Japanese lightly built carrier aircraft

GregP said:

Sometimes coummunication is difficult ...

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LOL. But I think as regards the F6F it goes a little beyond just that. What I mean is, just look at the question in this thread. It comes down to, why didn't we build a lighter aircraft to deal with the Zero? At least, that's the point at which I came into the thread. And, the answer's so simple. It's, we had something better. In fact, we had two "somethings" better, the F4U and the F6F, already in the works. Why in the world would we ever want to dogfight the Zero when we had that and knew they were game-changers? That's the simple answer, right there.

But, it even goes beyond that. What I mean, there, is, just look at some of our other aircraft. Namely, look at the P47, the P38, and throw in the P51. Those aircraft are legendary. Is it any wonder why many still are reluctant to accept a track record of a stout, rotund aircraft that blows every one of those away? I think not. Rather, make excuses for that performance. And, while you're at it, go out of your way to do it. The competition was minor-league. Or, the sources are biased. Or, their numbers simply overwhelmed the competition. Anything to diminish an appreciation of the significance of what this stout, rotund, beast of an aircraft actually achieved for us squared-off against the competition.

Finally, I'm not saying those factors didn't play a part in the success-rate of the F6F. In three short years Bethpage did manage to turn out some 12,000 F6Fs. But Axis-attrition happened everywhere as the War wore on, and was a factor, everywhere, and not just in the PTO. Let's grab ourselves some sense, I'm saying. We can factor-in Axis-attrition all across the board relative to the combat-ratings of every Allied aircraft.

The issue is, i think whether the Hellcat and the philosophy (the heavy fighter concept) made any difference to the loss rates suffered by the Japanese. A corollary to that is whether the zero, as a light fighter concept retained any competitiveness in the air after the introduction of the Hellcat.

But first we need to at least have a look at those loss rate put out by the USN after the war. How accurate are they? Wouldnt know. However, Ellis claims that the Japanese lost 38000 aircraft in total in total, and that 9000 of these were lost in air combat. About 16000 were lost on the ground. the remainder were non-operational losses, training accidents, lost due to getting lost etc.

For the Hellcat, indeed the USN claims 3500 enemy aircraft shot down whilst losing in total (including non-operational losses) 2384 of their own number. Thats from the material greg posted.

For the Zero, Peter Chen in an article he wrote says that 10980 Zeroes were produced during the war, and that 3800 were surrendered. More than half IJN aircraft were Zeroes on the basis of numbers produced. 1280 were expended as Kamikazes. If we assume (I think reasonably) that similar proportions to the overall Japanese average were lost on the ground or to "other causes", then of the remaining 5980 destroyed (other than the Kamikazes) about 1400 were destroyed in air combat. The remainder were smashed up on the ground or lost for other reasons (eg went down with the ship). We dont know how many of those estimated 1400 were shot down by ground fire. For the hellcat it was 540 of their total losses of 2384 were lost to AA. I dont have any figures for Zero losses to ground fire, but surely it would have to be around the 40% mark. That would place Zero losses in air combat at around 800 to 900.

So, in air combat my estimate is that the Hellcat lost 247 a/c to the Japanese 850 (roughly). That would mean the Japanese Zero in air combat lost around 3.4 as many aircraft as the Hellcat.

I dont think ther can be any denial that the Hellcat was not an exceptional aircraft. Ive never believed that it wasnt. The inference that the exchange rate of Hellcats losts was 19:1 though is clearly bogus. The claim that 3500 enemy aircraft were shot down whilst losing 245 of their own number is also bogus because it is not including losses to all causes for the US whilst indeed including all losses for the Japanese. You cannot do it any other way, since many of the Hellcats "kills" were for aircraft on the ground. Its just not a completely valid number to use as a surrogate measure of relative air combat performance.

Overall,the Japanese lost 38000 a/c to all causes (admittedly some sources do claim 50000) whilse the Americans in the Pacific lost 4500 to operational reasons and about 4500 to other causes. Thats a ratio of 38/9, or 4.2:1 against the japanese. Whilst not a completely valid comparison its intersting to note that the zero had a loss rate compared to the Hellcat of 3.4;1, whilst overall, the Japanese airforce to US air force had a loss rate of 4.2:1. relatively therefore the Zero was more survivable than the rest of its air force, which again suggests the theory the heavy fighter concept was superior is rather a suspect claim to make.

Hey VBF-13,

I've always been a BIG Hellcat fan since I got to sit in one when I was about 5 years old. Talk about a big deal, I'd never been even CLOSE to a fighter until then. Mom said I was an airplane nut since age 2.

