drgondog
Major
Maybe F4U was closer?
Long range, high speed Spitfire fighter: the best approach? (1 Viewer)
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Maybe F4U was closer?
Glider
Major
Have to say thats a good choice, an aircraft that served for many years without a fundamental change in its design. The only thing that I would say is that its introduction into service was a few years later than the Spitfire. However you are right it is a good contender
The 45 degrees is probably moot, but the jist of it was the US/British fighters were difficult to line up a shot with rudder relative to the ME109. So in a dogfight the ME109 had an advantage of enabling in the pilot to chose to use rudder control for fine tuning his shot, the allied planes resorted to mostly to stick only. I have seen this comment by several pilots including non-Germans. So apparently those pilot st least felt this was worth mentioning. And no I do not have any analysis to back this up just commentary from several pilot interviews.
There are clips of German attack on bombers where yes they actually rake the bombers side to side in plane so that appears to be rudder control.
drgondog
Major
Where in the world do you dream this stuff up? Using rudder in a co-ordinated way with ailerons is second nature to even an average pilot - If you ski it is the difference between a stem Christie and a carved turn.
Go watch Ralls comments on youtube (from military channel or discovery not sure which) to start. Then search for ME109 pilot bios or interviews.
These are NOT coordinated turns, no watching the ball. They are flat side to side movement to move the streams of rounds across an aircraft.
Again go watch the clips there are many on youtube, easy to find.
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
Another moronic comment from an armchair pilot...
drgondog
Major
I have approximately 60 hours of 8th AF gun camera film and one hour of LW film - pretty familiar with the concept. If You, on the other hand with your vast knowledge of LW tactics against bombers or fighters, look at them more closely you will note for example:
When close in - say on a B-17, the pilot is usually firing a package of 20mm into one engine, then moving to a second, then fuselage and maybe a third as contrast with 'spraying'.. against a fighter at 6 O'clock he's not moving wingtip to wingtip by choice - the fuselage, cockpit and engine are the key - not the wing per se.
If the target is flying straight and level, there is nor reason for aileron adjustment (Hand for you) other than to stabilize in wake turbulence - there you only need some rudder (feet for you) control.. to regain target acquisition.
OldSkeptic
Senior Airman
- 509
- May 17, 2010
Just been doing some re-reading recently.
It's amazing the impact one person can have, from the moment he became CAS (head of the RAF) Portal endlessly fought against a long range fighter.
His attitude was that it was impossible to make and given his position he made sure it never happened.
But even I didn't know (until some reading recently) how hard he fought against it. He had a running battle withe USAAF right through 1943 repeatedly telling them that it 'was impossible'. Did so even when the USAAF flew a couple of modified Spits across the Atlantic (plus all the prototypes and test done by the RAF itself) as a demonstration and were literally begging the RAF to help out.
Kept it up right until (for example advising Churchill even as late as Oct 43 that 'it was impossible') the P-51B came into service (even though he must have known that it was in preparation and about the much earlier the Mustang X trials).
Only then did he finally shut up.
The damage that one man created by his idiotic obstinacy. He was so adamant about it and so tirelessly worked to make sure it didn't happen that he was even soundly criticised about it in the official RAF history of WW2.
Makes me wonder who was really responsible for the incredible reluctance to use night fighter intruders for BC support (and how little resources were put into it until very, very late on). I always thought it was Harris, but now I wonder if it came from Portal himself (the record on this is very murky).
It was a bad day when they got rid of Dowding, he (and his number 2 Evill) had gotten R&D work done on longer ranged Spits in early 1940 even pre the BoB .... all cancelled when Douglas and Mallery took over of course and especially when Portal took over the 41.
The RAF by and large gets a good write up over WW2, but when you read the details you can't help but notice that they had a real lot of dunderheads in the senior levels, with a real bit of the WW1 'over the top chaps and run right towards that machine gun ' attitude in far too many areas.
It's amazing the impact one person can have, from the moment he became CAS (head of the RAF) Portal endlessly fought against a long range fighter.
His attitude was that it was impossible to make and given his position he made sure it never happened.
But even I didn't know (until some reading recently) how hard he fought against it. He had a running battle withe USAAF right through 1943 repeatedly telling them that it 'was impossible'. Did so even when the USAAF flew a couple of modified Spits across the Atlantic (plus all the prototypes and test done by the RAF itself) as a demonstration and were literally begging the RAF to help out.
