Midway with expanded Kido Butai?

[Thumpalumpacus]

I think the Navy just wasn't going to allow the other side a kill. The IJN didn't have that luxury.

... or choice. Even successfully towing Hiryu home from Midway, it'll be 12-18 months before she's active again, and at what risk to escorting ships for the return? That's the math playing out in IJN minds when they order two destroyers back to make sure she's sunk.

 

[GrauGeist]

And meanwhile the next day or two TF16 is actively searching for stragglers. Granted, no more torpedo bombers left, and dive-bombers probably ain't sinking any Kongo-class without help, but they also have to consider subs (the Japanese weren't aware of Mk 14 issues at that time).

There's also fueling to consider.

They made the right decision to cut losses and go home.

The Saratoga arrived shortly after, the fleet loitered for a few days to be sure the Japanese had actually retired, then turned for Pearl around the 10th if I remember right.

 

[Conslaw]

1. I think it was justified for Japan to occupy part of the Aleutians when they did. If they didn't, the US would have fortified the lower Aleutians later in 1942. The forces chosen were reasonable for the task. I think this was actually more strategically important than attacking Midway. Ultimately Japan had the same problem both with the Aleutians and Midway in that they could take the land but they couldn't hope to hold it. (Well, I'm not sure they could have even taken Midway.) Between the low quantity and the lower quality of the aircraft and aircrew on the light carriers, I don't think they would have played a major role in a hypothetical Midway battle had they participated.

2. If the IJN could have combined the air groups of Shokaku and Zuikaku and sent out Zuikaku with Kido Butai, with a relatively full composite air group, that might have been worthwhile, but if that would have caused a delay in the operation, it might have allowed the Saratoga to come into action on the US side. As it was, the US really only had two effective carriers, the Yorktown and the Enterprise. The Hornet's group was pretty ineffective. The more experienced Saratoga air group would have likely performed at least as well as the Enterprise. If so, there was a significant likelihood that the US would have knocked out all 5 of Japan's fleet carriers.

 

[mack8]

Just to quickly add on an angle regarding why Zuikaku was not sent in OTL. Someone offered the reasoning that IJN commanders wished to preserve the remaining pilots of Cardiv 5 as a nucleus around which to rebuild the air groups. If they would have sent them all with Zuikaku, given the frightful attrition at Coral Sea, they were probably gravely concerned that further losses at Midway, likely heavy too, would have resulted in almost the complete anihilation of CarDiv5s airgroups, especially the attack squadrons. So there would be hardly a nucleus left to rebuild CaRdiv5s airgroups.

From that angle, i can understand why they were reluctant to send Zuikaku at Midway. With the benefit of hindsight it was a mistake, but i guess their reasoning at the time is understandable.

 

[SaparotRob]

The biggest contribution the smaller carriers could have made would be adding to the CAP, IMO. Their planes would not be used for scouting which was the role for cruiser launched float planes.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

The biggest contribution the smaller carriers could have made would be adding to the CAP, IMO. Their planes would not be used for scouting which was the role for cruiser launched float planes.

Yanking their bombers and filling up on fighters would have meant more A5Ms, though. Zeros were scarce at that time, IIRC.

 

[EwenS]

which was the role for cruiser launched float planes.

And the pair of Yokosuka D4Y1-C Suisei (recce version of the Judy divebomber and the first version to enter service). 2 aircraft aboard Soryu at Midway. One went u/s as a result of a deck accident IIRC and was lost when Soryu burned. The other flew a sortie landing back on Hiryu and being lost on her.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

1. I think it was justified for Japan to occupy part of the Aleutians when they did. If they didn't, the US would have fortified the lower Aleutians later in 1942. The forces chosen were reasonable for the task. I think this was actually more strategically important than attacking Midway. Ultimately Japan had the same problem both with the Aleutians and Midway in that they could take the land but they couldn't hope to hold it. (Well, I'm not sure they could have even taken Midway.) Between the low quantity and the lower quality of the aircraft and aircrew on the light carriers, I don't think they would have played a major role in a hypothetical Midway battle had they participated.