A lot of people in here don't like kill ratio as a watermark, but I think it is the only watermark that counts. Yes, the pilots matter, but the employment of the aircraft by the pilots is what wins or loses battles and sometimes wars. The F6F rules all other piston fighters as the most effective ever employed by any combatant in a prolonged war. Of course the F-15 outranks it today, but is also a jet with advanced avionics in relation to the F6F, which only had a radio.

Taken as a whole, the F6F, F4U, and P-51 were simply outstanding, with the P-38 not far behind in effectiveness. It was the mount of our two top WWII Aces and did a lot to help win the PTO.

That does not denigrate any other fighter ... just a thought about our top fighters. If we had built a lightweight fighter like the Zero, it is probable that many of our boys would not have flown it without armor protection. Diffrent national philosophies. We don't mind risking our necks, but want good equipment to do it in. Speaking only for myself, I'd decline to fly a fighter without self-sealing tanks and pilot armor.

I'm not sure 10,000 pounds is necessary, but am also not sure what I'd leave out to make it lighter. Seems like most of the components are required for operation of the Hellcat, especially the 2,000 pound wing. It had the most wing area of any US WWII fighter, including the P-38, except the Tigercat, and that one didn't affect WWII since it got there only a few weeks before the end and never got into the fight.

VBF-13 said:

LOL. But I think as regards the F6F it goes a little beyond just that. What I mean is, just look at the question in this thread. It comes down to, why didn't we build a lighter aircraft to deal with the Zero? At least, that's the point at which I came into the thread. And, the answer's so simple. It's, we had something better. In fact, we had two "somethings" better, the F4U and the F6F, already in the works. Why in the world would we ever want to dogfight the Zero when we had that and knew they were game-changers? That's the simple answer, right there.

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I can agree that F4U and F6F were vastly better than 80% of fighters Japan produced in ww2. They, however, were not game changers - the game was changed by units that were flying F4F, P-40, P-38, along with RAF/RAAF/RNZAF, in time prior late 1943.

But, it even goes beyond that. What I mean, there, is, just look at some of our other aircraft. Namely, look at the P47, the P38, and throw in the P51. Those aircraft are legendary. Is it any wonder why many still are reluctant to accept a track record of a stout, rotund aircraft that blows every one of those away? I think not. Rather, make excuses for that performance. And, while you're at it, go out of your way to do it. The competition was minor-league. Or, the sources are biased. Or, their numbers simply overwhelmed the competition. Anything to diminish an appreciation of the significance of what this stout, rotund, beast of an aircraft actually achieved for us squared-off against the competition.

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F6F and F4U were not encountering 400 mph fighters until what, mid 1944? Most of Japanese fighters were under 380 mph. They USN fighters was more numerous than IJA/IJN adversaries from mid 1943, they were operated by either seasoned wartime pilots, or by novice pilots with plenty of flying time. They were operating with radar support, unlike Japanese. Net result: F6F have had the good war in front of it, once introduced.
Contrary to that, the USAF in ETO was fighting vs. adversary that did have radar support, where the lack of skilled pilots happened in 1944 (much due to those very fighters, plus RAF) instead of 1943, and where only P-51 have had clear undisputed advantages, along with just a few weak points.
added: The size of F4U and F6F was dictated by the size of big, two stage radial engine. The USN did not have had engines of modest size and great power (all altitudes) to choose from, they were not in turbo V-1710 camp, and the resulting fighters were as big as they were.

Finally, I'm not saying those factors didn't play a part in the success-rate of the F6F. In three short years Bethpage did manage to turn out some 12,000 F6Fs. But Axis-attrition happened everywhere as the War wore on, and was a factor, everywhere, and not just in the PTO. Let's grab ourselves some sense, I'm saying. We can factor-in Axis-attrition all across the board relative to the combat-ratings of every Allied aircraft.

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The Axis attrition happened everywhere, the Japanese felt the effects 1st, while being far less apt to replace the lost, both of men and aircraft. The US steam roller was not to be stopped, from mid/late 1943 on.

Parsifal,

Nobody ever claimed that the 245 or so lost Hellcats were the only losses. What is true is that the 245 or so were lost in air-to-air combat. All the other losses were not in air-to-air combat. You're trying to lump all the losses in with combat losses and it won't wash.

The Hellcat's overall air-to-air kill ratio WAS 19 : 1, and that's not a made up number. It is real. The ratio versus fighters is 15 : 1 or better since we don't know how many of the 245 air-to-air losses were due to fighters alone. I assumed the entire 245 were due to fighters. If any were shot down by bombers, then the fighter ratio goes up.

