But 5 mosquitos are 10 merlin engines, 5 pilots 5 navigators etc etc.
Mosquito - the alternative strategic bomber
- Thread starter Timppa
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This implies you are intending to have a bomber force with five times as many Mosquitoes as Lancasters to deliver the same load.
In July 1944, having carried out the tactical diversions for the invasion and moving on with the oil and transport plans, as well as strategic bombing, you will need 4,270 Mosquitoes!!!!!! (there were, historically 864 Lancasters)
Obviously if the Mosquito is to be used as a strategic bomber it will have to be used somewhat differently to the way that the 'heavies' were. I'm interested to hear ideas on how this might have been done.
Cheers
Steve
buffnut453
Captain
think that the data does show that it was no more accurate by night than any other bomber, and operating by day, certainly through 1943 and 1944 presents another set of survivability problems. It couldn't be precise operating at the altitudes at which it was more or less immune from interception and a potential German reaction to lower level attacks has already been mentioned by another poster. I don't think this is a mistaken view born out of prejudice
Steve,
For the most part I agree with your sentiments. The bureaucratic inertia alone would have prevented any major shift towards Mosquitos from heavies. I also accept that larger-scale, low-level daylight raids would have resulted in higher losses for the Mosquito irrespective of the operating altitude. That said, even radar-laid guns struggle to acquire and track aircraft operating at treetop height unless the target is in the flatest of flat parts of Holland. Manually laid AAA would have a pretty hard time successfully engaging low-level aircraft. It must be borne in mind that, to this day, the RAF continues to train at low level so the tactic must have some merits.
Clearly, range would be an issue for low-level missions...and this is where we start to creep into modern airpower theory. Adoption of hi-lo-hi mission profiles would offset some of the range problems, albeit at increased risk and necessitating some very careful ingress/egress planning. Then there's the whole challenge of getting enough bombs on target. Taking another leaf from modern airpower approaches, I think it's entirely possible that different tactics could have been employed by a large Mosquito force to inflict considerable damage on German infrastructure. Rather than the heavy bomber approach of putting lots of aircraft over one target and raining down tens of thousands of bombs, there would be the option of distributing the force in smaller packets to attack multiple locations in a given mission/day. The greater precision of low-level daylight attack would greatly increase the chances of hitting a target like a rail yard or a factory, with much reduced collateral damage to surrounding civilian dwellings. Such an approach would also help diffuse German defensive capabilities because the direction of approach of the incoming raids would be much less predictable, and hitting multiple targets at once would spread airborne defences more thinly. Faster revisit rates would also make it difficult for repair parties to complete their tasks and get factories back up and running.
The problem is that British policy was not just to target factories and similar targets. There was a desire to inflict as much pain on the German people as possible in a bid to reduce the number of available factory workers and make those that did get to work less productive. It's callous but there is logic to it. Additionally, it's clearly too much to expect senior officers in 1943 to have sufficient foresight to envisage Low-level "strategic" bombing using tactics and airpower operational art that only truly came of age in the postwar period.
I'm not advocating for the Mosquito as a strategic bomber - I don't think that was possible for a whole host of reasons. But it's interesting to consider how such a campaign might have been waged as a way of exploring whether it was technically possible.
Cheers,
Mark
buffnut453
Captain
Only if you wanted to use the Mosquitos the same way the Lancasters were used and spray bombs all over the German countryside without hitting the target. I'm being (a little bit) facetious...but there's a valid point to be made. The bombing stats for high-level daylight and night bombing are pretty horrendous when it comes to precision and accuracy. So many of those bombs never even got near the town, let alone the aiming point, until rather late in the game.
The problem with low level bombing is the vulnerability of the aircraft to light flak. In the first Gulf war the RAF was forced to abandon this tactic, one it had trained for during many years, for precisely this reason.
It is one thing to fly across the North Sea to Denmark and attack a building in a virtually undefended city at low level, quite another to fly to and attack a target in the Ruhr or Berlin. I think it would have been suicidal. The Luftwaffe would also have a much better chance of making interceptions, the sort of force we are talking about would not overwhelm the air defence systems, one of the primary reasons for the historic concentration of the bomber stream.
