Lancaster as an escorted, daylight bomber ala B-17/24?

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If the .303's were that ineffective, instead of giving the tail gunner a bigger window to jump out of, they'd should have made him even safer and let him stay home.

You have to remember that during night operations the ranges were very close, I have read of bomber crews having night fighters fly right past them with neither seeing each other until the last minute, at those ranges, we are talking under 200m four closely spaced .303's would be very effective against any target, especially if the burst went into the cabin or engine.
 
You have to remember that during night operations the ranges were very close, I have read of bomber crews having night fighters fly right past them with neither seeing each other until the last minute, at those ranges, we are talking under 200m four closely spaced .303's would be very effective against any target, especially if the burst went into the cabin or engine.
This is a very good point. I have never read or heard about a night fighter of any side, who considered the bombers LMG defences to be ineffective.
 
This is a very good point. I have never read or heard about a night fighter of any side, who considered the bombers LMG defences to be ineffective.
Night fighters may have been over their own territory, but if you take a bullet that means you have to bale out or force land, the place below is blacked out.
 
1 Only Pathfinder carried H2S. American bombers also carried H2S, in large numbers, only their version was called H2X and was used for bombing through the clouds...

This statement is false. ALL lancaster aircraft carried H2S, at least from May 1944 onwards and perhaps longer.

Jim
 
The primary reason for the Lancaster not being viable as a day bomber was its low ceiling - 21,500 feet loaded. This was even lower than that of the B-24 (23,500 feet) and far below that of the B-17 (at least 30,000 feet). This low ceiling rendered Lancasters operating in daylight very vulnerable to both flak and fighters. Very late in the war, as the German threat declined, some Lancasters were operated in daylight under heavy escort; however, this was very much an exception. It is good to recall that a major reason why the B-24 began to phase out of the 8th AF from the summer of 1944 was due to its relatively low ceiling. With its even lower ceiling the Lancaster was a non-starter.

Was it unviable? And your source is...what? This is nonsense and not supported by the historical records! The Lancaster Bomber was a fully capable day bomber when escorted. Just as the B-17 and the B-24 were fully capable at night. The records show that losses by both Lancasters and Halifaxes on daylight operations were very low...lower than night operations by the end of the war.

For the record, dad flew 11 daylight operations out of his total of 31, September 1944-March 1945.

The attached document is the 4th page of the Form "B" which outlined the tactics for Dad's daylight to Mannheim, March 1, 1945. Note 6: Fighter cover, 8 Squadrons of Mustangs and 7 Squadrons of Spits. from 11-Group. 3 Squadrons of Thunderbolts from TAF written in Ink. Rendezvous position is 5 degrees 30 minutes east on track.

Jim
 

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Was it unviable? And your source is...what? This nonsense and not supported by the historical records! The Lancaster Bomber was a fully capable day bomber when escorted. Just as the B-17 and the B-24 were fully capable at night. The records show that losses by both Lancasters and Halifaxes on daylight operations were very low...lower than night operations by the end of the war.

For the record, dad flew 11 daylight operations out of his total of 31, September 1944-March 1945.

The attached document is the 4th page of the Form "B" which outlined the tactics for Dad's daylight to Mannheim, March 1, 1945. Note 6: Fighter cover, 8 Squadrons of Mustangs and 7 Squadrons of Spits. from 11-Group. 3 Squadrons of Thunderbolts from TAF written in Ink. Rendezvous position is 5 degrees 30 minutes east on track.

Jim
As I understand it, the load out of Lancasters and others was based on being below 22,000 ft when loaded, above that height you make vapour trails.
 
i dont hate the lancaster anyways i just wouldnt trust it in a broad daylight raid thats all

The premise of the OP includes "escorted".

The -17 and the -24 were both flown unescorted in deep raids, both lost a lot, both were pulled back in the autumn of 43 until the P-51B came online.

Under competent escort, I see no reason at all why a Lanc couldn't do the same job -- indeed, delivering more tonnage in so doing.
 
I have to admit that this quote doesn't impress me one bit. He was a man of considerable power and know to be not afraid to use it. Had he wanted 0.50 guns sooner he was in a position to make it happen sooner. If he has insisted in late 42 that he wanted twin 0.50 instead of quad 303 I am confident it would have happened.

