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I think the Navy just wasn't going to allow the other side a kill. The IJN didn't have that luxury.
The Saratoga arrived shortly after, the fleet loitered for a few days to be sure the Japanese had actually retired, then turned for Pearl around the 10th if I remember right.And meanwhile the next day or two TF16 is actively searching for stragglers. Granted, no more torpedo bombers left, and dive-bombers probably ain't sinking any Kongo-class without help, but they also have to consider subs (the Japanese weren't aware of Mk 14 issues at that time).
There's also fueling to consider.
They made the right decision to cut losses and go home.
The biggest contribution the smaller carriers could have made would be adding to the CAP, IMO. Their planes would not be used for scouting which was the role for cruiser launched float planes.
And the pair of Yokosuka D4Y1-C Suisei (recce version of the Judy divebomber and the first version to enter service). 2 aircraft aboard Soryu at Midway. One went u/s as a result of a deck accident IIRC and was lost when Soryu burned. The other flew a sortie landing back on Hiryu and being lost on her.which was the role for cruiser launched float planes.
1. I think it was justified for Japan to occupy part of the Aleutians when they did. If they didn't, the US would have fortified the lower Aleutians later in 1942. The forces chosen were reasonable for the task. I think this was actually more strategically important than attacking Midway. Ultimately Japan had the same problem both with the Aleutians and Midway in that they could take the land but they couldn't hope to hold it. (Well, I'm not sure they could have even taken Midway.) Between the low quantity and the lower quality of the aircraft and aircrew on the light carriers, I don't think they would have played a major role in a hypothetical Midway battle had they participated.
2. If the IJN could have combined the air groups of Shokaku and Zuikaku and sent out Zuikaku with Kido Butai, with a relatively full composite air group, that might have been worthwhile, but if that would have caused a delay in the operation, it might have allowed the Saratoga to come into action on the US side. As it was, the US really only had two effective carriers, the Yorktown and the Enterprise. The Hornet's group was pretty ineffective. The more experienced Saratoga air group would have likely performed at least as well as the Enterprise. If so, there was a significant likelihood that the US would have knocked out all 5 of Japan's fleet carriers.
USN reports from June 1942 list her air group asWeren't some of Sara's air group already aboard Yorktown for the battle?
USN reports from June 1942 list her air group as
VB-3
VF-2
VS-3
VT-3
The Saratoga arrived shortly after, the fleet loitered for a few days to be sure the Japanese had actually retired, then turned for Pearl around the 10th if I remember right.
Thanks for providing the detail. IIRC, Sara was largely filled with crated aircraft on its voyage to PH and could not be immediately operational.
I have not hidden my thoughts on the A6M on this forum, it is in my opinion the most overrated aircraft of WW2 and your reply here is the one of the many reasons why, armed fueled aircraft had to be kept below decks because the deck itself had to be clear for the CAP fighters to re-arm, the Japanese pilots would land and replace the 20mm ammunition as soon as possible because the two mgs were simply not effective enough against armored aircraft. The IJN carrier doctrine was influenced by the A6M's limitations, limitations that contributed to fueled aircraft being in the hangers. The carriers lost at Midway were caused by many small deficiencies then when added up resulted in a perfect storm for their destruction.I don't think any of the carriers at Midway had containable fires once avgas caught fire -- which on Akagi, Kaga, and Soryu was immediate, seeing as how they all had fueled and armed aircraft in enclosed hangars. That's going to superheat right away, and also contain the force of the exploding ordnance, increasing its deadliness.
I have not hidden my thoughts on the A6M on this forum, it is in my opinion the most overrated aircraft of WW2 and your reply here is the one of the many reasons why, armed fueled aircraft had to be kept below decks because the deck itself had to be clear for the CAP fighters to re-arm, the Japanese pilots would land and replace the 20mm ammunition as soon as possible because the two mgs were simply not effective enough against armored aircraft. The IJN carrier doctrine was influenced by the A6M's limitations, limitations that contributed to fueled aircraft being in the hangers. The carriers lost at Midway were caused by many small deficiencies then when added up resulted in a perfect storm for their destruction.
Again, the arming, especially of the torpedoes, had to be done in the hangar due to insufficient ammo lift. Parshall makes this point himself in his Midway interview with Drachinifel.Shattered Sword says otherwise, the requirement of having the decks cleared for the CAP limits what else can be done, there are photo's from the B17 strike that clearly show the decks clear of aircraft except for A6M's re-arming, it's deficiency had an effect on tactics, lots of little things adding up to the loss of those four carriers.
I have not hidden my thoughts on the A6M on this forum, it is in my opinion the most overrated aircraft of WW2 and your reply here is the one of the many reasons why, armed fueled aircraft had to be kept below decks because the deck itself had to be clear for the CAP fighters to re-arm, the Japanese pilots would land and replace the 20mm ammunition as soon as possible because the two mgs were simply not effective enough against armored aircraft. The IJN carrier doctrine was influenced by the A6M's limitations, limitations that contributed to fueled aircraft being in the hangers. The carriers lost at Midway were caused by many small deficiencies then when added up resulted in a perfect storm for their destruction.
Kaga took a direct hit on her island killing the senior officers, American and British ships have men down to junior ranks that are trained to work independently and autonomously if the worst case scenario happens, Kaga took two serious hits that killed her commanders and knocked out the fire suppression system, neither of those are fatal IF there is redundancy in the chain of command and DC control, yes her avgas lines were ruptured but again IF the crew were trained to work without officers having to tell them what to do the problem could have been dealt with before it became fatal. Lots of what if's but from were I sit the Japanese seem to have never considered the repercussions of the enemy striking back and the results of that, their aircraft ships tactics in general appear to me to be all based on them always winning, never the other way around.Again, you're not addressing my point: your comment about Kaga being saved by better damage control isn't very tenable.