MIflyer
Captain
Found this on a Youtube Video, although it has nothing to do with the subject being discussed.
Interesting Chart
- Thread starter MIflyer
- Start date
Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
- Thread starter
- #2
MIflyer
Captain
Note that prior to June 1944 - the peak of the chart for both graphs - a large percentage of "strategic" bombing was against transportation targets in preparation for Overlord, rather than against industrial production targets. That was true for both the USAAF and RAF. So after Operation Cobra, when Patton broke out of the bridgehead, the bombers could return to hitting factories, and it is about that time when German fighter production started a precipitous drop. And in that same time frame Rome was captured, freeing up heavy bombers of the 15th AF to hit German targets. Is that what happened?
And, by the way, the widespread introduction of the P-51 in an escort role in March 1944 meant that by June of 1944 the Luftwaffe was facing essentially an impossible situation when it came to daylight defense of those factories.
And, by the way, the widespread introduction of the P-51 in an escort role in March 1944 meant that by June of 1944 the Luftwaffe was facing essentially an impossible situation when it came to daylight defense of those factories.
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
If anything, that chart backs up the idea that if one wishes to go to war, one should have the means to do it beforehand.
- Thread starter
- #4
MIflyer
Captain
There has been a series of videos on Youtube about the German POW experience in the USA. All it took was a trip across the Atlantic on a Liberty Ship where they were served much better and more food, followed by a train ride in Pullman cars rather than 40and8 boxcars, in which they viewed everything lit up to an unheard degree, as well as huge factories with the parking lots filled with cars owned by the workers - and then the POW camps themselves. And they started thinking, "We thought we were ready! We thought we were strong! THIS is being ready and strong!"
Another video described Col Piper leading his Panzers in the Ardennes and capturing a US Army fuel depot with 50,000 gallons. And as a result realizing that the war was surely lost. The Americans thought so little of 50,000 gallons that they did not even bother to destroy it to keep it from being captured. It was impossible to win against such people.
And as impressive as that chart is, even the USAAF had to admit at the end of the war that maybe in the fall of 1944 they should have diverted their bombers into hauling fuel and supplies for Patton's Third Army. It does not matter if a factory is not yet destroyed if there are Sherman tanks idling in the parking lot.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Staff Sergeant
- 1,094
- Sep 30, 2021
Interesting chart, it suggests the Germans had a method of turning dropped bombs into fighters. The use of yearly figures is a poor way of presenting data unless things are stable year to year, consider the 1944 figures are for 12 months, the 1945 for 3 or 4 months, so you need to multiply the 1945 figures by 3 or 4 to create comparable figures. It also looks like the 1939 figures are for the final 4 months of the year.
USSBS yearly German aircraft production figures, total, average, worst and best months, ratio of best to worst, and percentage of average for best and worst months
Total 10,497
Average 874.75
Jan-41 572
Mar-41 1,078
Ratio 1.88
min % 65.39
max % 123.24
Total 14,731
Average 1,227.58
Feb-42 820
Dec-42 1,507
Ratio 1.84
min % 66.80
max % 122.76
Total 24,944
Average 2,078.67
Jan-43 1,463
Jul-43 2,435
Ratio 1.66
min % 70.38
max % 117.14
Total 39,590
Average 3,299.17
Feb-44 1,992
Jul-44 4,199
Ratio 2.11
min % 60.38
max % 127.27
The USSBS says the top 3 months were 4,007 in August, 4,103 in September and 4,199 in July 1944.
Next comes what is a fighter, most German fighter airframes had reconnaissance versions, many Me262 were built as bombers, about a third of Fw190 production was ground attack. Going the other way the USSBS considers all Ju88 to be bombers.
USSBS fighter production 1939 to 1944, 1,856, 3,106, 3,732, 5,213, 11,738, 28,926, nothing like the chart.
Another set of figures, all "fighter" airframes (Bf109, Fw190 etc.) plus the Ju88 etc. fighter versions, final 4 months of 1939 around 600, then 2,850, 3,950, 5,650, 12,500, 31,200, deduct the reconnaissance and ground attack versions it becomes 500, 2,750, 3,750, 5,500, 11,100, 26,800, the chart figures over estimate the 1941 and 1943 figures, while under estimating the 1944 figures.
In the first quarter of 1945 German fighter type airframe production was on the order of 7,000 or about 6,000 fighters after deducting reconnaissance and ground attack versions.
The USSBS, with its classifications says the ratio of fighters to bombers 1939 to 1944 was 0.65, 0.79, 0.86, 0.80, 1.37, 4.47. For the 12 months in 1944 it was 2.98, 1.95, 2.71, 2.97, 3.41, 3.48, 3.85, 5.51, 7.89, 9.12, 7.27, 10.04
Using total production numbers, fighters (excluding airframes built as reconnaissance or ground attack) made up 28.09% of production in 1940, 34.23% in 1941, 37.67% in 1942, 45.51% in 1943 and 66.27% in 1944. As is well known the major increases in German fighter production in 1944 in particular were partly made by cutting production of all other types.
Using the Official History Bomber Command yearly tonnage, long/short tons
1939 31 / 34.72
1940 13,032 / 14,595.84
1941 31,704 / 35,508.48
1942 45,561 / 51,028.32
1943 157,457 / 176,351.84
1944 525,518 / 588,580.16
1945 181,403 / 203,171.36
Total 954,706 / 1,069,270.72
Half of all bombs dropped by early July 1944, half of all bombs dropped on Germany by end September 1944. May 1940 to August 1944 is 53 months, then as many bombs again in 6.5 months, or about 8 times the previous rate.
