Out of the Big Three WW2 bombers (B-17, B-24, Lancaster), was the Flying Fortress the most redundant?

[33k in the air]

Regarding the question of the B-17 versus the B-24, the book I mentioned previously, The B-24 Liberator — A Pictorial History by Allan G. Blue, has a section devoted to that question. Some excerpts:

There were certain other contrasts between the two aircraft which were becoming apparent to men who were acquainted with both. For example the overall impression one got from the Fortress interior was that it was, like its exterior, round and smooth — with its equipment built-in rather than added-on. Each B-17 crew member had a place to sit down and strap himself in — a small point, perhaps, but psychologically important. On the other hand the Liberator fuselage, while of larger dimensions than the Fortress, offered little in the way of comfort for the crew. There seemed to be draughts everywhere, and of such magnitude that they were far more than the troublesome spot heaters could contend with. Movement throughout the ship was awkward and difficult in full flight gear, and more often than not resulted in jarring collisions with various sharp-edged and unyielding structural members and/or installed equipment. Idle gunners sat on the floor — if they sat — and likely as not pondered possible fates for the design engineer who was responsible for a fuel-transfer system that required any prudent B-24 pilot to crack open the bomb bay doors in flight to disperse the petrol fumes. Or perhaps the ball and tail gunners thought about the greater speed with which their B-17 counterparts could exit their stations in a emergency.

p.184

Inevitably the Liberator continued to be compared with the Flying Fortress and, as far as the later versions of the two bombers were concerned, suffered by the comparison. This was due not so much to short-comings of the Liberator — although it certainly had them — as to the fact the B-17 was in many respects an exceptional aircraft, with many of its merits having particular — and personal — appeal to the men who flew it and flew in it. From the beginning the Fortress was an honest aircraft, easy to fly in formation, with a low landing speed and with no major vices. 'A four-engined Piper Cub' was the popular and rather apt description. Most important, the Fortress retained its original characteristics throughout its development, while the Liberator did not.

p.186

Actually the Liberator never did lose its performance edge over the B-17, as a series of tests run at Elgin Field demonstrated conclusively late in the war. Rather, the areas in which the B-24 excelled became less important in the European and Mediterranean theatres. The range of the Fortress was adequate for Europe, and individual aircraft speed became academic because of formation requirements. Altitude, however, became paramount and here, literally, the B-17 remained on top. In addition, with over 70% of Eighth Air Force mission failures being attributed to navigational errors, the superior accommodations of the B-17 nose were highly desirable. General Doolittle, in fact, considered poor visibility the number one fault of the B-24.

In the Pacific theatre there was no vocal contest between the two aircraft, for although B-24's were originally requested by Pacific theatre commanders because they felt there was a better chance of getting them than the more popular B-17, the Liberator's longer legs soon demonstrated that it was a natural choice for an air war conducted for the most part at extreme range. The European requirement for tight formation flying was not as severe, and the typical maximum-range mission allowed Pacific Liberators, when necessary, to approach the target at adequate altitude because of the large amount of fuel burned on the way.

p.186-187

 

[SaparotRob]

I am loving this thread.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Maybe not moot, maybe already preparing for the post war situation.

The study was specifically about the bombing of Japan. At the time the study was being prepared the atomic bombs not been dropped and the invasion of Japan was to be the way forward. Very few people knew of the existence of the A bomb before August 6 and it did not enter into US military planning.

Regarding the question of the B-17 versus the B-24, the book I mentioned previously, The B-24 Liberator — A Pictorial History by Allan G. Blue, has a section devoted to that question. Some excerpts:

IIRC the Marauder wound up with the lowest overall loss-rate per sortie of two- or four-engine bombers.

Of course it did, it attacked much less dangerous targets than the heavies. Rand Paper RM-402 "Aircraft Vulnerability In World War II" discusses this topic in detail.

"Despite the other variables of missions which affect the damage and loss, inspection of the of missions grouped according to geographic areas attacked shows a dependence on location which may be reasonably attributed to the peculiar circumstances associated with attacks on each region. These circumstances include:
1. The character of the AA defenses which must be crossed
2. Whether the target is approached largely over land or over water
3. Whether the target is in occupied territory or Germany
4. The strategic importance of the target to the enemy
5.The depth of penetration, because the deeper the penetration
a. More AA positions flown over
b. More time for enemy to mobilize fighters
c. Longer bomber exposure time to fighters
d. Longer time bombers are without escort
e. Further damaged bombers must fly"

"Throughout the war, however, there was an appreciable difference in the loss rates to German and non-German targets, which reflects primarily the disposition of the German defenses and the greater mission distances involved."

