Japanese lightly built carrier aircraft

[Balljoint]

some changes were made to the Hellcat design after the potential of the Zero was revealed. I dont know what those changes were, or how significant they were, but my book on the Hellcat at home will probably give some further details..

I think that it was noted from recovered Aleutian Zero that it had a bias in its vertical stabilizer rather than a trim tab. The Hellcat was supposedly tweaked to take advantage of the effect this had on the Zeros capacity to turn –though I suspect the zero turned rather well anyway.

 

[RCAFson]

If the Japanese could make light carrier aircraft then why couldnt the Americans who made a big fuss of their robustness.

They did and it was called the F2A-1. However, the airframe proved incapable of absorbing the needed increases in armour, self sealing tanks and firepower, that the war in Europe seemed to indicate was required for modern combat aircraft. The F4F-3/4 were (just) capable of accepting these changes while remaining a viable fighter.

 

[VBF-13]

If the Japanese could make light carrier aircraft then why couldnt the Americans who made a big fuss of their robustness.

Um, let me take a wild guess. Because in lieu of that we opted to make a bombing-fighting aircraft that out-slugged anything the Japanese had in the skies at the time at an unprecedented victory rate of 19:1 and that could take a licking and make it back to the carrier still ticking, and we kind of figured, how shall I say, that was good enough?

 

[The Basket]

Um, let me take a wild guess. Because in lieu of that we opted to make a bombing-fighting aircraft that out-slugged anything the Japanese had in the skies at the time at an unprecedented victory rate of 19:1 and that could take a licking and make it back to the carrier still ticking, and we kind of figured, how shall I say, that was good enough?

How shall I say...your missing the point. The Zero in its heyday....let me take a wild guess...was good enough too. And slugged any western fighter in the skies at the time. So I guess the Japanese kind of had it figured too.

 

[CobberKane]

Regarding the Aleutian Zero and its impact on the design of the F6F, I think we would all agree that the myth of the Hellcat as a purpose built Zero killer has long been put to bed. The Hellcat was well advanced before the Aleutian Zero fell into US hands, and any consequent adjustments to it's design were minor.
The real value of the captured Zero lay in intelligence; discovery (or confirmation) that the Zero's handling deteriorated badly above 250 knots. In the early part of the pacific war this was not far off the top speed of the US fighters in any case, although USN and USAAF pilots still had the option of diving attacks and escapes, but by 1944 new US fighters enjoyed speed advantages of sixty or seventy miles an hour over the Zero, greatly increasing their capacity to engage and break of at will. The Japanese tried to keep up - reducing the size of the Zeros control surfaces, thickening the skinning, modestly increasing engine power and even introducing some armour - but the Zero's lightweight design imposed limits that meant it would never be able to attain the levels of performance of the P-38 or F4U. The wonder-fighter of the Philippines became the easy meat of the Marianas.

 

[Shortround6]

IT may have been even worse as the Zero was not allowed to keep up due to a lack of engineering capacity and "official" intervention. Later models of the Sakae engine (like the 31) arrived late and did not make the promised power. Mitsubishi engineers wanted to switch from the Nakajima engine to their own Kinsei engine but such a switch was not sanctioned by the Japanese Navy until much too late.
The Japanese spent way too much effort trying to develop new airframes instead of developing existing ones, given the size of their aero industry. The Navy's Raiden, Shiden and Reppu were certainly and ambitious program for single seat, single engine navy fighters. Throw in the Gekko, Ginga and Tenrai twin engine planes and the Japanese Navy had more programs than the US navy.

The Japanese Army wasn't much, if any, better. Too many programs and too much changing back and forth of requirements meant the Ki.43 was still in production in 1945 almost unchanged form from 1942.

 

[VBF-13]

How shall I say...your missing the point. The Zero in its heyday....let me take a wild guess...was good enough too. And slugged any western fighter in the skies at the time. So I guess the Japanese kind of had it figured too.