It tends to smack of a little too much hindsight for me.

Yeah as MikeMeech's excerpt from Harris alludes to -- it was a battle for years trying to get better turrets for Bomber Command. There were a few battles he had for years that are just as exasperating to read about. The one to get a good cluster projectile springs to mind.

Again, Harris:
I can recall one civil servant whose whole-hearted devotion to the country and to his work, was worth at least a division to the enemy on every day of the war. But for the human limitations of even his devotion to duty and to an eighteen-hour day he would undoubtedly have been worth two divisions. Luckily he was far from being typical, else should we have perished. Not for nothing was it said in the fighting services that had they only the King's Enemies to deal with -- how easy that would be.
 
I've read that about sea battles as well, that the target crew on occasion could see the shells coming at them.
In WW1 when many planes were used as observers and artillery was frequently howitzers lobbing high at (comparatively) short range pilots and observers would see the shells almost come to a halt around them then continue on their parabola downwards.
 
Firstly even radar directed FLAK is more effective when combined with visual sighting and aiming.

The two main Luftwaffe FLAK radars were Wurzburg-D (3m diameter aerial) and Wurzburg-Riesse (7m diameter aerial) both had conical scan and were capable of accurate blind fire. The smaller Wurzburg-D had a on paper accuracy of 0.2 degrees but is sometimes quoted as 0.3/0.5 which is the 60% accuracy when low to ground and ground plane interference. The Bigger Wurzburg Riesse was about twice as accurate and was also well generally surveyed and aligned, about 0.1 degrees or 0.15/0.2 when low to ground. Range accuracy of both was 16m when pointing up. The Bigger radar was very accurate but rarer (4000 versus 500) and often used to direct fighter aircraft interceptions.

The accuracy of FLAK was thus better if optically tracked but ranged by radar. It was also possible to see the bursts. It was quicker to find the targets. Often Wurzburg would put a searchlight on the target and then provide the range as optical systems took over. Finally many engagements were optical only. A rarer German FLAK radar was the Mahnheim FuSE 64 FuMG 41 Radar which had auto track for the range gate. Even if heavily noise jammed, spoof jammed and jammed by windows if an operator happened to get the beam pointed at a target and scanned through he could get an autoblock even if it was manually impossible to track. So visual sightings helped.

The 8.8cm FLAK 37 had an engagement time of less than 14 seconds at 29,500ft so was ineffective at that altitude. It was moderately effective at 25,000ft where the B17's operated comfortably. It was considerably more effective at 23,000ft where B-24 Liberators often operated and was effective at 20,000ft where lancasters would be.

At 20,000ft where the Lancaster would be operating the 8.8cm FLAK 37 would be quite effective. The guns beauty was it was in mass production, not hard to transport and in very wide spread use.

The other two German guns the 10.5cm FLAK 38 and 39 and the 12.8cm FLAK 40. In small number the advanced high velocity 8.8cm FLAK 41.

Luftwaffe studies indicated that at 29,500 feet, the 88-mm/Model 18, 36, 37 had only fourteen seconds to effectively engage a target, the 105-mm had forty-nine seconds, and finally the 88-mm/Model 41 and the 128-mm 12.8cm FLAK 40 had approximately sixty-eight seconds of effective engagement time. At 36,000 feet, only the 88-mm/Model 41 and the 128-mm were able to engage a target for a period of only thirty-one seconds.

Incidentally there were 85 12.8cm FLAK 40 at Ploesti and many over parts of Berlin. These, the most powerful AAA gun of WW2 were what cost the RAF so much in the Battle of Berlin when they ventured above them and the USAAF over Ploesti. The gun was accurate and the burst was huge.

Secondly If the penetration height is reduced from 25,000ft to 20,000ft there is easily a doubling in FLAK burst accuracy (likely more) and the engagement time of the gun probably doubles or trebles to several minutes. FLAK is now 4-8 times more effective.

