Japanese Zero vs Spitfire vs FW 190

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All of you gentlemen are of course correct up to a point. I would like to restate my point and tweak it a bit.

If you can safely make a pass at a bomber and avoid escorts then you should do so.

On the other hand, if you ignore an escort to make a pass at a bomber and you lose a plane and/or a pilot then you have 1 less defending fighter for the next raid.

Also, if you shoot down an escort, that is one less escort they will have for the next raid.

Would everyone agree that it all depends on the tactical situation at the time?
 
In a 1960 discussion with an Air Defense Command exF-86D pilot, he told us of the unofficial ideas of the Dog pilots, should formations of Tu-4 come over the pole or through Alaska. Keep in mind the Saber Dog was armed with only 24 unguided rockets on a retractable under nose tray. The rockets could be fired all 24 at once or 12 at a time. If the homeland was attacked by Nuclear armed bombers, the pilot would make one intercept fire 12, make a second and fire 12, make a third intercept and either ride the plane in or eject. When asked why ride the plane into the bomber, we were told bailing out over Alaska was the same thing.
 

The dates are the most interesting part, why didn't you just break the thread into sections?
 
pinsog said:
the Spitfire V with the tropical filter was in fact inferior to the Zero it fought.
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It was, clearly, but what of it? It's been demonstrated here that the RAAF continued fighting and eventually the Japanese bombing campaign against Darwin ground to a halt. There are many examples of where the defenders have inferior equipment to the attackers, the PZL P.11 against the Bf 109, the Hawker Hurricane I , the Defiant, Gladiator, Blenheim, even the much vaunted Spitfire I had inferiorities compared to the Bf 109E, but they were still thrown into the fight. Why? Because they had no choice.

pinsog said:
On the other hand, if you ignore an escort to make a pass at a bomber and you lose a plane and/or a pilot then you have 1 less defending fighter for the next raid.
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Yes, and I get your point, but that one loss needs to be put into context. During the Battle of Britain it was routine that the Jagdgeschwader sent 30, 40, 50, 60, up to a hundred and more escort fighters with the bombers and the RAF sent interceptors to deal with them in Flights of threes, sixes, nines and 12s and sometimes combining squadrons along the way, yet the Luftwaffe singularly failed in its attempts at wiping out Fighter Command. As mentioned earlier, the Bf 109 equipped Jagdgeschwader established a 1.2 to 1 kill ratio over the defenders, because they were going out of their way to target the interceptors, yet the Luftwaffe still lost. A part of that winning strategy was the fact that Park deliberately did not send large numbers of interceptors into the fray, despite the overwhelming disparity in enemy aircraft number.

Fighter Command made the losses that really mattered count with a kill ratio of almost 2 to 1 over the Luftwaffe, which German aircraft production could not replenish in time, and it's worth adding that by the official end of the battle, Fighter Command had more fighters than it began the battle with, so it had not only coped with the losses it had sustained at the hands of the escorts, but it had added more from local production. Statistically speaking, that tends to diminish the impact of what the escorts achieved.

As I mentioned in my earlier post, context reveals the price of statistics and taking the greater number of kills by escorts against interceptors has to be compared with total enemy losses to make sense in the battle environment and this particular scenario of interceptors versus the enemy. Because, that's why the interceptors are there, not to destroy the escorts, but to destroy the bombers.

The fact that Zeros shot down a larger number of Spitfires over Darwin is pointless as a bare statistic, but when you add Japanese bomber losses with the escorts shot down by the interceptors you begin to see a bigger picture forming, then add the surrounding data, such as the number of losses to all causes on both sides and the rate at which both sides replenished their losses and that picture becomes broader and you begin to have greater situational awareness, which reveals a meaningful context within which that disparity makes sense.
 
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That's called "target of opportunity"
pinsog said:
Also, if you shoot down an escort, that is one less escort they will have for the next raid.
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Yes, but the more valued target is a bomber
pinsog said:
Would everyone agree that it all depends on the tactical situation at the time?
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Yes - but in the campaigns mentioned the primary objective was to concentrate on the bombers
 
Pick ANY naval engagement between USN and IJN fleet actions in the PTO and tell me at which point the defending fighters focused on the enemy escorts and let the dive-bombers and torpedo-bombers pass by unchallenged.
 