USAAF ETO bomb tonnages, short tons, all types
1942 1,713
1943 55,655
1944 591,959
1945 322,435
Total 971,762
USAAF MTO bomb tonnages, short tons, all types
1942 4,410
1943 98,462
1944 346,993
1945 132,836
Total 582,701
Combined Totals in short tons
1939 35
1940 14,596
1641 35,508
1942 57,151
1943 330,469
1944 1,527,532
1945 658,442
Total 2,623,734
Combined Totals in short tons, Bomber Command and USAAF heavy bombers only.
1939 35
1940 14,596
1641 35,508
1942 55,992
1943 274,289
1944 1,272,185
1945 513,459
Total 2,166,065
Which appear to be the bomb figures in the chart. The US ETO heavy bombers hit their half bomb tonnage dropped in mid September 1944, for Germany mid November 1944, 23.5 months for the first half, 5 months for the second when attacking Germany.
For the MTO the half way point was early August 1944, the half way point for the 110,000 tons of bombs dropped on Germany and Austria was mid December 1944. First raid on Austria was in August 1943 giving 16.5 months for the first half, 4 months for the second.
Richard Davis says the USAAF MTO heavy bombers dropped 14,861 short tons of bombs on aircraft industry targets, 3.9% of effort, while the ETO effort was 45,041 tons, 6.3% of effort. Despite the prominence in the histories of attacks on aircraft industry the USAAF they were a minority of effort.
The above exclude the RAF in the Mediterranean, the nominal strategic force, 205 Group, dropped 47,267.5 short tons of bombs February 1943 onwards, the 1945 Jane's says the RAF MTO dropped 160,790 long tons of bombs, of which 2,352 tons were on Germany. Janes also adds 3,481 long tons of bombs by Fighter Command, 61,838 by 2nd TAF and 4,778 by Coastal Command.
Bomber Command bombs dropped in good to moderate weather on German cities, percentage within 3 miles of the aiming point over the past 6 months, Q1/44 50 to 60%, Q2 60%, Q3 65 to 75%, Q4 80 to 90%, about a 50% increase in average accuracy.
Finally the bomb tonnages by month, then the percentage of effort against Germany (8th Air Force and Bomber Command) and Germany and Austria (15th Air Force), the final column excludes 205 group and is bombs dropped on Germany and Austria that month. The 15th Air force started attacks on Czechoslovakia in June 1944, ceased attacks on France in August and Romania in September.
Air supply to France in 1944 required airfields able to handle the aircraft and support troops to quickly move any cargo to the ground forces.
Third army allows units to send their trucks to rear dumps for supplies, but does not enforce the units reporting what they have received to the Third Army quartermaster. This results in the army persistently underestimating its fuel requirements for most of August, until the informal system both breaks down and what it has been doing is recognised. During the last two weeks in August 3rd Army Quartermaster did not know daily requirements or receipts.
During the pursuit the combat troops make things worse by hijacking some convoys and in some cases taking all the fuel the supply trucks needed to return to the rear areas. In addition some of the support units are simply taking what they need from dumps as well, without asking permission. The logistics history notes that convoy hijacking was mainly done by 3rd army and the draining of fuel from supply trucks, preventing their return was only done by 3rd Army. The Red Ball trucks received orders not to go into 3rd Army Area. (Apparently one hijacking was 76 2,000 gallon tankers meant for ADSEC).
The Logistics history states that the delivery of fuel to the ground troops held up but the requirements simply kept going up, mainly the cost to haul the fuel forward, plus the widening of the US front from 100 to 300 miles in August-September, with the strain on lateral communications. A bad side to the broad front.
At the end of September there are now around 280 merchant ships assigned to the theatre, around 160 waiting their turn to unload. Amongst the items not shipped or landed through the lack of unloading capacity are replacement vehicles.
In September 1944 the allied ground force commanders in France were really competing for who would be the one to suffer a defeat by going "a bridge too far". Montgomery, and the paratroopers, "won"
USSBS yearly German aircraft production figures, total, average, worst and best months, ratio of best to worst, and percentage of average for best and worst months
Total 10,497
Average 874.75
Jan-41 572
Mar-41 1,078
Ratio 1.88
min % 65.39
max % 123.24
Total 14,731
Average 1,227.58
Feb-42 820
Dec-42 1,507
Ratio 1.84
min % 66.80
max % 122.76
Total 24,944
Average 2,078.67
Jan-43 1,463
Jul-43 2,435
Ratio 1.66
min % 70.38
max % 117.14
Total 39,590
Average 3,299.17
Feb-44 1,992
Jul-44 4,199
Ratio 2.11
min % 60.38
max % 127.27
The USSBS says the top 3 months were 4,007 in August, 4,103 in September and 4,199 in July 1944.
Next comes what is a fighter, most German fighter airframes had reconnaissance versions, many Me262 were built as bombers, about a third of Fw190 production was ground attack. Going the other way the USSBS considers all Ju88 to be bombers.
USSBS fighter production 1939 to 1944, 1,856, 3,106, 3,732, 5,213, 11,738, 28,926, nothing like the chart.
Another set of figures, all "fighter" airframes (Bf109, Fw190 etc.) plus the Ju88 etc. fighter versions, final 4 months of 1939 around 600, then 2,850, 3,950, 5,650, 12,500, 31,200, deduct the reconnaissance and ground attack versions it becomes 500, 2,750, 3,750, 5,500, 11,100, 26,800, the chart figures over estimate the 1941 and 1943 figures, while under estimating the 1944 figures.
In the first quarter of 1945 German fighter type airframe production was on the order of 7,000 or about 6,000 fighters after deducting reconnaissance and ground attack versions.
