It would be difficult to come up with a meaningful number of the average bombloads carried by the Mosquito. There were many subtypes where bombs were not needed to be carried, many other missions where bombs were being carried by the fighter bomber versions where the load for low level tactical strikes were inevitably about 100-2000 lbs.
This debate is looking like a total mis-manipulation of the statistics to me, and reminds of the way a hostile BC received Bennett in his report on the mosquito in 1944 as they were trying to can it as a bomber in the inventory.
'Group commander Donald Bennett, who later commanded the Pathfinder Force of Mosquito bombers which were equipped with the latest electronic navigation equipment and located and marked targets for the formations of heavy bombers which followed, described this beaurocratic attitude well: "I test flew the Mosquito by day and by night. At a meeting at the Air Ministry on the subject, Bomber Command and the Air Ministry both very strongly opposed the adoption of the Mosquito. They argued that it was a frail wood machine totally unsuitable for Service conditions, that it would be shot down because of its absence of gun turrets, and that in any case it was far too small to carry the equipment and an adequate Pathfinder crew. I dealt with each one of these points in turn, but finally they played their ace. They declared that the Mosquito had been tested thoroughly by the appropriate establishments and found quite unsuitable, and indeed impossible to fly at night. At this I raised an eyebrow, and said that I was very sorry to hear that it was quite impossible to fly it by night, as I had been doing so regularly during the past week and had found nothing wrong. There was a deathly silence. I got my Mosquitoes."
But even so, and despite all the accumulated information and statistics of the Mosquito's proven success and advantage as both a day and night bomber, Bennett (and others) were completely unable to pursuade people that mattered of the Mosquitoes capabilities. Bomber Command used the Mosquito until the end of the war only as a secondary bomber, very successfully operating ahead of and beside the large formations of heavy night bombers, and impressively performing as a precision day bomber, but never replacing the big and slow heavy bombers, because bomber command remained locked with its belief that the only way to destroy Germany was with big heavy bombers carrying large crews and gun turrets. This wasn't their only misbelief'. I believe that was a mistake, borne out of prejudice and not any objective appraisal of the types capabilities