Motivations for the Creation of RAND

[Dana Bell]

Why would the wartime system no longer be viable?

So this was about their lack of forward thinking? In what ways?

Wright Field was deeply imbedded in the "not-invented-here" syndrome. They would tell Arnold why an idea wasn't worth pursuing when he was ordering them to pursue. They would omit data that didn't fit their narrative. Arnold had worked there and seen it in person; when he became chief, he knew exactly what they were doing and decided to get what he wanted through other channels.

This doesn't say that Wright Field was wrong - there were cases where Arnold was barking up the wrong tree! But he wasn't always wrong, and external organizations seemed more readyy to work with him than the folks at Wright...

Cheers,



Dana

 

[Zipper730]

Wright Field was deeply imbedded in the "not-invented-here" syndrome. They would tell Arnold why an idea wasn't worth pursuing when he was ordering them to pursue. They would omit data that didn't fit their narrative.

Why does that sound so familiar?

he knew exactly what they were doing and decided to get what he wanted through other channels. . . . This doesn't say that Wright Field was wrong - there were cases where Arnold was barking up the wrong tree! But he wasn't always wrong, and external organizations seemed more readyy to work with him than the folks at Wright...

I'm curious why the Council for National Defense wasn't adequate since it already existed (created in 1916 if I recall, dissolved in 1921, then resurrected around WWII), and it had institutions such as the NDRC/OSRD, and they coordinated scientists with civilian and military policy makers.

 

[MikeMeech]

Why would the wartime system no longer be viable?

Hi

War ends, Defence Budget reduces, demobilisation, Scientists return to their civilian careers, OR teams reduced in size and/or consolidated or even disbanded totally, so OR becomes a shadow of its former self, especially as urgency of task has also reduced. Therefore during 'peace' it is not the same as the full WW2 OR system, the tax payer is not going to pay for the wartime scale so it is not viable in that sense.

Mike

 

[PStickney]

@Shortround6

Jet engine development...

Westinghouse J30, J32, and J34. All with superior performance to anything actually built in Germany, and at least equivalent to any of the UK axial compressor jets.
The GE J33 and J35, both developing more than 4,000 lbf (A touch less than 2000 kg) of thrust in early 1944, which spurred the development of the Rolls Nene and Derwent.
German compressor and turbine aerodynamics were poor, which hobbled their engines as much as the material limitations.
By Mid-1944 the Jet Race wasn't between the U.S., U.K, and Germany, it was between the U.S. and U.K.

 

[Zipper730]

War ends, Defence Budget reduces, demobilisation, Scientists return to their civilian careers, OR teams reduced in size and/or consolidated or even disbanded totally, so OR becomes a shadow of its former self, especially as urgency of task has also reduced.

Why was RAND able to manage with a smaller budget?

Westinghouse J30, J32, and J34. All with superior performance to anything actually built in Germany, and at least equivalent to any of the UK axial compressor jets.

Yes, but it's not just the ability to do it, but to do it in a given timetable. The Germans had jets available as early as 1939 (prototype), and the British had an engine online by 1941 for prototypes.

 

[pbehn]

"The Cheiftan" who has a YouTube channel and used to command and drive a Challenger says that the crane lifting limit set the tank weight limit. He's been in pretty much every tank from WW1 onwards. There were a few bigger cranes about in the US and UK no doubt other reasons such as factory cranes, track limits, bridge limits.

Tiger I which were 55 tons were often used to clear mines fields simply by driving through them. This lead to a lot of damaged tracks and suspension. It explains some of the losses.

To me it looks like they used turretless StuG and Jagtpanzers for this roll Simply because it was a way to up gun and up armour an existing chassis.

Germans never gave up on medium tanks. They included them in their E series E10,E25, E50, E75, E100.