The Mosquito, flown at altitude and flown fast was almost invulnerable, flown low and having to slow down to bomb, it was not. I would have to look up the cruising speed of the Mosquito at lower altitude, but I doubt it would trouble a latish war Bf 109 or Fw 190 which might have the advantage of warning and altitude.
Cheers
Steve
It is one thing to fly across the North Sea to Denmark and attack a building in a virtually undefended city at low level, quite another to fly to and attack a target in the Ruhr or Berlin. I think it would have been suicidal. The Luftwaffe would also have a much better chance of making interceptions, the sort of force we are talking about would not overwhelm the air defence systems, one of the primary reasons for the historic concentration of the bomber stream.
The Mosquito, flown at altitude and flown fast was almost invulnerable, flown low and having to slow down to bomb, it was not. I would have to look up the cruising speed of the Mosquito at lower altitude, but I doubt it would trouble a latish war Bf 109 or Fw 190 which might have the advantage of warning and altitude.
Cheers
Steve
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
One of the shortcomings of the Luftwaffe's bombing campaigns, is that they relied almost exclusively on light/medium bombers for their campaigns and while they acheived a certain amount of success, it was much less effective than a strategic heavy bombing campaign.
So if the RAF were to decide that the Mosquito was their primary bomber, how long would it take to build up a sizable force that would be able to conduct comparable bombing campaigns that matched the tonnage dropped by the RAF's heavy bombers.
The Mosquito's heavy bombload capability also wasn't available in the early stages of the war, so what does the RAF do in the interim? Hundreds of small surgical strikes hoping to inflict "death by a thousand paper cuts" on German targets?
So if the RAF were to decide that the Mosquito was their primary bomber, how long would it take to build up a sizable force that would be able to conduct comparable bombing campaigns that matched the tonnage dropped by the RAF's heavy bombers.
The Mosquito's heavy bombload capability also wasn't available in the early stages of the war, so what does the RAF do in the interim? Hundreds of small surgical strikes hoping to inflict "death by a thousand paper cuts" on German targets?
This is true of the Luftwaffe.
For the second point, it isn't just mounting those strikes in the first place, it's keeping the pressure on whichever system is being targeted. This was a failing of the historic strategic campaign and would have been even more difficult with the precision strike force envisaged in this new scenario.
Cheers
Steve
It is all just a question of philosophy, the British didnt believe in an unarmed bomber but amazingly built 2000 Fairey Battles a single engined three man plane with one defensive gun plus one for dog fighting I presume.
Use those 2000 merlins in 1000 mosquitos which can be used instead of Hampdens Blenheims and Wellingtons on almost suicidal daylight raids. They would have been much more use from 1940 onwards "leaning into Europe" so long as we had Park doing it and not Leigh Mallory.
Use those 2000 merlins in 1000 mosquitos which can be used instead of Hampdens Blenheims and Wellingtons on almost suicidal daylight raids. They would have been much more use from 1940 onwards "leaning into Europe" so long as we had Park doing it and not Leigh Mallory.
buffnut453
Captain
Your statement about RAF ops in Desert Storm is only partly correct and misses some important details. Low-level tactics were employed to attack Iraqi airfields using JP233 resulting in flight profiles that were highly predictable, and which enabled the Iraqis to deploy AAA to provide overlapping arcs of fire over the airfields. Once JP233 missions were abandoned, the RAF started flying LGB missions which require operation at medium altitude for an airborne designator. For the record, the RAF's recce Tonkas flew at low level throughout the campaign with no losses. Despite over 20 years of medium altitude operations in combat zones, the RAF still practices low flying today because it remains a viable method for avoiding advanced air defence systems...but it requires the crew to plan their mission carefully to avoid threats and make maximum use of available terrain.
The key question is whether the Mosquito, at low-level cruising speed, exposed itself for sufficient time to enable German defenders to engage. From experience, low-flying aircraft are very hard to engage - even relatively small buildings and trees can provide sufficient masking to prevent manually-laid weapons, while radar must be capable of rapid traversing to keep track of the aircraft. Again, small groups of aircraft ranging widely over occupied Europe that bomb targets with accuracy would be a formidable challenge for the Germans to address.