The USSBS, with its classifications says the ratio of fighters to bombers 1939 to 1944 was 0.65, 0.79, 0.86, 0.80, 1.37, 4.47. For the 12 months in 1944 it was 2.98, 1.95, 2.71, 2.97, 3.41, 3.48, 3.85, 5.51, 7.89, 9.12, 7.27, 10.04
Using total production numbers, fighters (excluding airframes built as reconnaissance or ground attack) made up 28.09% of production in 1940, 34.23% in 1941, 37.67% in 1942, 45.51% in 1943 and 66.27% in 1944. As is well known the major increases in German fighter production in 1944 in particular were partly made by cutting production of all other types.
Using the Official History Bomber Command yearly tonnage, long/short tons
1939 31 / 34.72
1940 13,032 / 14,595.84
1941 31,704 / 35,508.48
1942 45,561 / 51,028.32
1943 157,457 / 176,351.84
1944 525,518 / 588,580.16
1945 181,403 / 203,171.36
Total 954,706 / 1,069,270.72
Half of all bombs dropped by early July 1944, half of all bombs dropped on Germany by end September 1944. May 1940 to August 1944 is 53 months, then as many bombs again in 6.5 months, or about 8 times the previous rate.
USAAF ETO bomb tonnages, short tons, all types
1942 1,713
1943 55,655
1944 591,959
1945 322,435
Total 971,762
USAAF MTO bomb tonnages, short tons, all types
1942 4,410
1943 98,462
1944 346,993
1945 132,836
Total 582,701
Combined Totals in short tons
1939 35
1940 14,596
1641 35,508
1942 57,151
1943 330,469
1944 1,527,532
1945 658,442
Total 2,623,734
Combined Totals in short tons, Bomber Command and USAAF heavy bombers only.
1939 35
1940 14,596
1641 35,508
1942 55,992
1943 274,289
1944 1,272,185
1945 513,459
Total 2,166,065
Which appear to be the bomb figures in the chart. The US ETO heavy bombers hit their half bomb tonnage dropped in mid September 1944, for Germany mid November 1944, 23.5 months for the first half, 5 months for the second when attacking Germany.
For the MTO the half way point was early August 1944, the half way point for the 110,000 tons of bombs dropped on Germany and Austria was mid December 1944. First raid on Austria was in August 1943 giving 16.5 months for the first half, 4 months for the second.
Richard Davis says the USAAF MTO heavy bombers dropped 14,861 short tons of bombs on aircraft industry targets, 3.9% of effort, while the ETO effort was 45,041 tons, 6.3% of effort. Despite the prominence in the histories of attacks on aircraft industry the USAAF they were a minority of effort.
The above exclude the RAF in the Mediterranean, the nominal strategic force, 205 Group, dropped 47,267.5 short tons of bombs February 1943 onwards, the 1945 Jane's says the RAF MTO dropped 160,790 long tons of bombs, of which 2,352 tons were on Germany. Janes also adds 3,481 long tons of bombs by Fighter Command, 61,838 by 2nd TAF and 4,778 by Coastal Command.
Bomber Command bombs dropped in good to moderate weather on German cities, percentage within 3 miles of the aiming point over the past 6 months, Q1/44 50 to 60%, Q2 60%, Q3 65 to 75%, Q4 80 to 90%, about a 50% increase in average accuracy.
Finally the bomb tonnages by month, then the percentage of effort against Germany (8th Air Force and Bomber Command) and Germany and Austria (15th Air Force), the final column excludes 205 group and is bombs dropped on Germany and Austria that month. The 15th Air force started attacks on Czechoslovakia in June 1944, ceased attacks on France in August and Romania in September.
| month | BC | 8th | 15th | 205 Gp | Total | BC | 8th | 15th | GE+AU |
Jan-44 | 20,639.36 | 12,397 | 11,051 | 797.4 | 44,884.76 | 91.39 | 70.96 | 4.14 | 28,116.73 |
Feb-44 | 13,500.48 | 19,146 | 6,747 | 866.1 | 40,259.58 | 97.82 | 71.24 | 27.38 | 28,693.11 |
Mar-44 | 31,021.76 | 21,346 | 10,376 | 1460.5 | 64,204.26 | 71.16 | 69.56 | 12.99 | 38,271.20 |
Apr-44 | 37,515.52 | 27,576 | 21,256 | 1815.1 | 88,162.62 | 41.84 | 61.27 | 17.53 | 36,318.49 |
May-44 | 41,722.24 | 38,029 | 30,355 | 2209.4 | 112,315.64 | 22.94 | 55.21 | 15.75 | 35,347.81 |
Jun-44 | 64,139.04 | 59,625 | 24,466 | 2231.2 | 150,461.24 | 8.56 | 22.52 | 21.35 | 24,141.34 |
Jul-44 | 64,528.80 | 46,605 | 32,183 | 2233.6 | 145,550.40 | 22.95 | 66.00 | 27.89 | 54,544.50 |
Aug-44 | 73,757.60 | 49,305 | 27,839 | 2625.2 | 153,526.80 | 21.93 | 49.18 | 21.00 | 46,269.43 |
Sep-44 | 58,897.44 | 42,162 | 20,856 | 3466.5 | 125,381.94 | 40.02 | 86.30 | 17.24 | 63,552.14 |
Oct-44 | 68,548.48 | 45,087 | 16,257 | 1812.1 | 131,704.58 | 84.2 | 99.96 | 49.89 | 110,897.40 |
Nov-44 | 59,384.64 | 41,818 | 17,297 | 2558.8 | 121,058.44 | 99.7 | 93.43 | 66.25 | 109,736.31 |
Dec-44 | 54,924.80 | 43,069 | 18,757 | 1228.1 | 117,978.90 | 95.13 | 99.68 | 66.89 | 107,727.70 |
Air supply to France in 1944 required airfields able to handle the aircraft and support troops to quickly move any cargo to the ground forces.
