P-39 vs P-40

[varsity07840]

I think the actual truth is somewhere between the two extremes.

For example I have never seen any evidence of the part of the trope that says the P-40 was designed for low altitude and/or ground attack.

There is plenty of circumstantial evidence to the contrary. like the fact that the Army had switched to air cooled engines on all it's purpose built attack planes back in the early 30s and later the A-36 was the only Army plane with an Attack designation to see production (and that was a trick to get around a funding restriction).
Also the fact that armament of the initial P-40 prototype was rather unsuited to ground attack, standard army ground attack planes in the 1930s carried four .30 cal guns for strafing, two synchronized .50 cal guns with just 200rpg (on the prototype) is not very good for strafing. Bomb load is iffy, some sources (most) say none and some say up to six 20lb bombs which is laughable considering the bomb loads of the P-26 Peashooter and the P-35. Army went backwards in it's "ground attack" fighter?
3rd fact. The XP-40 (and all the long nose P-40s) were fitted with the highest altitude engine Allison had in production at the time, over 1000 P-40s being built before the 3rd YP-38 is built so there is no ready to go turbo installation (and early P-38s, B-17s and P-43s had plenty of trouble with the turbo installation).

AS to maneuverability. The P-36 was noted as being very maneuverable with effective and well coordinated controls. There is no reason to believe that changing the engine should change that to any great degree. Increasing the wing loading will affect stall speed and thus turning ability to some extent but roll response, rudder authority (except what may be needed to counteract long nose) and elevator effectiveness should be pretty close. The is plenty of anecdotal evidence to suggest the P-40 was as manuravable as plane of it's size and wing loading could be. There are no reports of ineffective alleirons at speed ( at least not to the extent that some other planes have. ) See http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/naca868-rollchart.jpg
Which shows the P-40F (and there is no reason to believe the other P-40s were much different as there is little or no mention of changes to the Ailerons between models) was among the better rolling aircraft. The chart does have few flaws or lapses like the Spitfire as with the Spitfire to cover ALL models you would need at least 4 curves and not 2. I am guessing that the Spitfire "normal wing" is with the metal ailerons and not the earlier fabric covered ones.

However "maneuverability" or sluggishness can cover a range of altitudes or conditions, so pilots comments are both subjective and often not well detailed.
The P-40 was actually pretty sleek (as were the P-39 and Allison P-51s) and could go as fast or faster than some other aircraft (SPitfires and 109s ) on the same power while weighing hundreds if not over a thousand pounds more. The problem starts coming in once you are several thousand feet above the critical altitude of the engine (FTH). The American planes are still fast but any maneuver is going to bleed off speed ( it will bleed pretty much the same speed of any opponent doing the same thing.) ANd once speed has bled off it takes the heavier American planes longer to recover the speed, or in some cases due to lower power weight ratios the engine cannot enough extra energy to the plane to keep from losing speed faster than another plane in the same maneuver and winding up slower at the end of the maneuver even if starting at the same or similar speed.
Rate of climb is a good (but not perfect) indicator of the excess energy available for maneuvering at a given altitude.
A pilot trying to intercept Japanese bombers at over 20,000ft may complain that his P-40 was sluggish or didn't maneuver well, but what is he really saying? The plane may eventually reach a high level speed but an 8000lb plane with only 700-750hp available may not accelerate like a 6000lb plane with the same amount of power.
the lighter plane may be able to perform a gentile turn (under 2 Gs) without losing speed or altitude that the P-40 cannot follow. Or the lighter plane can turn and climb at the same time and the P-40 can either turn or climb at the same speed but not both.
Now please note the P-40 may be able to trade speed for a high turn rate for limited amount of time and get into a position to fire or break from a plane on his tail but at teh cost of having to either dive to regain speed or fly straight and level while he builds speed up again.

A P-40 at low altitude (lets say under 5000 where it can really use the over boost) may have a power to weight advantage over some other planes or opponents despite the extra weight and may be able to turn with them without losing speed as the engine at 1400-1500hp may be able to replace the energy used up in the turning maneuver. Our low altitude pilot may read the comment of the high altitude pilot and, having never tried to fight at 22-25,000ft in the P-40 may think the high altitude pilot has rocks in his head.

An F4F was slower than a P-40 but once you get several thousand feet above 20,000ft the F4F had more power despite similar weight and higher drag. It's relative performance to the P-40 changed from the lower altitudes.