Well, now, that's a step in the right direction, a statement I can agree with. Let the record reflect this is what you were confused about:

If the Japanese could make light carrier aircraft then why couldnt the Americans who made a big fuss of their robustness.

You'll permit me to add by the time we entered the War the Hellcat was well-past the concept stage and we knew it could take anything the Japanese had. All we needed was to give Grumman the green light.

 

[parsifal]

Even that is not quite correct. USN did not enter the war "knowing the hellcat was better than anything else". Lack of intell was a major problem for the US at that stage.

For the middle part of the war the Grumman was decisive, because it was intelligently used . Against the Zero it never achieved a 19:1 kill ratio. Against all aircraft types, maybe, but not against the Zero solely. this number is therefore very misleading in the context of this thread .

Later on, it was not aircraft quality that was the issue, it was pilot quality. Against George, or a Jack or Ki100 or Frank, its very hard to argue the superiority of the hellcat. What had happened though was a twofold effect....the US by that stage was vastly bigger in numbers, and the experience of the average pilot far exceeded that of the japanese. The US had a far better training program, that featured rotation of personnel, and this meant that long term they evolved a force structure with great depth of experience. The Japanese, with only 1300 frontline aircraft at the beginning of the war, never had the luxury of depth, and never had the ability to rotate or train crews and create depth. Once the good pilots were gone, it was all over. Moreover, whilst piloted by a competent pilot, the Zero was very competitive, as sakais accounts clearly demonstrate. Put a rookie pilot in a Zero against a Hellcat with a good pilot , and he was toast usually.

If you were to put put two pilots of equal quality one into a zero and one into a Hellcat, it would, in my estimation be a very close call. Put two pilots of equal quality, one in a George and one in a Hellcat, and the George would have the advantage.

The Hellcat was a great aircraft, but arrogantly dismissing its opposition not only disrespects the opposition, it also cheapens the achievements of this great aircraft as well.

 

[Jenisch]

Moreover, whilst piloted by a competent pilot, the Zero was very competitive

That would depends of the situation. For defensive missions this would be more likely to be the case. The Zero had some serious faults which could be explored by a rookie US pilot against a Saburo Sakai. For example, it could not follow a Hellcat in a dive. A late war experienced Zero pilot would try to attack the enemy in the most advantageous situation and get out fast. He could not expose himself to the the American planes, he would be pursuit and shoot down.

 

[CobberKane]

I'd take issue with the Hellcat and the the Zero being close 1 on 1, given pilots of similar ability. A competent pilot in a Hellcat should have the ability to dictate the nature of the engagement and keep things in the high speed zone where the Zero struggled, whereas the Zero pilot could not compel the Hellcat pilot to slow down. Of course, if for whatever reason they joined combat in the low and slow range, where the zero excelled, that would be differrent - but that assumes things starting out advantageuosly for the Zero.

 

[VBF-13]

Even that is not quite correct. USN did not enter the war "knowing the hellcat was better than anything else". Lack of intell was a major problem for the US at that stage.

For the middle part of the war the Grumman was decisive, because it was intelligently used . Against the Zero it never achieved a 19:1 kill ratio. Against all aircraft types, maybe, but not against the Zero solely. this number is therefore very misleading in the context of this thread .

Later on, it was not aircraft quality that was the issue, it was pilot quality. Against George, or a Jack or Ki100 or Frank, its very hard to argue the superiority of the hellcat. What had happened though was a twofold effect....the US by that stage was vastly bigger in numbers, and the experience of the average pilot far exceeded that of the japanese. The US had a far better training program, that featured rotation of personnel, and this meant that long term they evolved a force structure with great depth of experience. The Japanese, with only 1300 frontline aircraft at the beginning of the war, never had the luxury of depth, and never had the ability to rotate or train crews and create depth. Once the good pilots were gone, it was all over. Moreover, whilst piloted by a competent pilot, the Zero was very competitive, as sakais accounts clearly demonstrate. Put a rookie pilot in a Zero against a Hellcat with a good pilot , and he was toast usually.