For the Luftwaffe to intercept, they had to have some idea of where the attackers were coming from. Radar wouldn't help once the attackers descended to low level and it's blessed hard to spot aircraft at low-level with the MkI Eyeball. Again, dispersing the attacking force over multiple targets simultaneously, rather than putting hundreds of Mosquitos over a single city, would also disperse the defending Luftwaffe fighter force. I'm not sure your assessment of the rationale for concentrating the bombing stream is valid. The USAAF daylight campaign required condensed formations to provide mutual protection and reduce bomb spread due to the entire formation dropping in concert with the lead bombardier. For the RAF, I believe the factors are far more to do with preventing friendly aircraft colliding while, simultaneously, striving to get as many bombs on the target as possible within as short a timeframe as possible (which was needed because precision and accuracy were so poor).
We can argue the pros and cons of this 'til the cows come home and there's no right answer, nor am I trying to convince you to change your mind - simply offering some additional thoughts to contribute to the discussion. This would be an interesting exercise for a wargame/modelling & simulation environment to set some rules and see how such a campaign might play out. Bottom line, though, is that such a low-level Mosquito campaign was impossible from a practical implementation perspective, not least because it required a degree of foresight that simply cannot be achieved.
Cheers,
Mark
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
The Luftwaffe would have adapted to the RAF's tactics just as they did historically with the heavy bombing campaign.
This in turn would have put the Mosquitos at a disadvantage while conducting low level strikes as the Luftwaffe would have had time to get to moderate altitudes to dive on the attacking forces instead of the much longer time needed to get to the higher altitudes to intercept the heavies.
This in turn would have put the Mosquitos at a disadvantage while conducting low level strikes as the Luftwaffe would have had time to get to moderate altitudes to dive on the attacking forces instead of the much longer time needed to get to the higher altitudes to intercept the heavies.
Bomber Command's ORS completed an analysis of losses versus concentration over defended areas in March 1942 and concluded that concentrations of less than 50 aircraft per hour suffered a measurably higher loss rate than higher concentrations. The recommendation was for a concentration of at least 50 aircraft an hour when there was no moon and 80 aircraft an hour on moon lit nights. Additionally there was a recommendation for larger raids as these suffered proportionally lower losses than smaller ones. In response, according to the letter (from Saundby) which accompanied the report to the Ministry, the staffs of the various Groups were planning raids with a concentration of 150-200 aircraft per hour. It is obvious that forcing so many aircraft per hour through the German defences saturated them, it led to the demise of the 'himmelbett' system in its original form (one night fighter in each area) which was easily overwhelmed.
The primary factor driving concentration was self defence, it also allowed a concentration of bombing which, at this time, was being advocated as a means of creating fire storms. For Bomber Command this must have seemed a win, win situation.
Cheers
Steve
The primary factor driving concentration was self defence, it also allowed a concentration of bombing which, at this time, was being advocated as a means of creating fire storms. For Bomber Command this must have seemed a win, win situation.
Cheers
Steve
buffnut453
Captain
No doubt but there are limits to the amount they could adapt. With no radar-based GCA and airborne radar ineffective due to ground clutter, the Luftwaffe would have to rely on the MkI eyeball. That's very hard - it's a lot of territory to cover and very easy to miss aircraft if you happen to be looking the wrong way. The problem isn't engaging low-flying aircraft, it's detecting them so you know where to point your fighters. That's a problem that hasn't been solved today, even with advanced ground-based radars.
Again, I'm not saying the Mosquitos would be invulnerable, Far from it. But the challenges presented to the German defences would not be trivial to resolve. The fundamental problem for the Allies would be that overall destruction would be less comprehensive and more focused on the actual targets rather than on the wider German populace.
I'm thinking more Mosquitoes attacking oil targets (and power production) and less Lancasters attacking population centers.
