P-38 or P-47 for Strafing (1 Viewer)

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Although it would be difficult to quantify, accuracy is an important factor. If the P-38 was a more accurate bomber less sorties would be required for the same result. This would somewhat mitigate the loss rate.
If it takes 1/2 the sorties to destroy the target you can afford twice the loss rate. Further benefits accrue to a lower logistics footprint.
Of course, I can't resist going off topic by taking a dig at the B-24 which a much less accurate bomber than the B-17.
 
Wasn't the 14th withdrawn from combat for some months early in 1943 due to unsustainable losses?
 
Given that they built only nineteen of the QF6 pounder (57mm) cannon Mosquitos, it clearly was not perceived as a success. They preferred the 60lb rockets.
 
Given that they built only nineteen of the QF6 pounder (57mm) cannon Mosquitos, it clearly was not perceived as a success. They preferred the 60lb rockets.
As I noted in an earlier post, the 17 (not 19) Mk.XVIII were built in small batches of 2 or 3 airframes at a time, between Sept 1943 and Jan 1945. And they remained in squadron service from Oct 1943 until the end of the war. The modifications to the aircraft were extensive to withstand the shock of the gun's recoil. A lot of armour plate was added around the nose and engines, adding to aircraft weight and affecting performance. So they were very much a niche aircraft.

And it reduced the flexibility of the Mosquito. The gun took up so much space in the belly that there was no space for bombs or fuel aft of the gun as in a normal FB.VI. They always seem to have flown with 50 gal drop tanks on the wings, so no bomb / rocket carriage there.

In squadron service they had to be flown by specially trained crews, and the attack profiles called for very accurate flying to get the rounds on target. But on each attack run it was generally only possible to get about 5 rounds off on each firing pass, such was the closing speed on the target. Tse Tse were generally accompanied by other flak suppression aircraft while they made their runs. So the weapon worked well against isolated U-boats fighting it out on the surface in the Bay of Biscay where multiple attack runs could be made. That was what it was originally built for in 1943.

It didn't work so well in the kind of strikes practiced by the strike wings 1943-45 where the objective was to swamp a target, usually a convoy with multiple escorts, in a single.pass lasting 2-4 minutes, although they were used in such attacks. It is worthy of note that when withdrawn from 248 squadron at Banff in March 1945, the whole Tse Tse Flight was transferred to 254 squadron at North Coates specifically to target midget submarines being encountered along the Dutch coast.

The 3" rockets and their associated rails could be fitted to any FB.VI fitted with the appropriate wing strengthening strips on the production line I.e. most of them by 1944. 3" rockets didn't reach the Coastal Command Mosquito squadrons until after they moved to Banff in Sept 1944 (first rocket operations in Oct/Nov IIRC). And the initial fit precluded the use of drop tanks (4 rails on each wing) so limiting their range and ability to roam along the Norwegian coast. It wasn't until Feb 1945 that the 100 gal drop tank with 2 double tiered rocket rails on each wing was fitted after the Wing was withdrawn from action for a week or so to have the refit work carried out on the station by the squadron ground crews. The first operation in that configuration was flown on 7 March 1945.

So for more than half it's operational life the Tse Tse was not in competition with rocket equipped Mossies. And for another 6 months they operated alongside each other. So I don't think it was a perception that they were not a success. Given the small numbers in service at any one time (usually no more than approx 4) it would have been easy to drop them from service. But they didn't.

Edit:- trials with the FB.VI with rockets didn't take place until the end of Sept 1944. They proved successful and were quickly fitted to the Banff Wing Mossies who flew their first rocket equipped mission on 26 Oct 1944 after training on the local bombing ranges. Prior to that the call in Coastal Command had been for more Tse Tse.
 
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Wasn't the 14th withdrawn from combat for some months early in 1943 due to unsustainable losses?
Yes. Hence Barrett's phrase 'rebuild'. The losses were not so much the F or G model related faults but poor pilot training in type and poor combat tactics in theatre due to inexperience - no mentorship from 'previous' P-38 warriors. They were the first and tried to fight in horizontal, therby neutralizing the natural P-38 attributes of speed, acceleration and rate of climb.

Your earlier comments about 'accuracy' were sound. Hub Zemke noted that of the three top US Fighters he took into combat, the "P-38 was the best gun platform" and it also translated in dive/glide bombing accuracy as the airplane was significantly stable in Yaw due to prop rotation scheme. That said, he also stated that the P-51 was best for manueverability and range.

Only light forces on rudder required for both speed and throttle changes for P-38 whereas both the P-47 and P-51 required rudder feed and trim changes.
 
Thats the first time I have ever defended the P-38
 
Thats the first time I have ever defended the P-38
If I am truly objective, I would have to say my 'animosity' toward the P-38 was more irritation with Bodie's slavish devotion to the "P-38 didn't get a fair shake in ETO", coupled with "The P-38K w/Merlin - which would have solved every issue". Specifically he blamed lack of success in comparison to Merlin Mustang to politics.