This was the advantage of P-40F vs the E or the K. Hundreds more HP at 20,000ft and above in a similar weight/drag airplane allowed not only better speed but the ability to maneuver without losing as much speed, It allowed the P-40F to fight at the higher altitudes and stay there vs having to dive away to regain speed/energy.

As to the Bomber mafia this may be another trope. The Army had only ordered 38 B-17s in all of 1939 (when they ordered over 500 P-40s) and only ordered another 42 B-17Ds in early 1940 and ordered the B-17E in Aug of 1940. First B-17E flew in Sept of 1941 which is after the prototype P-40F with Merlin engine (Supplied by the British as Packard was not yet in production).
At this stage of aviation technology (100/100 fuel for one thing) there was no possibility of a single engine fighter being able to escort the B-17 to the reaches of it's range. These early B-17s being rated to carry 4000lbs of bombs over 2400 miles.
Disliking the P-40 because it could not escort the B-17 seems a bit much as nothing the army even had on the drawing boards (let alone in prototype form) could perform the escort mission.
Please remember that in 1940 there was only 1 YP-38 and while it could carry 400 gallons internal for it's two engines (no self sealing tanks) it wasn't planned or plumbed for drop tanks. Therefor no possibility of escorting B-17s even as escorting was understood in 1940.

yes there is plenty of misinformation about the P-40 in print and on the web.

I would say the Army didn't hate the P-40 in the beginning but rather viewed it as an interim fighter to bridge the gap while they developed the planes they really wanted (even if they didn't really know what they were yet) See , P-43--P-44--P47 saga and see P-47A vs P-47B. they were still holding out hope that they could power something with the Continental IV-1430

In Bill Bartch's book Doomed At The Start, a 24th PG P-40 pilot described one of the few practice interceptions of B-17s done prior to the war. In essence he said that they were able to make one pass at them and then the B-17s ran away from them. I think it's safe to assume that the P-40s were already at the B-17's altitude, mimicking an interception with adequate early warning. The key word in your comments above is acceleration, especially when the P-40 is operating above 12,000 to 15,000 feet. Higher maximum speed than say, a Ki-43 or A6M is not worth much if it takes all day to get from cruising speed up to combat speed.

 

[Schweik]

I don't disagree with most of that except the part about the influence of the Bomber Mafia.

I do agree that the P-40F / L -- and maybe the lightened N, were the only models that could really fight and maneuver at 20,000 ft which is why that was the variant they used against the Germans in the Med. For the Russians it didn't matter, in the Pacific and CBI they could make hit and run attacks at higher altitudes and safely dive away in single aircraft or pairs or flights of four, because the Japanese didn't have many planes that could catch them in a dive.

I think the USAAF first became aware that the altitude limitations with the Allison Engines were going to be a serious problem during the Battle of Britain and shortly afterward when the English decided to send all their P-40s to the Middle East. This was sharpened in early 1942 when problems intercepting bombers manifested so obviously in the Pacific. The P-40F did improve the situation a lot but not enough to escort high flying bombers, which is why they put so much effort into the turbocharged P-38 and P-43 / P-47 in spite of their long teething problems and development cycles.

But by the second quarter of 1942 it is quite clear that bomber escort, and specifically high altitude bomber escort was the plan and "Bomber Mafia" were ascendant. Doolittle was part of the Bomber Mafia and even though it was a low-level raid, his propaganda success with the Tokyo raid, along with English problems doing revenge bombing of Germany in daylight, and the billions of dollars spent on the Norden bomb sight were all shifting the focus (and dreams) of USAAF leadership toward what would become the high altitude heavy bomber campaign, and against anything that didn't fit neatly into that plan. This is in part why the decision was made to stop making P-40F/L and their Merlin XX type engines and start heavily ramping up Merlin 60 series Packards.

The early / Allison Engined mustang incidentally was a good example of my point that speed doesn't make the fighter. The P-51A, Mustang I and Mustang II were much faster than any production version P-40, but apparently in part due to problems with the ailerons, they were not particularly good fighters. Much worse than the P-40. They did actually have a need for a high-speed bomber in the A-36, which was in a way the Anglo-American answer to the Fw 190, and it was used fairly heavily in later 1943 and 1944 especially in and around Italy, mainly but problems with dive brakes and high combat losses gradually ended the career of that bomber. The British employed it in their own narrow (but useful) Tac-R and intruder niche with success I think to the end of the war. But it had limited utility.