Third army allows units to send their trucks to rear dumps for supplies, but does not enforce the units reporting what they have received to the Third Army quartermaster. This results in the army persistently underestimating its fuel requirements for most of August, until the informal system both breaks down and what it has been doing is recognised. During the last two weeks in August 3rd Army Quartermaster did not know daily requirements or receipts.
During the pursuit the combat troops make things worse by hijacking some convoys and in some cases taking all the fuel the supply trucks needed to return to the rear areas. In addition some of the support units are simply taking what they need from dumps as well, without asking permission. The logistics history notes that convoy hijacking was mainly done by 3rd army and the draining of fuel from supply trucks, preventing their return was only done by 3rd Army. The Red Ball trucks received orders not to go into 3rd Army Area. (Apparently one hijacking was 76 2,000 gallon tankers meant for ADSEC).
The Logistics history states that the delivery of fuel to the ground troops held up but the requirements simply kept going up, mainly the cost to haul the fuel forward, plus the widening of the US front from 100 to 300 miles in August-September, with the strain on lateral communications. A bad side to the broad front.
At the end of September there are now around 280 merchant ships assigned to the theatre, around 160 waiting their turn to unload. Amongst the items not shipped or landed through the lack of unloading capacity are replacement vehicles.
In September 1944 the allied ground force commanders in France were really competing for who would be the one to suffer a defeat by going "a bridge too far". Montgomery, and the paratroopers, "won"
- Thread starter
- #6
MIflyer
Captain
The military is primarily a giant bureaucracy with enormous inertia and tends to keep doing the same thing, no matter what. The USAAF was trying to win the war through strategic bombing of industrial targets. The RAF was trying to win the war through de-housing of the Germans. By the time Patton made his breakout those objectives made no sense. At that point even Hitler realzied that the Me-262 was useless as bomber.
Initially there was concern in the USAAF over the advent of new more portable radio equipment being used by enlisted ground troops to divert aircraft from their planned missions, some Private on the ground overruling plans approved by Generals. The RAF developed coordination between airpower and ground forces in the Western Desert but in the CBI insisted that the airplanes talking to the ground forces directly since their staffs could properly brief the aircrew before takeoff - and besides they lacked suitable radios. This led to the USAAF talking to the ground forces in Burma directly since they had the "older" HF radios rather than the VHF sets the RAF had adopted. Both services finally figured out that FACs on the ground were a good idea in the ETO, and the USAF pretty much forgot that for Korea and had to rediscover it.
They shut off Patton's supplies because he was not following the agreed to plan of a "Dress Right Dress" march across France, all the Allied forces finally arriving at the border with Germany in JUNE 1945. Inertia Rules!
There were numerous former Luftwaffe airfields in France that could have handled B-17's and B-24's and the real problem was the lack of a suitable port to handle supplies, the French ports either occupied by the Germans or destroyed. Airlift to airfields in France would have helped that situation a great deal, at least relative to Patton's 3rd Army.
Initially there was concern in the USAAF over the advent of new more portable radio equipment being used by enlisted ground troops to divert aircraft from their planned missions, some Private on the ground overruling plans approved by Generals. The RAF developed coordination between airpower and ground forces in the Western Desert but in the CBI insisted that the airplanes talking to the ground forces directly since their staffs could properly brief the aircrew before takeoff - and besides they lacked suitable radios. This led to the USAAF talking to the ground forces in Burma directly since they had the "older" HF radios rather than the VHF sets the RAF had adopted. Both services finally figured out that FACs on the ground were a good idea in the ETO, and the USAF pretty much forgot that for Korea and had to rediscover it.
They shut off Patton's supplies because he was not following the agreed to plan of a "Dress Right Dress" march across France, all the Allied forces finally arriving at the border with Germany in JUNE 1945. Inertia Rules!
There were numerous former Luftwaffe airfields in France that could have handled B-17's and B-24's and the real problem was the lack of a suitable port to handle supplies, the French ports either occupied by the Germans or destroyed. Airlift to airfields in France would have helped that situation a great deal, at least relative to Patton's 3rd Army.
What wasn't in Allied plans, and really couldn't have been planned for, was the massive collapse of the German forces in the West following the Battle of Falaise Pocket between 12th & 21st Aug 1944. The plan was to reach the Seine by D+90. British forces crossed the River Seine on 25th Aug. By 4th Sept their advance elements (11th Armoured Div) had taken Antwerp. 250miles covered in just 10 days. And not by pushing all the Germans in front of them but by punching through many retreating German units leaving large numbers on either flank and to their rear in Belgium. On the Channel coast the Germans withdrew in organised fashion, turning ports into fortresses that had to be captured in set piece actions (Le Havre, Boulogne & Calais) or surrounded and left to wither (Dunkirk).
Existing airfields in France had been heavily bombed in the run up to D-Day and beyond. Any existing airfield needed a lot of work to bring it back into use. More had to be constructed in the lodgement area and more added as armies advanced. Airfields in Normandy were full of fighter bombers of 9th AF and 2nd TAF. As the armies moved forward, the first air units moving forward were those fighter bomber units, needed to support the armies on the ground. Behind them the medium bomber units of 9th AF and 2nd TAF moved in from England to vacated bases, giving them the extra range to support the armies in the field.
To take one example, Chateaudun (A-39). A pre-war French airfield 70 miles southwest of Paris. Captured 17th Aug by 35th US Inf Div. It took 9 days work by two Engineer Aviation Batts to make it useable. It was used by various recce and NF units from 9th AF until the 387th BG(M) moved in from its English base on 18th Sept. It moved on in Nov being replaced by the 439th TCG which stayed until July 1945.
In terms of supplies none of the Allied armies had sufficient supplies, or the transport, to move all their units forward in Aug. The British 2nd Army left all its infantry divisions behind in France so that its 3 armoured divisions (2 reinforced by an extra armoured brigade each) could make that rapid advance.
