Out of the Big Three WW2 bombers (B-17, B-24, Lancaster), was the Flying Fortress the most redundant?

[Reluctant Poster]

This is great info but I find a few things funny. It looks like these reports were put together in 1945. I believe the 5th AF gave up the last of their B-17s in 1943 so was this data based on what the aircraft was capable of or what was actually flown? Additionally why even put the B-17 in this chart if they are no longer participating?

They were planning on B-17s at one point. The paper I posted showed that the B-29s were far more effective and hence the change in deployment.

 

[spicmart]

Could someone give a brief summary?:
Did the disadvantages of the B-24 outweigh its advantages? And would it have been justified for it to be to completely replaced by the B-17?

 

[Reluctant Poster]

No information on the planned end 1945 operational B-29 force.

The wind down of the 8th and 15th Air Forces started with the B-24 groups, apart from the 492nd all had been sent to the US or the ATC by mid June 1945. Three 15th Air Force B-17 groups remained as occupation forces, 2 were inactivated in Italy in September 1945, the 301st went to the US in July, redesignated Very Heavy in August.

Three 15th Air Force B-24 groups went to the ATC, the remaining 12 to the US, of which 7 had been redesignated Very Heavy by end August 1945. For the 14 8th Air Force B-24 groups again 7 were redesignated Very Heavy by end August 1945. No returned B-24 groups were inactivated before 18 August 1945.

Seven 8th Air Force B-17 groups had returned to the US by end July 1945, none redesignated Very Heavy, none inactivated before 28 August 1945, 2 more B-17 groups inactivated in Morocco in July 1945.

Measuring the B-24 safety record by number of accidents and fatalities is being somewhat unfair, given the numbers of B-24 built versus other types and a multi seat aircraft by definition exposes more people to risk in a crash. Accident rates are a better comparison. Having said that the B-24 accidents in the US 1942 to 1945 accounted for 8.8% of fatal accidents, 20.5% of fatalities and 5.9% of destroyed aircraft, the B-17 figures were 5.1%, 12.7% and 3.8%. Accidents by Primary, Basic and Advanced trainers were responsible for 37.8% of fatal accidents, 25.5% of fatalities and 38.3% of destroyed aircraft. The fighters, percentage of total fatal accidents, P-38 6.1%, P-39 6.6%, P-40 5.8%, P-47 7.5%, P-51 2.5%, P-63 0.3%. An average of 7.9 people were killed in a B-29 fatal accident, 6.2 in a B-17 and 5.7 in a B-24.

The San Diego Air and Space Museum holds a lot of Consolidated Company Records, plenty of details on B-24 production.

All F-7 were conversions however 3 B-24L were accepted as such but delivered to USAAF as F-7B in November and December 1944 and 29 B-24M were accepted as such but delivered to USAAF as F-7B January to June 1945, all from San Diego, so in these cases the conversion happened before USAAF service. How many B-24 does Allan Blue think were converted to F-7, by B-24 version?

The US production reports agree with Allan Blue's totals with a couple of exceptions, like designations, using LB-30B versus Liberator I, LB-30 versus Liberator II (The RAF used LB-30A for its first 6 aircraft), also having 285 C-87 and 0 AT-22, considering all 5 AT-22 as conversions.

The production reports have two less aircraft from Consolidated, San Diego,

1 LB-30, AL503 was destroyed in an accident on 2 June 1941, "contractually non-existant inasmuch as it never been delivered", unusually for the US system it was omitted from the production reports, to make up the numbers another LB-30, FP685, was built, Allan Blue has the correct total.

1 RY-3. Order NOa(s)-3236 dated 14 March 1944 was for 112 RY-3, 86 for the USN and 26 for the British, Bureau Numbers 90020 to 90131, but 79 of the USN order were cancelled on V-J day (maybe first 66 then another 13), leaving 33 on the order of which 90020, 21 and 90023 to 50 and 90057 to 59, were built, (26 as JT936, JT937, JT975 to 998), the 33 Bureau Numbers matching the acceptances of 1 for the USN in June 1944, then 19 for Britain December 1944 to March 1945, another 7 from June to August 1945, then 6 for the USN November and December 1945. However Bureau Number 90022 is marked retained by contractor, making it the 34th aircraft. What does Allan Blue say about 90022? If it flew then it is an omission from the production reports, Consolidated say they built it. Air Arsenal North America thinks the entire order was for Britain, with one aircraft retained in the US for trials, so the 86 to 26 split in the USN documents could be reflecting what the order became, not as placed.