Nobody counts AAA losses in with air combat losses. Ditto operational losses and accidents like getting lost. It's tough to dodge flak since you have no idea where it will explode and mostly don't know when it is coming at you in the first place until the explosion gets your attention.

I posted the numbers and they are as accurate as the US Navy/Marine post-war accounting was. I believe they accounted for things as best they could at the time, and I seriously doubt that anyone trying to do it again today would have enough knowledge or complete enough records to do any better job of it.

I only wish we had those numbers for other theaters of operation, the USAAC, and I wish all the other nations had similarly well-documented totals. Alas, most do not have them with any degree of certainty and it makes it hard to talk about the numbers with accuracy, doesn't it?

GregP said:

Parsifal,

Nobody ever claimed that the 245 or so lost Hellcats were the only losses. What is true is that the 245 or so were lost in air-to-air combat. All the other losses were not in air-to-air combat. You're trying to lump all the losses in with combat losses and it won't wash.

The Hellcat's overall air-to-air kill ratio WAS 19 : 1, and that's not a made up number. It is real. The ratio versus fighters is 15 : 1 or better since we don't know how many of the 245 air-to-air losses were due to fighters alone. I assumed the entire 245 were due to fighters. If any were shot down by bombers, then the fighter ratio goes up.

Nobody counts AAA losses in with air combat losses. Ditto operational losses and accidents like getting lost. It's tough to dodge flak since you have no idea where it will explode and mostly don't know when it is coming at you in the first place until the explosion gets your attention.

I posted the numbers and they are as accurate as the US Navy/Marine post-war accounting was. I believe they accounted for things as best they could at the time, and I seriously doubt that anyone trying to do it again today would have enough knowledge or complete enough records to do any better job of it.

I only wish we had those numbers for other theaters of operation, the USAAC, and I wish all the other nations had similarly well-documented totals. Alas, most do not have them with any degree of certainty and it makes it hard to talk about the numbers with accuracy, doesn't it?

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It looks like those numbers are kill claims, not verified kills. It would be pretty amazing if they were able to verify every kill claim against IJ records.

Those numbers are official US Navy records, and that is good enough for me. I do not subscribe to modern revisionism and strongly believe that if we are going to look at revising the victories, then we should look at all of them, not just the top aces or one particular guy, or let them stand as is.

People have tried to reduce Pappy Boyington's killls ... but they conveniently forget most everyone else. Some would like to reduce Erich Hartmann;'s victories for some reason, too. But if they're not going to scrutinize them ALL, then they should shut up and let it stand. Selective revision is not OK.

Nobody ever claimed that the 245 or so lost Hellcats were the only losses. What is true is that the 245 or so were lost in air-to-air combat. All the other losses were not in air-to-air combat. You're trying to lump all the losses in with combat losses and it won't wash

The Hellcat's overall air-to-air kill ratio WAS 19 : 1, and that's not a made up number. It is real. The ratio versus fighters is 15 : 1 or better since we don't know how many of the 245 air-to-air losses were due to fighters alone. I assumed the entire 245 were due to fighters. If any were shot down by bombers, then the fighter ratio goes up

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Thats not what your USN figures say. It says in that table that the hellcat destroyed 4800 (my mistake last post,....i didnt include bombers destroyed), which comes out at 19:1. But it doesnt say that is just from air to air combat. its the total losses estimated to have been inflicted by Hellcats on the japanese. And it has to be "estimated and claimed now that i look at the document moree carefully. How can the USN be sure of the aircrafdt destroyed on the ground as being exact in number. At best, the figures published in the USN reports are based on claims and estimates. admittedly with the benefit of some post war cross checking, but still only claims. Based on the experiences of the RAF, and the Comments of Foreman on RAF claims versus acrtual victories, you can at best use these claims as an indication of air activity, and not more. if you really wanted to press the issue, you might want to base your estimates for the ir to air air component on foremans research. The component of that 4500 enemy aircraft destroyed, based on Ellis's figures is that 15000/24000, or 2/3 of kills of Japanese aircraft were destroyed on the ground. 2/3 of 4500 is 3000, whilst the reamining 1500 claimed losses also have to have an estimated adjustment along the lines of Foreman (for the RAF). that reduces the actual numbers of Japanese a/c actually shot down in the air by Hellcats to around 900 to 1000. That reduces the victory to loss ratio to 3:1, not 19:1. and thats everything including bombers, flying boats and every other sort of flying target you care to think of. It also includes Kamikazes, and we know that 2300 Japanese aircraft were expended in this way. So in conventional combats, it is not unreasonable to estimate actual hellcat victories to be around 7-800, or around 2:1. And it is further not unreasonable to surmise that against Japanese fighters, the margins for victory were even closer.