Kept it up right until (for example advising Churchill even as late as Oct 43 that 'it was impossible') the P-51B came into service (even though he must have known that it was in preparation and about the much earlier the Mustang X trials).
Only then did he finally shut up.
The damage that one man created by his idiotic obstinacy. He was so adamant about it and so tirelessly worked to make sure it didn't happen that he was even soundly criticised about it in the official RAF history of WW2.
Makes me wonder who was really responsible for the incredible reluctance to use night fighter intruders for BC support (and how little resources were put into it until very, very late on). I always thought it was Harris, but now I wonder if it came from Portal himself (the record on this is very murky).
It was a bad day when they got rid of Dowding, he (and his number 2 Evill) had gotten R&D work done on longer ranged Spits in early 1940 even pre the BoB .... all cancelled when Douglas and Mallery took over of course and especially when Portal took over the 41.
The RAF by and large gets a good write up over WW2, but when you read the details you can't help but notice that they had a real lot of dunderheads in the senior levels, with a real bit of the WW1 'over the top chaps and run right towards that machine gun ' attitude in far too many areas.
The USAAF reached the same conclusion in 1940/41 as well. Spaatz wrote in the mid 30s that any fighter with sufficient fuel for long range escort wouldn't be able to cope with short range defensive fighters at the target.
I think it's a bit unfair to blame Portal. Eaker was still maintaining the line that US heavy bombers wouldn't need escort until June 1943. In August 1943 the USAAF sent representatives to Lockheed, Republic and North American to request extra fuel tanks be fitted to their fighters. It took Republic until spring 1944 to modify the P-47, NA had a simpler solution of fitting a rear fuselage tank. It wasn't until Feb 1944 that the 2 Spitfires were sent to the US for trials with more fuel.
When Vandenberg and Spaatz ruled out fitting bombs and drop tanks to the P-39, the memorandum said they would:
Portal also had more to think about than the purely technical aspect of fitting more fuel to the Spitfire. Until the US effort really got going in late 1943 he didn't have enough fighters to carry out a long range deep penetration campaign against Germany. From the summer of 1943 onwards he had preparing for an invasion as his priority. Apart from the possible delays to production caused by modifying fighters to carry more fuel, Portal must have been concerned that his fighters would have been diverted to supporting US bombing to the detriment of UK defences and tactical operations over France and the Med.
I think it's a bit unfair to blame Portal. Eaker was still maintaining the line that US heavy bombers wouldn't need escort until June 1943. In August 1943 the USAAF sent representatives to Lockheed, Republic and North American to request extra fuel tanks be fitted to their fighters. It took Republic until spring 1944 to modify the P-47, NA had a simpler solution of fitting a rear fuselage tank. It wasn't until Feb 1944 that the 2 Spitfires were sent to the US for trials with more fuel.
When Vandenberg and Spaatz ruled out fitting bombs and drop tanks to the P-39, the memorandum said they would:
Portal also had more to think about than the purely technical aspect of fitting more fuel to the Spitfire. Until the US effort really got going in late 1943 he didn't have enough fighters to carry out a long range deep penetration campaign against Germany. From the summer of 1943 onwards he had preparing for an invasion as his priority. Apart from the possible delays to production caused by modifying fighters to carry more fuel, Portal must have been concerned that his fighters would have been diverted to supporting US bombing to the detriment of UK defences and tactical operations over France and the Med.
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CobberKane
Banned
- 706
- Apr 4, 2012
Maybe the F4U's climb rate might have worked against it in the Spitfire's primary role; as a short range interceptor. I believe that's one area where the Seafire found a niche in the PTO, though it's assignment to the task probably also arose from the realisation that the Corsair and Hellcat did everything else better.
OldSkeptic
Senior Airman
- 509
- May 17, 2010
None of them took into account the simple fact that the LR fighter burns off most of its fuel getting to the combat area, returning it to a normal fighter again.
Even the Mustang was a total pig fully fueled up with drop tanks on, but by the time it took to get to its escort rendezvous it was back to normal.
You use a layered escort pattern with SR fighters, MR and then LR ones all rendezvousing at different points (which can be the same type of plane with different fuel loads of course).