The Anglo-American hybrid P-51B/C and later D / K etc. series with the Merlin 60 engines turned out to be the real solution to the dreams of the Bomber Mafia, but also fortuitously for the Allies, useful and highly effective in just about every Theater of the War. Better than any P-40 no doubt, which is to be expected as it was a much later innovation. Quite capable of catching and destroying naughty Fw 190s among other things.

 

[Schweik]

In Bill Bartch's book Doomed At The Start, a 24th PG P-40 pilot described one of the few practice interceptions of B-17s done prior to the war. In essence he said that they were able to make one pass at them and then the B-17s ran away from them. I think it's safe to assume that the P-40s were already at the B-17's altitude, mimicking an interception with adequate early warning. The key word in your comments above is acceleration, especially when the P-40 is operating above 12,000 to 15,000 feet. Higher maximum speed than say, a Ki-43 or A6M is not worth much if it takes all day to get from cruising speed up to combat speed.

It was certainly a major problem, but due to the slow speed and considerably lower operating altitude of the Japanese bombers like the G4M and Ki-21 (compared to a B-17), and the altitude performance limitations of the Ki-43 and the Zero (the A6M2 had a critical altitude of about 18,000') they were able to apparently make multiple passes in flights of four and shoot down considerable numbers of the bombers -even with novice pilots new to the type- and in spite of anemic altitude performance. The dive speed and lower altitude performance of the P-40 helped alleviate the problem - if the escorts chased them down they could turn the tables once they got down about 5,000 feet.

I've posted this article twice to this thread already but it is worth posting again as it's a good analysis of how this was done.

The USAAF 49th Fighter Group over Darwin: a forgotten campaign | The Strategist

However it is worth noting that this kind of tactic wasn't really possible against German or Italian fighters as they were too fast and could also dive well. But in the Med higher altitude level bombing wasn't as common, (most bombing was at lower altitudes) and they eventually had the Merlin P-40s which were fine up to roughly 28,000 feet and also P-38s and Spitfires.

 

[Dan Fahey]

I don't disagree with most of that except the part about the influence of the Bomber Mafia.

I do agree that the P-40F / L -- and maybe the lightened N, were the only models that could really fight and maneuver at 20,000 ft which is why that was the variant they used against the Germans in the Med. For the Russians it didn't matter, in the Pacific and CBI they could make hit and run attacks at higher altitudes and safely dive away in single aircraft or pairs or flights of four, because the Japanese didn't have many planes that could catch them in a dive.

I think the USAAF first became aware that the altitude limitations with the Allison Engines were going to be a serious problem during the Battle of Britain and shortly afterward when the English decided to send all their P-40s to the Middle East. This was sharpened in early 1942 when problems intercepting bombers manifested so obviously in the Pacific. The P-40F did improve the situation a lot but not enough to escort high flying bombers, which is why they put so much effort into the turbocharged P-38 and P-43 / P-47 in spite of their long teething problems and development cycles.

But by the second quarter of 1942 it is quite clear that bomber escort, and specifically high altitude bomber escort was the plan and "Bomber Mafia" were ascendant. Doolittle was part of the Bomber Mafia and even though it was a low-level raid, his propaganda success with the Tokyo raid, along with English problems doing revenge bombing of Germany in daylight, and the billions of dollars spent on the Norden bomb sight were all shifting the focus (and dreams) of USAAF leadership toward what would become the high altitude heavy bomber campaign, and against anything that didn't fit neatly into that plan. This is in part why the decision was made to stop making P-40F/L and their Merlin XX type engines and start heavily ramping up Merlin 60 series Packards.

The early / Allison Engined mustang incidentally was a good example of my point that speed doesn't make the fighter. The P-51A, Mustang I and Mustang II were much faster than any production version P-40, but apparently in part due to problems with the ailerons, they were not particularly good fighters. Much worse than the P-40. They did actually have a need for a high-speed bomber in the A-36, which was in a way the Anglo-American answer to the Fw 190, and it was used fairly heavily in later 1943 and 1944 especially in and around Italy, mainly but problems with dive brakes and high combat losses gradually ended the career of that bomber. The British employed it in their own narrow (but useful) Tac-R and intruder niche with success I think to the end of the war. But it had limited utility.