Quite possibly but the limits are pretty much the same today. The standard load today in UK in a 40 foot container is 40 tons. The standard "gauge load" in UK was 40 tons, recently increased to 44 but with stipulations about number of axles and numbers of wheels on axles etc. Once you get above 40 tons things become a problem, I don't know whether that is because of natural limits of things like single cable crane safe working loads and the loads that roads and ground can withstand or whether things (like bridges) were designed around something like 1 ton per foot of length. When tanks get to around 60 tons they create problems of transport and use. Just looking at wiki they are prone to getting stuck, being stranded in bomb holes but were still vulnerable to hits from things like a PIAT or Panzerfaust. Blitzkrieg made its gains with light to medium tanks Panzers I to IV. The Panther Tiger and other big tanks and assault guns were mainly defensive weapons. A British veteran of the Normandy campaign speaking on a TV documentary said that when in action they changed tanks every three days on average. That was what the battle was about, you cannot make a super tank for that battle because the crew cant stay awake 24/7 and they break down, hit mines, get hit or just bog down.

 

[Koopernic]

Westinghouse J30, J32, and J34. All with superior performance to anything actually built in Germany, and at least equivalent to any of the UK axial compressor jets.
The GE J33 and J35, both developing more than 4,000 lbf (A touch less than 2000 kg) of thrust in early 1944, which spurred the development of the Rolls Nene and Derwent.
German compressor and turbine aerodynamics were poor, which hobbled their engines as much as the material limitations.
By Mid-1944 the Jet Race wasn't between the U.S., U.K, and Germany, it was between the U.S. and U.K.

The Heinkel HeS 030 also known as 109-006 by its RLM designation and often somewhat incorrectly abbreviated as HeS-006 outperformed any allied jet engine in terms of frontal area, power to weight ratio, fuel efficiency till 1947/48. See Anthony Kay. The secret of this engine was the use of a reaction type axial compressor that could perform in 5 stages what took the Jumo 004's impulse type axial compressor 8 stages and do so with 10% greater efficiency. The engine had initially been developed by Max Adolph Mueller at the Junkers airframe division as the 109-002. When the RLM insisted that engines be developed by engine makers Junkers Jumo took over from Junkers Airframe and Mueller and the 109-002 moved to Heinkel Hirth.

Reaction type compressors must be carefully machined rather than stamped like impulse hence the RLM did not favour them.

Reaction type compressors were designed and built for the BMW 003C and 003D as well but not flown.

Anyway the delays created by centrifugal compressor airframe integration was almost as bad.

The Germans created problems for themselves by making decisions based on shortages.

 

[Koopernic]

Wright Field was deeply imbedded in the "not-invented-here" syndrome. They would tell Arnold why an idea wasn't worth pursuing when he was ordering them to pursue. They would omit data that didn't fit their narrative. Arnold had worked there and seen it in person; when he became chief, he knew exactly what they were doing and decided to get what he wanted through other channels.

This doesn't say that Wright Field was wrong - there were cases where Arnold was barking up the wrong tree! But he wasn't always wrong, and external organizations seemed more readyy to work with him than the folks at Wright...

Cheers,



Dana

Arnold seems a competent officer who face the equivalent of a deep state but he made two mistakes I can think off.
1 He specifically order drop tanks for the P47 not be ordered despite Republic having one available.
2 When he brought the Whittle turbojet to the USA I suspect he was involved in purposely not informing the NACA. The result was the overly thick wing design on the Bell XP-59. Meanwhile Eastman Jacobs was working on "Jakes Jeep", the forerunner of the Bell x-1 using a motor jet.

Arnold probably feared NACA interference or was it a genuine security concern?

When one hears the Germans and Japanese criticised one should remember the allies had some oddities as well.

 

[Zipper730]

Arnold seems a competent officer who face the equivalent of a deep state

While I'm not a big fan of that term, he apparently might have sought to limit the bureaucracy that was obstructing him.

1 He specifically order drop tanks for the P47 not be ordered despite Republic having one available.

I didn't know that, but I knew the bomber guys were surprisingly obstinate when it came to the idea of using drop-tanks.

2 When he brought the Whittle turbojet to the USA I suspect he was involved in purposely not informing the NACA. The result was the overly thick wing design on the Bell XP-59. Meanwhile Eastman Jacobs was working on "Jakes Jeep", the forerunner of the Bell x-1 using a motor jet.

As I understand, the idea of keeping NACA in the dark over the gas-turbine was for experimental purpose withe motorjet being the control. I know wind-tunnel access was heavily restricted, but I didn't see that as being interconnected.

Arnold probably feared NACA interference or was it a genuine security concern?