What matters is how much fuel you have for combat and return (after you have burned off the rear and dropped your drop tanks) and being able to have it without impacting performance.
For a Spit that meant you had full fuel (front and wing tanks) of 122 (UK) gals when combat starts, using the rear and drop tanks for cruise to rendezvous and the escort period.
More than enough for combat and cruise to return on a 500 mile range mission.
They had plenty of Spits (roughly) 60+ squadrons with very high production.
And there were more than enough to throw away 1,000+ of them in Leigh Mallery's 'leaning towards the enemy strategy' during 41 and 42.
And that really shows the dunder headedness, the 'plan' to hammer the Luftwaffe and make them draw more forces to France could only be achieved if there were MR and LR Spits, otherwise the Germans simply pulled their bases out of range and only engaged the RAF when it tactically suited them and inflicted tremendous losses. Note that this was also at a time when they were screaming for Spits in North Africa and Malta.....
Modifying the Spit was pretty easy, wing leading edge bags (as per the Mk VIII) and a rear tank. Even with just (say) a 30 gal rear tank (or under the seat as per some PR versions) and the wing ones you have an easy combat radius of 300 miles. Larger rear tank (only really possible in Merlin 60 series Spits) and a 90 gal drop tank and Berlin is within range (all gals are UK ones).
10 March 1941 according to Davis.
Which suggests the opposition need to intercept early in the flight. For the Germans this would have been over the coast of France/Belgium/Netherlands, when the long range fighter is still loaded down with excess fuel. RAF fighter cover meant that wasn't a good idea. But if the RAF fighters were the long range escorts, then the obvious tactic for the Germans would have been to intercept over the coast, forcing the fighters to drop external fuel tanks, making it impossible for them to escort all the way to the target. The Germans can then have another go at the now unescorted bombers over Germany, and a third go at them as they fly back via France.
The daylight bomber offensive required the sort of numbers of fighters that weren't really available until the end of 1943 anyway.
OldSkeptic
Senior Airman
- 509
- May 17, 2010
The RAF had 50 squadrons of Spitfire in June 42 (nearly all MK Vs, few MK IIs, bit later some Mk IXs), they were producing 350 fighter pilots a month (and planes). They were facing just JG 2 and 26 in France (from memory).
They had such an overwhelming numerical advantage that they could have given each Spit pilot a club, ordered them to fly over the the airfields, bail out over them (or land) ... and club every Luftwaffe pilot to death.
There was no need to worry about defences, the Luftwaffe never did any further daylight operations of any note and RV Jones promised that he would give 6 weeks notice of any new (and night, hence the Spits would be useless) bombing campaign.
They already starved the ME (inc Malta) anyway, N.A. only got Spits (2 squadrons whoopie do) at the end of '42. And Malta (again from memory) only got 4 squadrons.
So they had all those Spits sitting around with the pilots twiddling their thumbs (except those that Leigh Mallory threw away of course).
That 50 squadrons excluded the NA and Malta ones.
Slap a 30 gal tank in the rear, fix a bob weight to the elevator circuit, hang a 45 gal drop tank and send them right over the Luftwaffe's airfields. Escort bombers right to them if they still don't come up to fight.
4 weeks tops and there are no Luftwaffe fighters left in France, so then go after bomber, recon and anti-shipping airfields and planes.
Another 4 weeks and there is Luftwaffe in France at all.
RAF bombers can then go at will and in daylight against any targets that supply the Germans.
Repeat for Belgium and the Netherlands.
The thing to note is that by making an incorrect assumption ... and sticking to it despite all the evidence ... they strategically and tactically neutered themselves.
With even just a 300 mile combat radius for Spit Vs then they increased all their options tremendously (everywhere, N.A. and Malta too).
With 500 mile MK VIIIs and IXs then they have real options to grind the Luftwaffe to death and actually do some useful bombing (not something that happened much in 42).
The Luftwaffe never got much above 1,000 fighters at any point. Even when they increased production they couldn't supply the pilots and attrition meant that their operational numbers basically stayed constant.
With the RAF being able to clear France, Belgium, etc in the air meant that the Luftwaffe would have had to bring fighters back from the eastern front (etc), creating a battle of attrition which the Luftwaffe could not win.
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Glider
Major
At Malta they added two 45 gallon droptanks from Hurricanes under the fueslage to give some long range escort to the Malta Convoys. I don't know what the actual range was but it must have helped and shows what could be done if people are allowed to try.