DerAdlerIstGelandet said:
If it so outclassed, why is my company still building them, and why do we still have customers wanting it?
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Outclassed may nor have been the best word, but when compared to its potential opponents its TTW ratio could be an issue and it's ability to recover from a high AOA and gain energy when in a 'within visual range' 'knife fight in a phone box' scenario could leave it vulnerable. But it's ability to stand on its tail in a high angle of attack at low speed and bring a fight onto its own terms is a unique and recognised characteristic of the F18. As we all know the F18 is a rugged, tough and reliable bit of kit that has the respect of those that fly it. And a master at the multi role package.

The comparison was more how WW2 pilots used their skill and knowledge to match the abilities of a better performing platform and those skills are still taught today at the FWS to make the F18 a potent adversary regardless of who it is up against. Having said that, the days of dog fights may well be in the passed where it is all BVR contact, where it's the software on any platform and the ability of the crew that determines who might survive.
 
GrauGeist said:
Pick ANY naval engagement between USN and IJN fleet actions in the PTO and tell me at which point the defending fighters focused on the enemy escorts and let the dive-bombers and torpedo-bombers pass by unchallenged.
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I gotta tell you I tried to think of one instance and I couldn't. The closest I could think of was a few Zeroes peeling off from escorting their strike package to attack USN bombers during the Battle of Cape Esperance (?).
 
And again, a close in VR knife fight is not the optimum way to conduct air to air combat unless one had to abide by some politician's Rules of Engagement. Although trained for the "knife fight" as a last resort, in modern unrestricted aerial combat, first blood should be accomplished BVR - unless you still have a copy of "Top Gun" in your old VCR!
 

Ki-43 was an extremely deadly fighter, and still quite dangerous in the hands of a good pilot well into 1944. The 'light fighter' approach to aircraft design had it's limitations but it was not entirely unsuccessful, and is generally something I think hard to grasp for people who are really into the Anglo-American aircraft, (and those who read and in some cases became enamoured of the various biographies and memoirs of the German pilots) since it's a different design philosophy. We tend to think in terms of more and more horsepower, more guns and more armor as the solution to all combat limitations, and top speed (esp. at high altitude) as being the single most important factor in combat. But both for the Japanese and Soviets the 'light(er) fighter' approach, which was maybe intentional and maybe just something they had to adapt to, was successful.

There is more than one way to skin a cat.

All historical authors have some kind of bias I suspect Shores leans a bit toward the Japanese and Axis in general sometimes in but this is kind of an antidote to the postwar (and much later) grandstanding about how great the Allies did, and all that stuff about 11-1 "kill ratios" and so on which melts away when you double check the Axis records. That said, as incredibly valuable as his work has been, I don't think Shores is the last word.
 
GrauGeist said:
Pick ANY naval engagement between USN and IJN fleet actions in the PTO and tell me at which point the defending fighters focused on the enemy escorts and let the dive-bombers and torpedo-bombers pass by unchallenged.
Click to expand...
Please read my post #1315 again where I said exception to engaging escort over bombers 1. Defending a carrier. If your carrier is sunk you have no place to land.

I agree 100% with everyone that bombers were the main target, but you have to deal with the escort if they are in the way by either 1. having enough performance you can ignore them OR 2. by having some of your fighters engage them and tie them up.

The quarterback is the main target but you have to get past the linemen to get to him. You can either 1. Have a guy with a speed advantage go around them or 2. Your linemen engage their linemen and fight their way through. Their linemen aren't the target but they must be delt with
 
End of discussion - the rest are combat scenarios that could probably go in several different directions...

Now with that said, during the BoB I believe you did have Hurricanes concentrating on the bombers and Spitfires engaging the fighters, but at the end of the day, and at the expense of repeating myself, the bomber was the ultimate target.
 

I previously posted this before in this thread here, but somehow whenever this debate comes up, with all the ink spilled about the Spitfire's defense of Darwin, the earlier defense by the P-40s of 49th FG seems to be utterly forgotten. It turns out that no, the Japanese did not just fly over the P-40s. Bombing from 27,000 ft was not as effective, but they did it anyway, and still got intercepted and suffered losses. Apparently they too were close to their altitude limitations, though obviously not suffering so badly as P-40s.