Unlike the bloodsucking mosquitoes we are used to, these will suck petroleum, the lifeblood of the Wehrmacht.
parsifal
Colonel
and there is less than half the chance statistically that the Mosquito will be lost compared to a 4 engine bomber. We don't have a direct correlation as to mission type, but in my view, the types of missions the historical Mosquito force was subjected to were a higher risk to the high level bombing the main force was employed in. A mosquito equipped force for BC would have expanded exponentially compared to the historical model and with less manpower soaked up. In 1944, BC hovered around the 4000 a/c mark. It had taken 4 years of bloody and costly lessons to get there. Every bomber brought down was a massive cost in lives and treasure. Its hard to say this was the best or only way the job could have been done.
And the job was one that did need to get done. a mosquito equipped force would have reached that 4000 a/c mark sometime in 1941-2 in my estimation, and be pressing 8-10000 by 1944. its ability to fly at night, bomb area or precision targets, fly high or low or some mix of both is well proven, well known and yet still challenged. far from constricting or preventing BC from its task, a Mosquito equipped main force would have opened up possibilities that we simply will never know.
I am sure that the methods settled upon for the heavies would not be ideal for the mosquito. I am also sure that other options would have presented themselves as the force became available. there is more than one way to skin a cat. after the war, area bombing as a concept more or less sank like a stone from the inventory of military theory. This descent did not even wait for new precision bombing aids and techniques to become available. By wars end, it was obvious that the moral dilemmas, the inefficiencies and sheer cost of area bombing rendered it obsolete as a weapon of war. it was, in fact, obsolete during the war, but the bomber barons would not allow any alternatives to be even considered.
And the job was one that did need to get done. a mosquito equipped force would have reached that 4000 a/c mark sometime in 1941-2 in my estimation, and be pressing 8-10000 by 1944. its ability to fly at night, bomb area or precision targets, fly high or low or some mix of both is well proven, well known and yet still challenged. far from constricting or preventing BC from its task, a Mosquito equipped main force would have opened up possibilities that we simply will never know.
I am sure that the methods settled upon for the heavies would not be ideal for the mosquito. I am also sure that other options would have presented themselves as the force became available. there is more than one way to skin a cat. after the war, area bombing as a concept more or less sank like a stone from the inventory of military theory. This descent did not even wait for new precision bombing aids and techniques to become available. By wars end, it was obvious that the moral dilemmas, the inefficiencies and sheer cost of area bombing rendered it obsolete as a weapon of war. it was, in fact, obsolete during the war, but the bomber barons would not allow any alternatives to be even considered.
I think having a Mosquito force equipped for precision attacks on Harris' 'panacea' targets seems a good idea with hindsight. The problem is still getting enough of them to the targets and destroying them. We are talking about flying hundreds of miles across enemy territory to attack some of the most heavily defended targets in the world at the time.
It is worth remembering that even after the invasion the RAF's 2nd TAF was forced to curtail its 'deep penetration' missions due to unsustainable losses to flak. In December 1944 the operational tour of duty for a 2nd TAF pilot was reduced by 60% (from 200 to 80 missions) in order to give them any chance of survival. The average survival time for a newly arrived pilot was just 17 missions. Mosquitoes were just as vulnerable to this type of light flak as Typhoons and it is what accounted for almost all these losses. A report by the ORS 2nd TAF of July 1945 stated that.
"practically all damage sustained on operations due to enemy action was caused by light flak."
It is inconceivable that in the face of such attacks by low flying Mosquitoes the Germans would not have reacted by increasing production and deployment of anti aircraft weapons in the 20mm-40mm calibre range. If the 'heavies' are replaced to any extent by the 'mediums' then manpower and resources could be diverted from the much more expensive (in all terms) heavy flak batteries.
I've already mentioned the sheer weight of bombs required to disable, and keep disabled, an easy and fairly large target like a marshaling yard or oil facility, but how about a harder transportation target like a bridge?
The medium bombers of MATAF had to drop 600 bombs to be sure (95% probability) of a hit on a bridge target occupying 6,000 square feet. The medium bombers of the RAF desert air force needed 2,400.