Balljoint
Senior Airman
Actually, the US strategic bombing was subordinated to gaining the air superiority required for the invasion. Once the long range fighters were brought to bear the LW over France was obliterated in less than six months which, it would seem, was also the best UK defense.
Edgar Brooks
Senior Airman
Hoping, of course, that they managed to avoid the flak on the way.
And they were well aware that the Germans weren't going to attack, again? They knew, in advance, that Russia was not going to be defeated, and that the planned four-engine bombers (which were expected) were never going to happen? Really? It's a shame you weren't there to soothe their fears, and set them straight. I think you'll find that the inhabitants of Plymouth, Portsmouth, Liverpool, Hull, Southampton, London, Birmingham, Exeter, Glasgow, Belfast, and sundry other towns, didn't feel there was no need for any defences, when they were getting killed every other night.
So the Hurricanes and P-40s, which were sent, didn't amount to a can of beans; I'm sure the pilots will appreciate being written off so easily. I take it you don't know how difficult it was to conjure up a filter suitable for desert use? Eisenhower asked for Spitfire IXs, to cover "Torch," but couldn't have them, due to inadequate filters.
Easy in theory, but not in practice; read the Spitfire V manual, and you'll find it mandatory that the extra fuel tank could only be used in conjunction with the 90-gallon ferry tank. There was also no direct fuel line from the tank to the engine (pilots weren't too keen on sharing the cockpit with fuel, for some reason,) so the fuel must go through the ferry tank, and be used first. If the aircraft was jumped, and jettisoned the fuel tank, there was no means to dispose of any fuel remaining in the rear tank, which meant that, as the fuel drained out of the front tanks, the aircraft became progressively less stable, and impossible to control. This love of the bob-weight is interesting, since experienced pilots didn't like it, due to loss of manoeuvrability, and Mike Crosley was of the opinion that it killed more pilots than it saved, since, when a pilot inverted the aircraft to abandon it, the weight worked in the opposite sense, and slammed the elevators hard up, giving the pilot no chance to get out.
Which is what you're doing.
All of which employs 20:20 hindsight, and wasn't known at the time.
Even the Mk.IX couldn't have a rear fuel tank fitted, without major modifications, and it was the end of 1942 before they could make the trip from Gibraltar non-stop to Malta. Incidentally, as for Malta being "starved," 431 Spitfires arrived there, between March and October, 1942.
I'm sure, too, that those pilots who went as far as they could, to meet, and escort home USAAF bombers, will be pleased to know they were just "twiddling their thumbs."
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There was also JG 1 in the Netherlands, various other units seem to have helped out as and when. They were also well supplied and equipped.
Hooton gives sortie totals for Luftflotte 3. In June 1942 they managed over 3,500 fighter sorties, in August over 4,000. To put that in perspective, Luftflotte Reich managed 3,300 fighter sorties in January 1944, 4,500 in April 1944.
Spitfire fighter production was around 3,800 in 1942. Hurricanes weren't up to fighter combat over Europe, Typhoons were few in number and not properly sorted for combat. The Germans produced about 4,500 109s and 190s in 1942.
There were a lot of tip and run raids, anti shipping strikes and recce flights. The RAF had to maintain fighters the length and breadth of the UK.
385 Spitfires were flown to Malta between March and early October 1942.
That sounds like what the Luftwaffe tried in the BoB. Grass airfields do not make good bombing targets. Especially when there are very large numbers of them, mostly empty.
The Spitfire VIII didn't really come along until 1943. The Spitfire IX would have required modifications to increase the range, and at that time more Spitfires were much more important than better Spitfires. Look at those production figures again.
The numbers just aren't there. The Luftwaffe had numerical superiority and were just off the British coast in 1940 and still lost. The RAF had numerical superiority but were hundreds of miles from Germany in 1942. They didn't have enough planes to make deep penetration raids work. In fact, they only had enough to contest airspace over France, not drive the Luftwaffe from the skies, even within the range they did have.
How can they clear the whole of France and Belgium etc when they didn't have enough aircraft to clear the much smaller areas they had range for?
The numbers just aren't there. A long range daylight bombing campaign requires a superiority of force that the RAF didn't posses in 1942, or even the first half of 1943.
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