"Table 14 Summary of 227 Daylight Attacks on 104 targets for 17 August through 31 December 1943" gives a great deal of detail on loss rates that I am to lazy to reproduce, but I will summarize as follows:
South Germany 16.8%
Central Germany 15.5%
Rhine-Ruhr Area 11.3%
Hamburg Kiel Area 8.8%
N.E. Germany (&Poland) 8.0%
Emden-Bremen Area 6.1%

France, Holland, Belgium Over 200 Mi.fr. Bases. 4.5%
Norway 2.0%
France, Holland, Belgium Under 200 Mi.fr. Bases 1.6%

Note that this is for 1943 when losses were at their peak. The B-26 loss rate for 1943 would be higher than the overall loss rate you quoted. If the B-17s and B-24s flew the same missions as the B-26 their losses would be corresponding low.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Regarding the question of the B-17 versus the B-24, the book I mentioned previously, The B-24 Liberator — A Pictorial History by Allan G. Blue, has a section devoted to that question. Some excerpts:

My favorite attempt to improve the facilities in the nose of the B-24 is the grafting of the B-17 nose on a B-24


I have walked through the bomb bay catwalk in a B-24 and I will attest that it is tight. This was on the ground in summer clothes. i cannot imagine doing it in the air wearing flight gear.

 

[Greg Boeser]

And the roll up bomb bay doors of the B-24 could not support the weight of a man.

 

[SaparotRob]

Hey, how come "the big bad B-17G researcher" hasn't chimed in? Remember him?

 

[Greg Boeser]

You guys were mean to him.
He shook the dust from his sandals and moved on.

 

[special ed]

Did he go with a Peter Three Nine long range escort?

 

[SaparotRob]

You guys were mean to him.

Only a little.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

And the roll up bomb bay doors of the B-24 could not support the weight of a man.

According to Ambrose's The Wild Blue (yes, sketchy source, apply salt as needed), the skin on the B-24 couldn't hold a man in the airplane if he fell while moving around, it was that thin.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

The accident rate for the B-26 got progressively lower as the war progressed. Improvements in training and the adoption of the longer wing contributing greatly. Both A-26 and A-20 had higher accident rates.

The accident rate got progressively lower for ALL aircraft as the war progressed. In 1944 the B-26 was still significantly worse than the B-25. 1942 was a was by far the worst year for accidents. Training was rushed for good reason. The Japanese were running a muck in the Pacific, the Germans were still doing well in Russia (until Stalingrad) and North Africa. There was a shortage of instructors as well. One of the excuses given for the P-38 and B-26 is that there was no proper twin engine training. The reality is that there was no one to conduct it. Very few pilots had twin experience in 1942 and virtually no one had experience in high performance twins like the B-26. If an aircraft is difficult to fly it is a major flaw when you are in the midst of a crash program (no pun intended) to expand your air force.
As to the A-26 it is interesting to note that the FEAF didn't want it. They wanted to keep using the B-25.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

IMO - the B-17 was 'redundant' in the Pacific and CBI after 1942. The ETO/MTO favored the B-17 unless and until the 8th AF decided to uniformly bomb at lower altitudes around 18-21K where the B-24 operated. Even so, the word 'redundant' can not apply as it took the 50+ BG-H between 8th and 15th to systematically attack German/Austrian and Romanian targets. Both types were required in the most dangerous region of Axis defenses.

Just finished reading South Pacific Air War volume 5 and the B-17s were just starting to become effective in combat (by using low-level bombing and skip bombing) in Nov / Dec 1942. Many other types were coming in but nothing had the range of the B-17 except the PBYs and maybe the B-24s. But did they ever do skip-bombing with B-24s?

B-24 of course did seem to become the ultimate maritime patrol aircraft, but their success rate in bombing attacks on ships was low in every case I know (spotty admittedly as i don't know the full operational history)

Another factor discussed above - namely comparative loss rates. The B-24 in SWP and CBI never faced an equivalent fighter force to LW based in Germany. Loss rates per sortie due to enemy action was significantly lower. Another factor re: comparative loss rates is the threat environment in 1943 when B-24 number of BGs and sorties were far lower than B-17 - as well into Q1 and Q2 1944. At the time slice that the LW day fighter threat had largely been blunted prior to D-Day, only then were replacement Bomb Groups in ETO skewed toward new operational B-24 BGs.

I agree with that - from the same book, B-17s and B-24s routinely got into engagements with large numbers of A6M or Ki-43 without any fighter protection and survived, sometimes with serious damage, sometimes without any. It was definitely nothing like NW Europe in that sense.

From my perspective, when you take into account that the 4 ETO 8th AF B-24 BG were taken off ops to go to N.Africa and train for Tidal wave, the 1st and 3rd BG of B-17s were increasingly pressured - all the way though the second Schweinfurt mission on October 14th. Contrast that to Tidal Wave as the only significant loss incurred by 8th AF (on TDY to 12th for Ploesti) B-24s. The 2nd BD attacked only a few targets, took heavy losses August 1, 1943 but were basically unmolested afterwards until November 1943. They were still a small Division of 4 B-24BGs, were mostly flying diversions while they replaced Tidal Wave bombes and crews and IIRC first flew more than 4 BG strikes in 2BD in January 1944 when the four new B-24 BGs went operational.