Cheers
Steve
It is worth remembering that even after the invasion the RAF's 2nd TAF was forced to curtail its 'deep penetration' missions due to unsustainable losses to flak. In December 1944 the operational tour of duty for a 2nd TAF pilot was reduced by 60% (from 200 to 80 missions) in order to give them any chance of survival. The average survival time for a newly arrived pilot was just 17 missions. Mosquitoes were just as vulnerable to this type of light flak as Typhoons and it is what accounted for almost all these losses. A report by the ORS 2nd TAF of July 1945 stated that.
"practically all damage sustained on operations due to enemy action was caused by light flak."
It is inconceivable that in the face of such attacks by low flying Mosquitoes the Germans would not have reacted by increasing production and deployment of anti aircraft weapons in the 20mm-40mm calibre range. If the 'heavies' are replaced to any extent by the 'mediums' then manpower and resources could be diverted from the much more expensive (in all terms) heavy flak batteries.
I've already mentioned the sheer weight of bombs required to disable, and keep disabled, an easy and fairly large target like a marshaling yard or oil facility, but how about a harder transportation target like a bridge?
The medium bombers of MATAF had to drop 600 bombs to be sure (95% probability) of a hit on a bridge target occupying 6,000 square feet. The medium bombers of the RAF desert air force needed 2,400.
Cheers
Steve
I think that we are all, including me, confusing to some extent what we mean by 'precision' and 'area' bombing. Webster and Frankland make this point.
"It has to be decided whether the offensive should be concentrated by selective bombing against a group of related targets all of which are associated with the same activity, that is to say a 'target system', or dispersed over a wider range of activities in a general bombing offensive. These were complicated alternatives which are sometimes confused with another choice, namely, that between precision and area bombing. In fact, however, a selective offensive, for example, could be pursued by area or precision attack. The choice between area and precision attack is primarily governed by operational factors; the choice between a selective and a general bombing offensive is a matter of strategy."
Bomber Command decided long before the 1942 directive (typically one or two sentences of which are quoted with no context) that area bombing was it tool of choice. In 1941 some ostensibly naval targets were in fact entire German towns.
It is this strategy which militates against the adoption of a medium bomber (which is effectively what the Mosquito was) instead of the heavy bombers. Even when Bomber Command engaged precise targets it did so by area bombing. On 30th June 1944 266 aircraft of Bomber Command dropped 1,100 tons of bombs on a road junction at Villers Bocage, effectively preventing the passage of the tanks of 2nd and 9th Panzer Divisions to attack the Allied beachhead. Mosquitoes could not have achieved this as they would have been engaged in precision attacks.
This is reflected in the attack of other 'precision' targets. On 13th November 1944 Bottomley wrote to Harris in an attempt to cajole him into attacking oil targets. First he made a point about the US attacks.
"The weight of attack which the U.S.Air Forces could, for various tactical reasons, bring to bear against any one plant on any occasion was limited; it was barely sufficient to keep the major producers out of action between the fairly frequent attacks."
After explaining the policy that he wished to pursue he continued.
"The weight and density of attack of which your Command has shown itself capable, given adequate marking, far exceeds that normally achieved by U.S. Air Forces. It is considered that one successful large scale concentrated attack by Bomber Command on an oil target should, on the basis of past experience, result in the long term immobilisation of activity which is now required. If therefore you can achieve damage on the scale of the 'KAMEN' attack of 11th September, 1944, upon plants such as Leuna and Politz, you will make a major contribution to the current vital oil plan....."
Once again it is the weight of attack that is the overriding factor.
Cheers
Steve
"It has to be decided whether the offensive should be concentrated by selective bombing against a group of related targets all of which are associated with the same activity, that is to say a 'target system', or dispersed over a wider range of activities in a general bombing offensive. These were complicated alternatives which are sometimes confused with another choice, namely, that between precision and area bombing. In fact, however, a selective offensive, for example, could be pursued by area or precision attack. The choice between area and precision attack is primarily governed by operational factors; the choice between a selective and a general bombing offensive is a matter of strategy."
