North American A-36 Apache

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A friend of mine who was in the CBI said that the A-36A's they had in Burma were sometimes better ordnance haulers than the P-47's because they were better able to get out of jungle airstrips.

While the A-36A would have been a logical choice for the RAF 2d Tactical Air Force, an even more logical one might have been the P-47. Based on the engine reliability problems and poor ditching characteristics with the Typhoon, I think the P-47 would have been a superior mount. I do not know if the P-47 was available in sufficient numbers by mid-1944. Republic had two plants going but Curtiss did a poor job of ramping up production of the P-47G.

In any case, the RAF already had plenty of pilots that knew how to fly the Mustang Mk 1, they had ground crews experienced with the airplane and no doubt could have taken on the Apache Mk1 or Mustang Mk VI or whatever easily. But with only 500 built and NAA production switched over to the Merlin version there just were not enough around. Perhaps it was too bad that the 300 P-51A's were built rather than just continuing A-36A's.
 
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I've heard the same from a ground support crewman who said that they had less jungle to cut out (three if I remember correctly) for an air strip to support the Chindits as they moved closer to Japanese forces. The P-51As required less runway length as compared to the P-47. He also said that they did put 2 1,000 pounders on the Mustangs, even though they were now rated for this weight. They likely didn't have to fly very far since they were operating from an improvised forward runway.
 
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To add to the nomenclature confusion, when the P-51-1 (and -2s) became F-6As, they kept the original black stencil of 'P-51-1' under the L cockpit.
 

Interested to know where Flight Journal got the idea the RAF concluded they needed A-36As instead of other available UK manufactured aircraft already to hand and available. Every Air Ministry/RAF report I've seen on the A-36A for use by the RAF in the ETO concluded that it did not meet their requirements, in particular RAF operational doctrine for support to the Army by fighter-bombers. It's potential for use in other theatres of operation and suitability for use outside the ETO is left for further consideration/decision eg in MTO and CBI. The reports all concluded that in terms of priorities, the RAF wanted Merlin engined Mustangs - they were looking forward to the requirements to support and escort the bombers of 2TAF and Bomber Command over the Continent in support of the invasion; they wanted more Typhoons which by then were a known quantity and showing the reliability that was needed; they had the Tempest in its various marks in the pipeline, and the late Griffon engined Spitfires in the pipeline. Added into that was standardisation of armament, rationalisation of number of aircraft types to be supported, logisitics suppport, maintenance support, which was needed for the invasion, particularly to ensure the RAF Servicing Commandoes and Servicing Echelons to be put into the Advanced Landing Grounds after the invasion had the ability to maintain and support all main aircraft types in the RAF inventory.

It is interesting that in late 1943 the Air Ministry/RAF had to put great pressure on North American Aviation, Allison Aero Engines and the USAAF to get production of required spares for the remaining Allison engined Mustangs already being used by the RAF in the ETO to ensure their continued serviceability and support through the invasion period and to provide sufficient spares holding to allow repair of damaged aircraft and normal time based servicing of the exisiting aircraft to the end of 1944. Because the NAA and USAAF focus was so much on the Merlin engined Mustangs they had great difficulty getting what was required - hence why you see in early 1944 a consolidation of the remaining Mustang Mk.I and Mk.IA aircraft into a smaller number of Squadrons, and a number of Squadrons previously equipped with Mustangs converting onto the interim Spitfire FR.IX variant eg. No.16 Sqdn RAF, or converting back to earlier sub-types such as No.63 Sqdn onto Spitfire Vs and No.309 (Polish) Squadron to Hurricane IIs & IVs. That is also why you see the proposal for the FR variant of the Hawker Typhoon coming forward and 100 Typhoons being planned for modification to FR standard - altho that number in total was never modified the number being closer to 60. So adding a Allison engined sub-type at a point where because the focus was on the Merlin engined versions, with difficulty in getting spares and support was already becoming apparent, the RAF was certainly not looking to A-36As as a solution for their tactical fighter bomber role for the invasion and beyond.

Underlying all this, going back to late 1940 is a political and doctrinal battle between the British Army and the RAF about close air support for the Army and the need the Army continually felt that the RAF had to have dive bombers and even to the degree at one point where the British Army was proposing it have its own Air Corps of dedicated close air support aircraft, of which a very large part was proposed to be dive bombers - the myth of the Stuka from 1940 lived on. Imagine the dilution of air power that suggestion may have wrought if it had ever been implemented.
 
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I suspect that the USAAF offered six (6) A-36As to be used for low level long range recon, which the RAF accepted. This is my assessment, from viewing the 6 A-36As that were remarked with RAF roundels, fuselage bands and Lettering. I am surprised that the USAAF didn't give them some of their F-6As instead. The USAAF may have known that replacement aircraft were due in (P-47s ?), so offered the A-36As. The A-36A could carry drop tanks, where their F-6As could not. However, these Allison engine Planes had plenty of internal fuel capacity to meet most mission requirements. So I am only guessing. Dive bombing was likely not the mission the RAF had in mind.
 
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Most if not all of the F-6As retained the black stenciling on the left fuselage just forward of the canopy of P-51-1 or -2; F-6Bs retained the stenciling of P-51A. Confusion, confusion! I believe 'Mustang' became dominate due to the aircraft's first use in combat by the RAF. Identification placards introduced at the time for allied gunners, fighters, etc. needed quick 'I'd calls' to prevent destruction of 'friendlies.'
 
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An A-36A with 'Mustang' painted on the engine cow, so there; they are Mustangs! LOL!

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To add to the nomenclature confusion, when the P-51-1 (and -2s) became F-6As, they kept the original black stencil of 'P-51-1' under the L cockpit.

This USAAF telegram from July 1942 suggests a preference that all P-51 types be referred to as 'Mustangs'
 
RAF Mustang EW998 (original SN 42-83685)
The only A-36 delivered to the RAF for evaluation.


 
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That was the only part of it I saw, maybe the rest of it or the whole thing is floating around the net somewhere.
On Quora a fellow alleges that the Allison engined Mustangs exported to the U.K. were not supercharged. Is there any validity to that assertion? Seems absurd to me, but he does refer to a ban on export of supercharged engines... which I still think is absurd...
 
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The Allison engine P-51A, which became the Mustang Mk II, was equipped with a new Supercharger (over previous models; Mk I and Mk IA) which further enhanced low lever performance. It also increased its mid-to-high level performance over previous Allison engines, raising its maximum speed from 388 to 409 mph at 11,000 feet.
I suspect other viewers can provide more technical info than I, but engines and carburetors were in short supply by 1942. However, pressure was on industry to improve both throughout WWII.
 

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