New F-35 Report

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surely you must know a plane is an enemy before it comes into visual range. They mainly look the same, if forced have to wait until you are sure with your eyes I think that is way too late.
 
The days of early AIM-7 sparrow missiles launched of F-4's in SE Asia having a high 'dud rate' have long gone.

It's now possible to fabricate a highly accurate inertial navigation system onto a MEMS integrated circuit to guide that missile without radar to within a hundred meters or so before its terminal sensors (radar, imaging infrared, or home on jam) go active.

Some missiles can pull 20G and the experimental BAE ASRAAM could pull 50G so there is not much chance of outmanoeuvring them.

I suppose one day, maybe, there will be real life scenario of a dogfight where F-35's have depleted their defensive missiles (having likely destroyed a huge number of enemy aircraft from a large force) and a dog fight ensues but it will be rare and the F-35's other virtues will ensure it has won in the most common scenarios.
 
I suppose one day, maybe, there will be real life scenario of a dogfight where F-35's have depleted their defensive missiles (having likely destroyed a huge number of enemy aircraft from a large force) and a dog fight ensues but it will be rare and the F-35's other virtues will ensure it has won in the most common scenarios.

Even in that situation, I would expect a many-vs-many scenario where the F-35 pilots, supported by AWACS and other offboard sensors, would have much better SA on the movements of the enemy aircraft, thereby enabling positioning the F-35s for an optimal visual intercept. One could even have a pair of "noisy" F-35s to illuminate the threat while a pair of "silent" F-35s sneak up and destroy the targets.

As I've said before, if you're lining up for a fair fight then you're doing it wrong! :)
 
Again, why are you trying to compare the F-35 to dedicated air to air fighters? Why don't you try comparing the f-35 to the F-15E, Su 34 or even the Shenyang J-16????

Here is the problem Flyboy, in Australia, as with many other JSF partner countries, the F-35 will have to perform the air to air role as much or more so than the strike role. We don't have the luxury of dedicated air to air aircraft like the F-22.
 
Even in that situation, I would expect a many-vs-many scenario where the F-35 pilots, supported by AWACS and other offboard sensors, would have much better SA on the movements of the enemy aircraft, thereby enabling positioning the F-35s for an optimal visual intercept. One could even have a pair of "noisy" F-35s to illuminate the threat while a pair of "silent" F-35s sneak up and destroy the targets.

As I've said before, if you're lining up for a fair fight then you're doing it wrong! :)

An analysis of the many vs many scenario performed many years ago suggested that the F-35s would run out of weapons before they ran out of targets, assuming 100% weapon success rate.

At that time the AIM-120 AMRAAM had a success rate of around 50% in BVR engagements, including a friendly fire incident. I understand that the AMRAAM has improved seekers which should increase the success rate.
 
Hi Wayne,

Better have them shoot from beyond visual range (BVR) and close to see the wreckage.

We hope they don't say, "Oops! Damn! That was a FRIENDLY village ..., but the software was updating itself when I pulled the trigger!"
 
You do realize that the F-16's cost in 1998 was about $18,500,000.00 which is roughly $27,000,000.00 in today's dollars?

And why do we suppose an F-35 would do any worse than current NATO aircraft, where MANPADS are concerned?
Per-aircraft cost isn't the problem with the F-35 program, on the whole it's not really THAT expensive compared to other modern aircraft of the last few decades. The problem is that the development program ended up hugely bloated and far, far over budget. And in the general sense, as far as I'm aware, most of that was due to bureaucratic/political issues of many sources. The original JSF competition and both X-35 and X-32 prototypes seemed sound enough at the time, what progressed after that is where the added costs came in, both monetary and time to service.

I don't think it's fair to blame Lockheed-Martin either, though I don't see anyone explicitly doing that here anyway. (I'd imagine SOME bureaucratic issues originated from them at some points too, but I'd think the majority comes from other sources -something that's happened time and time again in the history of military/government R&D, let alone with international interests involved ... and measures made to 'cut costs' ending up doing anything but)

That said, we're stuck with all those costs now, and making the best of the machines finally resulting from all that is what matters going forward. (granted, this is a military history forum, and the 'what if' aspect of all this is intriguing as ever, but not really relevant to whether the /existing/ F-35 is a competitive or reasonably cost effective weapon in the roles it's intended for -particularly cost effective in the sense of non-fixed costs ... the development money is spent so the only thing you'll save now is just not building/maintaining more of the things ... and dropping THAT is just a tiny drop in the bucket next to the existing investment)

If there were truly equal superior alternatives that WERE cheaper to manufacture and maintain, that would be another matter. (and there certainly may be some roles the F-35 is being forced into where older, more specialized aircraft would still perform better, but that too is more of a political issue ... and a strategic and tactical decision making one, as well as weighing genuine effectiveness against forcing the F-35 into more roles to falsely justify the investment rather than utilizing it based on its true merits -again that's a political issue, and hopefully one we'll be able to minimize)

In fact: people should be legitimately outraged if our existing or planned military resources (human and material) are being misused and wrongly allocated, and not be so bent out of shape over 'excessive spending' ... it's the latter that tends to end up costing a LOT more in the long run, and forcing decisions that look good for politicians and the public eye rather than actually make practical sense for the needs of the military.