Bomber Command decided long before the 1942 directive (typically one or two sentences of which are quoted with no context) that area bombing was it tool of choice. In 1941 some ostensibly naval targets were in fact entire German towns.
It is this strategy which militates against the adoption of a medium bomber (which is effectively what the Mosquito was) instead of the heavy bombers. Even when Bomber Command engaged precise targets it did so by area bombing. On 30th June 1944 266 aircraft of Bomber Command dropped 1,100 tons of bombs on a road junction at Villers Bocage, effectively preventing the passage of the tanks of 2nd and 9th Panzer Divisions to attack the Allied beachhead. Mosquitoes could not have achieved this as they would have been engaged in precision attacks.
This is reflected in the attack of other 'precision' targets. On 13th November 1944 Bottomley wrote to Harris in an attempt to cajole him into attacking oil targets. First he made a point about the US attacks.
"The weight of attack which the U.S.Air Forces could, for various tactical reasons, bring to bear against any one plant on any occasion was limited; it was barely sufficient to keep the major producers out of action between the fairly frequent attacks."
After explaining the policy that he wished to pursue he continued.
"The weight and density of attack of which your Command has shown itself capable, given adequate marking, far exceeds that normally achieved by U.S. Air Forces. It is considered that one successful large scale concentrated attack by Bomber Command on an oil target should, on the basis of past experience, result in the long term immobilisation of activity which is now required. If therefore you can achieve damage on the scale of the 'KAMEN' attack of 11th September, 1944, upon plants such as Leuna and Politz, you will make a major contribution to the current vital oil plan....."
Once again it is the weight of attack that is the overriding factor.
Cheers
Steve
Shortround6
Major General
Actually it is the weight of attack in a given target area (and assuming appropriate bombs are used). Bombs that fall outside the target area are pretty much wasted.
However that brings us to Bombing Accuracy which really deserves a thread of it's own.
As in how different bombers compared under identical conditions.
Not comparing low level strikes by bomber A to high altitude formation bombing by bomber B to blind bombing by Bomber C.
I find it very hard to believe that it made any difference to the bomb as it dropped as to what aircraft had dropped it once it was a short distance (100ft or less?) from the aircraft.
Local airflow over bomb bay and such may affect things but not enough to miss by thousands of feet.
Steadiness as a bombing platform covers two things. Stability of the airplane affecting bomb release as in plane is yawed 2 degrees when bomb leaves the bomb bay. Bomb will NOT follow a 2 degree departure from line of flight as the fins will soon soon point the bomb in direction the planes was traveling and not the direction the plane was pointed at moment of release. Worse accuracy than plane not yawing but not enough to miss large targets.
However such a plane showing directional instability or yawing or hunting is going to make it harder to operate the bombsight. This may have a much larger impact on bombing accuracy if inaccurate inputs are made to the bombsight due to aircraft movement.
Obviously height decreases accuracy for all bombers.
Other factors????
Then you can get into bombsight differences and other variables.
When saying bomber A could be substituted for Bomber B for mission XXX it help a great deal if we knew the accuracy for both bombers flying the same mission. Granted Bomber A might be able to fly a different mission profile than Bomber B but that throws in a bunch more variables (different AA defense, etc)
However that brings us to Bombing Accuracy which really deserves a thread of it's own.
As in how different bombers compared under identical conditions.
Not comparing low level strikes by bomber A to high altitude formation bombing by bomber B to blind bombing by Bomber C.
I find it very hard to believe that it made any difference to the bomb as it dropped as to what aircraft had dropped it once it was a short distance (100ft or less?) from the aircraft.
Local airflow over bomb bay and such may affect things but not enough to miss by thousands of feet.
Steadiness as a bombing platform covers two things. Stability of the airplane affecting bomb release as in plane is yawed 2 degrees when bomb leaves the bomb bay. Bomb will NOT follow a 2 degree departure from line of flight as the fins will soon soon point the bomb in direction the planes was traveling and not the direction the plane was pointed at moment of release. Worse accuracy than plane not yawing but not enough to miss large targets.