The Anglo-American hybrid P-51B/C and later D / K etc. series with the Merlin 60 engines turned out to be the real solution to the dreams of the Bomber Mafia, but also fortuitously for the Allies, useful and highly effective in just about every Theater of the War. Better than any P-40 no doubt, which is to be expected as it was a much later innovation. Quite capable of catching and destroying naughty Fw 190s among other things.

Problems with the A36 Dive Brakes is a Myth!
Someone state side made that claim and to wire the Dive Brakes Shut. That was not the issue in use. They pilots had no problems with the Dive Brakes.

As for high losses....177 were lost to all causes but the amount of damage and havoc they produced was huge.
Almost all the losses were from AA and ground fire.
Air to Air they had a nice kill ratio.

The British loved the P51-A's and very fast at low -medium altitude with the -81 Allison.
They were more rugged than the Merlin and the Brits fixed up and held on to the few that were produced to the end of WW2.

 

[Schweik]

Problems with the A36 Dive Brakes is a Myth!
Someone state side made that claim and to wire the Dive Brakes Shut. That was not the issue in use. They pilots had no problems with the Dive Brakes.

As for high losses....177 were lost to all causes but the amount of damage and havoc they produced was huge.
Almost all the losses were from AA and ground fire.
Air to Air they had a nice kill ratio.

The British loved the P51-A's and very fast at low -medium altitude with the -81 Allison.
They were more rugged than the Merlin and the Brits fixed up and held on to the few that were produced to the end of WW2.

Mediterranean Air War Vol IV mentions several incidents of A-36 lost to 'wings falling off in a dive' and etc., if you want I can get you the exact dates etc.

I do think they were effective as bombers (and played a useful role) & heavy casualties are normal for Tactical bombers but their retirement seems to have been directly linked to those incidents.

 

[Shortround6]

I don't disagree with most of that except the part about the influence of the Bomber Mafia.

In what way did the "Bomber Mafia" hate the P-40 or work to downplay the P-40s abilities or reputation?

Just curious here as I have not really seen this mentioned.

I think the USAAF first became aware that the altitude limitations with the Allison Engines were going to be a serious problem during the Battle of Britain and shortly afterward when the English decided to send all their P-40s to the Middle East. This was sharpened in early 1942 when problems intercepting bombers manifested so obviously in the Pacific. The P-40F did improve the situation a lot but not enough to escort high flying bombers, which is why they put so much effort into the turbocharged P-38 and P-43 / P-47 in spite of their long teething problems and development cycles.

The Army was aware (or should have been) of the altitude limitations of the Allison engine in late 1938 and early 1939. It is why the XP-39 was originally built with a turbo, the XP-38 had turbos. At the 1939 fighter trials there were two Seversky fighters, one with a turbo (led to the P-43) and one with a two stage supercharged R-1830, an early model of the engine used in the F4F, there was also a Curtiss Hawk 75 with a two stage supercharger (accounts differ as to mechanical or turbo). The British were making no secret about the FTH of the Merlin III engine and indeed had announced the two speed Merlin X engine including tentative power ratings on 100 octane fuel at the 1938 Paris Air show. During the BoB (Sept 1940) the Army ordered 773 P-47B&C fighters with turbos.
The first flight of the XP-40F (P-40D serial number 40-360)which was fitted with a Merlin engine and first flew on June 30th 1941 which is 8-9 months before the P-40Es were having trouble intercepting Japanese bombers over Darwin. The Problem was shifting from what to do with the 3000 Merlin engines The US got from the first contract with Packard to getting enough Merlins quick enough. When the Packard factory was set up the contract called for 800 engines per month. If two thirds go to the British that leaves 266 engines a month for the Americans. It took Packard until July of 1942 to reach the 800 engine a month production rate (May saw 602 engine built).

For the Russians it didn't matter, in the Pacific and CBI they could make hit and run attacks at higher altitudes and safely dive away in single aircraft or pairs or flights of four, because the Japanese didn't have many planes that could catch them in a dive.

This is more a failure of Japanese development/production than any great virtue of the P-40 or other allied fighters. The Japanese were slow and late in developing the Ki 61 and while nine Ki 44 were deployed in an experimental unit in Indochina in Dec of 1941 but the Japanese put it on the back burner and then held some of the early production in the Japanese homelands after the Doolittle raid. The P-40 may well have out dived both of these aircraft but the difference in dive capability over the more common Japanese fighters would have been much less marked.
However it points out the fallacy that many aircraft were designed in response to the deployment of an enemy fighter. Given the design/test/tool up cycle of around two years (if you are both lucky and good) the best that could be done was to tweak existing designs.