From Shores Mediterranian Air War series, the B-24s were actually quite effective in destroying Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica airbases in Tunisia. They didn't take many losses because they were heavily protected by escorting fighters. But the B-24s raids in particular seemed to destroy a very large number of enemy aircraft per raid, as in 20-30 vs 3-4 on most of the earlier raids with light bombers and fighter bombers. I think their role in Tunisia is somewhat unsung, they were important there.

Tidal Wave was of course a disaster but it did put a dent in what turned out to be the most vulnerable and critical Axis industry of all- oil production.

My point is that the lions share of 2nd BD operations occurred from when Mustangs and Lightnings were getting numerous and very effective as escorts through the EOW. Even though the relative force ratio was high B-24/low (er) B-17 in 12th and 15th, the same dynamics existed for MTO ops. Namely smaller LW reaction forces in MTO for lower (but significant for major targets like Ploesti and Austria where strong fighter forces could be applied).

The B-24 in ETO typically flew as a Division at 18-22K, completely separate from 1st and 3rd BD B-17s because of their high altitude formation struggles and the fact that their cruise at 22K was typically 180mph TAS to B-17 150mph TAS at 25K.

Simple summary - B-24 basically faster, with larger bomb load for same mission target ranges. B-17. The B-17 was more survivable to battle damage, easier to fly. B-17 was in combat, in strength before B-24 contributions.

B-17 definitely seemed to be tougher in general, and flying higher means a little harder to hit with heavy flak. I have also read that B-24 was hard to bail out of safely.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

But did they ever do skip-bombing with B-24s?

AFAIK - No. 5th AF General Kenney left that for B-25s and A-20s.

 

[SaparotRob]

The Boeing was definitely better looking.

 

[EwenS]

AFAIK - No. 5th AF General Kenney left that for B-25s and A-20s.

One issue with the B-24 in the Pacific was the relative lack of Bomb Groups / Squadrons compared to the ETO and MTO. Ultimately by 1945 these were:-

5th AF - 22nd, 43rd, 90th & 380th
13th AF - 5th & 307th. In addition there was the 868th BS which specialised in low level radar directed bombing including shipping usually operating in small numbers.
7th AF - 11th, 30th & 494th.
11th AF in Alaska - 404th BS in 28th CG.
10th AF in India - 7th BG
14th AF in China - 308th BG

There had been some swapping of units between the various Air Forces in the Pacific during the course of the war.

But the bulk of the anti shipping war in the Pacific was in the hands of the USN. They had a number of PB4Y-1 squadrons (USN designation for the B-24) from early 1943 most of which later converted onto the P44Y-2 Privateer. Their history can be read about in these books.

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[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

All I know about B-24s vs ships (USAAF types too not just PB4Y) are some specific examples of specific raids and mini-campaigns against certain Japanese task forces, convoys and individual ships and so on, from 1943-through to 1945. And these didn't typically go well in the sense that they never seemed to hit anything. I don't know the whole operational history of the B-24 in the Pacific but I do know several specific incidents in some detail.

(and I don't know it all, not because I can't find books on it but because my interests / time have focused on other aircraft and other campaigns, though I'm getting into reading more about the Pacific again now that rigorous operational histories with actual results corroborated by records on both sides etc.)

The interesting thing about the B-17s in the latest Clairngbould book is that they did actually score some hits doing skip and low altitude bombing. No doubt B-25 / A-20 were better for that due to being smaller targets, and probably a bit faster down low, but they also didn't have the range of a B-17. As far as I know the B-17s never hit any ships with high altitude bombing though, or anyway not in any account I have read so far (I wouldn't rule it out I've just never seen a case).

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

One issue with the B-24 in the Pacific was the relative lack of Bomb Groups / Squadrons compared to the ETO and MTO. Ultimately by 1945 these were:-

5th AF - 22nd, 43rd, 90th & 380th
13th AF - 5th & 307th. In addition there was the 868th BS which specialised in low level radar directed bombing including shipping usually operating in small numbers.
7th AF - 11th, 30th & 494th.
11th AF in Alaska - 404th BS in 28th CG.
10th AF in India - 7th BG
14th AF in China - 308th BG

There had been some swapping of units between the various Air Forces in the Pacific during the course of the war.

I would say in the Pacific and China there was generally somewhat of a lack of USAAF units in general or anyway not as much as you had in NW Europe or even in the Med. Longer supply chain and somewhat lower priority, and the Navy was bearing the brunt of the fighting.

