Out of the Big Three WW2 bombers (B-17, B-24, Lancaster), was the Flying Fortress the most redundant? (1 Viewer)

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The Avro Lancaster could be modified to deliver the Dam Buster bouncing bomb as well as the Tall Boy, which was used to sink the battleship Tirpitz, and the Grand Slam to destroy U-boat bunkers. This was possible because of its cavernous bomb bay.

The B-24 Liberator was known for its long range enabling it to engage targets out of reach of the other heavy bombers. It closed the Atlantic Gap which contributed to turn the tide in this war theater in the Allies' favor and it could attack the Romanian oilfields of Ploesti from bases as far as North Africa. For the same reason it replaced the B-17 to cover the vast ranges of the Pacific.

The B-17 had the advantage of being able to drop its bombload from greater heights than the other two and it was a bit more rugged although its loss rate was about the same as the Liberator's. In the end the B-24 could do the same strategic bombing missions as the Fortress.
The Lib could also be produced more easily and faster being optimized for mass production.

So could one say that the B-17 could have been done without?
I'd have to say that the utility of a warplane is measured by what happens to is when the war that it has been in is over. B-17s and Lancasters served into the late 1950s, B-24s left the inventory as fast as they could be ferried to the salvage depots - by the end of 1946, there are no B-24s in USAAF service. Yes, the Navy kept its PB4Y-2s, but a Privateer isn't a Liberator.
As for the performance differences - The '24 certainly did have longer range, but economical cruise speed (which for a bomber or transport is what counts) were actually pretty close - 165 mph for the B-17G and 170 for the B-24J - which is within the variation that you'll find in different airplanes of the same make and model. (Some are good, some are slugs)
The B-17 was better for excess power - it always has about a 5,000' advantage on the B-24 - all numbers from the Specific Flight Operation Charts of their Flight Operating Handbooks.
 
I'd have to say that the utility of a warplane is measured by what happens to is when the war that it has been in is over. B-17s and Lancasters served into the late 1950s, B-24s left the inventory as fast as they could be ferried to the salvage depots - by the end of 1946, there are no B-24s in USAAF service. Yes, the Navy kept its PB4Y-2s, but a Privateer isn't a Liberator.
As for the performance differences - The '24 certainly did have longer range, but economical cruise speed (which for a bomber or transport is what counts) were actually pretty close - 165 mph for the B-17G and 170 for the B-24J - which is within the variation that you'll find in different airplanes of the same make and model. (Some are good, some are slugs)
The B-17 was better for excess power - it always has about a 5,000' advantage on the B-24 - all numbers from the Specific Flight Operation Charts of their Flight Operating Handbooks.
Practical speed for 8th AF missions was at slowest speed the old boys could keep up - namely 150-155IAS at 25K, B-24 comparables were 170 TAS at 22K.
 
I was surprised by the numbers for the A-20. Perhaps because it was one of the first fairly high-speed attack profile aircraft, tricycle gear and single pilot with multiple engines to control? Did the train on low level stuff state side? If so, that would certainly increase the accident numbers.
A lot of it is training issues - in the early part of the war, there wasn't a lot of specific multi-engine training, and as the training ramped up, it took a while to realize that there's a big difference between a moderate performance twin, like a Beech 18 (T-7, T-11, C-45, many of which were the multi-engine trainers), C-47 or C-46, and the high performance airplanes like the A-20, B-26, and P-38. The current day equivalent would be, say, transitioning from a Piper Seneca or Apache to a Mitsubishi Mu-2 (High performance turboprop) When all is working well, the Mu-2 is easy to fly - fast, powerful, and responsive. But when things go wrong, they go wrong fast, and you need to be prepared and on top of your game to handle it. Mu-2s had a bad reputation - they're fairly economical to buy, and a lot of people got hurt not being able to deal with things like losing an engine on takeoff. (Lots of horsepower and big props far out on the wing mean that things happen fast, especially at low speeds. - toss in a small wing that gets it low speed lift through high lift devices - the whole trailing edge is flaps) The solution was specific and recurring training to get and keep an Mu-2 endorsement on your ticket, where you could practice the dangerous stuff in the simulator, and make your mistakes there.
 
IIRC the Marauder wound up with the lowest overall loss-rate per sortie of two- or four-engine bombers.
When you factor together combat losses and operational losses. The characteristics that led to the high operational losses also meant that combat losses were less.
One thing to remember about comparing numbers - all airplanes have a relatively high loss rate as they're entering service. Given that the Martin B-26 was very mature, and the Douglas A-26 was just ramping up production, it's not too surprising. Pilots I've talked to that flew both were proud of the Marauder, if a bit cautious about it, but were universally ecstatic about the A-26,
 
When you factor together combat losses and operational losses. The characteristics that led to the high operational losses also meant that combat losses were less.
One thing to remember about comparing numbers - all airplanes have a relatively high loss rate as they're entering service. Given that the Martin B-26 was very mature, and the Douglas A-26 was just ramping up production, it's not too surprising. Pilots I've talked to that flew both were proud of the Marauder, if a bit cautious about it, but were universally ecstatic about the A-26,

Definitely agree about this and the previous post, based on operational histories. New units with new types of aircraft had a lot of trouble both with accidents and in combat, and then they worked out maintenance issues and flying and figured out ideal tactics for combat, and loss rates went way down. This definitely seems to be a pattern with Allied units anyway.
 