To be fair I have to lay some of the blame for later arrival into ETO on not only P-38 acolytes such as Ben Kelsey and Oliver Echols at Wright Field, but also Gen Gordon Saville, Air Defense Directorate. The latter was also the officer in charge of aircraft type deployment priorities for AAF, and know to be 'less enthusiastic' about the British Project (my words) P-51. It was his decision, despite, having full envelope performance information in hand for P-51B-1-NA in June 1943, to allocate ALL P-51, P-51A, A-36 and P-51B to TAC. That is the reason that 354, 357 and 363FGs were destined for priority dispatch of P-51B for 9th AF. Even the 339th FG was trained in P-39 and was originally tasked for TAC in mid 1943.

IMO, the importance of 8th AF as roadmap for USAF, the disappointment in the results achieved on destruction of LW industry by mid 1943; the apparent shock of Blitz Week losses, followed by Tidal Wave, followed by Schweinfurt-Regensburg; and the seeming indifference of Directorate- Air Defense and Materiel Command on the P-51B promise of LR escort, were the dominating factors that caused Arnold to 're-evaluate'his attatchments to long professional associates - both Echols and Eaker. He also exercised 'command authority' to 're-direct' P-38 and P-51B resources to ETO in August, 1943. Arnold is also documented as expressing concerns that P-38 was LR escort solution based on MTO experience with the type - versus s/e LW fighters..

In other words, the P-38 vs P-51B debate was amongst an 'extended Village' within AAF senior circles, not just Bodie vs Marshall.
 
The veterans association for the 449th BG (15th AF) published a couple of books of memories from the air and ground crews. From what I remember from reading my dad's books, they said that the Romanian air force was pretty much finished off during the 4/4/44 raid on Ploesti; the Luftwaffe took up some of the slack, but most of the threat after that was from the anti-aircraft batteries.
 
The whole posting was very informative. The following has been posted before on other threads so apologies for those who may remember it.

My son once had a German girlfriend whose father was on the small escort ships in the German navy. He told my son that they hated the big gun mosquitos as it seemed personal. They would know if the aircraft was targeting the bridge, a group of defensive guns, whatever, because they knew that the target was almost certainly going to get hit. Interestingly the Germans recognised that the rocket armed aircraft were the real danger to the ship, but they hated the 'big gun' mosquito's more.
 
A little story. After my Dad retired in 1986, he had a neighbor who flew in the ETO. He was assigned to the first Mustang group in the 9AF. after about 6 weeks on operations they came looking for pilots for a TAF P-47 group. He was the only pilot to volunteer! All his buddies said "what are you doing, we're flying the P-51!" He told them if he was going to be flying ground attack, he wanted to be in the P-47! He had pictures in his den of 3 shot up P-47's that he belly landed back at his home base. He comment was that if any had been a Mustang, he would have been a POW. Or worse. He had flown Mustangs, Thunderbolts and Lightning's so I asked which of the three was his favorite to fly. He said that the P-38L with the dive flaps and boosted ailerons was hands down, the "most fun to throw about the sky"
 
Even transferring at 6 weeks ops (approx Jan 15, 1944) TAC wasn't tasked to fly CAS or low level attack until just before D-Day in mid May. So instead of fighting the LW over Berlin he flew Jugs in shorter range penetration/withdrawal escort. Missions. The 354th FG didn't fly that many CAS in Mustangs, much more B-26/A-26 escort medium range until assigned P-47 for two months, spanning the Bulge ops December/January. Then 354th got Mustangs again and finished with medium bomber escort and tactical sweeps.
 
I don't know when he joined the 354th group. I believe it was already operational in the ETO when he got there.
 
I talked to him in about 1994 before my father died. I don't remember his name. His story on how he got assigned to go overseas was remarkable. I had a delightful 3 hours sitting in his den.
 
Hello, was it mentioned if the 20mm gun was kept for a total of 3x .60 + 1x 20mm or was the armament just 3x .60 cal?
 
The P-38L strafer had eight .50 cal. MGs in the nose (and two .50s in each wing pod).
Since space in the nose is limited, the 20mm cannon was omitted.
Ah, I meant the one special testbed for the 0.60 cal guns, not the one with 8 .50 cals. But following this line of thought, would there be enough space in the nose for a 20mm cannon after installing 3 .60 cal guns?
 
Ah, I meant the one special testbed for the 0.60 cal guns, not the one with 8 .50 cals. But following this line of thought, would there be enough space in the nose for a 20mm cannon after installing 3 .60 cal guns?
Ohhh, the .60 HMG, my bad!

The T17 family of machine guns were much larger than the AN/M2 .50 MG, so three .60 HMGs would have most likely been the practical limit, considering their size and the need for ammunition bins.
 
Ah, I meant the one special testbed for the 0.60 cal guns, not the one with 8 .50 cals. But following this line of thought, would there be enough space in the nose for a 20mm cannon after installing 3 .60 cal guns?
Very likely there would not be room.
One of the .60 cal cartridges.

It makes the .50 cal look like toy. It was later necked down to make the 20mm round used in the 20mm Vulcan gun.
Each .60 cal machine gun was as big (or bigger) than a 20mm Hispano.
 

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