But by the second quarter of 1942 it is quite clear that bomber escort, and specifically high altitude bomber escort was the plan and "Bomber Mafia" were ascendant. Doolittle was part of the Bomber Mafia and even though it was a low-level raid, his propaganda success with the Tokyo raid, along with English problems doing revenge bombing of Germany in daylight, and the billions of dollars spent on the Norden bomb sight were all shifting the focus (and dreams) of USAAF leadership toward what would become the high altitude heavy bomber campaign, and against anything that didn't fit neatly into that plan. This is in part why the decision was made to stop making P-40F/L and their Merlin XX type engines and start heavily ramping up Merlin 60 series Packards.

I believe your timeline is a bit out of whack. Do you have anything to show that in the 2nd quarter of 1942 (April-June) "high altitude bomber escort was the plan" or how the "Bomber Mafia" were ascendant, affected the versions of the P-40 being produceed in the 2nd half of 1942 or the first 1/2 of 1943?
The Fisher P-75 was started in April of 1942 in response to an Army request for proposal issued in Feb 1942 but the initial request proposal, while it wanted long range, was not specifically intended as a escort fighter. That requirement was added until July 1943 when the US Army added six additional prototypes.
If the Army was planning on long range escorts in the 2nd quarter of 1942 they certainly dropped the ball because they didn't come up with workable high altitude drop tanks for well over a year and the Mustang didn't get them for a year and half.
I would also note that Packard didn't stopped making single stage Merlins until Dec 44/Jan 45. In the 24 months of 1943/44 Packard production of single stage merlins was over 800 engines a month for 13 of those months. Peak monthly Packard production (in 1944) was over 2400 engines of both types combined but that required an expansion of the factory over the 800 engine a month size. Packard built almost 27,000 single stage Merlins by the end of 1944 and over 18,500 two stage Merlins.
Now maybe a few hundred more P-40L would have done more for the allies than a few hundred Canadian built Hurricanes.

They did actually have a need for a high-speed bomber in the A-36, which was in a way the Anglo-American answer to the Fw 190, and it was used fairly heavily in later 1943 and 1944 especially in and around Italy, mainly but problems with dive brakes and high combat losses gradually ended the career of that bomber. The British employed it in their own narrow (but useful) Tac-R and intruder niche with success I think to the end of the war. But it had limited utility.

The A-36 was not intended to be a high speed bomber or Anglo-American answer to the Fw 190. Jabo.
As evidenced by the large dive brakes. dive brakes and high speed low altitude flight don't really go together.
The A-36 was really a funding trick, In the Spring of 1942 the US was finally discovering that the Allison Mustang was a pretty good airplane even as it was. however contracts were winding down and the Army had already spent all of the money allocated to the for fighters. There was money left over (unspent) for attack aircraft however. So a quicky requirement and contract was put out in April of 1942 for the single seat dive bomber, work started in June and the first plane came off the line Oct. It was a way to keep the production line going until the funds for the next fiscal year became available. Once they started putting Merlins in test airframes in Aug of 1942 there was never any intention of ordering more A-36s that I know of. Possible?

Production considerations often affected what was ordered and when and not back room conspiracies.
Allison was constantly expanding their engineering staff but the Army was also requesting all kinds of experiential stuff or diverting effort into the V-2320 24 cylinder engine.
Allison tried using 9.60 supercharger gears like were used in the P-40M&N back in Dec of 1941 but the gears were too narrow and broke under under the strain. to use wider gears called for new casting molds for the crankcase to have a deeper housing for the gears. In the first few months after Pearl Harbor nobody wanted to reduce production of the existing design to change over. Allison was feeling their way in supercharger design as none of the American companies had very good superchargers at the beginning of the war.

edit changed KI 43 to Ki 44 in second response. The Ki 44 being sort of a failed opportunity for the Japanese to stay up to Western standards.

 

[Schweik]

Design and military requirements attempted to determine far in advance what was needed - then it was a matter of choosing what kept being produced, what was changed or tweaked, and what was dropped or changed to a different role or given to minor allies or whatever.