A massive problem with the F35 its too fu***ng expensive no one apart from the US can afford to lose one, good luck getting anyone in NATO risking there shiny new F35s anywhere near a man with a $5,000 shoulder launched rocket or even a $10 AK47 never mind a $20,000,000 aircraft.
I'd think operational accidents would be major concerns as well ... even if you have a nearly unbeatable plane in combat, the issue of malfunction, error or any number of other non-combat losses or damage are serious concerns too.

In addition to my points above on the EXISTING F-35 and all its R&D costs, there is indeed the other issue of the original JSF proposal and project goal of producing a relatively low-cost modern fighter to (in part) replace the likes of the aging lightweight fighters like the F-16 while being far less costly and less risky to export (technology wise) than the F-22. Multi-role capabilities are all well and good, but there tends to be a threshold between being too specialized and too generalized so a limited number of diverse partially-specialized and partially generalized aircraft designs would be ideal. The F-35 DID end up a balance of specialization and generalization, but ended up deviating from a lot of the initially assumed concepts and not towards the lower end cost compromise range. (I'm sure fighting over ever changing requirements and trying to decide what to cut or what to add contributed to a huge amount of the aircrafts development cost, delays, and final manufacturing costs)

I wonder if it might have been better to have kept the competing X-32 in development to branch off different specialization for the two designs rather than trying to accomplish all the original (and any additional) goals with a single design. (if nothing else the X-32 seems like it would have adapted to the STOL requirements of small British/European aircraft carriers more easily)

That and possibly initiated a new/separate next-generation lightweight fighter program to directly replace the F-16 and other lower-cost fighters. (something sharing some of the advances of the likes of the F-22 without being as expensive)




Staying with the F-22 would have cheaper by long shot. Somehow we went from "the F-22 is too expensive so we're going to cap it at 177 aircraft and shut it down" to "let's spend MORE for a jet that has one less engine." Since it is going into service, let's hope the F-35 proves to be the winner the proponents say it is. As long as we're gonna' fly it anyway, go baby ... kick A$$.
PLANNING on relying on F-22s and continuing production of them to fill the air to air role and COMPLIMENT new generation lightweight fighters AND multi-role strike fighters would have made plenty of sense. Anyone expecting the F-35 to completely replace the F-22 isn't thinking straight or understanding the original JSF project goals. (there's more of an airgument for intended goals to replace the Strike Eagle AND F-16 AND be more cost effective ... as above, keeping multirole strike fighters and lightweight fighters in separate categories would make far more sense -adding new stealth and VTOL tech to ALL of them would also make sense, even if 'VTOL' ended up really more effectively STOL)

It never WILL be able to replace the A-10 and they should seriously rethink retiring that platform in lieu of the F-35. I wouldn't want to risk an F-35 in a typical A-10 environemnt anyway since that is NOT what it was designed to do. It will kill tanks, but not up close and personal. It will kill them from BVR with standoff weapons. If you need up close and personal tank kills, you're MUCH better off with an A-10 under most ROE I have heard of. If the ROE are OK with BVR kills, then go for the F-35 attack and be done with it.
The A-10 being an extremely specialized close support attack aircraft really just needs a direct, dedicated replacement. (as well as it's aged, I'm sure there's a good deal of improvements an all-new design could make ... or could have made a couple decades ago)


And I might add that when the F-22 was in the works, people were up in arms about that, too. The ONLY reason we didn't hear more about the F-22 (or anything else) to such a degree, is because the world hadn't yet discovered social media as a means to propegate shallow causes, conspiracy theories, misinformation and other means to promote virtual bed-wetting and hyperventillating.
The F-22 development program was nowhere near as expensive either, and I'm betting a lot of the average public are confusing varying context of talks about expenses and costs that deal with total program cost rather than individual aircraft cost. (while having no real understanding on operational military costs in general)

But yes, IF we'd continued to produce F-22s in any significant numbers, I'm sure there'd be a lot of (mostly ignorant) complaints as well. That's another problem: sorting out the few examples of legitimate criticism from the sea of misinformation and social/political drama.
 