I agree with your assessment that the air groups of the two carriers would not have made much of a difference at MI, but disagree that taking Attu and Kiska was strategically important. The weather there was the common enemy of both forces, and would have severely limited the number of American ops put up. Supplying such islands with the logistics to provide for a large aerial offensive in such a hostile environment should have been a factor in Japanese considerations, imo.

American bombers could just barely reach Hokkaido from there if memory serves, and you're going to have larger non-combat losses all the same.

2. If the IJN could have combined the air groups of Shokaku and Zuikaku and sent out Zuikaku with Kido Butai, with a relatively full composite air group, that might have been worthwhile, but if that would have caused a delay in the operation, it might have allowed the Saratoga to come into action on the US side. As it was, the US really only had two effective carriers, the Yorktown and the Enterprise. The Hornet's group was pretty ineffective. The more experienced Saratoga air group would have likely performed at least as well as the Enterprise. If so, there was a significant likelihood that the US would have knocked out all 5 of Japan's fleet carriers.

Weren't some of Sara's air group already aboard Yorktown for the battle?

 

[EwenS]

Weren't some of Sara's air group already aboard Yorktown for the battle?

USN reports from June 1942 list her air group as

VB-3
VF-2
VS-3
VT-3

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

USN reports from June 1942 list her air group as

VB-3
VF-2
VS-3
VT-3

Thanks for providing the detail. IIRC, Sara was largely filled with crated aircraft on its voyage to PH and could not be immediately operational.

 

[33k in the air]

The Saratoga arrived shortly after, the fleet loitered for a few days to be sure the Japanese had actually retired, then turned for Pearl around the 10th if I remember right.

Thanks for providing the detail. IIRC, Sara was largely filled with crated aircraft on its voyage to PH and could not be immediately operational.

According to the Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships entry for the Saratoga:

"Saratoga departed Puget Sound on 22 May for San Diego. She arrived there on 25 May and was training her air group when intelligence was received of an impending Japanese assault on Midway. Due to the need to load planes and stores and to collect escorts, the carrier was unable to sail until 1 June and arrived at Pearl Harbor on the 6th after the Battle of Midway had ended. She departed Pearl Harbor on 7 June after fueling; and, on 11 June, transferred 34 aircraft to Hornet and Enterprise to replenish their depleted air groups. The three carriers then turned north to counter Japanese activity reported in the Aleutians, but the operation was cancelled and Saratoga returned to Pearl Harbor on 13 June."

 

[GrauGeist]

All the aircraft aboard Saratoga were operational, not crated.

When she rendevoused with the fleet, the aircraft (except for her own air group) were distributed between Enterprise and Hornet.

She then returned Pearl, again took aboard new aircraft and returned to Midway to replenish the USMC and USAAF air groups.

 

[PAT303]

I don't think any of the carriers at Midway had containable fires once avgas caught fire -- which on Akagi, Kaga, and Soryu was immediate, seeing as how they all had fueled and armed aircraft in enclosed hangars. That's going to superheat right away, and also contain the force of the exploding ordnance, increasing its deadliness.

I have not hidden my thoughts on the A6M on this forum, it is in my opinion the most overrated aircraft of WW2 and your reply here is the one of the many reasons why, armed fueled aircraft had to be kept below decks because the deck itself had to be clear for the CAP fighters to re-arm, the Japanese pilots would land and replace the 20mm ammunition as soon as possible because the two mgs were simply not effective enough against armored aircraft. The IJN carrier doctrine was influenced by the A6M's limitations, limitations that contributed to fueled aircraft being in the hangers. The carriers lost at Midway were caused by many small deficiencies then when added up resulted in a perfect storm for their destruction.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I have not hidden my thoughts on the A6M on this forum, it is in my opinion the most overrated aircraft of WW2 and your reply here is the one of the many reasons why, armed fueled aircraft had to be kept below decks because the deck itself had to be clear for the CAP fighters to re-arm, the Japanese pilots would land and replace the 20mm ammunition as soon as possible because the two mgs were simply not effective enough against armored aircraft. The IJN carrier doctrine was influenced by the A6M's limitations, limitations that contributed to fueled aircraft being in the hangers. The carriers lost at Midway were caused by many small deficiencies then when added up resulted in a perfect storm for their destruction.