In the early days of Sept Eisenhower, backed by everyone all the way up to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and Churchill and FDR meeting at the Octagon Conference in Quebec, decided that the main Allied thrust into Germany would be north of the Ruhr. The hope then was that with the Germans having been in full retreat, a total collapse could be forced as in 1918. One good kick at the door and the war could be over by Christmas 1944. Allied intelligence proved incorrect and failed to take sufficient account of already stiffening German resistance. Then came Operation Market Garden as part of that revised strategy.
After D-Day through to Market Garden Allied transport aircraft squadrons were not idle. They flew supplies into France and removed casualties. RAF transport squadrons assisted with the movement of 2nd TAF squadrons to more forward airfields as that 250 mile advance proceeded.
So there was no space on French airfields for the strategic bombers, who, after being released from supporting the Allied armies were targeting the enemy oil supply chain.
Allied logistics had been planned on the basis of that slow advance across France to the German frontier and not what actually happened. Various other things did not help. The failure of Mulberry A (lucky Cherbourg proved better than expected), the failure of PLUTO to deliver fuel (fortunately it wasn't intended to rely on it), decision to cancel Operation Chastity (plan to build a port in Quiberon Bay) at the end of Aug because it would have been too far behind the front line.
French ports were cleared and brought into service as soon as possible. But by 1944 the Germans had become experts in their destruction. Dieppe was captured more or less intact, Le Havre, Boulogne & Calais all required a lot of work. The US put a lot of effort into capturing Brest, but it's condition and location far behind the front meant little use was made of it IIRC.
Existing airfields in France had been heavily bombed in the run up to D-Day and beyond. Any existing airfield needed a lot of work to bring it back into use. More had to be constructed in the lodgement area and more added as armies advanced. Airfields in Normandy were full of fighter bombers of 9th AF and 2nd TAF. As the armies moved forward, the first air units moving forward were those fighter bomber units, needed to support the armies on the ground. Behind them the medium bomber units of 9th AF and 2nd TAF moved in from England to vacated bases, giving them the extra range to support the armies in the field.
To take one example, Chateaudun (A-39). A pre-war French airfield 70 miles southwest of Paris. Captured 17th Aug by 35th US Inf Div. It took 9 days work by two Engineer Aviation Batts to make it useable. It was used by various recce and NF units from 9th AF until the 387th BG(M) moved in from its English base on 18th Sept. It moved on in Nov being replaced by the 439th TCG which stayed until July 1945.
In terms of supplies none of the Allied armies had sufficient supplies, or the transport, to move all their units forward in Aug. The British 2nd Army left all its infantry divisions behind in France so that its 3 armoured divisions (2 reinforced by an extra armoured brigade each) could make that rapid advance.
In the early days of Sept Eisenhower, backed by everyone all the way up to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and Churchill and FDR meeting at the Octagon Conference in Quebec, decided that the main Allied thrust into Germany would be north of the Ruhr. The hope then was that with the Germans having been in full retreat, a total collapse could be forced as in 1918. One good kick at the door and the war could be over by Christmas 1944. Allied intelligence proved incorrect and failed to take sufficient account of already stiffening German resistance. Then came Operation Market Garden as part of that revised strategy.
After D-Day through to Market Garden Allied transport aircraft squadrons were not idle. They flew supplies into France and removed casualties. RAF transport squadrons assisted with the movement of 2nd TAF squadrons to more forward airfields as that 250 mile advance proceeded.
So there was no space on French airfields for the strategic bombers, who, after being released from supporting the Allied armies were targeting the enemy oil supply chain.
Allied logistics had been planned on the basis of that slow advance across France to the German frontier and not what actually happened. Various other things did not help. The failure of Mulberry A (lucky Cherbourg proved better than expected), the failure of PLUTO to deliver fuel (fortunately it wasn't intended to rely on it), decision to cancel Operation Chastity (plan to build a port in Quiberon Bay) at the end of Aug because it would have been too far behind the front line.
French ports were cleared and brought into service as soon as possible. But by 1944 the Germans had become experts in their destruction. Dieppe was captured more or less intact, Le Havre, Boulogne & Calais all required a lot of work. The US put a lot of effort into capturing Brest, but it's condition and location far behind the front meant little use was made of it IIRC.
- Thread starter
- #8
MIflyer
Captain
It was not in their plans because they did not push to do it. Patton wanted to close the gap at Falaise but was told not to. He was pissed at that. As it was, in order for the US Forces rushing to close the gap with the Free Polish forces they actually had to bisect an escaping German column in the middle of the night. The German traffic cop stopped his column and let the Americans cross at a 90 degree angle; probably a very good decision on his part, personally, in terms of his survival.
See the book "Patton's Gap" by Maj Gen Richard Rohmer, RCAF. He was a Mustang I pilot who covered Normandy.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Staff Sergeant
- 1,094
- Sep 30, 2021
The debate over naming Operation Overlord heroes starts with things well before the actual invasion.
COSSAC was a junior staff who had to accept what they were given, not ask for what they decided was needed. They came up with a three beach assault one problem of which was the mixture of landing craft promised "bore little of or no relation as to numbers and types to the actual requirements of the proposed operation". COSSAC had produced a plan where "the foot was cut to fit the shoe". This plan was debated at Quebec in August 1943, Churchill suggested a 25% increase in the assault if possible and Marshall agreed, so COSSAC knew it could try for a larger attack. However for some time post Quebec the agreed landing craft allocation was the supreme plan, Overlord came second, despite that it was supposed to be the other way around. After the allied Mediterranean command team came into the picture it became 5 beaches which resulted in people today strongly claiming it was the good Mediterranean general who made the change, with everyone else following.