The paranoia seemed to be the major issue, but it seemed largely unnecessary: We lagged behind the UK and Germany in jet-engine development.

 

[pinehilljoe]

I assume ASWORG started in WW2?

I never knew OR went that far back, though I'm surprised the RAE played a role in operational research. I thought they were predominantly like a military British NACA.

It seems that, during WWII, the US had engaged in Operational Research as well as the British, and with the USN directly or indirectly (i.e. retired USN personnel) being involved in the process for sometime well before WWII.

Yes ASWORG was formed at the start of the was in 1942. Both Baker and Blackett employed actuarians, staticians, accountants, lawyers in their team, skills that may not have been valued in the front line or needed for the Manhattan Project, but were exactly the types of minds needed for operational research.

One of the achievements was determining the optimal depth setting for an aerial depth charge. Blackett's team deduced the optimal setting (going from memory I believe it was 20 feet, but have to check the book). When a submarine dives it can go left, right, or straight ahead. Depth charges had been set for 80 feet, which meant the U-boat, if it changed course, could be far enough from the blast to render the depth charge ineffective. At 20 ft though it gave the pilot less time to react, the U-boat would in the blast area. ASWORG came to the same conclusion independently. An example of not inventing weapons, but defining tactics to use the weapons at hand.

The book describes, Blackett statistical analysis for the big convoy, going from 20 to 30 ship convoys to 80 or 100. Blackett thought one of his greatest mistakes in the War was not coming to this realization at the start of the war, regretting millions of tons of shipping might have been saved with big convoys from the start of the War. The concept is simple. He analyzed the data of ships sunk in a convoy, and realized it was largely independent of the size of the convoy. A wolf pack could only sink so many ships. But double or triple the size of the Convoy, with the same number of ships sunck, the percent of ships sunk in the convoy goes down, and with less convoys, it allowed easier distribution of escorts.

 

[Zipper730]

Yes ASWORG was formed at the start of the was in 1942. Both Baker and Blackett employed actuarians, staticians, accountants, lawyers in their team, skills that may not have been valued in the front line or needed for the Manhattan Project, but were exactly the types of minds needed for operational research.

Nonetheless, it would appear that the USN"s ASWORG arrived at the same conclusion for depth-charges.

The USAAF's interest seemed based on the issues of bombing accuracy: Ironically, Zuckerman was wrong in some of his predictions of bombing accuracy in the aftermath of World War II.

The book describes, Blackett statistical analysis for the big convoy, going from 20 to 30 ship convoys to 80 or 100. Blackett thought one of his greatest mistakes in the War was not coming to this realization at the start of the war, regretting millions of tons of shipping might have been saved with big convoys from the start of the War. The concept is simple. He analyzed the data of ships sunk in a convoy, and realized it was largely independent of the size of the convoy. A wolf pack could only sink so many ships. But double or triple the size of the Convoy, with the same number of ships sunck, the percent of ships sunk in the convoy goes down, and with less convoys, it allowed easier distribution of escorts.

Apparently the same strategy worked with bomber-streams: It's called a saturation attack. Crudely said: If you throw enough shit at a wall, some will stick.

 

[pbehn]

Nonetheless, it would appear that the USN"s ASWORG arrived at the same conclusion for depth-charges.

The USAAF's interest seemed based on the issues of bombing accuracy: Ironically, Zuckerman was wrong in some of his predictions of bombing accuracy in the aftermath of World War II.
Apparently the same strategy worked with bomber-streams: It's called a saturation attack. Crudely said: If you throw enough shit at a wall, some will stick.

It is similar but not the same, increasing a convoy from 30 to 100 ships doesn't really make it easier or harder to find and a submarine only carries a limited number of torpedoes. If the KM had information on the actual position of the convoy and converged on it with a wolfpack they also increase the chances of being found by putting many submarines in the same place.

 

[pinehilljoe]

Nonetheless, it would appear that the USN"s ASWORG arrived at the same conclusion for depth-charges.

The USAAF's interest seemed based on the issues of bombing accuracy: Ironically, Zuckerman was wrong in some of his predictions of bombing accuracy in the aftermath of World War II.
Apparently the same strategy worked with bomber-streams: It's called a saturation attack. Crudely said: If you throw enough shit at a wall, some will stick.

it will stick, and you will saturate the defenses.