If you were to put put two pilots of equal quality one into a zero and one into a Hellcat, it would, in my estimation be a very close call. Put two pilots of equal quality, one in a George and one in a Hellcat, and the George would have the advantage.

The Hellcat was a great aircraft, but arrogantly dismissing its opposition not only disrespects the opposition, it also cheapens the achievements of this great aircraft as well.

Yeah, I've heard that one, before, the "pilot inexperience." The way some of you boys make it sound the Japanese pilots by the middle of 1943 were lucky they could take off and touch down on three wheels. Sorry, not buying it. Not any of it.

 

[Jenisch]

As you said: the Hellcat had the iniciative. The Hellcat could broke the engagement, whereas the Zero could not.

 

[CobberKane]

Yeah, I've heard that one, before, the "pilot inexperience." The way some of you boys make it sound the Japanese pilots by the middle of 1943 were lucky they could take off and touch down on three wheels. Sorry, not buying it. Not any of it.

I wouldn't suggest pilot quality was the only difference between the Japanese and Americans towards the end of the war - but it was one of the major ones. Relative quality of the aircraft was too. Sure, the japanese had experienced pilots through to the end of the war, just fewer and fewer of them. Likewise they had Ki100s and Ki-87s, just never as many as the Allies had P-51s F4Fs, P-38s, P47s F4Us, Seafires.....and well trained pilots to fly them.

 

[parsifal]

Yeah, I've heard that one, before, the "pilot inexperience." The way some of you boys make it sound the Japanese pilots by the middle of 1943 were lucky they could take off and touch down on three wheels. Sorry, not buying it. Not any of it.

get it right, pilot inexperience, AND numbers. Im not buying what your saying either, so i suppose thats where it rests.

 

[VBF-13]

Sure, the japanese had experienced pilots through to the end of the war, just fewer and fewer of them.

That's because we kept shooting them down.

 

[parsifal]

perhaps its appropriate to consider some eyewitness accounts of the Zeroes effectiveness, whilst in the hands of an experienced pilot. This is an account from early in the war of a battler between 10 P-40Es and 4 Zeroes over Moresby

"There are ten P-40 fighters in a long column, patrolling at fourteen thousand feet over the vital New Guinea base of Port Moresby. The formation leader suddenly sights four Japanese Zeros, two thousand feet lower than his own force.

It couldn't be better. He snaps out his orders. Three fighters are to dive with him to bounce the enemy; the remaining six P-40s will hold their altitude, ready to come down at once in case there is trouble. He doesn't expect any. After all, he is in a perfect position to attack: he holds an altitude advantage, and he has fast-diving, heavily-armed fighter planes. It's just the kind of situation that any pilot would want—meat on the table.

Smoothly, functioning as a team, the four P-40s roll on their backs and plummet toward the Japanese fighters. The plan is simple: as the Zeros scatter, each P-40 pilot will take one, bounce him hard, and end the battle almost as quickly as it begins.

But it doesn't happen that way, for the P-40 pilots have run into the worst hornet's nest in all the Japanese Navy. Those aren't rookies in those Zeros; they're the best that Japan has ever put into the air. Not only are the Japanese pilots aces, they are the leading aces of the famed Lae Wing, and the Lae Wing is the crack outfit of Japan's fighter pilots. The pilot's names: Nishizawa, Sakai, Ota, and Takatsuka. . . .

Even before the P-40 commander sighted the four Zeros, Nishizawa had picked out the American planes, rocking his wings in signal to the other pilots and pointing. Each Zero pilot nodded. Ota slid in just a few feet to fly off Nishizawa's wing; Takatsuka did the same with Sakai. From afar the Japanese planes never appeared to move. The pilots gave no indication that they were aware of the P-40s above them.

The heavy American planes plunged at high speed, each pilot ready to fire. At the last second, just before that moment when the Zeros would be helpless, the Japanese formation leaped out of the way. But instead of rolling away and scattering, as the P-40 pilots expected them to do, the Zeros nosed upward in a swift, almost vertical climb.