The US army has a number of histories devoted to supply or making supply requirements a big part of the history. The titles include two devoted entirely to the European Theatre of Operations supply situation, The logistics histories
Logistical Support of the Armies Volume I
Logistical Support of the Armies Volume II
The Quartermaster Corps,
Organization, Supply and Service Volume I
Organization, Supply and Service Volume II
Operations in the War Against Japan
Operations in the War Against Germany
The Transport Corps,
Responsibilities, Organisation and Operations
Movements, Training and Supply
Operations Overseas
For PoW treatment and casualty evacuation there are the medical histories, mainly The Medical Department: Medical Services in the European Theatre of Operations, they have a remarkable amount of aviation content.
In sorting though the various claims and quotes I am quite confident you could select the evidence to "prove"
1) The British were dragged kicking and screaming into Overlord by the US
2) The US was dragged kicking and screaming into Overlord by the British
3) The western allies were dragged kicking and screaming into Overlord by the USSR
Point 3 requires the most careful selection of "evidence". As for point 2 the US refused to give Overlord overriding priority in 1943 as the British requested, cut back on landing craft in early 1943 and until the end of 1943 had the priority for cargo to the China/India/Burma theatre higher than preshipment cargo to the UK.
By end July 1944 the majority of the air commanders had worked out they could not win the war alone, Bomber Command had reduced area bombing to around the same level as the 8th Air Force Marshalling yard attacks using H2X through complete or near complete cloud cover, poor weather attacks to keep the pressure up.
Around 2nd/3rd August General Wood, commander US 4th armoured division formulates his plan to turn east, but his request comes into corps HQ too late to affect his orders for the day. He has to wait until Rennes is captured. The commander VIII corps (Middleton) then permitted a compromise, drive south, not west, until the Chief of Staff of 3rd Army intervened and ordered 4th Armoured to go west. By the 7th Wood was at Lorient, but it was the 15th before he was released to go east. On 3rd August Bradley told Patton to minimise forces in Brittany, on the 4th Montgomery issued the go east orders. The Mortain counter attack started on the 7th.
During August 21st Army group loans 300 to 360 3, 6 and 10 ton trucks (6 or 7 above average capacity truck companies) to 12th Army Group, mainly used for 3rd Army supply. This loan is trucks as well as 3 to 4 UK truck companies.
On 16th September start of Red Lion run, 8 US truck companies (6 with 2.5 ton trucks, 2 with 10 ton semi trailers) to ship around 650 tons/day for a total of 18,000 tons for Market Garden, half these supplies are for the 82nd and 101st. The companies are withdrawn from the Red Ball Express and are replaced there by provisional companies using the men and trucks from the 26th, 95th and 104th divisions. The provisional companies are reported to be better performing than the standard companies. The British have responsibility for Red Lion route maintenance, supply loading and unloading, control of traffic and supplying the men and machines used. The US looks after vehicle maintenance. The route is very efficient thanks to denser cargo and the fact all cargo comes from the one dump near Caen to a single dump near Brussels, a distance of 300 miles. Each truck carries an average load of 5.9 tons.
In late September 12th Army group required 650 tons per divisional slice per day, plus 9th Air Force and advance communication section tonnage. It projected needs of 18,800 tons/day for 22 divisions in early October.
During the pursuit 21st Army Group's initial plan was for 7 supply routes. The roads in the area had been under maintained since 1940 but it was considered enough were first class. Instead it was soon discovered many of the roads were too narrow or too fragile to stand the traffic. US Red Ball routes had to be adjusted when roads were declared unrepairable.
As the US Army leaves Normandy it leaves behind over 2 million jerricans, which hampers the fuel distribution system.
The US had never had an army group in combat. It came up with a cumbersome supply system.
As soon as sufficient territory had been gained 1st army would draw a rear boundary handing control of installations beyond that line to COMZ, the Communications Zone. Or more particularly ADSEC, the Advanced Section of COMZ, so there would be the army area, ADSEC area, COMZ area from front to rear. ADSEC would be a semi mobile organisation, keeping a minimum amount of rapid use supplies so as to be able to quickly move depots. One real source of friction was the head of COMZ, General Lee, was also deputy theatre commander, and while he was relived of this role shortly after the invasion the COMZ staff was also the ETOUSA staff, European Theatre Of Operations United States Army. This meant they were senior to the army groups, wearing ETOUSA hats and their equals when wearing COMZ hats. If there was a shortage ETOUSA would decide the allocation between COMZ and the Army Groups, in other words COMZ would decide. Since General Lee was an unpopular figure and gained a reputation with the armies for preferring appearance over substance any supply failures tended to generate even more heat.
On 1st August 1st Army finally drew a rear boundary and handed over control of the depots to around St Lo to ADSEC (COMZ), though it will continue to control some dumps for several more days. The COMZ HQ started to move to France in August, the office of chief Quartermaster ETO moving to Valognes. The change over date left very little time for the COMZ people to become familiar with the arrangements before things became frantic.
ADSEC stuck to the supply plan during the pursuit, opening depots that it stocked only to see them left well being the front line. By early September they had abandoned this plan, to assuming the pursuit was only temporarily paused, so hold off creating depots, an attitude that persisted through September.
One obvious example of the confusion was the units building the fuel pipelines having their transport taken away for a time to be used to haul supplies to the front.
Add caring for the civil populations, Paris had around 3 million people and needed special supply arrangements. The US was not able to put together a working supply system from the ports to the new front line plus care for all the civilians until weeks after the pursuit stopped at roughly the France Germany border, an area noted for its natural and man made defences.