That really minimizes the fact that the carriers got caught in that condition in the first place. The doctrine about arming planes in the hangar had little to do with the Zero, and a lot to do with limited ammo hoists and trucks for above-deck servicing. Even disregarding cycling CAP, Nagumo had to choose between launching immediately or recovering the Midway strike and rearming once he knew an American carrier was present at 0520 his time. His indecision put the armorers and fuelies in a position where combustibles and explosives were everywhere when the SBDs hit two hours later.

Those fires weren't containable under those circumstances, and cycling Zeroes had little to do with it. Nagumo's dithering and sloppy Japanese ammo handling had much more to do with it. While we can fault Japanese damage control, the losses they suffered on 4 Jun were a result of operational decisions by leadership as well as technical reasons, not sixty-round drums running low on a few fighters. I've fought POL fires, albeit without bombs laying around, and I can tell you that they can be a bitch. With bombs, much more worrisome.

 

[PAT303]

Shattered Sword says otherwise, the requirement of having the decks cleared for the CAP limits what else can be done, there are photo's from the B17 strike that clearly show the decks clear of aircraft except for A6M's re-arming, it's deficiency had an effect on tactics, lots of little things adding up to the loss of those four carriers.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Shattered Sword says otherwise, the requirement of having the decks cleared for the CAP limits what else can be done, there are photo's from the B17 strike that clearly show the decks clear of aircraft except for A6M's re-arming, it's deficiency had an effect on tactics, lots of little things adding up to the loss of those four carriers.

Again, the arming, especially of the torpedoes, had to be done in the hangar due to insufficient ammo lift. Parshall makes this point himself in his Midway interview with Drachinifel.

You've chosen one "little thing" to harp on while you're ignoring so many other factors in the loss of these carriers, while at the same time deigning to criticize Japanese damage control. Your aguing that Kaga's fires were "controllable" damage (which is what kicked off our sidebar here) and then assigning blame for that to the Zero's ammo capacity ignores so many other -- bigger -- factors that it bespeaks an irrational focus on your part.

If you bother to reply to this post at all, make sure you address the other points that I've raised above about damage control aboard these ships.

 

[PAT303]

Lots of little things that have been discussed in the past like unrealistic training, a lack of aircraft, lack of recon capability, poor DC training and hierarchy style leadership, cramped operations room, not actually having an idea of where the US fleet was and what it was comprised of, the recon aviators having poor ship recognition skills and probably the worse one, thinking not just the Americans but the Allies in general not fighting back but being submissive to Japan, the worse mistake of all.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Again, you're not addressing my point: your comment about Kaga being saved by better damage control isn't very tenable.

 

[Macandy]

I have not hidden my thoughts on the A6M on this forum, it is in my opinion the most overrated aircraft of WW2 and your reply here is the one of the many reasons why, armed fueled aircraft had to be kept below decks because the deck itself had to be clear for the CAP fighters to re-arm, the Japanese pilots would land and replace the 20mm ammunition as soon as possible because the two mgs were simply not effective enough against armored aircraft. The IJN carrier doctrine was influenced by the A6M's limitations, limitations that contributed to fueled aircraft being in the hangers. The carriers lost at Midway were caused by many small deficiencies then when added up resulted in a perfect storm for their destruction.

What killed the IJN carriers was disastrous bad DC and procedures.
They didn't purge and inert fuel lines, so any hit… BOOOM!

 

[PAT303]

Again, you're not addressing my point: your comment about Kaga being saved by better damage control isn't very tenable.

Kaga took a direct hit on her island killing the senior officers, American and British ships have men down to junior ranks that are trained to work independently and autonomously if the worst case scenario happens, Kaga took two serious hits that killed her commanders and knocked out the fire suppression system, neither of those are fatal IF there is redundancy in the chain of command and DC control, yes her avgas lines were ruptured but again IF the crew were trained to work without officers having to tell them what to do the problem could have been dealt with before it became fatal. Lots of what if's but from were I sit the Japanese seem to have never considered the repercussions of the enemy striking back and the results of that, their aircraft ships tactics in general appear to me to be all based on them always winning, never the other way around.