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My point regarding the F-16 was that the program was plagued with delays, development cost over-runs and ended up with a fly-away cost per unit much higher than was proposed at the beginning.

There was public hand-wringing, congerssional oversight committees and all that typical nonsense.

Pretty much the same thing we're seeing here...
 
The biggest cost multipler is always changes to the specs added along the way. Once something is designed, it can be horrendously expensive to go back and change things. Environmental and performance testing already completed must be re-developed and rerun, documents and drawings must be changed, and any interfaces to supplied equipment must be reverified as operational.

It is my firm belief taht we should thinking out a specification completely, then issues it, award it, and if it is still good when the award has been named, build it. Changes should be disallowed except at the conclusion of milestones ... no more than 1 set of changes per year until the prototypes have flown. Then fly them, see what needs to be improved, make those changes that are REQUIRED and built it that way. The only excpetions should be if something goes obsolete and requires repalcement durign a build.

I think the computers should be one of the last components specified to allow for computer development over time. The buy a 20 - 30 year set of spares and go with them. Make the defense industry stick with protocols and busses for the service life of the systems they are used in ... though I'd hate to program an F-16 today with a 8-track tape ...
 
Here is the problem Flyboy, in Australia, as with many other JSF partner countries, the F-35 will have to perform the air to air role as much or more so than the strike role. We don't have the luxury of dedicated air to air aircraft like the F-22.
Which is another reason why we really should have been developing a lower cost (modern) lightweight/low cost alternative to the F-22 and replacement for the F-16 (or in more extreme cases, F-5)

The F-35 (even ignoring the R&D overhead itself) didn't end up all that much cheaper than the F-22 either, perhaps more so if you consider the potential economies of scale had we built more of them, let alone if an export-approved F-22 been developed and mass produced. (that's still besides the point though: that you shouldn't NEED to buy a plane in the 100 million USD range ... the F-15E isn't really much better in that respect, though I believe the F-18E is ... still lacking in the sense of 'modern lightweight with added modern stealth, thrust vectoring, and updated avionics and FBW technology)

I see the potential of drones, but they have their limits. They can't distinguish between friend and enemy or when continuing with an attack is not indicated. All they can do is follow the program. If we make one smart enough, then it will be too expensive to lose ... more expensive maybe than the F-35. If we don't then we only send in the drones when we are sure the attack should be prosecuted or we need reconaisance.
That's only a problem with totally autonomous drones ... with no remote supervision and ability for manual override (let alone direct remote control). Honestly, having completely autonomous drones would be stupid ... at least as stupid as having manned aircraft completely cut off from all levels of outside communications (including line of sight contact with friendlies in the air or on the ground) ... or at least when comparing drones doing similar missions to said manned aircraft. (the lines between 'drone' and 'cruise missile' can be a bit blurry at times)



... in which a P-36 could beat a P-51 ...
... in which a P-26 could beat a P-36 ...
... in which a P-1 could beat a P-26 ...

You fight 'in the old style' and to your older opponent's strengths, you're going to lose.
Aside from the F-100 example problems already pointed out, those 3 scenarios would also be hard to really argue if you went with the newer plane's most optimized model/loadout against the old one. Compare the lightest P-36 to the heaviest P-51 and yes ... not a good comparison, same for light P-26 vs heavy P-36, while the P-1 and P-26 are more radically different in timing and design than the others. (a P-6 would be more likely to best both the P-1 and P-26 in more scenarios)
 
It is my firm belief taht we should thinking out a specification completely, then issues it, award it, and if it is still good when the award has been named, build it. Changes should be disallowed except at the conclusion of milestones ... no more than 1 set of changes per year until the prototypes have flown. Then fly them, see what needs to be improved, make those changes that are REQUIRED and built it that way. The only excpetions should be if something goes obsolete and requires repalcement durign a build.

I think the computers should be one of the last components specified to allow for computer development over time.
Agreed, though including some degree of modularity to a design to allow additions AFTER manufacturing could be useful, to a point. Though I suppose that's in line with the overarching issues of making too specialized or 'tight' a design vs making one too generalized or loose without enough performance to be competitive and reasonably efficient and competent in any of its designed roles. (excelling in one or two roles while being marginally competent in secondary ones would make much more sense and tends to be the case with most successful fighter and fighter/bomber aircraft ... for most of the history of aviation, actually -some cases of bombers or transports being versatile beyond standard roles but it really seems like fighters are more consistently called upon to perform beyond the more traditional 'fighter' roles of interception, patrol, and escort)
 
