereWas Hermes the only carrier at sea sunk only by dive bombers?
Of course, thirty-two dive bombers will get the job done.
Fleet defense was not one of its secondary roles. It was tried as an experiment at Coral Sea. It was not considered to be a sucess and the experiment was not repeated.The big advantage the USN possessed in the SBD was it had a good enough performance to act as a secondary fleet defence 'fighter' which was indeed one of its its secondary roles.
It was more than good enough to tangle with confidence with enemy bombers - and had a good ability to defend itself against fighter types. Its performance in the role was good enough to instil confidence in its pilots to 'have a go'.
Fleet defense was not one of its secondary roles. It was tried as an experiment at Coral Sea. It was not considered to be a sucess and the experiment was not repeated.
Coming across enemy aircraft is different than being assigned a sector of the air defense.Yes, it was such a non secondary role, many pilots felt confident to haver a go as a'fighter' when coming across Japanese aircraft, even willing to mix it with the A6M