The reason for the emphasis on escort fighters started with the over $1 Billion (1940 dollars) spent on the Norden bombsight, a huge project which cost about half as much as the Manhattan project if that helps you understand the scale. The new bombers like the B-17 and B-24, most of the medium bombers and even light bombers like TBF Avengers were already being fitted with the device, 50,000 bombardiers were trained to use it. Huge security measures are implemented to protect the secret machines.

Bombing in Northwest Europe had already long prior 1942 shifting into large scale level bombing. The British had however (mostly) given up on precision daylight bombing and issued the "Area Bombing Directive" in Feb 1942, shifting into using bombers a kind of attrition warfare and to just burn down cities at night since that was about all they could manage. The first thousand bomber raid was sent to Cologne in May of 1942.The Americans and specifically the Bomber Mafia still believed in daylight bombing but it was starting to become clear that daylight bombers would need escorts, despite the faith many still had in the defensive guns of the B-17. To quote the wiki I just linked "The ACTS {i.e. bomber mafia] officers who believed in the heavy bomber doctrine realized that any other Air Corps expenditures such as for tactical bombers and fighter aircraft would take away from the proposed large fleet of heavy bombers." Fighters that fit into the plan, potentially, were perceived as more valuable of course. There were B-17 squadrons operating from England from Sept 1942. It took a little while for the Germans to ramp up their activity and it wasn't until mid 1943 that they stopped sending un-escorted raids altogether, but the writing was on the wall from early days, and everybody knew Spitfires didn't have the range.

In the Pacific the issue wasn't so much altitude as range. Existing fighters like the P-40 were too short legged. The P-38 was considered better for long range escorts, with the added benefit of a second engine for those long over-water flights. The P-51 despite it's single engine was ideal when it arrived of course but that came much later. Eventually in the Pacific they got the B-29 which could fly high and fast enough to drop bombs in spite of interceptors.


The Ki-44 was actually used in some numbers and was a little more successful than the shorthand about it tends to suggest, but they just didn't have powerful enough engines yet so it was only competitive rather than dominant. The Ki-61 was a promising design, certainly comparable to the P-40 in many respects and better at altitude, (it was in part intended specifically as P-40 remedy) but the challenges of keeping a license built version of a DB 601 working properly in an open field camp in some place like Rabaul and Wewak, New Guinea were beyond the capabilities of Japanese forward area mechanics. The plane itself was also somewhat complicated to maintain aside from the engines.

I'm not sure even German mechanics could have kept those engines running in a place like this

S

 

[Schweik]

This quote by P-40 double Ace Robert DeHaven explains the context for the P-40 pretty well:

"If you flew wisely, the P-40 was a very capable aircraft. [It] could outturn a P-38, a fact that some pilots didn't realize when they made the transition between the two aircraft. [...] The real problem with it was lack of range. As we pushed the Japanese back, P-40 pilots were slowly left out of the war. So when I moved to P-38s, an excellent aircraft, I did not [believe] that the P-40 was an inferior fighter, but because I knew the P-38 would allow us to reach the enemy. I was a fighter pilot and that was what I was supposed to do. " Source

 

[Kevin J]

Lets look at this another way. The P-40, just under 7000 operated by USAAF, 2250 victories. P-39, about 5000, a few hundred. The P-47, 14000, 3500 v. The P-51, 12000, 5000 v. The P-38, 10000, 3850 v. So the P-40 achieved better results than the P-39 and P-47 and was operated in the most difficult phase of the war. The P-51 achieved the best results but was up against the least well trained opponents. The P-40 did pretty good. Maybe if the Americans had spent the time the Russians did resolving the Cobra's faults and developing suitable air battle tactics before committing it to battle then they would have done just as well. The P-47 was too busy dropping bombs to score lots more aerial victories as it dropped IIRC two/thirds the tonnage of bombs dropped by fighters.

 

[DarrenW]

...So when I moved to P-38s, an excellent aircraft, I did not [believe] that the P-40 was an inferior fighter, but because I knew the P-38 would allow us to reach the enemy. I was a fighter pilot and that was what I was supposed to do. "

This rates as one of my favorite fighter pilot quotes of all time!