Modularity is good. Specify the interface and anything that conforms to it would be able to work in the plane as a replacement. I also very much like plug in replacement instruments that slide in from the font. If the instrument goes bad, slide it out, slide a replacement in, and you're good to go. If the wiring is bad, it's the same old nightmare, but the most frequent issue is handled with ease. They should also have easy-to-change engines and hydraulics with quick-disconnects and slide-in replacement. The prob;ems come in when they ask for changes almost daily and some of the people asking for changes don't talk to everyone. So ... ALL changes should go through a change control board, and the frequency of changes should be down to once per build unless fatal flaws are discovered. That way they are building what the customer asked for in writing and making progress toward that goal. The real issue isn't the ability to DO it ... the issue is constantly-shifting goals and specifications. I'd describe it, but people like FlyboyJ and Drgondog have lived it like I have and KNOW the problems caused by constantly shooting at a moving target. There are many others in here who have lived it and know, too.

One of the main people at our Museum used to be an executive at Northrop on the F-18 program among others. When I ask him about it, he knows since he was in on making the hard choices. We have both lived through working with the Navy on aircraft and weapon system programs. The changes they ask for are many times idiotic, but they require re-running tests that were long-since thought of as done and out of the way on the requirements and specifications matrix maps. Each one re-rum is re-paid for by SOMEBODY. The government wastes a LOT of time and money trying to get contractors to pay for things that have to be redone at government request due to government-specified changes. They wind up paying anyway, but they drag you through the mud to get paid.

While I was at one company, we had local machine shops refusing to deliver fixtures until they were paid for because the money was slow in coming. Naturally, that impacted schedules, which tended to draw penalties on top of schedule slips ... all due to inefficiency in accounts payable. Our company refused to finance government projects and wait for the payment to come in the mail, so it was hurry up to get it done on time and then wait around to get paid before continuing with the supposed "continuous-effort" project.

As a taxpayer it was outrageous. As an engineer it was business as usual on some projects that shall remain nameless.
 
Read a news blurb that Israel is upping the number of F-35's they are going to buy. Israel has always been pretty savy with their weapons system purchases.............so I do not beleive they would be buying into a dead horse.
 
An analysis of the many vs many scenario performed many years ago suggested that the F-35s would run out of weapons before they ran out of targets, assuming 100% weapon success rate.

Can we have some specifics please? What were the parameters of the analysis? Who completed the study? How many aircraft were involved (on both sides)? What other factors (AWACS availability, onboard and offboard sensor fusion, tactics) were included or excluded? A study can come up with any number of different conclusions depending on the assumptions and biases that are incorporated.
 
My point regarding the F-16 was that the program was plagued with delays, development cost over-runs and ended up with a fly-away cost per unit much higher than was proposed at the beginning.

There was public hand-wringing, congerssional oversight committees and all that typical nonsense.

Pretty much the same thing we're seeing here...

And with the F-15 too. When that entered service, its radar performed worse than the fighters it was supposed to replace.
 
And with the F-15 too. When that entered service, its radar performed worse than the fighters it was supposed to replace.
Yes indeed...so back to my original point:
Name at least one aircraft in the historical U.S. inventory that went directly from paper to service that was at (or under) budget, delivered on time and performed exactly as projected/designed.

It'll be a very short list
 
Can we have some specifics please? What were the parameters of the analysis? Who completed the study? How many aircraft were involved (on both sides)? What other factors (AWACS availability, onboard and offboard sensor fusion, tactics) were included or excluded? A study can come up with any number of different conclusions depending on the assumptions and biases that are incorporated.

It was done by the RAND corporation and was about a conflict with China. It involved the F-35 located in the Pacific region - or about half of them.
 
Armed with egg rolls and killer hot sauce? Or what? What did the report say?

I have to believe the Chinese could put up a LOT of aircraft, possibly even MiG-15s and anything newer, including modern jets. A few F-35s won't have enough weapons to stop a mass attack, not that it's exactly imminent. There actually IS some safety in numbers if you have a LOT of numbers, and the Chinese do. I'd surely like to read the report you are quoting.

I think a few F-35s could certainly win a limited engagement that is in their envelope of tasks practiced. Not sure about a mass attack by thousands of aircraft like in WWII. If a single MiG-15 got behind an F-35 and he didn't know it fast enough, it would be game over by cannon negotiation.

We already proved conclusively with the F-15 that presenting a pilot with more than 5 - 7 target threats drives him or her into confusion. They engage effectively until the number of attackers reaches an individual mental limit of threats to deal with and then the pilot simply gets confused and shot down flying straight and level while trying desperately to decide what to do next.

So something like a normal, practiced encounter would be fine.

Something like mass attack would be countered with numbers or lost.

It's called Blitzkreig. Invented in 1939 by the Luftwaffe. Still works just fine if you can manage it.

Can you find that report again? If not, thanks for trying and no worries.
 

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