No Eastern front. What next?

[The Basket]

If the Germans do not invade USSR in 1941 then what happens?

Material wise the Germans will have full access to Soviet raw materials and so no shortages.

No massive loss of life or of war production.

Of course a future war is possible but in the short term, a Nazi war machine powered by Soviet gasoline is bad news for Europe.

 

[michaelmaltby]

... this scenario doesn't solve the German's problem of getting across the Ditch .....

 

[Shortround6]

The Germans do not have free access to Russian raw materials, they have to pay for them.
Some of what the Germans did get was paid for by the Cruiser Lutzow and other equipment/technology transfers.
Germany is in a much better position in this scenario but it does not have the full resources of Russia available.

 

[The Basket]

It can trade for resources.

I remember Speer once said Germany got more resources from the USSR by trade rather than occupation.

Against based on my faulty memory....the Germans gave the USSR the key to a lot of military tech secrets such as the He-100 and the Cruiser cos the invasion will be done and dusted before the Soviets could take advantage of them.

I think Stalin was a closer ally to Hitler than imagined in the 1940 timeframe.

 

[swampyankee]

Germany still has to maintain strong forces in the east, both for occupation of Poland and Czechoslovakia (and associated policy of murdering Jews) and defense against a Soviet attack. Of course, this is much easier than actually fighting the USSR.

 

[michaelmaltby]

"I think Stalin was a closer ally to Hitler than imagined in the 1940 timeframe."... HINDSIGHT talking, I believe.
At the time, the relationship between the two dictators was fluid ... with raw material deliveries being slowed to reflect Stalin's disposition to Hitler at any gives moment and the 'technology transfer' proceeding in spurts and halts .... there was arguably more real transfer in the Weimar years before 1933 ... than after, IMO.

From the M-R pact's signature (1939) right up to the Fall of France in 1940, Stalin treated Hitler with a perceived attitude of power. The pendulum swung so clearly to Hitler with the romp to the Channel, however, that Stalin became troubled, and the regime took note. Ore trains were crossing into German territory right up until the shooting started on June 22nd, 1941.

Speer was correct.

 

[The Basket]

So a few issues.

How would trade continue?
How would the German allies deal with Soviet-German cooperation?
Would war happen anyway?
How would this change the war with the UK and Japan in the Pacific?

 

[michaelmaltby]

".... Would war happen anyway?"
That question we can certainly answer with some confidence --- Hitler and Stalin were mortal enemies -- Germany's brush with communism --- street fights --- take-overs ... it all been too close .... and Protestant Germany was revolted by godless communism. Hitler never lost sight of Russia ... and Stalin never lost sight of Brest on the Atlantic ....
Britain and America (the Allies) will pay a huge butcher's bill with no Russians to sacrifice ...

In the Pacific, Japan will find a more aggressive USSR thanks to pre M-T Pact Russian shut-down at Nohoman in August, 1939. While the USSR and Allies won't be allied against Japan, the USSR will be very quick to nip at Japan's heels, IMO

 

[MIflyer]

Both Nazi Germany and the USSR recognized each other as two Socialist nations that had an identical outlook and similar ultimate goals. The question would have been, "When will the USSR attack Nazi Germany if Nazi Germany does not attack the USSR?" Germany desperately needed the oil the USSR could provide, as well as other raw materials. The Germans could have focused on the Middle East to try to get the oil, perhaps seizing Iraq and Iranian oil fields, but the Soviets would not have looked favorably on that, being on their border.

The USSR was busy reequipping its forces with more modern weapons and there was only one nation they were going to fight when they were ready.

Reading of Spitfires escorting the first B-17 raids on France in 1942, led me to wonder what would have occurred if the Germans did not fight the USSR in 1941 and decided to reopen the BoB. One thing that the 8th AF demonstrated early was its ability to pulverize German airfields in France with daylight raids. In the 1940 BoB German airfields in France were safe; they would not have been in 1942.

 

[The Basket]

Let's say Germany and USSR no war.

How can Germany lose?

I would say the UK would have to sign a truce and the USA won't get involved.

Japan would be the fly in the ointment but if USSR is selling oil to the Japanese then the US embargo could be overcome and no need to go to the Dutch East Indies.

USSR and Germany are more in common than different but of course there are always ghosts in the machine.

Japan USSR friendship? Tricky one that.
Mussolini invading and failing....
German allies like Finland and Romania getting the elbow from the USSR.
Conflict within the axis...Hungary Romania Bulgaria staring another Balkan War.

Germany lost in the East because of vast distances and logistics and bad weather but if the USSR invades then these problems disappear and you have proven war machine fighting on home soil.