 

[swampyankee]

I'm not sure even what forum to place this in, so I just put it here (I don't object if it's relocated to another forum): Regardless, I'm curious what variables lead to the development of RAND?

I've been told the Manhattan Project played a big role, but I'm curious if there were other technical developments in which the government successfully or unsuccessfully failed to coordinate industry and scientific efforts in line with governmental policy.

I'm curious, for instance, if the development of jet-engines played any role in this.

RAND has a pretty reasonable brief history on its website (https://www.rand.org/about/history/a-brief-history-of-rand.html); MITRE was started for pretty much the same reason (Our History). Both were intended to provide the sort of non-partisan, civilian objective expertise that is frequently lacking (or severely deprecated) by political decision makers. There were and are (far too many) organizations providing partisan, self-serving expertise (and money) to political decision makers.

 

[Zipper730]

RAND has a pretty reasonable brief history on its website (https://www.rand.org/about/history/a-brief-history-of-rand.html); MITRE was started for pretty much the same reason (Our History). Both were intended to provide the sort of non-partisan, civilian objective expertise that is frequently lacking (or severely deprecated) by political decision makers. There were and are (far too many) organizations providing partisan, self-serving expertise (and money) to political decision makers.

RAND, MITRE, it's like they're re-inventing the wheel rather than just using what they have in a practical manner. Am I the only one who sees that pattern?

 

[ThomasP]

Hey Zipper730,

re"RAND, MITRE, it's like they're re-inventing the wheel rather than just using what they have in a practical manner."

While there is some of that . . . the main purpose is to increase the chance that things that are 'practical' will be not overlooked by a military organization (such as the Army, Air Force, Navy, etc) and their departments, who because of ignorance may not realize a thing is practical.

In another sense, these organizations are intended to spot potential avenues of research that may lead to future developments, whether it is helping make a thing practical, or developing entirely new things. The value in the somewhat independent organizations is that while many research projects result from customer requests, they are generally not constrained to only focus on what any particular customer tasks them to look into. In addition, because the organizations are given authority by the civilian and military higher-ups, and the higher-ups tell the military to cooperate, their ideas are less likely to be ignored by the military.

For agencies like DARPA and RAND the spin-offs, whether from military-to-civilian or civilian-to-military, can be impressive.

 

[pinehilljoe]

This thread motivated me to read Blackett's War again. The figure attached illustrates the operational research that determined that the size of an escort screen was not linear to provide the same level of protection. Credit for the figure is: Blackett's War: The Men Who Defeated the Nazi U-boats and Brought Science to the Art of Warfare , by Stephen Budiansky, Publication date : February 19, 2013

 

[Zipper730]

While there is some of that . . . the main purpose is to increase the chance that things that are 'practical' will be not overlooked by a military organization (such as the Army, Air Force, Navy, etc) and their departments, who because of ignorance may not realize a thing is practical.

Do you think it's because the older organization is not seen as being useful anymore?

 

[ThomasP]

Hey Zipper730,

I do not think it was that black-and-white. It was (I think) simply that science and technology development (both theoretical and applied) had allowed a significant numerical increase in potential operational methods and effects - an increase beyond what any individual (and probably any small group) could 'see' ahead of time. The early-1900s and WWII forced the people in charge of such matters (including at least some of the 'Old Guard') to recognize the problem. This phenomenon occurs regularly/systemically in today's science and technology, regardless of the field or organization where it occurs.

A glaring example of this type of something being missed because of this phenomenon is the A-bomb. Prior to Einstein writing his letter to Roosevelt in August 1939, the US basically had no idea of the potential of fission as either a source of peacetime power generation or as a weapon. The UK, Poland,Germany, Japan, (and probably other nations that I can not think of at the moment) were all ahead of us in the science and the applied development of fission. There was no 'good' reason for this - the US had top notch teaching and research universities, equal research and developmental labs, and had better and more access to most natural resources. But that one brief letter from the right group of people (ie Einstein and the scientists that asked him to write it) to the right people (ie Roosevelt and the US higher command) allowed the US to develop the A-bomb before the other potential nations, even though we started from behind.