Thirdly The Germans had some statistics of the relative effect of targeting individual aircraft with a direct hit by the FLAK 37 versus direct hit. The double fuse (nose contact plus timed burst time to burst slightly after the bomber) was reckoned 3-4 times more effective against bombers in formation and 2.4 times against individual bombers so they Germans clearly missed an opportunity. So this suggests the ratio 1.25 to 1.66 of FLAK effectiveness of formation versus individual aircraft.

Fourthly American aircraft such as the B17 had much more armour and redundancy. The US aircraft had 4 generators and multiple hydraulic pumps. If a single hydraulic pump was lost on the Lancaster then all of the Lancaster's defensive turrets were shutdown. The US aircraft had more armour, they had radial engines.

The higher drag of the B17 heavier armament and radials was a moot point when the aircraft was flying at high altitude in thin low drag air.

Fifthly. The claim that the Lancaster can fly higher with a reduced load doesn't scan. The aircraft can fly higher at reduced load, with reduced speed and still has less armour and redundancy.

Finally Operating the Lancaster Mean operating at 20,000-21,000ft where the German fighters are at their peak of performance. The Lancaster 303 guns also are far less of a deterrent since the well armoured German fighters could deal with the 303 round.

Please provide your source for this. You are speculating on what the guns could or could not do. Flooding us with performance data tell us nothing about what actually happened in combat. Stick with what the historical records reveal. Oboe directed Mosquitoes flying individually on a straight path for 10-14 minutes, were highly vulnerable to flak, even at 35,000' at night and in the cloud, because their path could be predicted by radar. So if Mosquitoes could be shot down by predicted flak at 35,000' I suspect the B-17 was also highly vulnerable. The advantage the individual B-17 had was, the dilution effect of being in a large formation.

The tactic used by Bomber Command against defences was a highly concentrated Bomber Stream. It didn't matter whether it was flak or fighters. Day or night. The goal was to saturate defences. Furthermore the actual records show (and I can present these) Bomber Command on occasion used rapid descents upon leaving the target to confuse defences. Over the target the aircraft were dispersed in different height bands, so flak crews could not assume that that ranging guns at one height would be effective against all aircraft. Tactics were fluid from one point in the raid to the next and one operation to the next. It was a cat and mouse game. I would be surprised if the USAAF didn't use similar methods.

All aircraft shot down over Duisburg, October 14, 1944; were shot down by flak. It was predicted flak, i.e. directed by radar. It had to be as the target was covered by 7-10/10's cloud. 13 aircraft lost of 1,013 despatched. Middlebrook and Everitt speculate that the losses occurred from the earlier waves, before the flak positions were overwhelmed by the bombing. Dad's logbook records 4 "scarecrows", these being aircraft exploding midair over the target.

In his audio memoirs, dad discusses the subject of predicted flak. Pilots could tell when they were being predicted and about the actions an experienced pilot could take to avoid it. That might be hard to do when in a tight formation that the USAAF used. But I don't know because I don't know much about what the USAAF did or did not do.

And I'm not going to speculate what the capabilities of the B-17 were verses the Lancaster, because each force had their weapon and that was the weapon they used. Everything else is moot.

Jim
 
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As I understand it, the load out of Lancasters and others was based on being below 22,000 ft when loaded, above that height you make vapour trails.

What you understand is irrelevant. Please provide a source for this, preferably a wartime sources, otherwise it's just conjecture.
 
What you understand is irrelevant. Please provide a source for this, preferably a wartime sources, otherwise it's just conjecture.
No it isn't. From the very first use of the B-17 in daylight, forming vapour trails was a problem. Forming vapour trails at night in moonlight is only slightly less of a problem. German night fighters, when the bomber stream was in common use used to locate the stream by the turbulence in the air and follow it, it is much easier when that turbulence is coloured white by moonlight. There was no pressure on bomber command to increase height to avoid flak because to do so would put them in a height that made them obvious by eye sight even at night because of vapour trails. I have read this in so many books on the subject I find it strange that you demand a source.

my first hit from the internet gave this, from here https://www.historylearningsite.co....ampaign-of-world-war-two/bomber-command-1944/


using this search bomber command raids avoidance of vapour trails



"Nearly 800 bombers were used for the raid. However, for whatever reason, the Luftwaffe had guessed that Nuremburg was to be the target for that night. Within one hour, 59 bombers were shot down by Messerschmitt 109's and Focke-Wolfe fighters. During the flight towards their target, the bomber crews also experienced a very rare occurrence. Bombers did not usually create a vapour trail below 25,000 feet. For this raid, planes flew below 25,000 feet and some were as low as 16,000 feet. For whatever meteorological reason, the planes gave off vapour trails – clearly indicating to the German fighter pilots where they were. In all, the total loss to Bomber Command on this one mission was 64 Lancaster's and 31 Halifax's lost – 670 men."
 