 

[ODonovan]

Both Nazi Germany and the USSR recognized each other as two Socialist nations that had an identical outlook and similar ultimate goals

Although both "claimed" to be socialist, neither was. The USSR was communist and the Third Reich was fascist. It's common for totalitarian regimes to style their countries as something good when they're, in fact, just the opposite. Just look at North Korea. It's official name is "Democratic People's Republic of Korea," even though it's neither democratic or a republic.



-Irish

 

[GreenKnight121]

Most of the materials I have read over the years says that the commonly-accepted historical view is that if Germany had not invaded the USSR in 1941 that the USSR would have attacked Germany in 1942.

There has been ample documentary evidence released showing that Stalin had ordered not only plans to attack Germany through the shared border in Poland to be worked up, but that preparatory orders for manufacture and shipment of materials had been placed, and preparations had begun for moving troops and equipment from points further east to the western parts of the USSR.


You must remember that during the Nazi Party's rise to power in Germany that communists were one of the chief enemies that Hitler was whipping up public opinion against, second only to the Jews. Stalin well remembered this.

 

[pinehilljoe]

Interesting what if, but in Mein Kampf, Hitler made it clear there would a War in the East. Hitler's War was ideological, not political, War with Russia was inevitable. If the War in the East were delayed one or two years, Spain could have been annexed into the Reich and Gibraltar taken. Operation Hercules could have happened and Malta taken. With supplies, the Suez could have been taken by the Africa Korps. Churchill may have been forced to resign and a new Government formed, and an armistice signed.

 

[Dimlee]

Most of the materials I have read over the years says that the commonly-accepted historical view is that if Germany had not invaded the USSR in 1941 that the USSR would have attacked Germany in 1942.

Victor Suvorov's hypothesis of the Soviet preparation to attack Germany has been condemned for many years only to be accepted silently in 2000s-2010s when more documents became available for research. Yes, there were active preparations on the Soviet side and they were confirmed by many in Russian speaking historian community, even by those who positioned themselves as the opponents of Suvorov.
As for the dates, the debate continues. It could happen as late as in 1942 or as early as July 1941. There is one recent theory about the possibility of the Soviet attack on 22nd or 23rd June, after the provocation of Gleiwitz-Mainila kind. So far it was based on the anecdotal evidence though.

 

[Glider]

To be honest you end up with a situation similar to China and Taiwan today. Germany lacks the naval forces to invade the UK and the UK lacks the resources to invade Europe. If Hitler plays it clever and stops the Japanese attacking the USA then I cannot see the USA getting involved in the War apart from making huge profits out of supplying the UK with materials.

Result stalemate

 

[michaelmaltby]

"..... As for the dates, the debate continues."
Thank you, D.
The Suvorov book "Ice Breaker" was an eye popper for me, when I read it. Further, broader, reading over the years has diluted my enthusiasm: here's why:
Yes, the Germans encountered huge, deployed forces in the Western Ukraine in 1941, but, Red Army maneuvers were under way,
Yes, there was little resistance, i.e. the Soviets weren't dug in, but, the MR Pact had given Russia a new line of defense and the military was in the midst of savaging the old for the new.
Stalin: after the Fall of France, in May, 1940, he no longer held the whip hand on Hiter, his orders were to avoid provocation at any cost. Not the mind-set of an imminent attacker.
What Suvorov does reveal was Soviet plans for a fast moving armored thrust (BT Tanks, paratroops, etc.) into Western Europe; after France, Germany and Britain had fought WW1 all over again and ripped each other's guts out. (1943???) This is not a strategic 'revelation' on Suvorov's part. Red Army doctrine was always: attack, attack, attack. In the summer of 1941, tens of thousands of Russian troops perished in mindless 'attacks' because of that communist dogma.
Soviet Planners are no slouches when it comes to offensive combined arms operations. That they would be thinking in these terms about attacking a weakened Europe as early as 1938 should surprise no one, IMO, THAT is why the Ukraine and Parts of Siberia were starved starting in 1932, for their harvests and seed, to finance the industries and technolgies that would make a conquering Red Military a reality.

 

[GrauGeist]

And since the U.S. is neutral, no Lend-Lease to Britain and the Soviet Union...