The lead American fighter broke to the right and pulled up steeply into the beginning of a loop. Still in the climbing turn, the airplane shuddered as it ran into a stream of cannon shells. A wing tore off in the high-g maneuver, sending the fighter tumbling crazily through the air. Score one for Saburo Sakai.

Hiroyoshi Nishizawa hauled his Zero up almost into a stall, hanging on the prop. A P-40 moved into his sights, and a long burst of two cannon and two machine guns turned the fighter into a flaming streamer. The other two P-40s went down before the guns of Toshio Ota, and Takatsuka.

The Zeros scattered now to the right and left, as the remaining six P-40s, hovering overhead, raced to the scene—to find empty space before their guns. The Zeros whirled upward, came around in wicked, tight loops, with P-40s in front of their cannon. Nishizawa, Sakai, and Ota hammered a fighter apiece out of the air; Takatsuka's quarry rolled and dived away.

Regrouping, the Zero pilots climbed and flew back toward Lae. It was quite a fight: seven out of ten P-40s shot down, without a bullet hole in any of the Japanese fighters. But how could the P-40 pilots have known what they were running into.

The date of the air battle was May 7, 1942, and the four Japanese pilots had made what they called a "dream sweep," on a reconnaissance mission from Lae to Port Moresby. When they took-off from Lae, their combined kills already were great enough to command attention of all Japan. Saburo Sakai, with combat in China, the Philippines, Java, and Lae, had scored 22 kills to become the leading ace of Japan. Nishizawa, with barely a month in combat against the American and Australian planes at Moresby, had chalked up 13 kills. Ota had scored 11; Takatsuka trailed with nine".

Each of these men went on to successfully combat the big Grumman fighters, I know mostly of Sakais experience. On the 24 June 1944, he met 15 Hellcats against his single zero (Earler the 200 or so Hellcats had demolished the 42 Zero defenders, due to the inexperience of the pilots. In a long running fast moving fight, Sakai managed to evade all 15 of them, eventually forcing the Hellcats into a defensive ring and shooting down at least two of thge American planes.

Wherever there were experienced pilots to fly the Zero, it did okay. Put an inexpereineced pilot into the aircraft, and it was a deathtrap.

The Hellcat had advantages. It was faster, and could dive more quickly. it had far better protection,. Firepower was about the same as the Zero, but the zero retained the edge in horizontal manouvre, even at higher speeds. Standard Allied tactics against the Zero were worked out at the end of 1942, and remained more or less the same for the rest of the war.....never dogfight with a zero....using boom and zoom tactics and then move on. Keep the speed up. Thats not a better aircraft....thats using the known strengths of the aircraft to your advantage. The Japanese never worked out effective counters to that and once the edge n their pilot skills were gone, were just flying around waiting to get shot down.

 

[parsifal]

Two alternative views of the Zero vs Hellcat


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GOwamM_xo-8


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KjPUJJcl7Oc

Another one worth looking at is the legendary dogfight between Pug Southerlands Wildcat and Sakai in August 1942


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H80wPbj3i4g

 

[VBF-13]

Pars, which machine would you rather be in? That's it in a nut.

 

[parsifal]

hellcat of course. Thats not the issue. The difference between the two planes was their durability and survivability, but plane for plane the hellcat was not 19 times better than a zero. It achieved its high kill loss ration because of a whole bunch of reasons.....pilot quality, numbers, superior logistics, better tactics and strategy, just to name a few. Allied victory never came down to just one thing, or nation or event. oh that it was that easy. It was a complex menage of different factors all working simultaneously.

so, choosing or preferring a particular aircraft over another is not "it in a nut' as you so eloquently put it. try this shoe on.....woulld the US have still won if it had been equipped with the zero, and the japanese had the hellcat. answer is yes.


so much for the superiority of the hellcat over the zero. it makes little difference

 

[The Basket]

I would say Wildcat and not Hellcat.

The Japanese got it right then suddenly very wrong. I wonder if the initial success of the Zero was to lead to its downfall as a replacement wasnt urgent.