The B-24 had a much higher accident rate per flying hour than the B-17. Note that the table is per 100,000 flying hours. In particular the fatalities stand out.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Willow Run was named nicknamed Willit Run for a reason. It took a long time for production to get underway. Note that the first 800 B-24s produced by Willow Run were considered unsuitable for combat and were not send overseas. In 1943 when there was real shortage of heavy bombers Willow Run was not contributing much.

View attachment 665232
As for Willow Run's much hyped productivity it took a long time for Willow Run to exceed San Diego's productivity. July 1944 in fact.
View attachment 665234

I think a little bit of both. I think we know that the B-17 design, development and deployment was earlier than the B-24 and I also think that early in the program, Boeing was doing everything they can to see the B-17 was going to be produced. The B-24 started out as a well planned design with it's Davis Airfoil but I think Ruben Fleet did everything he could to ensure that Consolidated was able to produce a heavy bomber (rather than build B-17s under license), therefore the design was rushed and the B-24 turned into a bit of a flying monstrosity rather than a sleek streamlined bomber.

View attachment 665259

I also think the Boeing Douglas Vega group was much better organized than the group producing the B-24. They shared far more information and met regularly to exchange ideas. I have a paper on the subject at one time that i can no longer find. I am posting 2 papers that compare Seattle methods to Willow Run. Seattle is far closer to modern flexible production methods than Ford.

 

[33k in the air]

The B-24 had a much higher accident rate per flying hour than the B-17. Note that the table is per 100,000 flying hours. In particular the fatalities stand out.
View attachment 665371

Interestingly, the average number of fatalities per fatal accident is lower for the B-24 than the B-17.

B-24: 2,796 / 490 = 5.71
B-17: 1,757 / 284 = 6.19

Fatal accidents as a share of all accidents:

B-24: 490 / 1,713 = 28.60%
B-17: 284 / 1,589 = 17.87%

 

[EwenS]

Could someone give a brief summary?:
Did the disadvantages of the B-24 outweigh its advantages? And would it have been justified for it to be to completely replaced by the B-17?

The really important advantage of the B-24 over the B-17 was it's range while still carrying a useful load which only expanded as the war went on.

For example, RAF Coastal Command B-17 could fill the bomb bay with fuel but could then only carry 4 depth charges externally. The B-24 with extra fuel filling the forward bomb bay could still carry 8 depth charges or 4 plus a Mk24 homing torpedo internally and still fly further.

In 1945 the Liberator in SEAC was flying 24 hour missions out of Ceylon. Before the introduction of the B-29 it was the B-24 that were flying the longest ranged bombing missions of the war in 1942 and 1943. Check out the failed HALPRO mission to Ploesti in 1942 or the Shady Lady mission to Balikpapan in 1943.

There was a reason why the USAAF swapped B-17s for B-24s in the Pacific from early 1943. Range.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

The really important advantage of the B-24 over the B-17 was it's range while still carrying a useful load which only expanded as the war went on.

For example, RAF Coastal Command B-17 could fill the bomb bay with fuel but could then only carry 4 depth charges externally. The B-24 with extra fuel filling the forward bomb bay could still carry 8 depth charges or 4 plus a Mk24 homing torpedo internally and still fly further.

In 1945 the Liberator in SEAC was flying 24 hour missions out of Ceylon. Before the introduction of the B-29 it was the B-24 that were flying the longest ranged bombing missions of the war in 1942 and 1943. Check out the failed HALPRO mission to Ploesti in 1942 or the Shady Lady mission to Balikpapan in 1943.

There was a reason why the USAAF swapped B-17s for B-24s in the Pacific from early 1943. Range.

This is why I questioned that one chart several posts back. Depending on mission loadout and altitude flown, the B-24 had greater range than the B-17.

 

[EwenS]

Interestingly, the average number of fatalities per fatal accident is lower for the B-24 than the B-17.