 

[Schweik]

Lets look at this another way. The P-40, just under 7000 operated by USAAF, 2250 victories. P-39, about 5000, a few hundred. The P-47, 14000, 3500 v. The P-51, 12000, 5000 v. The P-38, 10000, 3850 v. So the P-40 achieved better results than the P-39 and P-47 and was operated in the most difficult phase of the war. The P-51 achieved the best results but was up against the least well trained opponents. The P-40 did pretty good. Maybe if the Americans had spent the time the Russians did resolving the Cobra's faults and developing suitable air battle tactics before committing it to battle then they would have done just as well.

Good post. Agreed 100%

So that breaks down to a production to claims rate of:

P-39 0.064
P-40 0.321
P-38 0.385
P-47 0.250
P-51 0.416

I think the Soviets were particularly suited for the Airacobra for the following reasons:

• The workup you mentioned that we now know they did for several months before deployment, allowing them to familiarize both pilots and planners with the aircraft.
• Many Russian pilots were already used to the 'tricky' handling characteristics of planes like the I-16, MiG-3, and LaGG-3, so the P-39 spin characteristics were not as intimidating.
• Russians liked heavy guns in the nose.
• Most Russian planes were similar - small, low drag, short wings
• So much of the combat took place at low altitude, and a short distance from the forward airfields.
• P-39 had the heavy gun, good build quality, and good radios unlike most Soviet fighters until fairly late in the war (early-mid 1943 for build quality, late 1943 I think for radios) so this made them similar to Soviet fighters but better in three important ways.

 

[varsity07840]

Design and military requirements attempted to determine far in advance what was needed - then it was a matter of choosing what kept being produced, what was changed or tweaked, and what was dropped or changed to a different role or given to minor allies or whatever.

The reason for the emphasis on escort fighters started with the over $1 Billion (1940 dollars) spent on the Norden bombsight, a huge project which cost about half as much as the Manhattan project if that helps you understand the scale. The new bombers like the B-17 and B-24, most of the medium bombers and even light bombers like TBF Avengers were already being fitted with the device, 50,000 bombardiers were trained to use it. Huge security measures are implemented to protect the secret machines.

Bombing in Northwest Europe had already long prior 1942 shifting into large scale level bombing. The British had however (mostly) given up on precision daylight bombing and issued the "Area Bombing Directive" in Feb 1942, shifting into using bombers a kind of attrition warfare and to just burn down cities at night since that was about all they could manage. The first thousand bomber raid was sent to Cologne in May of 1942.The Americans and specifically the Bomber Mafia still believed in daylight bombing but it was starting to become clear that daylight bombers would need escorts, despite the faith many still had in the defensive guns of the B-17. To quote the wiki I just linked "The ACTS {i.e. bomber mafia] officers who believed in the heavy bomber doctrine realized that any other Air Corps expenditures such as for tactical bombers and fighter aircraft would take away from the proposed large fleet of heavy bombers." Fighters that fit into the plan, potentially, were perceived as more valuable of course. There were B-17 squadrons operating from England from Sept 1942. It took a little while for the Germans to ramp up their activity and it wasn't until mid 1943 that they stopped sending un-escorted raids altogether, but the writing was on the wall from early days, and everybody knew Spitfires didn't have the range.

In the Pacific the issue wasn't so much altitude as range. Existing fighters like the P-40 were too short legged. The P-38 was considered better for long range escorts, with the added benefit of a second engine for those long over-water flights. The P-51 despite it's single engine was ideal when it arrived of course but that came much later. Eventually in the Pacific they got the B-29 which could fly high and fast enough to drop bombs in spite of interceptors.


The Ki-44 was actually used in some numbers and was a little more successful than the shorthand about it tends to suggest, but they just didn't have powerful enough engines yet so it was only competitive rather than dominant. The Ki-61 was a promising design, certainly comparable to the P-40 in many respects and better at altitude, (it was in part intended specifically as P-40 remedy) but the challenges of keeping a license built version of a DB 601 working properly in an open field camp in some place like Rabaul and Wewak, New Guinea were beyond the capabilities of Japanese forward area mechanics. The plane itself was also somewhat complicated to maintain aside from the engines.

I'm not sure even German mechanics could have kept those engines running in a place like this

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My understanding is that the Ki-44 came as quite a surprise to the 23rd FG and other 14th AF groups and caused a lot of problems for pilots flying P-40s, regardless of the model they were flying, K, M or N.

 

[Schweik]

My understanding is that the Ki-44 came as quite a surprise to the 23rd FG and other 14th AF groups and caused a lot of problems for pilots flying P-40s, regardless of the model they were flying, K, M or N.