However such a plane showing directional instability or yawing or hunting is going to make it harder to operate the bombsight. This may have a much larger impact on bombing accuracy if inaccurate inputs are made to the bombsight due to aircraft movement.
Obviously height decreases accuracy for all bombers.
Other factors????
Then you can get into bombsight differences and other variables.
When saying bomber A could be substituted for Bomber B for mission XXX it help a great deal if we knew the accuracy for both bombers flying the same mission. Granted Bomber A might be able to fly a different mission profile than Bomber B but that throws in a bunch more variables (different AA defense, etc)
I've never seen the accuracy of two or more bombers performing the same mission questioned. Bomber Command's ORS looked into just about every imaginable aspect of bombing, and it seems that a general assumption was made that any factors due to different aircraft types, when attacking the same target, in the same conditions, from the same altitude, at similar air speeds etc were not significant.
I don't think that a Lancaster was inherently considered any more or less accurate than a Halifax, Mosquito, Stirling or any other type.
There were many factors influencing bombing accuracy far more significantly than the type of aircraft, if that had any influence at all.
When the BBSU examined bombing accuracy for night time operations the formula it chose was the percentage of sorties despatched dropping bombs within 3 miles of the aiming point. This gives an idea of the size of the error generally. This figure increased from around 20% in late 1943 to over 90% by late 1944. More importantly the relative density of bombs dropped, at the aiming point, (measured by bombs per square mile per 100 dropped) increased from less than 1 in late 1942 to about 12 by late 1944. Again, the impact on these figures of different aircraft types was not significant.
As for different mission profiles, the Lancaster proved itself just as capable of making a low level precision attack as the Mosquito, it just wasn't considered a sensible use of the aircraft apart from in exceptional circumstances.
6 of 19 Lancasters were shot down by flak during 'Chastise' and another damaged. Why would that be very different for Mosquitoes making low level approaches and attacks on German targets?
Bomber Command considered 7% losses utterly unsustainable and that 5% losses over a three month period would seriously diminish the efficiency of the Command. How could losses of around 30%, to flak alone, be endured? I used the adjective 'suicidal' to describe this sort of mission in an earlier post, particularly in daylight, and I stand by it.
Cheers
Steve
I don't think that a Lancaster was inherently considered any more or less accurate than a Halifax, Mosquito, Stirling or any other type.
There were many factors influencing bombing accuracy far more significantly than the type of aircraft, if that had any influence at all.
When the BBSU examined bombing accuracy for night time operations the formula it chose was the percentage of sorties despatched dropping bombs within 3 miles of the aiming point. This gives an idea of the size of the error generally. This figure increased from around 20% in late 1943 to over 90% by late 1944. More importantly the relative density of bombs dropped, at the aiming point, (measured by bombs per square mile per 100 dropped) increased from less than 1 in late 1942 to about 12 by late 1944. Again, the impact on these figures of different aircraft types was not significant.
As for different mission profiles, the Lancaster proved itself just as capable of making a low level precision attack as the Mosquito, it just wasn't considered a sensible use of the aircraft apart from in exceptional circumstances.
6 of 19 Lancasters were shot down by flak during 'Chastise' and another damaged. Why would that be very different for Mosquitoes making low level approaches and attacks on German targets?
Bomber Command considered 7% losses utterly unsustainable and that 5% losses over a three month period would seriously diminish the efficiency of the Command. How could losses of around 30%, to flak alone, be endured? I used the adjective 'suicidal' to describe this sort of mission in an earlier post, particularly in daylight, and I stand by it.
Cheers
Steve
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KiwiBiggles
Senior Airman
And that sums up the whole argument, really. Very bright people whose sole job it was to study this, with all the information they wanted available at first hand, and with actual lives at stake, designed Bomber Command as we now look back at it. We can be sure that the idea of replacing the four-engined heavies with Mosquitos was considered and rejected.