The summary is that in spite of operating well above their performance ceiling, in addition to suffering from all of the same disadvantages of training, preparation, and (to a large extent, maintenance) the P-40Es of the 49th FG did pretty well, and arguably a bit better than the Spitfires. They lost 19 aircraft and 4 pilots, and (according to postwar Japanese records) they shot down 19 Japanese planes, including 7 x A6M, 1 x Ki-46, and (most tellingly) 12 x G4M bombers, which was the reason the bombing raids stopped for a while.

The article in The Strategist, an Australian military think tank, which breaks down a high level overview of the action is good but rather clinical. I have looked a bit more into this episode. I found some useful detailed information on this website. The following is a summary.

Prior to their arrival, another unit of 10 x P-40s from the 33rd Pursuit squadron was massacred in a single day in February, (more detail here) losing 9 out of 10 aircraft in a single massive raid. They were on their way to reinforce Java and arrived in Darwin just as the raid was happening. Some of the survivors of that unit later joined the 49th.

The level of training suitable to prepare for modern fighters was appalling. Most of the pilots had never flown aircraft with retractable landing gear. The US sent ~ 330 P-40s to Australia during Spring of 1942, of which 170 were destroyed in accidents within weeks, before reaching the combat area. Many others were lost at sea such as those on the Langley. The initial attempt by the 49th FG to send fighters to the combat area near Darwin resulted in near catastrophe. Of 25 fighters sent from from Brisbane, 13 made it to Darwin on 18 March 1942.

Logistical support was also incredibly lacking. Prior to one combat sortie from Horn Island, pilots were given spark plugs and ammunition and instructions by mechanics and armorers on how to prep their aircraft for combat. The guns were not bore-sighted and the aircraft had no oxygen. They had no proper charts and were trying to use road maps and maritime charts to navigate. The aircraft were brand new, many of them literally the first batch of P-40Es, which had a wide range of teething issues that sill needed to be worked out (chief among them, problems with guns jamming). The aircraft flight manuals at that time stated that they could not be operated at more than 45" Hg (vs. the later default settings of 51" for military and 57" for WEP) making them extremely under-powered.

Though they were being taught correct tactics by their experienced commander Paul Wurtsmith, combat was chaotic and disorganized especially for the first couple of months. Two examples;

On 14 March 1942, 9 x Kittyhawks intercepted a formation of 8 x G4M and 12 x A6M2 of the 4th Kokotai. Two P-40s were damaged by A6Ms with their pilots wounded, a third P-40 was damaged when he deliberately rammed an A6M after his guns jammed (losing 3' of wing). Another P-40 was damaged and fled the battle area, the pilot then becoming lost, he flew 400 miles West and finally bailed out. He was saved by aboriginal people but was evacuated back to the US. In all the US lost 1 x P-40 destroyed (the one which got lost) and 3 x badly damaged but landed safely. They claimed 1 x bomber and 4 x A6M, actual losses were one bomber damaged and 4th Kokotai lost 2 x A6M, one of which was later discovered largely intact at the bottom of the Torres Strait in 1997.

On 16 June 1942 another raid came in with 27 x Japanese bombers (apparently mostly G4M) and 27 x A6M. 8th and 9th FS of 49th FG (with apparently two flights of 4 planes each) engaged the enemy. 1 P-40 from 8th FS piloted by Chester Namola was shot down (possibly went into a spin after being hit). Another P-40 burned out it's engine in a frantic dive to get away from Zeros, the pilot ditched in the water and was rescued by the Royal Navy the next day. A third P-40 piloted by Bruce Harris also dove away, but recovered, went into a zoom climb, caught up with the Japanese formation and attacked, firing until his guns jammed, but ran out of fuel heading back to base. He crash landed and his aircraft caught on fire and burned. He too was later rescued by an RAAF Wiwrraway after a harrowing ordeal. 9th FS did better and claimed 3 x A6M and 2 x G4M, while one P-40 was hit by return fire from a G4M and landed dead-stick. His aircraft was recovered the next day. Another made a belly landing on an artillery range. From the context it sounds like 9th FS was already at altitude when the raid came in, while 8th FS was climbing up. The site didn't indicate what Japanese losses actually were, but the US lost 3 planes, plus 2 badly damaged, with 1 pilot killed and one evacuated back home, claiming 3 fighters and 2 bombers.