B-24: 2,796 / 490 = 5.71
B-17: 1,757 / 284 = 6.19

Fatal accidents as a share of all accidents:

B-24: 490 / 1,713 = 28.60%
B-17: 284 / 1,589 = 17.87%

Is there a breakdown of those loss rates by theatre?

In the Pacific and CBI a lot of the flying was over water and the B-24 was a notoriously bad aircraft in a ditching.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Is there a breakdown of those loss rates by theatre?

In the Pacific and CBI a lot of the flying was over water and the B-24 was a notoriously bad aircraft in a ditching.

Those loss rates are for the continental USA

 

[Reluctant Poster]

The really important advantage of the B-24 over the B-17 was it's range while still carrying a useful load which only expanded as the war went on.

For example, RAF Coastal Command B-17 could fill the bomb bay with fuel but could then only carry 4 depth charges externally. The B-24 with extra fuel filling the forward bomb bay could still carry 8 depth charges or 4 plus a Mk24 homing torpedo internally and still fly further.

In 1945 the Liberator in SEAC was flying 24 hour missions out of Ceylon. Before the introduction of the B-29 it was the B-24 that were flying the longest ranged bombing missions of the war in 1942 and 1943. Check out the failed HALPRO mission to Ploesti in 1942 or the Shady Lady mission to Balikpapan in 1943.

There was a reason why the USAAF swapped B-17s for B-24s in the Pacific from early 1943. Range.

The other reason was that the 8th AF was the Prima Donna and they wanted all the B-17s.
Also note that once the B-17s were equipped with "Tokyo Tanks" the range difference wasn't all that great. The paper I posted earlier shows the B-24 without bomb load have a greater range but with a bomb load the positions are reversed. In either case the difference in range isn't huge.

 

[spicmart]

The really important advantage of the B-24 over the B-17 was it's range while still carrying a useful load which only expanded as the war went on.

For example, RAF Coastal Command B-17 could fill the bomb bay with fuel but could then only carry 4 depth charges externally. The B-24 with extra fuel filling the forward bomb bay could still carry 8 depth charges or 4 plus a Mk24 homing torpedo internally and still fly further.

In 1945 the Liberator in SEAC was flying 24 hour missions out of Ceylon. Before the introduction of the B-29 it was the B-24 that were flying the longest ranged bombing missions of the war in 1942 and 1943. Check out the failed HALPRO mission to Ploesti in 1942 or the Shady Lady mission to Balikpapan in 1943.

There was a reason why the USAAF swapped B-17s for B-24s in the Pacific from early 1943. Range.

How were the Liberators equipped to perform 24 hour missions? And what were the ranges that were flown?

 

[JDCAVE]

The B-24 had a much higher accident rate per flying hour than the B-17. Note that the table is per 100,000 flying hours. In particular the fatalities stand out.
View attachment 665371

A couple of points with this table:

1) only the "Rate" (2nd line) is comparable across all types. The rest of the statistics, such as fatalities, I'm pretty sure are not normalized for flying hours, and so you cannot make conclusions about rates of fatalities based on this table.

2) I'll bet that the B-17 and B-24 statistics reflect newly trained pilots (I presume all these pilots were trained in the US). By comparison, I'll wager the B-29 stats are for pilots who were already well trained on other 4-engines types.

So…the "Rate" for the B-29 stands out to me because 40/100,000 flying hours for this type exceeds that of the B-17 (30/100,000 hours) and the B-24 (35/100,000). And this for whom would probably be well trained on 4-engined a/c, perhaps combat trained.

Edit Note: We can take lines 1 and 2 and back-calculate the flying hours, and then we can calculate the fatality rates using line 3 and the back calculated flying hours. I will do that when I get home.

Jim

 

[JDCAVE]

So I have back calculated the flying hours as follows:
B-29: 6.8-100,000 hrs. (680,000 hrs)
B-17: 53.0-100,000 hrs (5,300,000 hrs)
B-24: 48.9-100,000 hours. (4,890,000 hrs)

This is a correction: Fatal Accident Rates not Fatalities

Fatal accident rates:

B-29: 63/6.8 = 9.3 fatal accidents/100,000 hrs.
B-17: 284/53.0 = 5.3 fatal accidents/100,000 hrs.
B-24: 490/48.9 = 10.0 fatal accidents/100,000 hrs.