I'd have to say that the utility of a warplane is measured by what happens to is when the war that it has been in is over. B-17s and Lancasters served into the late 1950s, B-24s left the inventory as fast as they could be ferried to the salvage depots - by the end of 1946, there are no B-24s in USAAF service. Yes, the Navy kept its PB4Y-2s, but a Privateer isn't a Liberator.
As for the performance differences - The '24 certainly did have longer range, but economical cruise speed (which for a bomber or transport is what counts) were actually pretty close - 165 mph for the B-17G and 170 for the B-24J - which is within the variation that you'll find in different airplanes of the same make and model. (Some are good, some are slugs)
The B-17 was better for excess power - it always has about a 5,000' advantage on the B-24 - all numbers from the Specific Flight Operation Charts of their Flight Operating Handbooks.

I think there is some truth in this but it's also true that they simply didn't need so many different types of aircraft after the war and were consolidating, so some fairly capable aircraft were cancelled in favor of others. They kept the P-51 but instead of using the H they stuck with the D because it was less effort to produce. As for the B-24, B-17s weren't being made after WW2 either right? They put everything into the B-29 and then later jet types.

Conversely some countries like England also really needed to save money so they would continue using older types for a while so long as they weren't in a hot war... I think that explains the post-war use of the Lancaster pretty well.
 
Conversely some countries like England also really needed to save money so they would continue using older types for a while so long as they weren't in a hot war... I think that explains the post-war use of the Lancaster pretty well.
In Canada, the Lanc was used for aerial photos for mapping.
 
They kept the P-51 but instead of using the H they stuck with the D because it was less effort to produce.
I don't know about that - Bill M could probably chime in but the P-51H was produced into 1946 with over 550 produced. It was lightened and was reported to fly better than the P-51D. Several thousand were cancelled. I don't know when P-51D production ended

Conversely some countries like England also really needed to save money so they would continue using older types for a while so long as they weren't in a hot war... I think that explains the post-war use of the Lancaster pretty well.
The Lancaster (as a bomber) was slowly being replaced by the Lincoln. It was recognized that both aircraft were approaching obsolescence as the 1950s approached and were supplemented by 87 B-29s. Both Lancaster and Lincoln served in other roles well into the 50s.
 
I don't know about that - Bill M could probably chime in but the P-51H was produced into 1946 with over 550 produced. It was lightened and was reported to fly better than the P-51D. Several thousand were cancelled. I don't know when P-51D production ended


The Lancaster (as a bomber) was slowly being replaced by the Lincoln. It was recognized that both aircraft were approaching obsolescence as the 1950s approached and were supplemented by 87 B-29s. Both Lancaster and Lincoln served in other roles well into the 50s.

The Lancaster soldiered on with the French Navy up to july 1964.
 
When you factor together combat losses and operational losses. The characteristics that led to the high operational losses also meant that combat losses were less.
One thing to remember about comparing numbers - all airplanes have a relatively high loss rate as they're entering service. Given that the Martin B-26 was very mature, and the Douglas A-26 was just ramping up production, it's not too surprising. Pilots I've talked to that flew both were proud of the Marauder, if a bit cautious about it, but were universally ecstatic about the A-26,

I've read that the Invader was preferred by pilots over the B-26 for its flight characteristics. I can't speak to the accuracy of those reports.
 
You could look at the pilot's manuals and see what they say about landing speeds and minimum control speeds and any other restrictions.

The A-26 has got double slotted Fowler flaps and may have a lower stalling speed with the flaps down.
 
You could look at the pilot's manuals and see what they say about landing speeds and minimum control speeds and any other restrictions.

The A-26 has got double slotted Fowler flaps and may have a lower stalling speed with the flaps down.
A big problem with the Marauder is that, when you're slow, a lot of things happen all at one point - about 140 - 160 mph IAS. From the FAA Tpe Certificate AL-33 for the Martin B-26C
Maximum airspeed with wing flaps extended 160 mph
Maximum airspeed for landing gear extension 165 mph
Critical engine failure speed (V1) 135 mph
Takeoff climb speed (V2) 148 mph
Minimum Control Speed 140 mph
Stall Speed in those conditions, full flaps, is about 90-95 mph, more if heavy.
Basically, once you get to 140 mph on a single engine approach, with a light, clean airplane, the airplane is going to be on the ground - either on the runway, or in a smoking hole. But as you're getting to that point, there's a 20 mph band in the approach where you're busy getting the gear and flaps down, and you're constantly retrimming the airplane. You can add small amounts of power below the Minimum Control Speed, but a go-around is impossible - full power will roll you over and drive it in.
 
That's bacon because that's the first time I have run into an explanation that makes sense to a guy who loves flying but could never get his ticket from the military (color vision issues). Thank you for that explanation.
 