Certainly when it came to sinking IJN ships it was the USN and the Marines which did the most damage, though the Army played their role too once 5th AF got established.

 

[PStickney]

The Avro Lancaster could be modified to deliver the Dam Buster bouncing bomb as well as the Tall Boy, which was used to sink the battleship Tirpitz, and the Grand Slam to destroy U-boat bunkers. This was possible because of its cavernous bomb bay.

The B-24 Liberator was known for its long range enabling it to engage targets out of reach of the other heavy bombers. It closed the Atlantic Gap which contributed to turn the tide in this war theater in the Allies' favor and it could attack the Romanian oilfields of Ploesti from bases as far as North Africa. For the same reason it replaced the B-17 to cover the vast ranges of the Pacific.

The B-17 had the advantage of being able to drop its bombload from greater heights than the other two and it was a bit more rugged although its loss rate was about the same as the Liberator's. In the end the B-24 could do the same strategic bombing missions as the Fortress.
The Lib could also be produced more easily and faster being optimized for mass production.

So could one say that the B-17 could have been done without?

T think the true measure of the utility of an airplane - particularly a warplane, is what was kept after the war.

The Avro Lancaster could be modified to deliver the Dam Buster bouncing bomb as well as the Tall Boy, which was used to sink the battleship Tirpitz, and the Grand Slam to destroy U-boat bunkers. This was possible because of its cavernous bomb bay.

The B-24 Liberator was known for its long range enabling it to engage targets out of reach of the other heavy bombers. It closed the Atlantic Gap which contributed to turn the tide in this war theater in the Allies' favor and it could attack the Romanian oilfields of Ploesti from bases as far as North Africa. For the same reason it replaced the B-17 to cover the vast ranges of the Pacific.

The B-17 had the advantage of being able to drop its bombload from greater heights than the other two and it was a bit more rugged although its loss rate was about the same as the Liberator's. In the end the B-24 could do the same strategic bombing missions as the Fortress.
The Lib could also be produced more easily and faster being optimized for mass production.

So could one say that the B-17 could have been done without?

The Avro Lancaster could be modified to deliver the Dam Buster bouncing bomb as well as the Tall Boy, which was used to sink the battleship Tirpitz, and the Grand Slam to destroy U-boat bunkers. This was possible because of its cavernous bomb bay.

The B-24 Liberator was known for its long range enabling it to engage targets out of reach of the other heavy bombers. It closed the Atlantic Gap which contributed to turn the tide in this war theater in the Allies' favor and it could attack the Romanian oilfields of Ploesti from bases as far as North Africa. For the same reason it replaced the B-17 to cover the vast ranges of the Pacific.

The B-17 had the advantage of being able to drop its bombload from greater heights than the other two and it was a bit more rugged although its loss rate was about the same as the Liberator's. In the end the B-24 could do the same strategic bombing missions as the Fortress.
The Lib could also be produced more easily and faster being optimized for mass production.

So could one say that the B-17 could have been done without?

I think the measure of the utility of a warplane is how long they stayed in service when the war they were in ended -
In the WW2 case, the B-24 was immediately shelved - they're completely out of the inventory by the end of 1946 - sent to the scrapyards as fast as they could be transported. The same for the Martin B-26, the P-38, and the B-32. (Although one Lightning did hang around at Eglin AFB long enough to get re-designated "F-38" in 1948, with the Great Renumbering). The Navy kept its PB4Y-2s, Which you have to admit is not your Standard B-24, and the RAF and RCAF flew their Lancasters into the late 1950s.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

One issue with the B-24 in the Pacific was the relative lack of Bomb Groups / Squadrons compared to the ETO and MTO. Ultimately by 1945 these were:-

5th AF - 22nd, 43rd, 90th & 380th
13th AF - 5th & 307th. In addition there was the 868th BS which specialised in low level radar directed bombing including shipping usually operating in small numbers.
7th AF - 11th, 30th & 494th.
11th AF in Alaska - 404th BS in 28th CG.
10th AF in India - 7th BG
14th AF in China - 308th BG

There had been some swapping of units between the various Air Forces in the Pacific during the course of the war.

But the bulk of the anti shipping war in the Pacific was in the hands of the USN. They had a number of PB4Y-1 squadrons (USN designation for the B-24) from early 1943 most of which later converted onto the P44Y-2 Privateer. Their history can be read about in these books.

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All well known - My daughter's GGF was in the 30th BG and flew this B-24

Point was the B-24 was not used for skip bombing

 

[EwenS]

The last Air Force to fly the B-24 was the Indian Air Force. Having salvaged ex-RAF Liberators they continued to use them until 1968. Many of the B-24 in around today owe their existence to the IAF.

India's Reclaimed Bombers: The B-24 Liberator

A history of the B-24 Liberator in IAF service ...

www.bharat-rakshak.com