Sorry for any confusion.

Jim

 

[Reluctant Poster]

So I have back calculated the flying hours as follows:
B-29: 6.8-100,000 hrs. (680,000 hrs)
B-17: 53.0-100,000 hrs (5,300,000 hrs)
B-24: 48.9-100,000 hours. (4,890,000 hrs)

Fatality rates:

B-29: 63/6.8 = 9.3 dead/100,000 hrs.
B-17: 284/53.0 = 5.3 dead/100,000 hrs.
B-24: 490/48.9 = 10.0 dead/100,000 hrs.

Jim

The B-29 fatality rate gets a bit skewed by its larger crew size. Each accident puts more people in jeopardy. No matter how you slice it the B-24 is atrocious.

 

[JDCAVE]

The B-29 fatality rate gets a bit skewed by its larger crew size. Each accident puts more people in jeopardy. No matter how you slice it the B-24 is atrocious.

It's twice that of the B-17, but the B-29 is likely over represented by experienced pilots.

The statistic I'd like to see is the comparable stats with well trained pilots across types, because, I have heard that the B-29 was "adventure" to fly. The engines were real problems, particularly on take-off. And the B-29 pilots were almost entirely well trained on other types prior to flying the B-29.

 

[wlewisiii]

Yes and no. Some of Fords problems were self inflicted. Willow Run was located in the middle of nowhere with no housing and no means of getting there from Detroit. Labor was hard to attract and turn over was high . Also Ford didn't understand the properties of aluminum.

That being said the AAF did demand a lot of changes certainly more than they the demanded for the B-17. Was that because the B-17 was simply a better design or perhaps Boeing was more in tune with the requirements of the AAF.

I've often wondered if the long gestation from the 299 through to the combat viable B-17E wasn't the greatest advantage Boeing had. Years to learn what did and didn't work along with the combat experience of the UK with the Sharktails. By the time the US was fully ramping up, the Boeing aircraft was ready. Consolidated's really wasn't.

 

[JDCAVE]

I apologize for any confusion in post 113, above.

Here are my calculations for all of the lines in the table in Post #103. I have repeated the figures in the first lines and then calculated the rates associated with them so that they can be comparable across all types. Quite frankly the B-29 jumps out at me. I'm not sure about the rest of you. The crew of the B-29: 11; B-17: 10; B-24: 11.

Jim

 

[at6]

After reading all of the comments, in an all out conflict such as World War 2 was, redundansy does not exist.

 

[drgondog]

View attachment 665354
They were planning on B-17s at one point. The paper I posted showed that the B-29s were far more effective and hence the change in deployment.

Good catch. I knew that the deployment was planned, did not know the final reason they were stood down. Do you have the date for this?

 

[Reluctant Poster]

I apologize for any confusion in post 113, above.

Here are my calculations for all of the lines in the table in Post #103. I have repeated the figures in the first lines and then calculated the rates associated with them so that they can be comparable across all types. Quite frankly the B-29 jumps out at me. I'm not sure about the rest of you. The crew of the B-29: 11; B-17: 10; B-24: 11.

Jim

View attachment 665402

I believe the B-24 had the same size crew as the B-17, but your point is well taken. I was thinking of the crew of the B-36. I blame Jimmy Stewart for his performance in the movie "Strategic Air Command", which I recently watched. It is a must watch for the exquisite photography of the B-36 in the air and for the shots of its interior. Jimmy Stewart was a real life Air Force General who at the time of the filming was fully qualified to fly the B-36 and the B-47. While John Wayne was protecting Hollywood from Japanese attacks, Jimmy was flying combat missions over Germany in a B-24. Before that he was a B-17 instructor.
Getting back to the subject, yes the B-29 was a half baked cake being force fed into service. Most of its issues seem to be related to the engines propensity to catch fire, not the aircraft itself.
Back to original point the numbers clearly show the B-24 was much more dangerous to its crew than the B-17. As an aside the numbers also show the B-26 in an extremely bad light compared to the B-25