I think that is correct initially until they realized they could out-turn it. But it was still a problem for 23rd FG etc. (and a similar problem for the Navy in the Philippines) because it meant you had two different strategies that had to be balanced, you couldn't dive from the Ki-44 and you couldn't turn with the Ki-43 or A6M. So if they were operating in a mixed group it could get dicey.

 

[michael rauls]

Lets look at this another way. The P-40, just under 7000 operated by USAAF, 2250 victories. P-39, about 5000, a few hundred. The P-47, 14000, 3500 v. The P-51, 12000, 5000 v. The P-38, 10000, 3850 v. So the P-40 achieved better results than the P-39 and P-47 and was operated in the most difficult phase of the war. The P-51 achieved the best results but was up against the least well trained opponents. The P-40 did pretty good. Maybe if the Americans had spent the time the Russians did resolving the Cobra's faults and developing suitable air battle tactics before committing it to battle then they would have done just as well.

Very interesting information. Never seen that before. The fact that the p38 was only a fraction behind the p51in victories per aircraft produced is not what I would have expected to see.

 

[eagledad]

Gentlemen,

Check this link to get a P-40 pilot's recollection of fighting Me-109s and FW-190s

Flying the P-40 against German fighters, from Capt. James Reed of the 33rd FG

Eagledad

 

[Stig1207]

Very interesting information. Never seen that before. The fact that the p38 was only a fraction behind the p51in victories per aircraft produced is not what I would have expected to see.

The victories are claims, and the production/ victories is dependant on the accuracy of the claims. The P-51 and P-47 scored the majority of their victories in the ETO in the late war period where the accuracy of claims was much higher; the P-38 only had some 4-500 claims in the ETO. The claiming accuracy was not of the same standard in the other theatres; so the comparison is is not entirely fair.

 

[michael rauls]

The victories are claims, and the production/ victories is dependant on the accuracy of the claims. The P-51 and P-47 scored the majority of their victories in the ETO in the late war period where the accuracy of claims was much higher; the P-38 only had some 4-500 claims in the ETO. The claiming accuracy was not of the same standard in the other theatres; so the comparison is is not entirely fair.

Interesting. However, my memory is a little fuzzy here so forgive me if im wrong but didn't the 8th air force allow ground kills to be added to totals. I seem to remember iether they were the only air force to do this or alowed it before others not sure which. If so this would seem to more than balance out any confirmation standards by theater.
As far as distribution of gun cameras the majority of p38s had them so I wouldn't think that would be a huge discrepancy.

 

[Schweik]

Interesting. However, my memory is a little fuzzy here so forgive me if I'm wrong but didn't the 8th Air Force allow ground kills to be added to totals. I seem to remember either they were the only air force to do this or allowed it before others not sure which. If so this would seem to more than balance out any confirmation standards by theater.
As far as distribution of gun cameras the majority of p38s had them so I wouldn't think that would be a huge discrepancy.

Yeah they were using gun cameras on Kittyhawks in the Med from late 1942 so I assume P-38s as well. They were also frequently able to recover crashed enemy aircraft in North Africa, Sicily and Italy to confirm victories.

 

[varsity07840]

Gentlemen,

Check this link to get a P-40 pilot's recollection of fighting Me-109s and FW-190s

Flying the P-40 against German fighters, from Capt. James Reed of the 33rd FG

Eagledad

A long time ago I read a comment by a P-40 pilot who flew in North Africa. I'm not sure what Group he flew with but I'm fairly confident that he was referring to Merlin powered P-40s. In essence he said that try as they might with all kinds of weight savings measures and the like, they couldn't turn a P-40 into a 109.

 

[Schweik]

A long time ago I read a comment by a P-40 pilot who flew in North Africa. I'm not sure what Group he flew with but I'm fairly confident that he was referring to Merlin powered P-40s. In essence he said that try as they might with all kinds of weight savings measures and the like, they couldn't turn a P-40 into a 109.

That is true and I'm sure a real quote - they never had the same (speed / altitude) performance, but they did have other advantages they could use.

Still I'm sure for fighter pilots they hated giving up the initiative and being attacked from above. Not as big a problem for the Merlin hawks since they were comfortable much higher up - but still a problem.

One thing that did happen though was that as the Bf 109s got faster, especially with the G-6 and later, they also got heavier and less agile. I think the G-6 took more losses than the F-4.