There is a lot more in the histories. The US supply system was inexperienced and inevitably made mistakes, Third Army compounded the problems instead of easing them. The Overlord plan that had the armies arriving at the German border a year after D-Day was actually made for supply purposes. Any use, or planned soon use, of the paratroopers largely shut down the air supply system.
Cargo transported by air August and September 1944. Columns are week ending / to 12th Army Group / to 21st Army Group / to Paris. Supply in tons (unknown whether short or long, probably short)
26 Aug / 4,185 / 350 / 0
2 Sep / 1,877 / 917 / 1,676
9 Sep / 3,516 / 2,787 / 975
16 Sep / 3,221 / 3,712 / 0
Total / 12,799 / 7,766 / 2,631
Grand total 23,216 tons, 2,849 by the RAF 20,367 by the USAAF. In addition from 6 June to 19 August inclusive aircraft transported 14,213 tons to France.
8th Air Force supply flights to end September 1944, probably not included in the above.
246 Arnhem
245 Chartres
1,454 Lille/Vendeville
191 Operation Buick
319 Operation Cadillac
68 Operation Grassy
176 Operation Zebra
527 Orleans/Bricy
101 Warsaw
3,327 Total
12th Army group supply arrangements during September 1944. At start of month receiving 11,000 tons/day, of which 4,000 was for the air force. Daily allocations,
5th September 7,000 tons for ground troops 50:50 1st:3rd armies.
14th September as before but next 1,500 tons/day to 1st army.
21st September 3,500 tons to 3rd, 700 tons to 9th, rest to 1st (with a minimum of 5,000 tons)
27th September 5,400 tons for 1st, 3,100 to 3rd (1st had 10 divisions, 3rd had 8)
COSSAC was a junior staff who had to accept what they were given, not ask for what they decided was needed. They came up with a three beach assault one problem of which was the mixture of landing craft promised "bore little of or no relation as to numbers and types to the actual requirements of the proposed operation". COSSAC had produced a plan where "the foot was cut to fit the shoe". This plan was debated at Quebec in August 1943, Churchill suggested a 25% increase in the assault if possible and Marshall agreed, so COSSAC knew it could try for a larger attack. However for some time post Quebec the agreed landing craft allocation was the supreme plan, Overlord came second, despite that it was supposed to be the other way around. After the allied Mediterranean command team came into the picture it became 5 beaches which resulted in people today strongly claiming it was the good Mediterranean general who made the change, with everyone else following.
The US army has a number of histories devoted to supply or making supply requirements a big part of the history. The titles include two devoted entirely to the European Theatre of Operations supply situation, The logistics histories
Logistical Support of the Armies Volume I
Logistical Support of the Armies Volume II
The Quartermaster Corps,
Organization, Supply and Service Volume I
Organization, Supply and Service Volume II
Operations in the War Against Japan
Operations in the War Against Germany
The Transport Corps,
Responsibilities, Organisation and Operations
Movements, Training and Supply
Operations Overseas
For PoW treatment and casualty evacuation there are the medical histories, mainly The Medical Department: Medical Services in the European Theatre of Operations, they have a remarkable amount of aviation content.
In sorting though the various claims and quotes I am quite confident you could select the evidence to "prove"
1) The British were dragged kicking and screaming into Overlord by the US
2) The US was dragged kicking and screaming into Overlord by the British
3) The western allies were dragged kicking and screaming into Overlord by the USSR
Point 3 requires the most careful selection of "evidence". As for point 2 the US refused to give Overlord overriding priority in 1943 as the British requested, cut back on landing craft in early 1943 and until the end of 1943 had the priority for cargo to the China/India/Burma theatre higher than preshipment cargo to the UK.
First Army created the break out as part of Operation Cobra on 25 July, Patton was not in command of any combat troops, he became an advisor on 27 of July and commander of troops in combat when 3rd Army was activated at noon on 1st August. The breakout was underway when Patton came onto the scene, he turned it into a potentially devastating pursuit by being prepared to take risks like being cut off and only having one open bridge.
By end July 1944 the majority of the air commanders had worked out they could not win the war alone, Bomber Command had reduced area bombing to around the same level as the 8th Air Force Marshalling yard attacks using H2X through complete or near complete cloud cover, poor weather attacks to keep the pressure up.
Who is they? Where did the supplies go to and what did the supplied units do as a result? Where inertia initially ruled was post breakout where the objectives remained the pre invasion capture of Brittany ports.
Around 2nd/3rd August General Wood, commander US 4th armoured division formulates his plan to turn east, but his request comes into corps HQ too late to affect his orders for the day. He has to wait until Rennes is captured. The commander VIII corps (Middleton) then permitted a compromise, drive south, not west, until the Chief of Staff of 3rd Army intervened and ordered 4th Armoured to go west. By the 7th Wood was at Lorient, but it was the 15th before he was released to go east. On 3rd August Bradley told Patton to minimise forces in Brittany, on the 4th Montgomery issued the go east orders. The Mortain counter attack started on the 7th.
During August 21st Army group loans 300 to 360 3, 6 and 10 ton trucks (6 or 7 above average capacity truck companies) to 12th Army Group, mainly used for 3rd Army supply. This loan is trucks as well as 3 to 4 UK truck companies.
On 16th September start of Red Lion run, 8 US truck companies (6 with 2.5 ton trucks, 2 with 10 ton semi trailers) to ship around 650 tons/day for a total of 18,000 tons for Market Garden, half these supplies are for the 82nd and 101st. The companies are withdrawn from the Red Ball Express and are replaced there by provisional companies using the men and trucks from the 26th, 95th and 104th divisions. The provisional companies are reported to be better performing than the standard companies. The British have responsibility for Red Lion route maintenance, supply loading and unloading, control of traffic and supplying the men and machines used. The US looks after vehicle maintenance. The route is very efficient thanks to denser cargo and the fact all cargo comes from the one dump near Caen to a single dump near Brussels, a distance of 300 miles. Each truck carries an average load of 5.9 tons.
