November 16
Concealed by strict radio silence, the carriers of the IJN sailed independantly from the Inland sea to avert suspicion. Their destination was the remote Tankan Bay in the Kurile Is. To camourflage their movements, Yammamoto orders their call signs transferred to destroyers.
Japanese cypher codes
This is an extremely complex, and even today, incomplete side of the story. There is no doubt that breaking of Japanese coses provided significant advantages to the Allies, but in the lead up to war, Allied abilities, particulalry in military ciphers were limited. perhaps 10% of Japanese military traffic could be read, and the US in particular lacked the assessment and evaluation infrastructure to take advantage of what intell it was receiving
JN-25 was the name given by codebreakers to the chief, and most secure, command and control communications scheme used by the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) during and slightly before World War II (it was the 25th Japanese Navy system identified). Introduced in 1939 to replace Blue Code (which dated back to WWI) , it was an enciphered code, producing five numeral groups in the traffic which was actually broadcast. It was frequently revised during its lifetime, and each new version required a more or less fresh cryptanalytic start. New code books were introduced from time to time and new superenciphering books were also introduced, sometimes simultaneously. In particular, JN-25 was significantly changed on 1 December 1940, and again on 4 December 1941, just before the attack on Pearl Harbor. That and the inability of the US codebreakers to even decode callsigns and ship deployments blinded the US sigint effort at a critical moment. It was the Deecember 04/41 edition of the JN-25 system which was sufficiently broken by late May 1942 to provide the forewarning which led to the U.S. victory at the Battle of Midway.
British, Australians, Dutch and Americans cooperated on attacks against JN-25 beginning well before the Pearl Harbor attack. However, the Japanese Navy was not engaged in significant battle operations until late 1941, so there was little traffic available with which to work. Before then, IJN discussions and orders could generally travel by more secure routes than encrypted broadcast, such as courier or direct delivery by an IJN vessel. Publicly available accounts differ, but the most credible agree that the JN-25 version in use before December 1941 was not more than perhaps 10% broken at the time of the attack, and that primarily in stripping away its superencipherment. JN-25 traffic increased immensely with the outbreak of naval warfare at the end of 1941 and provided the cryptographic "depth" needed to succeed in substantially breaking the existing and subsequent versions of JN-25.
The American effort was directed from Washington, D.C. by the U.S. Navy's signals intelligence command, called OP-20-G. It was centered at Pearl Harbor at the U.S. Navy's Combat Intelligence Unit (Station HYPO, also known as COM 14), commanded by Commander Joseph Rochefort. With the assistance of Station CAST (also known as COM 16, jointly commanded by Lts Rudolph Fabian and John Lietwiler) in the Philippines, and the British Far East Combined Bureau in Singapore, and using an IBM punched card tabulating machine (when available), a successful attack was mounted against the JN-25 edition which came into effect on 1 December 1941. Together they made considerable progress by early 1942. Cribs were used by exploiting common formalities in Japanese messages, such as "I have the honor to inform your excellency", the known call signs of various ships and the use of formal, stylized titles which were often in known plaintext format.
The Purple cipher (also sometimes referred to as AN-1, used by the Japanese Foreign Office as its most secure system, had no cryptographic connection with any version of JN-25, or indeed with any of the encryption systems used by the Japanese military before or during the War. Purple traffic was diplomatic, not military, and in the period before the Pearl Harbor attack, the Japanese military, which controlled Japanese policy, did not trust the Foreign Office enough to tell it much. JN-25 traffic, on the other hand, was limited to military matters, mostly IJN operational ones, from which strategic or tactical information could sometimes be inferred. Nevertheless, decrypted Purple traffic was very valuable, especially later in the war,
JN-39 was a naval code used by merchant ships (commonly known as the "maru code"), broken in May 1940. and again 28 May 1941, when the whale factory Nisshin Maru II visited San Francisco, U.S. Customs Service Agent George Muller and Commander R. P. McCullough of the U.S. Navy's 12th Naval District (responsible for the area) boarded her and seized her codebooks, without informing Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). Copies were made, in a clumsy way, and the originals returned. The Japanese quickly realized JN-39 was compromised, and replaced it with JN-40.
JN-40 JN-25 was replaced by JN-40 (just after Midway), which was originally believed to be a code super-enciphered with a numerical additive in the same way as JN-25. However, in September 1942, an error by the Japanese gave clues to the codebreakers at the FECB, Kilindini. Nevertheless, much of the guadacanal and new Guinea campaigns were fought "blind' by the allies as a result of this new code. JN-40 was a fractionating transposition cipher based on a substitution table of 100 groups of two figures each followed by a columnar transposition. By November 1942, they were able to read all previous traffic and break each message as they received it. Enemy Naval warships and military transport was thus trackable, enabling Allied submarines to successfully attack it.
JN-152A simple transposition and substitution cipher used for broadcasting navigation warnings. In 1942 the FECB at Kilindini broke JN-152 and the previously inpenetratable JN-167, another merchant shipping cypher.
JN-167A merchant-shipping cipher (see JN-152).
In 1942 there was an incident involving the Chicago Tribune that nearly compromised the Allied SigInt efforts. In June 1942 the Chicago Tribune, run by isolationist Col. Robert L McCormick, published an article that implied that the United States had broken the Japanese codes. This was a serious breach of national security. The government at first wanted to prosecute the Tribune under the Espionage Act of 1917. For various reasons, including the desire not to bring more attention to the article, the charges were dropped. Evidently, the Japanese dont read the chicago tribune