 

[Dimlee]

"..... As for the dates, the debate continues."
Thank you, D.
The Suvorov book "Ice Breaker" was an eye popper for me, when I read it. Further, broader, reading over the years has diluted my enthusiasm: here's why:
Yes, the Germans encountered huge, deployed forces in the Western Ukraine in 1941, but, Red Army maneuvers were under way,
Yes, there was little resistance, i.e. the Soviets weren't dug in, but, the MR Pact had given Russia a new line of defense and the military was in the midst of savaging the old for the new.
Stalin: after the Fall of France, in May, 1940, he no longer held the whip hand on Hiter, his orders were to avoid provocation at any cost. Not the mind-set of an imminent attacker.
What Suvorov does reveal was Soviet plans for a fast moving armored thrust (BT Tanks, paratroops, etc.) into Western Europe; after France, Germany and Britain had fought WW1 all over again and ripped each other's guts out. (1943???) This is not a strategic 'revelation' on Suvorov's part. Red Army doctrine was always: attack, attack, attack. In the summer of 1941, tens of thousands of Russian troops perished in mindless 'attacks' because of that communist dogma.
Soviet Planners are no slouches when it comes to offensive combined arms operations. That they would be thinking in these terms about attacking a weakened Europe as early as 1938 should surprise no one, IMO, THAT is why the Ukraine and Parts of Siberia were starved starting in 1932, for their harvests and seed, to finance the industries and technolgies that would make a conquering Red Military a reality.

Suvorov started his research with no access to the vast amount of documents that became available later. One of the persistent "bugs" of his earlier works was, IMHO, his fixation on the hardware of the Red Army and some bold assumptions made from that. For example, he assumed that Pe-8 could be mass-produced in thousands, that T-34 tank prototype was designed for fast speed movement on the German autobahns, etc. And he praised many strengths of the Red Army while ignoring crucial defects, especially in logistics, communications, training, and low morale. He has recognized and corrected many of his mistakes later.
Still, the main premise was proved later in the 1990s and 2000s. There is a consensus today, more or less, regarding the intentions of Stalin to strike first and of the active preparations underway during May-June 1941 (and probably since early 1941).

Your arguments (yes-but) are valid, but they do not contradict the premise. The maneuvres were a form of undeclared mobilization (the official mobilization began on the 2nd day of war only). The old defense line has never been savaged only de-manned. Germans counted over 3,000 pillboxes there. Part of the equipment was moved to the new line.
As for Stalin's orders to avoid provocations - such orders are natural for an attacker, actually. But for the smart attacker, not the "bully" one. "Appear weak when you are strong, and strong when you are weak" (Sun Tzu). Germans acted in the same way, tolerating Soviet recon aircraft and scout groups incursions.

If you were interested in Suvorov's works earlier, I'd recommend to look for his books or articles dated 2005-2010 or later.
Two other names (from many) that could be of interest: Mikhail Meltyukhov with his Stalin's Missed Chance and Mark Solonin. They are from the opposite sides of the ideological specter, so to say, the former is pro-Soviet while the latter is a devoted anti-communist. Both were opponents of Suvorov many years ago but eventually, after their own research, they have agreed with the thesis of the Red Army preparation to strike. Solonin went further than other historians in his study of the underlying weaknesses of the Soviet system which contributed to the catastrophe of 1941. The title of one of his first books "Cask and hoops" can be used as an allegoric description of the Red Army and of other Soviet institutions of that period. Remove the hoops (of terror) and the cask (the army, the state) falls apart.

 

[michaelmaltby]

Great post. I know "Ice Breaker" is early Suvorov and I appreciate your thoughtful analysis and familiarity with language/culture.
All you write, however, makes no mention of Stalin's reaction to the Fall of France and most of Western Europe.
Convince me that THAT tsunami didn't change the plans and the timeline of Stalin et al, D.

Attacking a successful, triumphant, German war machine entrenched securely in most of Western Europe, with a military never, bloodied on a scale larger than Nomonhon ..... and a complete sh*t show of a disaster in Finland. Stalin was no fool .... Communism is delusional ... but, Stalin was not.

Attacking a Europe smashed by France, Germany and Britain .... that I can totally accept as Soviet strategy .

 

[Dimlee]

The Fall of France was a surprise for the Soviet leadership, indeed.
As for the Winter War, despite the losses, it was a victory at the end and that was all that mattered. It has never been accepted as a disaster and many difficulties were simply explained by "impenetrable Mannerheim line" or "Anglo-French military assistance". In his speech to Red Army senior officers on 17th April 1940, Stalin has announced that "we have defeated not just Finns, but the equipment, the tactics, the strategy of the advanced European states". Was he delusional - probably he was not. But there was overconfidence and the belief, almost religious, that all problems can be resolved by applying the same methods which brought the Bolshevisk to the power in the largest country.
Soviet leaders were not fools. Yet they overestimated the strength of their forces and - even more - the impact of the Soviet propaganda and terror on the own population in the preceding 20 years. They could not imagine that millions of citizens would prefer to lay down the arms and hundreds of thousands would cooperate with the enemy.
Stalin wrote the article named "Golovokruzhenie ot uspekhov" in 1930. When I read the documents of 1940-1941 I have the feeling that the Soviet leadership has been dizzy with success in that period.