No it isn't. From the very first use of the B-17 in daylight, forming vapour trails was a problem. Forming vapour trails at night in moonlight is only slightly less of a problem. German night fighters, when the bomber stream was in common use used to locate the stream by the turbulence in the air...

I don't disagree with you about the fact that vapour trails are a big deal. And I've read Martin Middlebrook's book on the Nuremberg raid. It's a superb read. What I disagree with is the assertion that the Lancasters heights and loads were based on the need to avoid vapour trails. So I'd like to see wartime documentation that backs this up, because it's news to me. I've read looked through this document particularly carefully: Operational Research in Bomber Command by Basil Dickens

http://lmharchive.ca/wp-content/uplo...d-ORS-Full.pdf

Its really big, by the way. Nothing showed up on what you report and they looked at fuel and bomb loads of aircraft from soup to nuts.

Jim
 
I don't disagree with you about the fact that vapour trails are a big deal. And I've read Martin Middlebrook's book on the Nuremberg raid. It's a superb read. What I disagree with is the assertion that the Lancasters heights and loads were based on the need to avoid vapour trails. So I'd like to see wartime documentation that backs this up, because it's news to me. I've read looked through this document particularly carefully: Operational Research in Bomber Command by Basil Dickens

http://lmharchive.ca/wp-content/uplo...d-ORS-Full.pdf

Its really big, by the way. Nothing showed up on what you report and they looked at fuel and bomb loads of aircraft from soup to nuts.

Jim
What question do you want me to answer? You say that you agree that vapour trails were a big deal and you want me to prove that they were a big deal because you don't believe they were actually a big deal? Vapour trails and the forming of vapour trails are not a constant. I can guarantee that my wind up model wont form a vapour trail in my garden, I can also guarantee that a formation of B-17s aircraft at 30,000 ft will form a vapour trail. Look at your bomb and fuel loads for Lancasters at 30,000 ft. some could do it, but it is a lighter load with a big white flag saying "here I am" so it wasn't normally done. As per the link I posted the knowledge at the time was that below 25,000 ft you were OK for vapour tails, so missions were constructed around that with a safety margin of a few thousand feet. If you have a bomber stream and the ones at the top of the stream indicate where all those below are you may as well put your lights on to avoid collisions.
 
So let me tell you all a little bit about my work. I am researching my father's wartime operations in detail. I'm using his memoirs of the war. Frankly his recollection isn't great at times and it's needs scrutiny. However, he was there and I wasn't. So I have tried to collect together all of the wartime records of what is known: records of the actual briefings of aircrew, what they were told about the target, locations and gun counts of flak defences, locations of fighters and strength, Pathinder methods, call signs, route turning points, speeds, heights, who was the master bomber (if used), records of the master bombers sortie, Pathfinder records of the raid, ORB entry for my father, his bomb load and heading speed on the bombing run, what markers he bombed, actual records of what he and his crew saw, what other crews experienced and observed, fighter activity, who shot down which aircraft, notable photos of individuals and aircraft, film footage over the target, dad's strike photos and finally raid assessments by 6-Group and by Bomber Command.

All of this work is based on thousands of pages of wartime documents. Not someone else's book, (except for Theo Boiten and Rod MacKenzie's excellent books-researching the original German documents is beyond my capabilities). In other words there is a huge amount of historical information from primary sources with is available. We don't need to wave our hands in the air.

So it kind of burns my bottom, when I see arguments made on whether this aircraft is better than that aircraft based on technical details that have little relation to what actually happened.

sorry, just my opinion.

Jim
 
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