MIflyer
Captain
From the book Operation KE, the authors Richard and Dennis Letourneau, point out something interesting.
Overclaiming of air to air kills is normal but during the period covered by the book, that of early 1943 when the Japanese were withdrawing from Guadalcanal, the Americans overall claimed two kills for every actual kill made.
In contrast, the Japanese, Army and Navy, claimed four kills for every actual kill made.
And when non-kill losses are taken into account, the actual number of kills claimed by US pilots is in reality an accurate estimate of enemy losses.
Consider the impact on morale of this situation. In the Battle of Britain the Luftwaffe was assured that the raids of the day before had finished off the RAF, only to have the numbers of Spitfires and Hurricanes seemingly undiminished every day. On one occasion the RAF was indeed tapped out, with all units committed, but a lone WW1 pilot, station commander, attacked a formation headed for his base and they all jettisoned their bombs and ran for home. Of course in that case the the German bombers had missed meeting up with their fighter escort (German fighters and bombers could not talk to each other over the radio but occasionally RAF and German fighters were on the same frequency) and just knew they were going to get their arses well and truly kicked. The appearance of that one Hurricane was seen as conformation of this fear, since there surely had to be a hundred fighters right behind it.
With their massive overclaiming it must have seemed to the Japanese that the Americans had an inexhaustible supply of planes and pilots, which indeed they did, only just not right there and then.
And of course we know that many US aircraft hit by Japanese fire made it safely back to base. In contrast a USMC F4F pilot at the Canal was desperately trying to get the Zeros off a Admiral's PBY and just sprayed .50 cal at them to scare them off. It was years after the war that he found he had shot three Zeros down that day; they were only slightly damaged but in each case probably no more than a single .50 cal round had damaged an engine, punched through an oil line, and caused a fuel leak that prevented the Zeros from making it home.
Overclaiming of air to air kills is normal but during the period covered by the book, that of early 1943 when the Japanese were withdrawing from Guadalcanal, the Americans overall claimed two kills for every actual kill made.
In contrast, the Japanese, Army and Navy, claimed four kills for every actual kill made.
And when non-kill losses are taken into account, the actual number of kills claimed by US pilots is in reality an accurate estimate of enemy losses.
Consider the impact on morale of this situation. In the Battle of Britain the Luftwaffe was assured that the raids of the day before had finished off the RAF, only to have the numbers of Spitfires and Hurricanes seemingly undiminished every day. On one occasion the RAF was indeed tapped out, with all units committed, but a lone WW1 pilot, station commander, attacked a formation headed for his base and they all jettisoned their bombs and ran for home. Of course in that case the the German bombers had missed meeting up with their fighter escort (German fighters and bombers could not talk to each other over the radio but occasionally RAF and German fighters were on the same frequency) and just knew they were going to get their arses well and truly kicked. The appearance of that one Hurricane was seen as conformation of this fear, since there surely had to be a hundred fighters right behind it.
With their massive overclaiming it must have seemed to the Japanese that the Americans had an inexhaustible supply of planes and pilots, which indeed they did, only just not right there and then.
And of course we know that many US aircraft hit by Japanese fire made it safely back to base. In contrast a USMC F4F pilot at the Canal was desperately trying to get the Zeros off a Admiral's PBY and just sprayed .50 cal at them to scare them off. It was years after the war that he found he had shot three Zeros down that day; they were only slightly damaged but in each case probably no more than a single .50 cal round had damaged an engine, punched through an oil line, and caused a fuel leak that prevented the Zeros from making it home.