As I said, I do believe the Hellcat is a remarkable aircraft, but if you look at its vaunted victory loss ratio with any analytical technique at all, its alleged impressive perfoemancce rapidly falls away.

Postscript

I see from your Post number 65 9which i didnt see whilst i was prepring my main reply) that you dont accept revised numbers that are all the rage these days. Neither do i, but fsaced with some pretty hard and convincing research, its unavoidable for nearly all nationalities, including the US. Im happy to apply the rule of thumb that Foreman has done after a lot of research for the RAF, as 2 kill for every 3 claimed kills. Maybe thats right, maybe not.

Then I guess it's 19 : 1 to most people but you. Sorry, I base my ideas on the officially awarded victory tally, not somebody's theory about what really happened many years after the fact. You are free to recalculate it all you want.

Until proven otherwise, Erich Hartmann had 352, Boyington had 28, and the Hellcat was 19 : 1. Artificially reducing things so they fit some theory just isn't going to fly, at least with me.

But hey, if you want to claim it's 3 : 1, step right up. Some people may agree with you.

But hey, if you want to claim it's 3 : 1, step right up. Some people may agree with you.

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That may well include the US Navy since their own report does NOT say they achieved an air to air victory ratio of 19:1

People, the thread about claims, kills and losses in Asia/Pacific is opened:

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/asia-pacific-ww2-air-war-how-many-japanese-c-were-destroyed-allies-36249.html

good idea I think

Parsifal,

The US doesn't credit kills on the ground. We track them if the data are available, as we also tracked V-1 kills, but the awarded victories are for piloted airborne aircraft, one and all.

If I'm not mistaken, the British, Germans, Japanese, French, Australians, Russians, and Italians also didn't give credit for aircraft destroyed on the ground. Haven't checked on other air forces, but victories were usually awarded for piloted, airborne aircraft.

Naturally, they all loved to FIND them on the ground and shoot them up, but straffing airfields was fraught with danger. The losses for the second guy on target and after were all out of proportion to the potential benefits from a destroyed aircraft on the ground. It was different if it was only you and a wingman and you overflew an airfield only once while passing through, but to go back was almost a guarantee of ground fire hits. Ditto for a V-1 site and a railyard.

Better to locate this debate to the appropriate thread that Tomo has started.

The thread was about the design philosophy of the Zero. Why the Japanese did what they did.

I would happily put a spitfire IX against a Hellcat and lets see a 19:1 ratio then!

The Zero is a bit like the Hawker Hurricane been in fighter ops in 1945. The same Hurricane goodness is there but it really ain't at the races.

The Basket said:

The thread was about the design philosophy of the Zero. Why the Japanese did what they did.

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So after five pages what did you figure out? I think they did it because it gave them a crackerjack of a dog-fighter aircraft that very conceivably could have won the War for them had nothing better than it come along from the competition.

A few points. The American Navy did not need a big heavy fighter to dominate the Zero just a higher powered fighter. Any later mark Spitfire, 109 or Fw190 would have had a similar effect. Even the later P-40 had a worthwhile advantage.

Also the American Navy did go small and lighter with the Bearcat which was slim compared to the Hellcat.

It gave them a long ranged fighter as good as most others when introduced. The Navy may have been slightly less enamored of dog fighting than the Japanese army. The only way for it to win the war was if the war only lasted 6 months to a year.

The Specification leading to the J3M Radian was issued in Sept 1939 and had been delayed while the A6M1 was being worked on.
The Specification leading to the A7M Reppu was issued in April 1942 although the need to replace the Zero had been foreseen in 1940. Very few planes lasted 3-5 years in front line service, especially without major modifications. Unfortunately for the Japanese (and fortunately for the allies) the Japanese managed neither a replacement aircraft or a major modification (50% increase in power or some such).

Expecting the "competition" (enemy) not to come up with better aircraft in 3 or more years would be very poor planning.

I don't know that we could have come up with better had we been thinking tangling with the "Zeke" in a dogfight. For that matter, I don't know that we had better, anywhere.

PS: There's a link back in these threads on mock trials on that (forget who posted it, sorry).

There is more to air combat than dog fighting. The Japanese Navy pilots could and did dog fight with "Zekes". They also used used high speed (for the time) diving firing passes with climbs back to altitude and repeated. This latter tactic seems to have been the preferred one.

For Navy (carrier) planes range/endurance was important. Fire power and resilience were also important, Zero failing rather badly on that one.