I don't know about that - Bill M could probably chime in but the P-51H was produced into 1946 with over 550 produced. It was lightened and was reported to fly better than the P-51D. Several thousand were cancelled. I don't know when P-51D production ended


The Lancaster (as a bomber) was slowly being replaced by the Lincoln. It was recognized that both aircraft were approaching obsolescence as the 1950s approached and were supplemented by 87 B-29s. Both Lancaster and Lincoln served in other roles well into the 50s.
About the P-51H - In 1946, Merlin production had stopped, so no new V1650-9s, and the big push was for jets - Allison wasn't doing much with the V1710 - just enough to get the G series engines for the P-82 into acceptable shape, and that took years. So, by the end of 1945, more or less, those were all the H models you were going to get.
The H models were kept in the States, and assigned as Air Defense Interceptors from 1946-basically 1949, although some stuck in until 1950 in Regular Service. They were basically the only piston-engined fighters that could intercept an incoming B-29 or Tu-4 with the radar warning available at the time. Meanwhile, there were a lot of D models, and spares for them, in the boneyards, so they stayed around as well, both in the U.S. and overseas, and made up about half of the Fighter Squadrons of the newly forming Air National Guard.
 
Practical speed for 8th AF missions was at slowest speed the old boys could keep up - namely 150-155IAS at 25K, B-24 comparables were 170 TAS at 22K.
All due respect, but, since the fundamental answer to all aviation questions is "That Depends", I think that the B-24 number you're quoting is a bit optimistic - Just as with the B-17, or any other airplane, the book numbers are put together by tests of a limited number of airplanes, with some fudge factors thrown in, and the performance of individual airplanes varies Given that 170 IAS is the standard book number, I think that 160-165ish IAS is a more likely number, and for both airplanes could be high.
It makes a difference if you were trying to organize multiple formations of -17s and -24s, but as far as the FlaK and fighters are concerned, not so much.
 
All due respect, but, since the fundamental answer to all aviation questions is "That Depends", I think that the B-24 number you're quoting is a bit optimistic - Just as with the B-17, or any other airplane, the book numbers are put together by tests of a limited number of airplanes, with some fudge factors thrown in, and the performance of individual airplanes varies Given that 170 IAS is the standard book number, I think that 160-165ish IAS is a more likely number, and for both airplanes could be high.
It makes a difference if you were trying to organize multiple formations of -17s and -24s, but as far as the FlaK and fighters are concerned, not so much.
I agree the general 'that depends' but I am referencing many personal interviews with former 9th AF Bomb Group commanders while researching two of my books, including Paul Tibbets, Dale R. Smith and Dewayne "Ben" Bennet (384th), Budd Peaslee (384th, 1st SF). John Brooks (389th BG, 2nd SF), Allison Brooks (401st BG, 1st SF).

I wrote an in depth article regarding the April 24th 1944 mission for 1st BD attack on Munich area targets in which the limitations of maximum cruise were highlighted in the ill fated losses of 384th BG in CBW 41B due to inability to maintain 158mph TAS to catch up on LH turns (they were in once tried echelon left formation on RH side to maximize forward firepower of CBW 41A and 41B in lead of 1st TF). Mike Williams has the first draft in spitfireperformance.com. The final is in Our Might Always.

150mph IAS was the 'rule' but not the absolute, based on the multitude of airframes with nearly worn out engines on specific missions.
 
Final acceptances,
Apr-45, B-26
Jun-46, P-63C, B-24, C-54E
Jul-45, P-47D, P-61B, P-63E, B-17, A-26C
Aug-45, FM-2, P-38, P-51D, B-25, B-32, A-26B, F-2B, F-6D, C-45F, AT-6F, L-4, L-5, CG-4A
Sep-45, B-29B, PBY-6A, TBM-3, TBY-2, SC-1, C-46F, C-54D, C-64A (US financed), C-69, JRF-5, RA-6
Oct-45, F6F-5, B-29, PB4Y-2, SB2C-5, J2F-6, RA-6A
Nov-45, F6F-5N, P-51H, C-47B
Dec-45, P-47N, PV-2, PV-2D, RY-3
Jan-46, F7F-3, P-61C, C-54G
Feb-46
Mar-46, P-82B (P-82E began acceptances in September 1947)
Apr-46, RP-63G
May-46
Jun-46, F7F-3N, B-29A, PQ-14 (for USN)
Jul-46
Aug-46
Sep-46
Oct-46
Nov-46, F7F-4N

F8F-1/-1B continued into 1947, F8F-2 into 1949
F4U-4 continued into 1947, then came the -5, -7 and the AU-1 through until Q3/1952.
C-82A production began in June 1945
Small numbers of H-5/R-5 variants accepted 1945 until October 1946

V-1650 production ended in November 1945, wartime V-1710 in September 1945, except for 1 in November.

For the British the last Stirling Bomber in October 1944, Halifax Bomber November 1945, Lancaster in January 1946, plus 1 laggard in June 1946. Wellington October 1945. Lincoln production started in December 1944, continuing until August 1949. Stirling transport production ended in December 1945, Halifax transport/paratroop version November 1946, Lancastrian March 1947.
 

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