I have also read that Mr. Bell (Larry?) tried to persuade the USAAF to keep the turbocharger but didn't press the point since his company needed the money. It would have been nice if he continued testing/developing a model with the turbo on his own dime
Larry Bell ran his company a damn sight more conscientiously than Vaughn did Curtiss-Wright but he was nonetheless more bean-counter than engineer.
The P-39 really was a victim of 30s USAAC doctrine, bombers were regarded as the primary force in aviation, modest demands were placed on fighter design; the idea that fighters would routinely partake in high-altitude combat was not envisaged.
It wasn't just Bell, both Curtiss-Wright and Allison were ploughing ahead with their myopic, blinkered vision of what made a great fighter, completely lacking in adequate supercharging and no-one, not in the industry or the military found it remarkable. Allison, though a small company at the time (a division of General Motors) would not have come up with an engine so rigidly constrained by the standardised intregral mechanical power section if they hadn't believed they were on the proper course.
The Army eventually dropped its requirement for the turbocharger and even Bell saw this as a good move, solely for financial reasons; there was no hesitation in deleting the requirement from the planning or development process. The Army's outmoded views on fighter requirements had more or less infected the industry across the board and this would come back to hurt the USAAC in the early years of the war.
It's a great shame because the turbocharged P-39 would have been a match for the A6M and Bf109 at any altitude, in any climate or on any day of the week. Bell, Allison and the USAAC made the P-39 the mediocre fighter that it was but it was no different to events being played out a few hundred miles away where Curtiss-Wright were busy emasculating the P-40.