In late September 12th Army group required 650 tons per divisional slice per day, plus 9th Air Force and advance communication section tonnage. It projected needs of 18,800 tons/day for 22 divisions in early October.
During the pursuit 21st Army Group's initial plan was for 7 supply routes. The roads in the area had been under maintained since 1940 but it was considered enough were first class. Instead it was soon discovered many of the roads were too narrow or too fragile to stand the traffic. US Red Ball routes had to be adjusted when roads were declared unrepairable.
As the US Army leaves Normandy it leaves behind over 2 million jerricans, which hampers the fuel distribution system.
Why were the Luftwaffe building numerous airfields able to take aircraft bigger than what most of the Luftwaffe operated? And keeping them serviceable under the allied bombing?
Why was 3rd Amy much better placed for large German airfields?
Correct, there was a high chance of failure and he would be taking the supplies and troops that were being used to obtain bridgeheads over the Seine and capture other key objectives before the Germans could put defences in place. The Germans lost Falaise numbers of equipment and troops trying to get across the Seine before the allies arrived.
The US had never had an army group in combat. It came up with a cumbersome supply system.
As soon as sufficient territory had been gained 1st army would draw a rear boundary handing control of installations beyond that line to COMZ, the Communications Zone. Or more particularly ADSEC, the Advanced Section of COMZ, so there would be the army area, ADSEC area, COMZ area from front to rear. ADSEC would be a semi mobile organisation, keeping a minimum amount of rapid use supplies so as to be able to quickly move depots. One real source of friction was the head of COMZ, General Lee, was also deputy theatre commander, and while he was relived of this role shortly after the invasion the COMZ staff was also the ETOUSA staff, European Theatre Of Operations United States Army. This meant they were senior to the army groups, wearing ETOUSA hats and their equals when wearing COMZ hats. If there was a shortage ETOUSA would decide the allocation between COMZ and the Army Groups, in other words COMZ would decide. Since General Lee was an unpopular figure and gained a reputation with the armies for preferring appearance over substance any supply failures tended to generate even more heat.
On 1st August 1st Army finally drew a rear boundary and handed over control of the depots to around St Lo to ADSEC (COMZ), though it will continue to control some dumps for several more days. The COMZ HQ started to move to France in August, the office of chief Quartermaster ETO moving to Valognes. The change over date left very little time for the COMZ people to become familiar with the arrangements before things became frantic.
ADSEC stuck to the supply plan during the pursuit, opening depots that it stocked only to see them left well being the front line. By early September they had abandoned this plan, to assuming the pursuit was only temporarily paused, so hold off creating depots, an attitude that persisted through September.
One obvious example of the confusion was the units building the fuel pipelines having their transport taken away for a time to be used to haul supplies to the front.
Add caring for the civil populations, Paris had around 3 million people and needed special supply arrangements. The US was not able to put together a working supply system from the ports to the new front line plus care for all the civilians until weeks after the pursuit stopped at roughly the France Germany border, an area noted for its natural and man made defences.
There is a lot more in the histories. The US supply system was inexperienced and inevitably made mistakes, Third Army compounded the problems instead of easing them. The Overlord plan that had the armies arriving at the German border a year after D-Day was actually made for supply purposes. Any use, or planned soon use, of the paratroopers largely shut down the air supply system.
Cargo transported by air August and September 1944. Columns are week ending / to 12th Army Group / to 21st Army Group / to Paris. Supply in tons (unknown whether short or long, probably short)
26 Aug / 4,185 / 350 / 0
2 Sep / 1,877 / 917 / 1,676
9 Sep / 3,516 / 2,787 / 975
16 Sep / 3,221 / 3,712 / 0
Total / 12,799 / 7,766 / 2,631
Grand total 23,216 tons, 2,849 by the RAF 20,367 by the USAAF. In addition from 6 June to 19 August inclusive aircraft transported 14,213 tons to France.
8th Air Force supply flights to end September 1944, probably not included in the above.
246 Arnhem
245 Chartres
1,454 Lille/Vendeville
191 Operation Buick
319 Operation Cadillac
68 Operation Grassy
176 Operation Zebra
527 Orleans/Bricy
101 Warsaw
3,327 Total
12th Army group supply arrangements during September 1944. At start of month receiving 11,000 tons/day, of which 4,000 was for the air force. Daily allocations,
5th September 7,000 tons for ground troops 50:50 1st:3rd armies.
14th September as before but next 1,500 tons/day to 1st army.
21st September 3,500 tons to 3rd, 700 tons to 9th, rest to 1st (with a minimum of 5,000 tons)
27th September 5,400 tons for 1st, 3,100 to 3rd (1st had 10 divisions, 3rd had 8)
Yes. Not enough data points. The data should at least be monthly to get a decent idea of what was happening. It seems a fair bet that the bombing figures remained high on beyond June of '44, while German fighter production dropped off rapidly after that, and suddenly fell to zero in, what, mid-April '45? Or were there still new fighters on the assembly line on May 6?
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
Aircraft were still being produced until the guns fell silent.
While production fell off sharply from mid-44, they were still making them.
The larger issue, though, was getting the aircraft to the front intact and even then, finding pilots and fuel to operate them.
pinehilljoe
Staff Sergeant
- 874
- May 1, 2016
The chart also backs up the idea that to win a war in the 1940s, you need to destroy the enemy's forces. After Overlord, Cobra, and the Russian's Bagration, German aircraft production plummeted. German armed forces and economy crumbled. The German lost 1.2 Million dead and missing from June to November '44, compare that with losses from Sept '39 to May '44 of 2.0 Million