My takeaway from all this is that the 49th FG was in a similar situation to the Spitfire pilots. 95 out of 102 pilots in the FG had never flown P-40s before they flew them to the combat area (resulting in as much as 50% losses en-route). This is similar to the Spitfire pilots and also Australian Kittyhawk pilots of 75 FS who fought at Milne Bay. Maintenance and logistics situation was extremely precarious to say the least, only gradually improving, and the mechanics were as inexperienced as the pilots were. Aircraft were brand new and still had many teething issues. Like with the Spitfire unit, the 49th FG were hampered by low throttle settings. The Spitfires had a couple of added / extra problems in the form of the wing heaters, 20mm ammunition, and a couple of other things - which were severe. Plus the Vokes filters. Range was also a major limitation.

Also, while postwar analysis tells us that any Allied fighter could dive away from a Zero in a pinch, every time I read about them actually doing so in these early battles in Darwin and New Guinea, it seems a hell of a lot more desperate and close-run. Sometimes they dove away and still got shot down. Sometimes they burned out their engine. Quite often it was extremely harrowing. I remember one Aussie pilot from the 75th FS mentioned he got away in a mad dive from three Zeros and then smoked a whole pack of cigarettes once he landed. Technique for the 'escape maneuver' improved as pilots gradually learned the specific limitations of the zero (rolling at high speed) but I think the Japanese fighters and their pilots continue to be underestimated. The incredibly steep learning curve and logistical nightmares faced by the Allied pilots is also rarely given due acknowledgement. In New Guinea on top of all the problems suffered at Darwin far more of the pilots also had Disentary and Malaria, and were living unprotected in clouds of mosquitoes.

I found one other interesting tidbit somewhere else related to the Spitfire which I'll post in a minute.
 
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Two thoughts:
1 While a bomber is more expensive than a fighter, downing enemy fighters instead moves you closer to air superiority, achieve that you will destroy a heck lot of enemy bombers.
2 AFAIK, during the BoB, most British fighters could deal with German fighters and bombers. During the Battle of Germany, this was somewhat less the case. A fighter optimized to go after a heavy four-engine bomber needed quite heavy armament and ideally extra armor, which however significantly reduced performance against fighters. By contrast, the lighter German bombers were not as tough a nut to crack.
 
So the next thing I ran across involves and Australian double-Ace named Wilfred Arthur, aka 'Woof'. He was part of the gang who fought in the Western Desert (where he scored most of his victories) and then in North - Australia / New Guinea zone, where he commanded 75 Sqn RAAF, then 71 Wing also in New Guinea and later (after recovering from a serious injury) 78 Wing RAAF. He received the DFC and DSO and was 'mentioned in despatches' twice. He was also in the Morotai Mutiny in 1945.



During his wartime service, 'Woof' Arthur flew Gladiators, Hurricanes, Tomahawks, Kittyhawks, and more briefly, Spitfires and Mustangs. He scored victories in Gladiators, Hurricanes and Kittyhawks.

I found the transcript of an interview with him online, and I thought he mentioned some interesting details perhaps of relevance to this discussion. Excerpt follows with interviewer's questions in bold for clarity. I put the parts where he mentions the Spitfire in red:

(5.00) What were you saying?

Well, in the main the Kittyhawks would have been inferior to the Zeros in altitude, ability to
operate properly at height, and probably also less able to turn inside to ... inside the Zeros
which were lighter and ... but had a lighter wing loading so that they would be difficult if you
attempted to turn with them. Your combat technique would be more likely to be one of an
attack and then a zoom and attack again.

And getting out of the area as quickly as possible.

Well ... no, getting ... zooming so that you've got the opportunity to turn around and make
another attack.

I see, but not staying in close contact without ...

Not ... yes, you wouldn't turn inside anybody. You'd get down and up again to ... of course it's
often, or sometimes the case that if you're in an aircraft that can't turn inside the other one it's
quite probable that you can dive much faster than he can and that ... and at a speedy dive and
then a zoom could easily get you in a position of advantage - height advantage - over the other
one. It could be much more manoeuvrable in a steady turn.