Much as I enjoy what-iffing, the idea that sitting here at my computer three-quarters of a century later, with whatever third-hand information I can glean through Google, I could make a more-informed decision than those involved at the time, is hubris.
parsifal
Colonel
They were bright people, for sure, in about the same way as Napoleon was bright at waterloo, or Schlieffen was in the development of his plan. Within the field of there own expertise they were brilliant, but try to prise them away from what they are comfortable with and all of a sudden there is reticence, hostility, blindness. Napoleon for example when told of the possibility of an armoured steam driven ironclad warship, stated that he was not interested in such nonsense. And yet by 1814 the first steam driven warships were being built. This is precisely what happened within the RAF establishment. It was borne from the belief systems that went back a long way, 'the bomber will always get through' hence it was logical that performance didn't count that much what mattered was the tonnage dropped.
The generally low performance of the heavy bomber concept forced a number of expedients on BC that cumulatively degraded much of its effectiveness. There were two elements that worked against them. first was the need to bomb at night, dropping accuracy to maybe 5% of a daylight equivalent. That gradually improved as time progressed, to the point I believe that night bombing was almost as accurate as day bombing in clear conditions. blind bombing im not as sure of.
The other element affecting the bombers was their need to bomb from relatively high altitudes. Altitude reduced the effects of flak markedly, but it came at the cost of many bombs falling well outside the target area. it was not possible for the heavies to bomb lower, they were too expensive and too vulnerable to risk to some 5 bob a day shooting gallery specialist with a rifle or MG.
Whatever arguments about the mosquito, it has the runs on the board to show that conceptually at least it could operate by day or night, at high, medium or low altitudes. It might as a type have needed some modification in the design to increase range, or bombload, or engine power. we should not be arguing that the mosquito was designed for the purpose we are now considering. it wasn't. It was designed as a recon machine upon which a number of secondary roles were added, and then added and then added again. There is no impediment I think to extrapolating the design because heavy bombing was never something that was considered for it. Why for example, could there not be a four engine mosquito. the concept at issue here for me isn't a straight up Mosquito. its the different philosophies behind the two groups of aircraft. On the one hand we have the lumbering behemoths very much in the tradition of Trenchard, relying on firepower over speed and manouver. We know the extent of technological progress for that class of aircraft, and what happened to them more or less immediately after the war.
then we have a different class of aircraft, at the head of which is the mosquito. Its potential is not known, because it was never selected for development as a heavy bomber. it was certainly advocated by some of the more visionary members of RAF and the supporting industry members. But such support and parallel think was rapidly smothered by vested interests who had reason and motive to act in that way.
The generally low performance of the heavy bomber concept forced a number of expedients on BC that cumulatively degraded much of its effectiveness. There were two elements that worked against them. first was the need to bomb at night, dropping accuracy to maybe 5% of a daylight equivalent. That gradually improved as time progressed, to the point I believe that night bombing was almost as accurate as day bombing in clear conditions. blind bombing im not as sure of.
The other element affecting the bombers was their need to bomb from relatively high altitudes. Altitude reduced the effects of flak markedly, but it came at the cost of many bombs falling well outside the target area. it was not possible for the heavies to bomb lower, they were too expensive and too vulnerable to risk to some 5 bob a day shooting gallery specialist with a rifle or MG.
Whatever arguments about the mosquito, it has the runs on the board to show that conceptually at least it could operate by day or night, at high, medium or low altitudes. It might as a type have needed some modification in the design to increase range, or bombload, or engine power. we should not be arguing that the mosquito was designed for the purpose we are now considering. it wasn't. It was designed as a recon machine upon which a number of secondary roles were added, and then added and then added again. There is no impediment I think to extrapolating the design because heavy bombing was never something that was considered for it. Why for example, could there not be a four engine mosquito. the concept at issue here for me isn't a straight up Mosquito. its the different philosophies behind the two groups of aircraft. On the one hand we have the lumbering behemoths very much in the tradition of Trenchard, relying on firepower over speed and manouver. We know the extent of technological progress for that class of aircraft, and what happened to them more or less immediately after the war.
then we have a different class of aircraft, at the head of which is the mosquito. Its potential is not known, because it was never selected for development as a heavy bomber. it was certainly advocated by some of the more visionary members of RAF and the supporting industry members. But such support and parallel think was rapidly smothered by vested interests who had reason and motive to act in that way.