Perhaps if I could just ask you about the Kittyhawk now, I was going to in a
minute, Wilfred. Of course they were supposed to be very good at diving, they
were really quite heavy with all their armour plating and so on. What would
you recall as the main strengths and also the weaknesses of the Kittyhawk and
what was it like to fly as a plane? Did you enjoy it?

Yes, yes. I enjoyed it. It wasn't as docile an aircraft as the Hurricane and Spitfire and other
aircraft but it was ... you had good vision, you had good guns and quite good range and those
factors were of course the very important ones in New Guinea where you did have a lot of
advantage if you could stay in the air a fairly long time. Quite unlike, say, the combat must
have been in England where it was speed off the ground and short ... the aircraft you'd be
attacking would have to be attacked very quickly and the operation would be over in a short
time.

Mmm. There's very little long distance flying to engage the enemy.

Yes. I mean, that's why any sort of flat comparisons which aircraft is the better are just not
relevant unless you describe the particular situation. There is no doubt that under many ...
many conditions the Kittyhawk was far better than the Spitfire and under the other conditions
that is where a speedy take off is required because you had short intervals from when you
knew the aircraft were coming and when they'd actually arrive. Then the speed off the ground
of the Spitfire was very important, the ability to manoeuvre was very important, large amount
of ... large number of guns very important because perhaps the, you know, you'd be likely to
have a short and furious fight.

Mmm. Of course the Kittyhawk was very robust. Do you think, for example,
would Spitfires have stood up to the rough terrain of New Guinea airstrips?

I don't think they would have stood up quite as well and then they did also have another
problem and that is that they had a big problem of overheating in New Guinea. This was in
spite of the fact that they had bigger radiators than the ... I mean, they were equipped with
bigger radiators after arriving in Australia, which of course made them slightly better in their
ability to keep the temperatures right, but it also meant that it reduced their speed slightly
because the radiator was bigger than the previous ones.

Was that the Kittyhawk or Spitfires you were talking about?

Spitfire.

Right.

Oh no, the Kittyhawk was pretty good from cooling. It didn't get into much trouble taxiing or
doing the other things that some aircraft did.

-----
So it sounds like he says the Spitfires were having serious overheating problems in that zone and that the range limitation remained a big problem (at least presumably until Spit VIII were around in some numbers)
 

1. Not really. Intercepting the fighter escorts is surely a waste of material. It goes against the sensible tactic that proved to work in sending small numbers of interceptors up despite the size of attacking force. The RAF fighters sent up were more often than not numerically inferior compared to the force they were intercepting and this was done deliberately to conserve aircraft and to be able to send interceptors to different vectors at different times, especially when the Germans sent several waves over at once attacking different targets. The concept worked as long as the interceptors didn't get carried away and go chasing after the fighter escorts because a handful of Spitfires is no match for around 60 to a hundred Bf 109s.

The British realised that their fighter numbers were inferior, so Park and Dowding planned accordingly and used their interceptors sparingly. When the Germans figured this out, via Theo Osterkamp, who flew escort sorties in a Bf 109 so he could see what was happening first hand, thus becoming the only German commander who had a clear idea of what was going on - smart man, they changed their tactics by sending large formations of Bf 109s as a diversion to alert the radar stations into thinking they were bomber formations, but the Brits got wise to this and refrained from attacking.

2. Yes, by and large, the superiority of the Bf 109 was its altitude performance and the tactic of diving attacks from height, which is when most achieved their kills against unwary British interceptors. I remember reading a passage that stated a British pilot, when informed of the superior altitude performance of the Bf 109, said "well, they have to come down here and get us..."

But as what almost always happened, after diving on their prey, the Bf 109s then got into individual dogfights that descended in height, which is where the Spits and Hurris were in their element and could overcome unsuspecting Bf 109 pilots, the other problem was that this chewed up their precious fuel reserves, which meant they had to scurry back to France while the bombers were left undefended.

Schweik said:
Yes. I mean, that's why any sort of flat comparisons which aircraft is the better are just not
relevant unless you describe the particular situation.
Click to expand...

Yup, all about the context... Great interview, thanks for posting.
 
Interesting response to a positive post I wrote. Perhaps you are somebody who just chooses to pick points from someone's post that you do not like and comment on those as opposed to reading and taking in the whole post and evaluating it for how it was intended. But I shall leave you with that thought and will not be responding to anymore of your posts. Thank you for your points of view.
 
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